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**Bc. Markéta Zelinková**

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**Position of Austria to the Turkey's  
Enlargement of the EU**

**Vypracovala: Bc. Markéta Zelinková**

**Vedoucí diplomové práce: prof.PhDr. Vladimíra Dvořáková, CSc.**

**P r o h l á š e n í**

Prohlašuji, že diplomovou práci na téma Position of Austria to the Turkey's enlargement of the EU jsem vypracovala samostatně. Použitou literaturu a podkladové materiály uvádím v příloženém seznamu literatury a citacích.

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# Introduction

The diploma thesis presents an academic analysis of the Austrian position on the enlargement of the European Union by Turkey.

As a scholarship appointee I opted for a three-month government grant in Vienna. This is a partnership programme of Czech Ministry of Education and Bundesministerium Österreichs (Federal Government of Austria). As a scholar I was in a constant touch with politicians of the Foreign Ministry of Austria, Austrian Chamber of Commerce, various economic institutions such as the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW), Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP), Federal Ministry of Economic and Labour in Austria and European Commission based in Austria.

I benefited also from personal contacts and talks with some key persons involved in Turkey's question, Mag. PhD. Cengiz Günay, political scientist of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Dr Karl G. Doulík, representative of the European Commission in Austria, Franz Wessig, Co-ordinator for EU-Enlargement, Foreign Economic Relations with East and Southeast Europe at BMWA, Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour and Johannes Eigner Dr.iur., from Ministry for Foreign Affairs from Department EU- enlargement, Relations to the third countries.

I am also very appreciative of the help and guidance provided by my diploma thesis consultants and supervisors Professor Breuss from the Economic University of Vienna, Department – Europainstitut and prof. PhDr. Vladimíra Dvořáková, CSc. from the University of Economics in Prague.

My diploma thesis is based on following resources: books, dissertation thesis, study papers and internet resources. Turkey's question is broadly discussed in literature and a lot of sources can be found on this topic. I really appreciated the book of Lagro, E. and Jorgensen, K. - Turkey and the European Union. The advantage of this book is that it was published in the year 2007 and therefore deals with the current issues.

However, there are very few books which deal with the relation between Austria and Turkey. The ones I found most helpful, which directly analyse the position of Austria, are following: Ginnakopolous, A. – Die Türkei Debatte in Europa, Heinrich, G. – Die Türkei und die Europäische Union, Georgi, F. - The Politics of Adaptation and Integration in Austria. Nevertheless, those books are not the most recent ones and it was necessary to update the data. It

was also requisite to take into account the origin of the author of the book, as the objectivity was not always impeccable.

In Austrian official papers, Turkey is rarely mentioned. There is no official impact study on Austria concerning EU's enlargement by Turkey. Also the bilateral relations between Turkey and Austria are not described in the Austrian foreign policy program. Only one paragraph concerning Turkey can be found in this document.

As for study papers, I benefited from the materials which I obtained in the Austrian institutions. In this respect, the work of Austrian political scientist Ceniz Günay Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey relations was helpful. But also R. Baldwin, R., Widgren M.- The Impact of Turkey's membership on EU voting, Fritz Breuss - Erfahrungen mit der EU-Erweiterung, Havlik, P., Holzner, M.- Weathering the Global Storm, Costs and Labour Shortages were important, especially in the economic questions.

As for internet resources, at first I used ESI (European Stability Initiative) web, which is a non-profit research and policy institute that makes independent analysis of complex issues. The Turkish debate in Austria is one of their main concerns. Furthermore, I benefited from the materials of European Commission, especially from Turkey Progress Report, Turkey's Impact Study and also from the Eurobarometer, where positions of different countries on broad topics can be found.

However, Turkey's question in Austria is controversial largely due to the negative attitude towards Turkey and this in turn affects the discussion with Austrian politics and specialists. Furthermore, there is no single institute in Austria that analyses Turkey's question. The only relevant institution which makes surveys on the issue in Austria is the Turkish embassy, but obviously their results might not be completely objective.

As Austria belongs to one of the strongest opponents to the enlargement of the European Union by Turkey, I consider as very important to analyze this issue. The aim of this thesis is to explain the Austrian's attitude and the reasons for it. For this purpose, this thesis is divided into three main parts.

The first part will proceed from the character of Austria's foreign policy and its role in the European Union. The main focus will be on the Austrian's priorities, sensitive issues and attitude towards enlargement in general.

In the second part, the relations between Turkey and the European Union will be described. This part will examine if Turkey's rejection is limited to Austria or is more widespread and the reasons for this attitude. It will also determine what are the most problematic issues regarding Turkey's membership in the EU.

In the third part the Turkish debate in Austria will be described. It will go back to historical relations between Turkey and Austria and determine what are the main factors influencing the image of Turkey in Austria and the main reasons for the rejection of Turkey's accession into the EU. Furthermore, the main actors influencing this issue will be analyzed.



# 1. Austria's foreign policy

## 1.1. Austria's identity and political culture

The identity and political culture of Austria have essentially a much more complex structure than one would expect from a relatively small state. The complex sets of issues involved in the political processes not only influence the political culture of Austria but also shape Austrian foreign policy agenda and its outcomes. The main issues which constitute the pillars of Austrian identity are: the concept of neutrality after the Second World War and the concept of "Mitteleuropa" in the post cold war.

The turning point of reconstruction of Austrian identity was the period after the World War II. Thus, one important aspect of Austrian identity formation process was to come to terms with the Nazi past. This was reflected as victimization of Austria and took a long time for Austria to face the problems. In 1990s, these currents transformed into Austrian nationalism under the auspices of FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria).

The concept of neutrality accepted in 1955 carries significant messages for analyzing the current political stand of Austria in both its domestic and international affairs. The neutrality of Austria can have different meanings - from an instrument of strengthening the Austrian identity to the image of suitable mediator between the East and the West. The issue of neutrality has not been vigorously contested until the EU membership of Austria. After the beginning of this process, the neutrality was more carefully defined, especially towards the NATO and European Foreign and Security Policy. Today's concept of neutrality is far from being useful for Austria despite being rooted in the Austrian national identity.

The concept of "Mitteleuropa" is a part of Austrian history as well as part of its identity which was already present throughout the Cold War period. During the East Enlargement, this concept was put into practice when Austria used its past experiences stemming from her Habsburg legacy and played a role as a mediator between the East and the West by helping Central and Eastern European countries to prepare for alignment with Western Europe.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. LAGRO,E.: EU Enlargement and Transforming Paradigms of Political Identity in Individual Member States: Case of Austria, European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group on EU Politics, Third Pan European Conference, Istanbul, 21-23 September 2006, p. 6

Mediating was also the priority of the Austrian Council Presidency in 2006, which focused on promoting a more tolerant way of living together in the global village. For Austria, questions relating to the spreading of Islam and the growth of the Muslim representative organizations in Europe are of essential importance. A core element in this regard is the integration of the Muslim minority into the European model. In its approach to dialogue, Austria places great emphasis on the role of women and strengthening of their position, as well as involving young people in the dialogue.<sup>2</sup>

In this regard, Austria played an important role during mediating in the so-called “caricature dispute” which reached its climax during the Austrian presidency. To send out a signal of understanding, Federal Minister Ursula Plassnik invited the Danish Foreign Minister Per Sig Moller, the Danish Bishop of Lolland-Falster and the Grand Muftis of Syria and those of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a round table discussion in Vienna on 16 February 2006. At this high-level meeting possible ways of defusing the tensions and lending new impetus to the dialogue between the religions in Europe and between Europe and the Islamic world were explored. On 27 February, under the Austrian Council Presidency, the External Affairs Council of the EU adopted conclusions condemning violence and calling for respect for religious and other beliefs and convictions, mutual tolerance and respect for universal values.<sup>3</sup>

Another intention to give new impetus to the dialogue and better understanding between European countries and their Muslim communities under the Austrian presidency was the holding of the 2nd Conference of European Imams in Vienna. It was organized by the Islamic religious community in Austria with support from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the agenda at the three-day meeting was the issue of integration of Muslim communities into the European mainstream while maintaining European Muslims' identity, especially in regard to education, women, and youth issues. The final declaration clearly condemned all forms of fanaticism and extremism and proclaimed a commitment to diversity, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The conference met with positive responses the borders of Europe, especially in the Muslim world, and further strengthened Austria's reputation as a suitable venue for dialogue between Muslim authorities.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/foreign-policy-yearbook.html>, p.5

<sup>3</sup> Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/foreign-policy-yearbook.html>, , p.87

## 1.2. Austria's role in the EU

Austria's choice to stay outside the EU and join the EFTA (European Free Trade Area) was not lead by neutrality principle but by the complicated relations with Germany. Austria changed its attitude when other neutral states decided to join the EU. Austria finally became a full member in 1995. During the membership in the EU, Austria held two presidencies, the first one in 1998 and the second in 2006.

Austria belongs to sceptical countries within the EU. France and Austria are considered as to be the two most sceptical states in the EU as far as enlargement is concerned. Unlike the French, who are still traditionally "integrationist", are committed to the European Union and see enlargement as problematic if it comes at the expense of "deepening", the position of Austria is much more entrenched. Given Austria's geographical situation, enlargement greatly matters to the Austrian elites and to the Austrian population and it has become a major polarizing factor between political parties.<sup>5</sup>

One of the events which contributed to this negative stance was the election in 1999. After Schüssel's centre-right people's party, the ÖVP, formed a coalition with Jörg Haider's far right FPÖ in 2000, the EU has imposed political sanctions on Austria. Austria became the only member state that the EU has ever imposed political sanction on. Those sanctions were seen as exaggerated and gave rise to euroscepticism.<sup>6</sup>

### 1.2.1. Sensitive issues in Austria

There are a number of EU-related issues that are particularly sensitive in Austria:

- **Enlargement:** Austria borders four of the new member-states and has been the second biggest recipient of East European immigrants in the run-up to the 2004 enlargement, after Germany. There are also some 200,000 Turks living in Austria. Haider's past electoral success owed a lot to his anti-immigration and anti-enlargement stance.
- **Big country domination:** with eight million inhabitants, Austria sees itself as a protagonist for the rights of small member-states. German, French and Belgian plans for a "core Europe", or idea of directories of large countries, are not welcome in Vienna.

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<sup>5</sup> PERRAULT, Megali: Between Indifference and Opposition France, Austria and enlargement, <http://www.ce-review.org/00/39/eu39austria.html>,

<sup>6</sup> GEHLER, Michael: Österreichs Aussenpolitik der Zweiten Republik, Innsbruck, Studienverlag Ges.m.b.H., 2005, ISBN 3-7065-1414-1, p. 888

- **European Security and Defence Policy:** Austrians value their traditional neutrality. Although Austrian troops increasingly take part in peacekeeping missions (including NATO-led ones), both big parties are staunchly opposed to NATO membership or any other formal defence alliance.
- **Stability and Growth Pact:** Austria's finance minister, Karl Heinz Grasser, is the main critic of Germany and France having exceeded the pact's 3 % limit for four years in a row. Austria wants to revive the debate about a stricter stability pact.
- **EU intervention:** Schüssel has openly criticized the role of the European Court of Justice in interpreting or setting European rules.<sup>7</sup>
- **Energy:** Austria backs UK calls for an EU energy policy, but Vienna's emphasis on environmental issues will not be shared by all its partners. An abundance of hydro-electric power allows generating almost a third of its power from renewable sources. Also, while some EU countries are considering a nuclear revival, Austria remains committed to staying non-nuclear.<sup>8</sup>

Many of the problems Austria is struggling with today, including unemployment, are seen by numerous Austrians as connected to the EU membership.<sup>9</sup> The recent EU poll from 2007 showed that Austrians are the least supportive of the membership: Only one of four people in the country of 8 million thinks that belonging to the European Union is beneficial. As can be seen from the following graph, the Austrians are even more sceptical than the British.<sup>10</sup>


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<sup>7</sup> Austria's particular concern is with European Court of Justice ordering it to admit students from other member states to its Universities

<sup>8</sup> KATINKY, Barych: The Austrian EU Presidency and the Future of the Constitutional Treaty, Centre for European Reform, [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing\\_austrian\\_presidency\\_24jan06.pdf](http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_austrian_presidency_24jan06.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> Euro-skeptic Austria to adjust EU presidency, <http://european-union-news.newslib.com/story/107-3183592/>

<sup>10</sup> European Commission, , Eurobarometer 67, November 2007, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf)



**Figure 1: Satisfaction of the selected countries with membership in the EU in 2007<sup>11</sup>**

According to the Austrian specialist on Turkey, Cengiz Günay, this fear stems from the following fact: Austria's post World War II identity has been built on social stability. The welfare state with its institutions, such as the so-called social partnership has been seen as one of the country's biggest achievements and has been a source of pride for Austrian citizens. Globalization and neoliberal economic policies in the recent years have accelerated the country's economic transformation. An increasingly competitive atmosphere in the labour markets has caused uncertainties. Owing to the country's geographic location there is a general fear of labour migration from the cheaper East.

This fear could also be observed in the Eastern enlargement which was on the agenda under the first Austrian presidency in 1998. Although official government policy supported the enlargement, the Austrian population was against it, mainly, because of the fear of influx of cheap labour. In the end, the government managed to pacify the population by placing transition period on labour markets

This attitude towards enlargement is, however, paradoxical because, economically Austria benefited from the Eastern enlargement the most of the EU countries. First, the EU expansion boosted Austria's GDP by an additional 0.2 % annually, compared to an additional average GDP growth rate in the EU of 0.13 % annually, because of its over-proportional presence in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Second, Austria's active and passive FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) between the years 2003-2005 increased in comparison with the time period of 1992-1994 by 2,09 % and 1,54 % respectively. Third, the trade with 10 new members of the EU increased by 5 % between the years 2004 and 2007.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup>European Commission, Eurobarometer 67, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> BREUSS, Fritz: Erfahrungen mit der EU-Erweiterung, WIFO MB, January 2007, p. 56

As a consequence of the opening towards the East, the self-perception of being an outpost of Western civilization has regained a momentum. The fears have fostered the return of historically rooted patterns and narratives. These deeply rooted historical narratives have upheld the myth of Austria as a bastion of Western (Catholic) civilization and a remnant of Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian Empire in the struggle against the East, represented in history by the rival Ottoman Empire that preceded Turkey.

“Given that historical pattern, the debates on Turkey have mainly revolved around the country’s lack of “Europeaness”. Turkey has been perceived as fundamentally different, in moral, cultural and political terms. It has served as a convenient “other”, illustrating what Europe is not. In this context, Turkey has been Orientalized, helping to define Europe by contrast - a contrasting image, idea, personality and experience. The shortcomings of Turkey’s democracy, such as human rights abuses, the vulnerable situation of women and discrimination against minorities, have often been explained by essentialist arguments, such as Turkey’s culture or religion.”<sup>13</sup>

These arguments are on the one hand the result of historical narratives which have conveyed images and preconceptions of the “threatening other” and on the other hand are built on the current experiences with Turkish migrant communities, which seem to confirm these images.<sup>14</sup>

### **1.3. The Austrian EU Presidency 2006 and the priority of Balkan countries**

In this sense, it is obvious that Austria wishes to put her weight during enlargement process towards her historical linkage countries, and the attitude toward the historical rival Turkey remains negative. The fears against Turkey and privilege for linkage countries culminated before the Austrian presidency in October 2005, when Austria opposed the decision to start accession negotiation unless talks with Croatia were also started. Croatia as a Balkan country was among the Austrian presidency’s priorities. In the sphere of foreign policy, the Austrian presidency focused particularly on Balkan countries, both on the Enlargement and European policy front. The text prepared by the Austrian Foreign Ministry on the Austrian EU Presidency 2006 says

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<sup>13</sup> GÜNAY, Ceniz: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey relations, Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2007, p. 49

<sup>14</sup> GÜNAY, Ceniz: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey relations, Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2007, p. 49

that: “In June 2005, the European Council reaffirmed that all Balkan States have a “European Perspective” and thus have the possibility to accede to the EU, provided they satisfy the conditions for membership. Austria has always supported this policy. We are convinced that the future of all the countries in western Balkans lies in the European Union.”<sup>15</sup>

In this spirit, concrete steps were undertaken to move each individual Western Balkan state closer to Europe, including for instance the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with Albania, the launch of negotiations regarding such an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina and monitoring and supporting the peaceful inception of the new state of Montenegro. Another major concern was to assist Serbia on its way towards Europe.

The stability of the region South East Europe as a whole is one of the key Austrian foreign policy interests. Austria is keen on engaging in the process of political and economical stabilization. Within the EU Member States, Austria is playing a significant role in the transformation of the countries of South East Europe. Austria is an important trading partner, is one of the largest investors, and has maintained good relations with all the countries of the region.

Austria is interlinked with the region more than any other EU member state, especially, in economic terms. This is above all the merit of Austrian companies. Austrian companies, often following the pioneering business activities of Austrian banks and insurance companies, have established a considerable presence in the region by now. In 2007, Austria’s export to the region increased by a total of 22.7 % to some 5.4 billion Euro, and Austrian imports from the region reached 2.8 billion euro.<sup>16</sup>

Important as a trading partner, Austria has certainly played a much more prominent role as an investor in this area. In the region as a whole, Austria is the single largest investor and is number one in four South European countries- Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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
<sup>15</sup> Dr.LAGRO,E.: EU Enlargement and Transforming Paradigms of Political Identity in Individual Member States: Case of Austria, European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group on EU Politics, Third Pan European Conference, Istanbul, 21-23 September 2006, p.12

<sup>16</sup> Statistik Austria, [http://www.statistik.at/web\\_de/statistiken/aussenhandel/hauptdaten/index.html](http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/aussenhandel/hauptdaten/index.html)

Country	Position	Share on the passive FDI %
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	34,8
Slovenian	1	32,3
Bulgaria	1	25,9
Croatia	1	20,3
Rumania	2	12,1
Slovakia	3	14,8
Hungary	3	11,1
Czech Republic	3	11,1
Ukraine	3	7,6
Serbia	4	10,7
Montenegro	4	9
Poland	5	5

**Table 1: Austria's position among the top 10 investors in East and Central Europe in 2007**<sup>17</sup>

Despite the fact that Balkan countries were foreshadowed as priority in the Austria's foreign policy, the acceptance of these countries among the Austrian population is also low as can be seen from the following graph. Nevertheless, the willingness to accept Turkey into the EU is the lowest.



**Figure 2: Comparison of the EU's and Austrian preference for new members in 2006**<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> BREUSS, Fritz: Österreichs Aussenwirtschaft 2007, FIW Kompetenzzentrum „Forschungsschwerpunkt Internationale Wirtschaft“ 2007, Wien 2007

<sup>18</sup> European Commission, Eurobarometer 66, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf)



## **2. Turkey and the EU**

### **2.1. Development of relations between Turkey and the EU**

Each enlargement of the European Union represents a turning point in the history and accelerates debate on deepening versus widening of the EU. Turkey is in some respects a controversial country which adds to existing political tensions among EU member states and accelerates this debate more than any other state. Turkey can be also considered as a special case due to the fact that it has been striving for the accession to the European Union for a long time. It made a first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959 shortly after Greece's application. There were two reasons which led to this decision: political and economic. The political rationale resulted from the priorities of Turkish foreign policy: to be a member of Western institutions such as NATO and the Council of Europe. The economic reason was given by the success of the EEC.

The EEC responded to this first application and proposed the creation of an association between the EEC and Turkey which led to the signature of the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963. The Ankara Association was supplemented by an Additional Protocol, signed in November 1970, which envisaged establishment of the customs union.

About that time when the Additional Protocol was signed, Turkey was criticized for human rights issues. 1975 was a difficult year for Turkey because of a series of assassinations of Turkish diplomats carried out by Armenian terrorist groups. In contrast, Turkey's neighbour Greece applied for a full membership in 1976 and became a full member in 1981.

Consequently, relations between Turkey and the EEC were temporary frozen as a result of the military action in 1980 but were re-established again after the elections of 1983. Re-establishment of relations enabled Turkey to formally apply for a full membership in 1987. The application was rejected two years later and Turkey was offered the option of a customs union.

Subsequently, in the Maastricht Treaty two important issues related to Turkey were included. First, a technical cooperation agreement towards establishing a customs union was signed. Furthermore, the EU decided at its Lisbon meeting to expand relations with Turkey.

Signature of the Customs Union in 1995 which came into force in 1996 contributed significantly to the development of trade relations between the EU and Turkey.<sup>19</sup>

At the same time there was a Kardak crisis between Turkey and Greece which led to blocking by Greece of the financial assistance from the EU resulting from the customs union. Subsequently, Turkey-EU political relations began to fade. “First, Christian Democratic Party leaders declared that Europe was essentially a Christian club, a “civilizational project” and that there was no place for a country like Turkey in the EU. Ever since then, this discourse has been among the main debates in some of the EU member states. Islam has consistently been one of the key arguments against Turkey’s full membership. However, Turkey is a secular state, as emphasized in its constitution, where the majority of population follow Islam as their faith. Hence, it is not a religion based state. This important fact seems to be overlooked in debates on Turkish membership.”<sup>20</sup>

The European Commission report, Agenda 2000, declared that Turkey was far from being a candidate state and the Council meeting in 1997 refused to include Turkey as a candidate country. The Turkey’s government considered this decision as unacceptable and decided to freeze political dialogue with the EU.

Finally, at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate country, at the. Since 1997, Turkey’s progress has been monitored and the European Commission issues annual reports.

However, the EU was reluctant concerning the starting date of accession negotiations. At first, Turkey was given a date in 2002 for setting the date for the negotiations. Then, 2004 was decided to be the possible date for negotiations.

### **Opening of negotiation talks**

Finally, the accession negotiations with Turkey started in October 2005 with the analytical examination of the EU legislation (the so-called screening process). Since then, one negotiating chapter on Science and Research has been opened and provisionally closed, in June 2006. The suspension of negotiations followed the EU Commission Regular Report on Turkey’s progress, partially, due to the Cyprus issue. In December 2006, the EU Council of Ministers suspended the negotiations of eight out of thirty-five chapters, while at the same time discussing

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<sup>19</sup> European Commission: EU-Turkey relations, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu\\_turkey\\_relations\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm)

<sup>20</sup> LAGRO, Esra, JORGENSEN, Knud, Erik: Turkey and the European Union, Prospects for a difficult Encounter, Hampshire, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2007, ISBN 1-4039-9511-7, p. 7

the future enlargement strategy and the absorption capacity of the EU. In addition, negotiations were opened on three chapters: Enterprise and Industry (March 2007) and Financial Control and Statistics (June 2007).

Considering the absorption capacity, a range of debates about Turkey's EU relations with the EU was launched between the years 2003 and 2006. Before opening the accession talks, the Austrian presidency demanded that the goal of negotiations should not be full membership. A month before winning the national election, Angela Merkel sent a letter to conservative heads of government in the EU suggesting that full membership is not the best way for the EU and that relations between Turkey and the EU should be in the form of privileged partnership and open-ended. This was in line with the French attempt to introduce the recognition of Cyprus as a new condition for beginning accession negotiations prior to 3 October. The same was the reaction of Christian Democrat group in the European Parliament which emphasized that neither Turkey nor the EU was ready for the accession talks.<sup>21</sup>

The attitude towards Turkey can be better seen in comparison with Croatia, whose accession talks were opened at the same day as with Turkey. "Whereas the negotiation framework for Croatia states by their "very nature, the negotiations with Turkey are an open ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand....In a similar vein, only the framework documents on Turkey contain the following section: "while having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond"....This phrase, which invites reflection on alternative outcomes such as a privileged partnership and highlights absorption capacity as a Copenhagen criteria, is non-existent in the text on Croatia."<sup>22</sup>

### **Absorption capacity**

The absorption capacity has been a key element of the debate about Turkey's membership in the EU. The concept of the absorption capacity was launched in the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, which stated that the Union capacity to absorb new members is an important element. However, this concept has never been prominent in the previous rounds of enlargements. Absorption capacity re-emerged, particularly, in the debate on Turkey's accession

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<sup>21</sup> DÜZGİT,S., ALTINAV,H., BENHABIB,S., ÖZDEMİR, C.: Seeking Kant in the EU's relations with Turkey, Artpres, December 2006, ISBN 975-8112-82-1, Artpres, December 2006, p.8

<sup>22</sup> Just what is this "absorption capacity" of the European Union, [shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item\\_id=1381](http://shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item_id=1381)

to the EU in 2005. This revival has strongly been linked to the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the referenda in France and the Netherlands. The debate reached a peak with June 2006 European Council Summit where “absorption capacity” became one of the most controversial issues of the meeting. With Austria holding presidency, Germany, the Netherlands and most particularly France were the key countries that pushed for the debate and demanded absorption capacity as an additional criteria for entry to the European Union. This was refused by opposition led primarily from the UK, Spain, Italy and the new member states.<sup>23</sup>

### **The case of France**

It was the previous president Chirac who initiated absorption capacity debate when he proposed to introduce a referendum. He defined the absorption capacity of the EU as an institutional, financial and political capacity.<sup>24</sup> This has also led actors in France to focus on questions such as Cyprus and the Armenian genocide which resulted in adoption of a law in 2006 foreseeing penalties for those who deny the existence of Armenian genocide. This law has not been approved by the Senate and it is criticized among historians.

A number of politicians in France underline the danger of enlarging without deepening and oppose Turkey on the ground that the EU should join forces and further its political union. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing stressed that the European Union is not ready for Turkey for two reasons: “First, the EU is not functioning well as it stands and this will get worse as the number of its members increases. Second, Turkey is a huge country and since with the Nice Treaty the institutions have tilted towards a greater degree of intergovernmentalism, the Union will become less federal as demography plays a more important role in determining decision-making power.”<sup>25</sup>

Newly-elected President Nicolas Sarkozy is firmly opposed to Turkish membership in the EU. He said that the European Union was not only an idea but also a geographical entity and ruled out Turkish membership.<sup>26</sup>

There are also fears about external borders of the European Union and potential neighbours such as Syria, Iraq and Iran. Furthermore, though a small Turkish minority in France is well integrated, the world debates about radical Muslims do not contribute to positive image of

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<sup>23</sup> DÜZGİT,S., ALTINAV,H., BENHABIB,S., ÖZDEMİR, C.: Seeking Kant in the EU’s relations with Turkey, Artpres, December 2006, ISBN 975-8112-82-1, Artpres, December 2006, p.8

<sup>24</sup> Just what is this “absorption capacity“ of the European Union, [shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item\\_id=1381](http://shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item_id=1381)

<sup>25</sup> LE GLOANNEC, Anne-Marie: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey relations, Instituto Affari Internazionali, July 2007, p. 79

<sup>26</sup> EU-Turkey relations, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678>

Turkey. Finally, the debate about integration of Turkey mirrors to some extent the debate about integration of the Turkish community in France.

## **The case of Germany**

The absorption capacity is also a prevalent topic in the enlargement debate in Germany. Although Germany is Turkey's most important trading partner, the relations are burdened by the image of Turks living in Germany. These include Turkish ghettos, Turkish mothers who do not speak a word of German, Turkish girls who are not allowed to go to school and high violence among male Turkish adolescents. In addition, the unemployment rate among Turks in Germany is almost double the average German rate.<sup>27</sup>

The official positions of two parties from the Grand coalition (CDU and SPD) remain diametrically opposed. While Angela Merkel's Christian-Democrat party (CDU) rejects Turkish membership and wants to offer a "privileged partnership", SPD's pro-Turkish position adopted by Schröder in 1998 has remained official party policy. However, as was stated in the coalition Agreement: "Turkey poses economic, demographic and cultural challenge... There must be strict compliance with the conditions contained in the negotiating mandate and the Declaration by the European Community and its Member States of 21 September 2005, also as regards the EU's absorption capacity."<sup>28</sup>

European institution also took a position in the debate. As for the European Parliament, a resolution was adopted in March 2006 which defines "absorption capacity" as a criterion for the accession of new countries. The discussion on whether the EU can absorb Turkey has socio-cultural, political, economic, financial and institutional dimensions.

## **2.2. Issues arising from the Turkey's membership in the EU**

### **2.2.1. Socio- cultural Dimension**

#### **Islam versus Christianity**

While considering Turkey's accession to the EU, it is of utmost importance for both parties to be aware of socio-cultural constraints. One of the main impediments for joining the EU is the hesitation in accepting the idea of living with the "other". Taking into account that Turkey

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<sup>27</sup> Stelzenmüller, Konstance: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey relations, Instituto Affari Internazionali, July 2007, p. 112

<sup>28</sup> Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD  
[http://www.bundestag.de/aktuell/archiv/2005/koalition/vertrag\\_en.pdf](http://www.bundestag.de/aktuell/archiv/2005/koalition/vertrag_en.pdf)

would be the only Muslim country in the EU with 99.8 % of Muslim population, it is not an easy task and it will require mutual understanding and empathy on both sides. As the famous philosopher Immanuel Kant once stated: “The state of peace among men is not natural, the natural state is one of war...A state of peace, therefore, must be established”<sup>29</sup>

So far, the European countries in their attempts to unify EU member states highlight a common cultural heritage such as: common history, Christianity, evangelic individualism, humanism, rationalism and secularism. However, in spite of all commonalities that characterize Europeans, they still seem to be hesitant about uniting with their fellow Europeans within the EU. How then Turks who we assume have different socio-cultural practices can be accepted into the Union and identify with these values?

Images of the “others” and identities are formed over the course of time in various spaces that preoccupy human minds and thus influence human thoughts. The image of Turks as “other” has been formed during the Turkish 700 year’s presence in Europe for variety of reasons.

First, during the expansion period of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were considered as “others” in Europe because of their expansionist character and their religion. This was the image of enemy, who was cruel, barbaric and devastating and considered to be a potential threat to Christianity. Second, the emergence of nation state also affected the image of Turks. Various communities within the Ottoman Empire: Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Yugoslavs and Albanians were striving for their independence from the Ottoman Empire, formed their new national identities by “othering” the Turks and describing all negative aspects to them. Another important phenomenon was the migration of Turkish guest workers. This movement was initiated by Germany in 1960s. Most of these people came from rural areas in Turkey without having proper education at home, thus they had cultural adaptation problems which caused creation of ghettos in which the immigrants shut themselves and refused to integrate to the cultural and social life of the host country. This resulted in lack of trust in both sides.<sup>30</sup>

Despite being historically seen as “other”, the major goal of the political elites in last centuries was modernization and westernization. In recent years, Turkey has begun to experience the civilian transformation of its already existing parliamentary democracy, which has also been affected positively by the speeding up of the EU membership process. Turkey can also be

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<sup>29</sup>KANT, Immanuel: Perpetual Peace <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm>,

<sup>30</sup> Dr. LAGRO,E.: EU Enlargement and Transforming Paradigms of Political Identity in Individual Member States: Case of Austria, European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group on EU Politics, Third Pan European Conference, Istanbul, 21-23 September 2006, p.78

considered as one of the few countries that were relatively successful in this process and could serve as an example for other countries.

## **Democracy and Human Rights**

From its beginning, the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and Fundamental freedoms and the rule of law and the Copenhagen criteria are commitments to this. The human rights problem contrasts with Turkey's relatively advanced preparedness on other matters. On the eve of Helsinki Summit in December 1999, where Turkey's candidate status was formally recognized, Turkey was already in a position to open negotiations for almost all the 31 chapters of *acquis communautaire*. Turkish governments completely failed to anticipate that human rights issues would sooner or later pose the major stumbling block for accession to the EU. Turkish memories were of the precedents created by treatment from NATO and the Council of Europe, generally prepared to overlook human rights issues.<sup>31</sup>

The European Commission has expressed both verbally and through its progress reports the expectations of further progress in the reform process, as well as of the continuous political will of the government to enhance democratic standards and to harmonize Turkish legislation with that of the EU. Since 2001, Turkey has undertaken significant reforms, although this process is far from complete. According to the Progress Report of the European Commission "Turkey continues to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria". However, limited progress was achieved on political reforms in 2007. Significant further efforts are needed, in particular, on freedom of expression, on civilian control of the military and on the rights of non-Muslim religious minorities. Further progress is also needed on the fight against corruption, the judicial reform, trade union rights, and women's and children's rights.<sup>32</sup>

Freedom of expression is one of the major areas of reform where probably the most intense struggle between the reformist and conservatives elements is taking place. It should be noted that in Turkey insults are generally considered to be more serious than defamation based on factual inaccuracies or untruths.

Legislative reform in this field, most particularly through the New Penal Code, has begun to be applied in practice. A significant number of people jailed under the old Penal Code

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<sup>31</sup> LAKE, Michael: *The EU and Turkey, Glittering Prize or a Millstone*, London, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2005, ISBN 1903403 61 8, p.51

<sup>32</sup>European Commission, *Turkey Progress Report 2007*

[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2007/nov/turkey\\_progress\\_reports\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf)

have been released. Despite the positive development, there is still a constant emergence of new cases where individuals expressing non violent opinions have been prosecuted and in some cases convicted under new Penal Code.<sup>33</sup>

Military powers retain a strong voice in Turkey. Many people in Europe are accustomed to thinking of Turkey as a semi military regime. Certainly the country has had three military coups since 1960. The armed forces remain attached to the prime Minister's office rather than the Ministry of Defence. The role of the military in Turkish society is not simply based on the experience of a series of coups since 1960, but also on the tendency to regard the military as guardians of the last resort, especially, against religious fundamentalism. Assessments of the future role of the Turkish military in politics depend on the degree to which the politicians maintain order and stability.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the fact that Turkey is a 99.8 % Muslim country, the problems with non-Muslim communities, which account for 0.2 %, are of a great significance.<sup>35</sup> Non-Muslim communities have been recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The main problems suffered by these minorities have been the lack of legal personality and the impossibility of acquiring or selling property.<sup>36</sup> The non-Muslim minorities are perceived as a threat to national security that needs to be guarded. Such conceptualization lies at the heart of the ban on the training of non-Muslim clergy. Similar problems have been encountered with non-Sunni Muslims, most particularly the Alevi. They are not recognized officially as a religious community.

## **Kurds in Turkey**

Other kinds of problems are with the most numerous Muslim minority in Turkey, namely the *Kurdish minority*. According to the CIA Factbook they account for 20 % of the 70 million people of Turkey.<sup>37</sup> Because of the size of the Kurdish population, the Kurds are perceived as the only minority that could pose a threat to Turkish national unity. Indeed, there has been an active Kurdish separatist movement in south-eastern Turkey by the Kurdistan

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<sup>33</sup> LAGRO, Esra, JORGENSEN, Knud, Erik: Turkey and the European Union, Prospects for a difficult Encounter, Hampshire, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2007, ISBN 1-4039-9511-7, p. 78

<sup>34</sup> LAKE, Michael: The EU and Turkey, Glittering Prize or a Millstone, London, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2005, ISBN 1903403 61 8, p.98

<sup>35</sup> CIA Factbook, Turkey, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>

<sup>36</sup> LAGRO, Esra, JORGENSEN, Knud, Erik: Turkey and the European Union, Prospects for a difficult Encounter, Hampshire, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2007, ISBN 1-4039-9511-7, p. 80

<sup>37</sup> CIA Factbook, Turkey, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>



Workers' Party (PKK) since 1984. The Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), also known as KADEK and Kongra-Gel, is considered by the US and the EU to be a terrorist organization dedicated to creating an independent Kurdish state in a territory (traditionally referred to as Kurdistan) consisting of parts of south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria and north-western Iran. There has been re-emergence of PKK terror in the 2005 which was followed by the not successful intervention in northern Iraq in 2008, albeit this terror is much weaker than in 1990s.

The government's main strategy for assimilating the Kurds has been language suppression.<sup>38</sup> There are now only four local radio and TV stations broadcasting in Kurdish. Educational programmes, teaching the Kurdish language are not allowed and there are no opportunities to learn Kurdish in the public or private schooling system. Use of language other than Turkish remains illegal in political life and participation of the Kurdish minority in parliament is severely blocked.<sup>39</sup>

In regard to women rights, despite some changes in recent years, millions of Turkish women are still not fully aware of their rights. Although women from educated elite have reached position of power, particularly in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, Turkey is still a strongly patriarchal society where discrimination against women is endemic and participation of women in the political life of the country remains minimal. In rural areas, particularly in south-east Anatolia, women are still commonly believed to be the property of their father or their husband. The 1999 UNDP report showed that only 25.9 % of Turkish women were free to choose their spouse and 22.6 % were married to relatives.<sup>40</sup>

Although the 1926 Civil Code banned polygamy, many men in rural Turkey, again particularly in the south-east, have more than one wife. In a study conducted in south-east Turkey by Pinar Ilkcaracan of the association Women for Human Rights, 10.6 % of marriages in those regions were shown to be polygamous.

The report of Commission towards the children's rights says that further efforts are needed in the areas of registration of children at birth as well as in prevention of violence against children.

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<sup>38</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Kurds, <http://countrystudies.us/turkey/28.htm>,

<sup>39</sup> European Commission, Turkey Progress Report 2007, p.22, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2007/nov/turkey\\_progress\\_reports\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf)

<sup>40</sup> LAKE, Michael: The EU and Turkey, Glittering Prize or a Millstone, London, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2005, ISBN 1903403 61 8, p.117

On trade union's rights, Turkey has not ensured that full trade union rights are respected in line with EU standards and the relevant International Labour Organization Conventions, in particular, as regards the right to organize, to strike and the right to bargain collectively.<sup>41</sup>

## **2.2.2. Geo-Political dimension**

### **Introduction**

Any commentary on Turkish security considerations must begin with the country's location, both geo-strategically and also because it straddles so many political and cultural fault lines. Turkey is simultaneously part of, or borders, Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, the Balkan, Black Sea and even Caspian regions. It is geographically Eurasian, Islamic by faith but officially secular, and broadly European in outlook and aspiration. In assessing the impact of Turkey's membership on the EU's external policies, one needs to take into account a number of factors:

- A) Turkey's relations with countries in the adjoining regions
- B) Trans-national issues
- C) Its membership in international organizations
- D) Its potential contribution to the EU's Security and Defence Policy

### **A) Turkey's relations with neighbouring countries**

With Turkish accession the Union's borders would extend to the Turkey's neighbours – that is to the Southern Caucasus states (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) already included in European Neighbour Policy (ENP) and to Syria, Iran and Iraq who are very important to the EU as the Middle East effects on the EU directly or indirectly through oil supply, terrorism, migration, human trafficking, narcotics and arms proliferation.

There is consent between Turkey and the EU about the need for stable, predictable and democratic **Iraq**. In the recent period, Turkey has acted constructively, taking several diplomatic activities with Iraq's neighbouring countries about common concerns related to the fight against terrorism e.g.: Turkey has offered to train Iraqi security forces, hosted an enlargement meeting of Iraq's neighbouring countries aimed at achieving national reconciliation and stabilization in the country. In August 2007, a memorandum of understanding with Iraq on enhancing mutual

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<sup>41</sup> European Commission: Turkey Progress Report 2007, p.13

[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2007/nov/turkey\\_progress\\_reports\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf)

cooperation in the field of security was signed. The presence of a Kurdish organization listed on the EU list of terrorist organization, the PKK, in northern Iraq, is an additional source of concern and Turkey has intervened repeatedly in Iraq's northern Kurdish region.<sup>42</sup>

**Iran's** nuclear programme remains a source of concern for Turkey, while Turkey's membership of NATO and its military links with the US are regarded in Teheran with suspicion. The two countries differ in their opinions on the relation between religion and government, but they have a shared interest to maintain a politically stable situation in Iraq and to contain Kurdish separatism. Both share a strong desire to the trade with the EU.

Relations with **Syria** have traditionally been difficult for various reasons. When Syria, under Turkish pressure, gave up support for the PKK and expelled its leader in 1998, a positive process started which accelerated due to the development in Iraq and mainly because of shared interest in maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity.

Turkey's relations with **Azerbaijan** are particularly strong, which in turn has impacted negatively on Turkey's relations with Armenia. In particular, the relations with **Armenia** will need to be improved with the establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of the land border which is currently closed after the human suffering in 1915/1916. EU relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia and countries surrounding the oil-rich Caspian Sea could also be enhanced through Turkish membership.<sup>43</sup>

These countries are presently a source of tensions and cause problems to the EU's external relations. Thus, when these countries become direct neighbours of the EU, the Union's foreign policy concerns in these regions will inevitably become more pronounced. As the EU lacks the means to tackle the problems originating in this region, it has been unable to play a role in the Middle East on a par with that of the USA. Thus, in addition to strengthening its EU's internal security the EU should also become a strong framework for extending stability to the EU's neighbourhood. Unfortunately, there is a possibility that the Middle East might transform adversely, perhaps even in a way that could cause serious harm to the EU. In this case, Turkey as a country familiar with this region could contribute to the EU's regional policies.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>European Commission: Turkey Progress Report 2007  
[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2007/nov/turkey\\_progress\\_reports\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf)

<sup>43</sup>European Commission: Issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective ,p.10  
[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2004/issues\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_paper_en.pdf)

<sup>44</sup> LAGRO,Esra, JORGENSEN, Knud, Erik: Turkey and the European Union, Prospects for a difficult Encounter, Hampshire,Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2007, ISBN 1-4039-9511-7, p. 210

## **B) Trans-national issues**

### ***Migration***

In terms of border management, Turkey would present a threat concerning organized crime, trafficking in persons, drug trafficking and illegal migration. After the 1980s Turkey has become both migration receiving and a transit country for two reasons. First, Iranian revolution in 1979 and conflicts in the Middle East such as the Gulf War have led to inflow of the people from these regions. Second, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has also become a country of immigrants from the Balkan countries and former Soviet republics. Thus, Turkey's geographic location between the East and West, and the South and North has made the country a transit zone for many migrants aiming to reach Western Europe. Turkey will not accede to the Shengen-zone after its accession, but it has to be determined by the Council following the strict evaluation of border management practices.

### ***Terrorism***

Terrorism presents another problem in regard to security. Turkey has suffered several terrorist attacks from extreme-left and radical Islamic groupings. Since the events of 11 September 2001, Turkey has associated itself with several EU initiatives related to the fight against terrorism.

## **C) International relations**

Ankara's diplomacy has reflected the complexity of Turkey's geopolitical circumstances. In addition to its membership in the NATO and other Western institutions, Turkey has been a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Organization of Islamic Conference, Islamic Economic Cooperation Organization, Stability Pact for South-East Europe, Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group. Turkey has also an observer status in the Arab League.

The Turkey's NATO membership has largely taken the form of a Turkish-US bilateral strategic alliance. Turkey's relevance for the US has changed in the last 15 years. While in the past, Turkey was appreciated for its geo-strategic location, now its attraction lies in its role as a possible stabilizer in a potentially unstable region.

Furthermore, Europeans have not always sympathized with Turkey in its regional difficulties. Turkey was not considered as European either geographically or politically. Only the UK and France have consistently maintained a broader engagement with security issues beyond Europe itself. Moreover, European criticisms of Ankara's approach to its Kurdish problem and the human rights have been far less muted than those of Washington.

## C) European Security and Defence Policy

Political dialogue between the EU and Turkey on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has evolved since 1990s. This has led to a considerable degree of convergence between the EU and Turkey on ESDP issues. Turkey takes part in the ESDP. Ankara declared at Nice its willingness to commit to the EU's proposed Rapid Reaction Force of a minimum of 5,000 troops, 36 F-16s and air transport and maritime vessels.<sup>45</sup> Turkey has its contingents in Afghanistan (ISAF), Bosnia (SFOR II) and Kosovo (KFOR). Turkey has the capacity to contribute to the EU security and defence. Turkish military expenditure is among the highest of all NATO members in relative terms, accounting for 2.7 % of its GDP in 2007 with 795,000 military personnel which constitute 31% of the forces of NATO's European members.




Figure3: Defence expenditure as % of GDP in 2007<sup>46</sup>

However, the head of the security section in the Austrian Defence Ministry argues that while Turkey can offer quantitative capacities, as far as quality is concerned, Turkey's capacities are far behind the capacities of many other NATO members.<sup>47</sup>

### 2.2.3. Economic dimension

Turkey has a population of around 71 million people (estimate for 2007), which is less than that of Germany (82.6) but more than those of other EU member states. In recent years, the

<sup>45</sup> LAKE, Michael: The EU and Turkey, Glittering Prize or a Millstone, London, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2005, ISBN 1903403 61 8, p.135

<sup>46</sup>Nato-Russia Compendium of financial and economic data relating to defence, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-141.pdf>

<sup>47</sup> REICHTER, Erich: Sicherheitspolitische und strategische Aspekte eines Beitritts der Türkei zur Europäischen, Lit Verlag GmbH Wien 2006, ISBN 3-8258-8690-5, p. 124

Turkish population has risen each year by about 1.1 million. With a surface area of some 78,000 square kilometres, Turkey is larger than France, so far the largest EU country (547,000 sq km).<sup>48</sup>

Compared to the extent of its territory and the size of its population, the country's economy is small in terms of the volume of productive capacity and the total annual output. Compared to the EU-27, Turkey's gross domestic product (GDP) was only 4.2 % in 2007. Each year, Turkey's economy produces a GDP similar in size to that of Poland, measured in purchasing power parities (PPPs).<sup>49</sup>

In terms of size, Turkey's economy is large in comparison to its close or remote Balkan neighbours: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro- and even Greece, an EU member state. In 2007, Turkey's GDP amounted to 403 billion US (in current prices) compared to 308 billion for Greece and 122 billion for Romania.<sup>50</sup>

In relative terms, the results are not so favourable for Turkey. Turkish population is certainly not the poorest in terms of GDP per capita measured in PPP's, it stood at with EUR 8,440, however, with EUR 13,180 Croatia is also more advanced.

Country	Turkey	Albania	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bulgaria	Croatia
GDP (current)	604,5	13,5	18	73,5	64,5
GDP/capita	8,440	5,350	6,010	9,390	13,180

Country	Greece	Macedonia	Montenegro	Romania	Serbia
GDP (current)	462	9	3	183	48
GDP/capita	18,040	7,120	8,180	10,140	8,950

**Table 2: GDP of selected countries in 2006 (in billion EUR)**

Now the economy is much more crisis proof than it was ten years ago. Market orientation is significantly more pronounced and economic activities benefit from a far friendlier environment. Two crises, one in 1999 and one in 2001, set in motion the consolidation and acceleration of reform efforts. A major driving force for reform was the government's intention to pave the country's way into the EU in the foreseeable future.

Turkey has always had a tendency towards high inflation, but no single generally accepted interpretation was found. Current inflation is 8.8 % in 2007. Unemployment has been

<sup>48</sup> POSCHL, J., VIDOVIĆ, J., WÖRZ, J., ASTROV V.: Turkey: Macroeconomic Vulnerability, Competitiveness and the Labour Market, WIIW Current Analyse and Country Profiles, April 2005, p.70

<sup>49</sup> HAVLIK, P., HOLZNER, M.: Weathering the Global Storm, yet Rosiny Costs and Labour Shortages May Campem Domestic Growth., WIIW Current Analyse and Forecast, February 2008, p. 82

<sup>50</sup> World Bank, Internal statistics, <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport>

on the rise over the past few years; it is currently higher than in the EU, especially in urban regions, and accounts for 9.9 %.

Most concern is expressed over the large deficit in the current account EUR -29,000 in 2007 which represents 7.9 % GDP. In recent years capital inflows did more than simply fill the gap. Two major factors governed capital inflows: foreign direct investments and inflows of other investments.

The increase in the current account deficit caused devaluation of Turkish currency and an inordinately high gross debt in public sector in the past. Due to the fiscal measurement, Turkey succeeded in decreasing public debt from 76.9 % GDP to 54.1 % in 2007. The success was also achieved in the deficit of public expenses at the 1.3 % level of GDP in 2007.<sup>51</sup>

One of the conditions for the accession to the EU is fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria in the economic area. According to the annual report of Commission Turkey is prepared in this regard: “Turkey can be regarded as a functioning market economy. It should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term, provided that it implements its comprehensive reform programme to address structural weaknesses.”<sup>52</sup>

#### **2.2.4. Impacts on the EU budget**

Given its size and level of economic development, Turkey’s accession would undoubtedly have an important impact on the EU budget. Most areas would be affected significantly if Turkey were a member state.

#### **Agriculture**

In regard to agriculture, it is clear that Turkey will be eligible for significant support under the Common Agriculture Policy. The size of agricultural sector in Turkey, both in absolute terms as well as with respect to its economic and social role, will represent an important element in budgetary considerations in the future. Agriculture is of key importance to Turkey. The employment in Agriculture amounts to 34 % which is 7 million people compared to 10.4 million

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<sup>51</sup> HAVLIK,P., HOLZNER, M.: Weathering the Global Storm, yet Rosiny Costs and Labour Shortages May Campem Domestic Growth,, WIIW Current Analyse and Forecast, February 2008, p. 82

<sup>52</sup> European Commission: Turkey Progress Report 2007, p.30  
[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2007/nov/turkey\\_progress\\_reports\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf)

in the EU as a whole. About half of Turkey's area of some 79 million hectares is devoted to agriculture.<sup>53</sup>

## Structural Policy

Turkey, with a level of GDP per capita at about 28.5 % of the EU 25 average at purchasing power standards, close to the level of Bulgaria and Romania, would be eligible for significant level of structural operations expenditure. The existing rule of GDP below 75 % of the EU average, however, has never been applied to a country of similar size, similar level of economic development and similar intensity of regional disparities as Turkey. A special mechanism would probably be needed to properly take into account these specific of factors.

It is difficult to calculate the costs of Turkish membership owing to the fact that not only Turkey but also the EU are evolving constantly. Hence, it is possible to ascertain only the hypothetical cost. This was an attempt of the Centre for European Studies. They calculated, first, what Turkey would receive under the Common Agriculture Policy and Structural funds, if it were already a full member today. A second calculation shows what Turkey would receive by 2015 if current rules do not change. The main result is that the cost would in either case be rather small in relation to the EU economy (0.2 % of the EU GDP). EU transfers would have a significant impact in Turkey (amounting to around 4 % of its GDP), but would still remain manageable for the EU budget.<sup>54</sup>

	Turkey in today's EU (in billions of current euros)	Turkey 2015 in enlarged EU (as a % of EU GDP)
Structural Funds	8	0.16
CAP receipts	9	0.08
Total receipts	16	0.25
Contributions to EU budget	2	0.05
(Max) Net receipts for Turkey	16 (0.16% of EU GDP)	0.20

Source: Own calculations based on current EU budgetary rules and regulations.

**Table 3: Maximum budgetary costs, full membership**<sup>55</sup>

<sup>53</sup> European Commission: Issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective , p.60  
[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2004/issues\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_paper_en.pdf)

<sup>54</sup> KEMAL, D., GROS.K.: Turkey and the EU budget, Centre for European Studies, August 2004,  
[http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item\\_id=1148](http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1148)

<sup>55</sup> Centrum for European Policy Studies: Turkey and the EU budget,  
[http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item\\_id=1148](http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1148)



### 2.2.5. Institutional impacts

Turkey's accession to the EU would have implications for EU decision making. As a large country, Turkey would play a relatively bigger role in the EU than many other entrants. The question is to what extent the accession will change the balance of power. The current legislation for the arrangement of the institution is the Treaty of Nice. Under this Treaty further enlargement is impossible as its institutional arrangement proposals are limited to 27 members. The institutional reforms are resolved in the Treaty of Lisbon, which is presently in the process of ratification. It is assumed that the Treaty will be adopted and will be in force by the time of Turkey's possible accession.

Under the Lisbon Treaty the seats in the European Parliament are limited to 751. The maximum ceiling per member state is 96 seats. Turkey's accession would significantly affect the allocation of seats; especially, the medium and large countries would have to give up seats to accommodate Turkey's accession.

Turkey's accession will not have large institutional impacts on the European Commission. Under the Lisbon Treaty the Commission should consist of two thirds of member's states from the year 2014. As the members will be selected on the basis of a system of equal rotation between the member state, Turkey's size and population are in this case negligible.


As far as the Council voting system is concerned, the Lisbon Treaty introduces qualified majority voting based on double majority. It represents at least 55 % of the members of the Council comprising at least fifteen of them and member states comprising at least 65 % of the population. The blocking minority is defined as, at least, four member states. If Turkey was a member of the EU, this blocking minority would be easily achieved from the population side. Turkey would also gain the weight in decision making equivalent to its share of population by which it would achieve a significant voice.<sup>56</sup>

The study of the impact of Turkey's membership on the Council of the EU voting was carried out by Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén from the Centre for European Studies. The study analyzes two variables: distribution of powers and efficiency of the EU. The study compares two situations: current situation under the Nice Treaty and situation under the Constitutional Treaty. As the newly proposed Lisbon Treaty has, de facto, the same effect as the Constitutional Treaty, in regard to the institutional changes, the following figures can be applied to the future development of the EU under the Lisbon Treaty.

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<sup>56</sup> European Commission: Issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective , p.10  
[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2004/issues\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_paper_en.pdf)

In regard to the impact on efficiency due to Turkey's large population, the EU would suffer little. (Efficiency tends to be higher when a large share of power is in the hands of just a few nations). Following figure shows that the Nice Treaty fails on efficiency grounds and makes matters worse. Enlargement of the EU to 27 members would cut the passage probability to 2.5 %- a third of its already low level. The main source of the lower efficiency is the high threshold of the Nice Treaty rules for Council votes. Under the new Lisbon Treaty, efficiency would increase but only in case of EU-27 members. By further enlargement the efficiency would decrease.<sup>57</sup>




**Figure 4: Passage probability: The European Council, 1957-2004 and after entry of Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey**<sup>58</sup>

In contrast, the distribution of power would be largely affected. Following graph compares the Nice Treaty and Constitutional Treaty (Lisbon Treaty). The message of the figure is clear. The countries that gain the most from the Lisbon Treaty are the biggest nations, Germany and Turkey. The biggest losers are Spain and Poland, as well as the medium-size countries, from the Netherlands to Austria. This finding could affect these countries' attitude toward either the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty or Turkey's membership.

<sup>57</sup> BALDWIN, Richard, WIDGREN, Mika: The Impact of Turkey's membership on EU voting, The Centre For European Studies, <http://hei.unige.ch/~baldwin/PapersBooks/TurkeyBookChapter.pdf>

<sup>58</sup>BALDWIN, Richard, WIDGREN, Mika: The Impact of Turkey's membership on EU voting, The Centre For European Studies, <http://hei.unige.ch/~baldwin/PapersBooks/TurkeyBookChapter.pdf>



Source: Authors' calculations.

Figure 5: NBI<sup>59</sup> Values under Nice Treaty and Constitutional Treaty Voting Rules for EU 29<sup>60</sup>

### 2.2.6. Cyprus

2004 was a crucial year for the Cyprus conflict which dates back to 1960 when Cyprus gained independence from Britain. Three years later, inter-communal violence broke out between the Mediterranean island's Greek and Turkish communities which eventually led to a Greek-sponsored attempt to seize the government and a military intervention by Turkey. In 1974, the Greek Junta violated the Treaty of Guarantee and Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus in 1974 and occupied 36 % of Republic's territory. The International community, most specifically United Nations Security Council and the European Community, condemned Turkey's continued occupation by military force of an area quite disproportionate to the Turkish Cypriot's population and refused to accept any permanent division of the island. The problem was compounded when, in 1983, the Turkish Cypriots, with Turkey's support established an independent Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. The United Nations was involved from the earliest stage of the dispute both in peacekeeping along the Green line which divided island in two and in the attempts to facilitate political settlement which would re-unite the island.

The most detailed and comprehensive attempt by the UN was the Annan Plan which was tabled in 2002 with an effort to reunify the island before the formal accession of Cyprus to

<sup>59</sup> NBI- Banzhaf Index-gauge how likely it is that nation finds itself in a position to break a winning coalition on a randomly selected issue

<sup>60</sup> BALDWIN, Richard, WIDGREN, Mika: The Impact of Turkey's membership on EU voting, The Centre For European Studies, <http://hei.unige.ch/~baldwin/PapersBooks/TurkeyBookChapter.pdf>

the EU. The Annan Plan would have established a federal government with few powers, composed of two constituent states, each of them exercising full autonomy. There would be a phase drawn down of Turkish and Greek troops, complete demilitarization of Cypriot military forces and a mandatory arms embargo. The Plan was put to referenda on both sides of the island and its outcome was a clear “yes” from the Turkish Cypriots (65 %) and clear “no” from the Greek Cypriots (76 %). The Turkish side saw the solution of the Cypriot problem as a road to the EU, as this obstacle always negatively influenced its relations with Europe.<sup>61</sup>

The accession of divided Cyprus to the EU took place in 2004 and constituted a setback for Turkish diplomacy. “What is in this issue striking is the way in which some member states encourage Greek Cypriot efforts to blackmail Turkey through its right to veto. In the aftermath of the failed constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands and in the wake of opening accession negotiations with Turkey, France demanded that Turkey can only begin accession negotiations if it is officially recognized the Republic Cyprus and that its will not to do so was not in the spirit expected of a candidate to the Union. This was in breach of the European Council Conclusion on 17 October 2004, where it was decided that accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October on condition that Turkey extends the customs union agreement to Cyprus. This was not only perceived as a breach of the EU commitments given to Turkey less than a year ago, but also as yet another reward for the Greek Cypriots whose own European credentials were seriously overshadowed by their recent actions.”<sup>62</sup>

Under the terms of its accession negotiations, Turkey committed itself to ratifying the protocol for extension of the customs to the new EU-10 states, but at the same time Ankara issued a declaration saying that its signature did not mean its recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey also refused to open its ports and airports to Cyprus. On 11 December 2006, the EU accession talks were suspended because Turkey had refused to implement the Ankara Protocol and open its trade to vessels from Cyprus.<sup>63</sup> Despite negotiation being re-opened in March 2007, this issue is expected to loom over Turkey during the whole course of accession negotiations.

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<sup>61</sup> LAKE, Michael: *The EU and Turkey, Glittering Prize or a Millstone*, London, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2005, ISBN 1903403 61 8, p.166

<sup>62</sup> DÜZGİT, S., ALTINAV, H., BENHABIB, S., ÖZDEMİR, C.: *Seeking Kant in the EU's relations with Turkey*, Artpres, December 2006, ISBN 975-8112-82-1, Artpres, December 2006, p.18

<sup>63</sup> Turkey accession and Cyprus  
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-accession-cyprus/article-135940>

## **3. Historical-cultural conditions influencing Austrian Society**

### **3.1. History**

When analyzing Austrian Turkish relations, it is necessary to take into account two turning points, respectively the Siege of Vienna in 1529 and battle of Vienna in 1683. The capture of the city of Vienna had long been a strategic aspiration of the Ottoman Empire, due to its interlocking control over Danubean (Black Sea-to-Western Europe) southern Europe, and the overland (Eastern Mediterranean-to-Germany) trade route.

In August 1526, Sultan Suleiman I. had defeated the forces of King Louis II of Hungary at the Battle of Mohács. As a result, the Ottomans gained control of southern Hungary. Suleiman's main objective was to re-establish Ottoman control over Hungary. He then laid siege to Vienna in 1529, which was the first attempt of the Muslim Ottoman Empire to capture the city of Vienna, Austria. But this attempt to take the city failed after the onset of winter forced his retreat. In 1532, another planned attack on Vienna was repulsed at the fortress of Guns. After further advances by the Ottomans in 1543, the Habsburg ruler Ferdinand officially recognized Ottoman ascendancy in Hungary in 1547 but for this temporary truce the Habsburgs had to pay tributes to Sultan Suleiman.

The Battle of Vienna took place in September 1683 after Vienna had been besieged by Turks for two months. It was the first large-scale battle of the Habsburg-Ottoman Wars, yet with the most far-reaching consequences. The battle was won by Polish-Austrian-German forces led by King of Poland John III Sobieski against the Ottoman Empire army commanded by Grand Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha. The battle marked the turning point in the 300-year struggle between the forces of the Central European kingdoms and the Ottoman Empire. Over the sixteen years following the battle, the Habsburgs of Austria gradually occupied and dominated southern Hungary and Transylvania, which had been largely cleared of the Turkish forces.

Following the successful defence of Vienna in 1683, a series of campaigns resulted in the return of all of Hungary to Austrian control by the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. The conclusion of the Treaty of Karlowitz marked the start of decline of Ottoman power in Central Europe.

Plans were made on dividing the Ottoman Empire. After the Treaty of Passarowitz the Ottoman Empire lost big parts in the Balkans in favour of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the Habsburgs gained the largest territories under their control in the history.<sup>64</sup> The image of a sick man of Europe, who was going to die soon, emerged and soon became a cliché among the enemies of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>65</sup>

The result of the changing strategy of the Habsburgs after the second siege of Vienna from offensive to defensive led also to the change of the image of Turks. The Turks were no longer considered to be dangerous enemies to the Empire, but to be weak and conquered as it can be seen from different artworks from that time. Gradually, the image of Turks was portrayed as exotic and somewhat appealing. Composers were influenced by Turkish music, and painters started to draw men and women in Turkish dress, perhaps the most prominent example of this being 12 etchings of the Austrian Empress Maria Theresia (reigned 1740-1780) in Turkish clothes which are kept in the archives of the Austrian National Library in Vienna.<sup>66</sup>

The quality of fights of both powers also changed. All the conflicts with the Ottoman Empire after the year 1718 had the character of disagreement between two states and not the fight against non-believers. From 18.th century, the main strategy of the Habsburgs was to maintain Turkey as a weak neighbour. In the First World War, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary were allies when the Ottomans joined the Central Powers, but both countries were defeated which led to their dismemberment.<sup>67</sup> However, despite the positive relations between both countries after the year 1718 and particularly in the First World War, the memories of the siege of Vienna in 1529 and the battle of Vienna in 1683 are still at the centre of attention.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> HEINRICH, Georgie, Hans: Die Türkei und die Europäische Union, Dissertation, Wien, November 2005, p. 67

<sup>65</sup> LAGRO, Esra, JORGENSEN, Knud, Erik: Turkey and the European Union, Prospects for a difficult Encounter, Hampshire, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2007, ISBN 1-4039-9511, p. 159

<sup>66</sup> The Turkish Face of Vienna

<http://www.virtualvienna.net/main/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=326&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0>

<sup>67</sup> Declining Ottoman Empire toppled after the First World War. Turkey lost ¾ of its territory under the Treaty of Sévres. Signing of the Treaty was delayed due to the Turkish national movement and Turkish War of Independence. The superseding Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 was actually a peace Treaty with Turkey and led to the end of the Independent War and the formation of the Republic Turkey as a successor of the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>68</sup> GINNAKOPOULOS, Angelos: Die Türkei Debatte in Europa, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Fachverlage, Januar 2005, ISBN 3-531-14290-9, p. 112

## 3.2. Migration

The largest group of non-EU foreigners in Austria are the nationals of former Yugoslavia and Turkey. The Turks are often presented as the least integrated group of immigrants. The first arrival of Turkish immigrant workers began in the 1964 after the signing of the bilateral agreement with Turkey in response to a labour shortage. The economic situation in Austria, in the early 1960s, was almost of full employment and there was need for extra manpower. From the beginning of the 1960s until the mid-1970 this led to the recruitment of guest workers, mainly from Turkey and Yugoslavia. Originally, the goal of most of these guest workers was to be employed abroad and to save enough money to take back home.

However, the immigration, that had been meant to be temporary, had become long term. By the early 1970s, it became clear that the presence of the Turkish community changed from temporary to permanent. The reaction to the oil crisis of 1973 was similar in most western countries: to stop further immigration, to encourage those who had arrived previously to return home and to require from those who stay to assimilate into the host society. The Yugoslavs on the whole opted to return home. The Turks chose to stay, which subsequently led to an increase in family reunification. The proportion of Turkish residents in Austria grew from 7.7 % of all foreigners in 1971 to 22.2 % in 2001 or 160,000 Turkish citizens. Austria's proportion of foreign residents in 2001 was even higher than that of the United States, reaching a level of 12.5 %.<sup>69</sup> An economic boom in the late 1980s created renewed labour shortages in some sectors, following which employers looked to the traditional sources of labour from South-Eastern Europe to fill these slots.

Austria continues to deny that it is officially an immigration country which is clearly reflected by recent immigration policies, but in fact the migrant community has gained access to the welfare system and has become very much settled. Austria has a highly developed corporatist welfare system. There is a strong relationship between previous occupation and entitlement to provisions and generous income protection for families with children. Employees are well protected against dismissal. The number of special schemes for occupational groups is high and there is extensive collective coverage for civil servants.<sup>70</sup>

Widespread public discontent over levels of immigration in the early 1990s led to a curtailment of the traditional migration and family reunification programs, supporting the official line that Austria is not a traditional country of immigration. On the other hand, it does not mean

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<sup>69</sup> [http://www.statistik.at/web\\_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/wanderungen/internationale\\_wanderungen/index.html](http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/wanderungen/internationale_wanderungen/index.html)

<sup>70</sup> WETS, Johan: Turkish studies, March 2006, ISSN 1468-3849, p. 90

that Austria wishes to close all possibilities for entering the country legally. The country's accession to the European Union and the joining of the Schengen system has brought more open borders. Furthermore, there are quotas for foreign seasonal workers, which enabled the admittance of thousands of temporary workers.

The discontent over the level of immigration also led to a political reaction. Right wing, anti-immigrant FPÖ party is one of the major forces in the country. They oppose the entry of new immigrants and demand that settled immigrants must assimilate or leave.

Turkish immigrants have been part of the scene in many European countries, but it does not mean that they fully participate in society. Due to Austria's conservative political culture and the specific form of its post-war nation-state building, the integration and naturalization of these immigrants and their descendants is, according to Fabian Georgi, even more problematic than in most of the other European countries. The Austrian nation-building process stems from that of the Austro-Hungarian period, contending on the one hand with a heterogeneous population and on the other hand with the formation of German nationalism.<sup>71</sup> Austria's assimilation or nationalization policy toward cultural minorities was a clear and conscious strategy implemented by the ruling elite of that time. This policy has led to an almost complete assimilation of most non-German groups in the Republic of Austria by the mid-twentieth century. The Austrian conception of the integration of migrant communities is a continuation of the strategy adopted towards the national minorities: integration is understood as a form of assimilation. According to Georgi, there is wide-ranging social and political exclusion in comparison with other Western European countries towards migrants.

This situation is reflected in the new Naturalization Act, passed in 1998, which retained a regular waiting period of ten years of naturalization and therefore, naturalization is difficult to achieve, even for the children of the third generation. This legislation is based on the principle of "jus sanguinis" which is a right by which nationality or citizenship can be recognized to any individual with an ancestor who is a national or citizen of that state. According to the new law, the individual immigrant who wishes to acquire Austrian nationality has to show that he or she is integrated into Austrian society and has to give proof that he or she is economically self-sufficient and sufficiently proficient in German. Minor criminal offences constitute reasons for denial of citizenship. According to the Essen-based Centre for Studies on Turkey, 53 percent of Turks living in Austria are naturalized.

Another major challenge that Turkish immigrants face in respect of structural integration is in the area of education. Schooling is compulsory in Austria for all children between the ages of

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<sup>71</sup> GEORGI, F.: The Politics of Adaptation and Integration in Austria, European Migration Centre, 2003



6 and 15 regardless of their nationality and whether they have a residence permit or not. The situation of children with an immigrant background is marked in the Austrian education system by inequality. The segregation of migrant children in the education system is to a large extent due to the social position of the parents. The first Turkish “guest workers” had a rural background and a low level of education. These unfavourable conditions were to a large extent inherited by the following generations. Three - quarters of the Turkish migrant population attained only primary education. In terms of education, no other migrant group has fared as poorly as the Turks.

A direct effect of the low educational qualifications is a poor position in the labour market where Turkish migrants fare worse than the other migrant communities. The Turkish labourers work mainly as blue-collar workers, earning less than their Austrian counterparts. They are employed as unskilled or semi-skilled workers. Only a minority is employed as white-collar workers. The Turkish labourers are mainly represented in industry and the service sector. Employment in the manufacturing industries has decreased during the last few decades. The sector with the largest shares of immigrant workers are construction, catering, and cleaning, which are also the sectors with the highest concentration of unskilled labour. The first generation migrants worked in these sectors as well as the second generation. The next generations are not significantly better educated than the generation of their parents, and thus take up similar position in the labour market.

Furthermore, Turks are significantly less self-employed than Austrian population or other migrants. Compared to the 12.5 % of self-employed among the Austrian population and 7.6 % among the (non-Turkish) migrant population, only 1.4 % of Turkish residents are self-employed.<sup>72</sup> This is due to the legislation: a basic requirement for obtaining a trade license is to be an Austrian or to have an Austrian partner.

Moreover, male Turks have a higher employment rate than the average Austrian male population. The Turkish women, however, are less present on the labour market. Since Austria sanctions unemployment and extended periods of unemployment can cost immigrants the legal base of their stay, there is greater pressure on foreign workers to find a new job as soon as possible than there is for unemployed Austrians. Therefore, they are much more likely to accept even low-paid or low-quality jobs.

In conclusion, Austria exercises policy of assimilation in its homogeneous society that still experiences conflicts with minority groups. That puts pressure on the minorities which results in the hostility toward them. These groups, including the Turks, remain marginalized and

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<sup>72</sup>AMS Österreich: Arbeitsmarktlage 2006 Jahresbericht [http://www.ams.at/ueber\\_ams/14201\\_726.html](http://www.ams.at/ueber_ams/14201_726.html)

segregated, and even third generation of descendants of the former guest workers tend to have higher unemployment rates, lower wages, and less educational success than Austrian host society.

But there are also other aspects of integration which should not be overlooked. It is necessary to go beyond the structural elements of integration, such as the access to the major institutions of society, among which are education and the labour, and look at social and cultural integration, especially the degree of identification with various norms and values of the host country. These dimensions are clearly more difficult to measure than labour market participation and school enrolment.

## 4. The current debate on the Turkey's accession to the EU

### 4.1. Official position

Austria has been a particularly interesting case with regard to the Turkish question. As is generally known, Austria together with France, Greece, and the Greek Cypriots are considered to be hardliners on the Turkish question. However, although these four countries may have acted together on several occasions, their interests differ radically. While Greece and Greek Cypriots have an interest in the continuation of Turkey's EU process, Austria would like to see negotiations break down.

When the decision about opening negotiation talks with Turkey was made by Council on 3. October 2005, Austria was the only country which objected and tried to hinder, delay and stop opening of accession talks with Turkey. Austria insisted on the possibility of alternative negotiation outcome such as the privileged partnership. Ursula Plassnik, Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, called for more emphasis on the limits of the EU's capacity to absorb new Members, with the aim of making it part of a formal condition for Turkey's EU entry. She also wanted to tone down the principle that "the shared objective of the negotiations is accession".<sup>73</sup>

In the end, Austria agreed to the opening of negotiation talks with Turkey. However, these negotiations can fail, be suspended or finish with non-agreement. The delegation of Austria was placated by the opening of negotiation talks with Croatia. Austria has close historical ties with Croatia and insisted on approval for membership talks with Croatia in return for its agreement on Turkey.

Since the negotiations have been opened, Austria, together with the above named three countries, has taken a tough stance against Turkey on several occasions. The latest example was in December 2006, when Turkey refused to implement the protocol of the customs union to the Republic of Cyprus.

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<sup>73</sup>Report, [http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/video\\_search\\_en.cfm?StartRow=41&keyword=plassnik&src=1&videoref=&wichtch=video](http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/video_search_en.cfm?StartRow=41&keyword=plassnik&src=1&videoref=&wichtch=video)

The Turkish question has been debated a lot and played an important role in political debates and the campaigns of political parties. This is rather surprising because Turkey plays a minor role in Austria's foreign relations. This region is for Austria favourable from economic, political and historical reasons. The market of Turkey is considered to be important for Austria but not to the same extent as for example for Germany or United Kingdom. In the forefront of the Austrian interests are Balkan countries.

Therefore, Austrian politicians and opinion makers have often favoured a privileged partnership instead of full membership for Turkey, without elaborating on what such a partnership would entail. This can be also seen in the programme of the Austrian Federal Government for the years 2007-2010: "It is in interest of all member states to guide Turkey and its population towards European values and standards in a targeted yet cautious manner. Austria has pushed for an open conclusion to negotiations with Turkey. We champion a step-by step approach first of all, with the aim of creating a specially-tailored community made up of Turkey and Europe. If the negotiation results define Turkey's accession to the Union as a target, Austrian citizens will in any case have the last word, in the form of referendum."<sup>74</sup>

Dr.iur Johannes Eigner<sup>75</sup>, with whom I conducted an interview on 13 March 2008, defined a specially tailored community as something more than a customs union but less than a full membership. He based his position regarding the effects of enlargement by Turkey on the impact study of the European Commission (Paper on issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective). He stressed the issues such as migration, right of residence, financial aspects of the enlargement, especially in connection with agriculture policy, structural policy and weighting of the votes in the EU.

But the question of referendum is controversial since referenda are not part of the country's normal politics. In fact, there have been only two previous referenda in Austria: one on nuclear power, and one to decide on Austria's own accession to the EU. Nor have Austrians been asked in previous decades to vote on the accession of any other candidate for EU membership. Turkey is, therefore, an exception.<sup>76</sup>

It can be said that the only enthusiastic advocate of the Turkey's accession to the European Union in Austria is Albert Rohan, a former general director of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign

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<sup>74</sup> Programme of the Austrian Federal Government for the 23 rd Legislative Period, Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, p.8, <http://www.austria.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=19879>

<sup>75</sup> a leader of department III.4- EU enlargement in the Ministry o Foreign Affairs

<sup>76</sup> A referendum on the unknown Turk?, Anatomy of an Austrian debate, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document\\_ID=101](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=101)

Affairs and member of the Independent Commission on Turkey. Albert Rohan and the former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, signed a document in favour of the opening of negotiations with Ankara. In the document "Start EU Negotiations with Turkey" of 31 August 2005, both authors defended Turkey after the suspension of negotiation talks. The document calls against the proposals of some governments to have the so called "Privileged Partnership" as alternative to full membership. It stated: "This proposal has also been discussed at last December's European Council meeting and was rejected, resulting in a reference to "open-ended negotiations" in the Council's conclusions. Such wording, which has never been used in previous enlargement rounds, may have somewhat ruffled Turkey's feathers, but was finally accepted as constructive ambiguity so often used in international diplomacy ... The very nature of accession negotiations makes it obvious that full membership must be the goal. Without that prospect no candidate country would go through the painful process of adopting tens of thousands of rules and regulations, the EU's "Acquis Communautaire. ... Moreover, it is difficult to imagine, what advantages could be offered to Turkey in the framework of a "Privileged Partnership".<sup>77</sup>

## 4.2. Position of political parties

The debate in Austria about the membership of Turkey in the EU started with the EU parliament election which took place on 12 June 2004. Unlike Germany where the debate started some months earlier, the positions of both major parties toward Turkey remained opened until spring 2004. When the Democrats FPÖ, currently in the opposition, attacked the ruling Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) for 'going soft' on Turkey by failing to block the opening of accession talks, leading the ÖVP chancellor knew that this topic might be used in the election by the FPÖ party and suggested the referendum about Turkey's accession. The Turkey's accession question dominated during the whole election and led to the fact that all parties had to take a stance on this issue. Turkey was also hotly debated in Austria's parliament elections in October 2006.

Unlike France, where Turkey's question was one of the factors which led to the rejection of the EU constitution in a public referendum, in Austria this question did not hinder the ratification of the EU constitution and the EU Constitution was ratified on 25 May 2005 by the Austrian Parliament. The Austrian government rejected calls by oppositional parties, the People's Party and Freedom Party, and especially Joerg Haider, a leader of a minority bloc in

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<sup>77</sup> ROHAN, A., AHTISARI, M.: Start EU negotiations with Turkey Martti Ahtisaari and Albert Rohan, [http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/oped\\_20050831.html](http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/oped_20050831.html).

Austria's government, for a referendum on the text. Though argument against Turkey appeared at the Austrian extreme-right party, its particular concern had been the country's neutrality, and affection by the suggestion of mutual defence. These arguments were outweighed by the fact that the EU constitution will give small nations like Austria greater influence within the EU. Furthermore, after “no” votes in the Netherlands and France, Austria pledged to revive the EU Constitution during its EU presidency in 2006. This aim was accomplished under the German presidency and Austria ratified the Lisbon Treaty on 10 April 2008.<sup>78</sup>

For the better understanding of parties' positioning it is necessary to analyze general attitude of the people. According to the Eurobarometer from the same year as the parliament election took place only 95 % of European population knows that Turkey has a candidate status and the majority of them are against the Turkey's membership. In particular, population in Austria is very sceptical - at that time 53 % of the population were against and only 32 % support Turkey's accession. Nowadays, only 5 % of population is in favour of accession.

In general, all Austrian parties with the exception of the Green party have clearly dismissed Turkey's membership. Even though the accession is conceivable for the Green party, the positive position is not prevailing. However, during the closer analysis it can be seen that the positions of the parties are very similar.

#### **4.2.1. ÖVP: The Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei)**

The ÖVP is a centre-right, Christian-democratic party traditionally linked to the Roman Catholic Church. The ÖVP has always advocated EU membership and has been strongly supportive of EU enlargement to ex-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>79</sup>

Since 1987, all Austrian foreign ministers have been members of the ÖVP. Since the Helsinki summit in December 1999, when Turkey was granted candidate status, there have been three ÖVP foreign ministers: Wolfgang Schüssel, Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Ursula Plassnik. ÖVP foreign ministers have supported all EU Council decisions on Turkey (Helsinki 1999, Copenhagen 2002, Brussels 2004, Luxemburg 2005).

From 2004 to the election program issued in September 2006, the ÖVP has supported negotiations with Turkey. It has accepted that full membership is the goal of these negotiations. It has stressed the need to focus on the absorption capacity of the EU. It has also promised a

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<sup>78</sup> Austria ratifies EU Constitution <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4578797.stm>

<sup>79</sup> Country Briefing Austria, 16th October 2007  
<http://www.economist.com/countries/austria/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Political%20Forces>,

referendum on Turkey.<sup>80</sup> Unlike in France, however, there is no provision in the Austrian constitution that requires such as referendum.

However, since early 2004, the previous chancellor Schüssel was attacked by all Austrian parties, except the Greens, for being too supportive of Turkish aspirations and there is also considerable opposition in the party to Turkey's possible future EU membership. In the forefront of their arguments stand the costs of the Turkey's accession, the different social constellation of both countries and the external borders of Turkey with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. They also emphasize the size of the Turkey in connection with its impact in The Council of the EU. Moreover, they mention the questions of democracy, law and minorities. On the basis of the fact that only 14 % of Visa applications have been approved, the country is not being considered as capable for membership.<sup>81</sup> In this matter, they also highlight that European Union is not only an economic actor, but also a political actor and that Turkey has not made sufficient progress in the fulfilling of political criteria.

Until today, the ÖVP specifically refrained from engaging its party basis on the Turkey question: "Changing public opinion on Turkey is a steeper challenge than convincing Austrians to vote for EU-accession in 1994, or getting them on board for the 2004-enlargement round. Our primary task is to win elections."

In light of Austrian opposition from other political parties and the public, the ÖVP has tried to present itself as slowing down without derailing the process of accession. In June 2006 an ÖVP MP and chairman of the Austrian-Turkish friendship group in parliament described thinking among ÖVP parliamentarians:

"There is now a rather negative attitude among people regarding Turkish EU accession. This is dependent on how Turks live here in Austria. Strong immigration in the past decades has led to the creation of foreigner ghettos, especially in big cities. This determines Austrians' image of Turks. There is a careful opening towards Islam. However, this has to be a mutual process, and this has to also apply to Christians in Turkey."<sup>82</sup>

The ÖVP stands for the gradual process of Turkey's adaptation to the European standards. The end of negotiations talks is seen as a tailored Turkish-European partnership. With regard to

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<sup>80</sup> Gemeinsam gegen der EU-Beitritt der Türkei [http://orf.at/070109-7920/?href=http%3A%2F%2Forf.at%2F070109-7920%2F7924txt\\_story.html](http://orf.at/070109-7920/?href=http%3A%2F%2Forf.at%2F070109-7920%2F7924txt_story.html),

<sup>81</sup> GINNAKOPOULOS, Angelos: Die Türkei Debatte in Europa, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Fachverlage, Januar 2005, ISBN 3-531-14290-9, p. 113

<sup>82</sup> Austria's October elections Implications for the Turkey debate, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document\\_ID=96](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=96)

full membership, the people should have the right to voice their opinions of the issue in a referendum.<sup>83</sup>

It has stressed the following demands:

- Need to focus on the absorption capacity of the EU
- Fulfilling of all criteria (rule of law, democracy and respect for minorities)
- All EU-members states have to financially contribute to Turkey's membership<sup>84</sup>

#### **4.2.2. FPÖ + BZÖ The Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), The Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ)**

In the early 1960s, the FPÖ became the first party in Austria that supported the country's entry into the EU (this position was reversed in the early 1990s, with the party adopting a strongly eurosceptic stance). At that time, the FPÖ reoriented its political course again, adopting a number of far-right positions and becoming more populist in orientation. This was almost entirely the result of the influential leadership of Jörg Haider. A dispute between opposing factions in the party eventually came to a head in April 2005, when Mr Haider - together with most of the FPÖ leadership, parliamentarians and more moderate representatives - broke away to form the BZÖ. The hard-line members of the FPÖ regrouped under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache. Mr Strache quickly repositioned the "new" FPÖ as a more radical grouping, adopting the positions of the traditional far right in criticizing the EU, opposing all forms of immigration and calling for a strengthening of law and order.

During the 2006 election campaign, the party adopted a strongly nationalistic and anti-Islamic stance.<sup>85</sup> Thus, the issue of Turkish accession has figured most prominently in their campaign and opposition to any negotiations with Turkey has been the main demand of this party. After the election, this political party become even more hostile towards Turkish accession. It is listed as the main issue on the party's own website ("what we stand for").

They stress that the European Union is a club of Christian states and Turkey does not belong to Europe, owing to its Islamic religion and the fact that only 10 % of its territory is in Europe. They also strongly oppose the declaration of Turkish government to increase nuclear energy as the nuclear energy has been opposed in Austria from 70's. In general, they speak about

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<sup>83</sup> Gemeinsam gegen der EU Beitritt der Türkei, [http://orf.at/070109-7920/?href=http%3A%2F%2Forf.at%2F070109-7920%2F7924txt\\_story.html](http://orf.at/070109-7920/?href=http%3A%2F%2Forf.at%2F070109-7920%2F7924txt_story.html),

<sup>84</sup> ÖVP, Programm-Türkei, <http://www.oevp.at/inhalte/index.aspx?pageid=5324>

<sup>85</sup> Economists: Country briefing:Austria, <http://www.economist.com/countries/austria/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Political%20Forces>



economic, social, politic, geographic, religious and cultural differences which present a heavy burden for the EU.<sup>86</sup> Turkey and Turks have been used as representatives and symbols of Islam, and such and they have been portrayed as a major threat to Austrian, Christian and European culture.<sup>87</sup>

Strache's campaign, which was widely considered xenophobic, included slogans such as: “Wien darf nicht Istanbul werden” (Vienna must not be allowed to become Istanbul), “Daham statt Islam” (at home, not Islam), “Arbeit statt Zuwanderung” (jobs, not immigration).<sup>88</sup>

Its position, however, is unlikely to have any direct political consequences. All other parties have excluded the option of forming a coalition with the FPÖ under its current leader Heinz-Christian Strache.

Jörg Haider, the leader of the BZÖ, has often changed his positions. In the late 1980s, he was for Austria joining the EU, and in the early 1990s, he was against. In the late 1990s, he opposed EU enlargement, while since late 1999 he has supported it. In 2004, he argued for Turkey starting negotiations. Since 2005, he has argued against it. His influence is also seriously diminished as a result of these elections.<sup>89</sup>

#### **4.2.3. SPÖ-The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs)**

The position of this party towards the Turkey's accession to the EU can be called as “zig-zag”. In late summer 2004, the SPÖ has changed its attitude, from supporting the EU consensus on Turkey to opposing Turkish accession negotiations.<sup>90</sup> The policy before the summer 2004 was led by the European Parliament deputy Johannes Swoboda who demanded the same dealing with Turkey as with other candidate members. He pursued the policy which should have resulted in the full membership of Turkey. He changed his position in the year 2002, became critical

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<sup>86</sup> GINNAKOPOULOS, Angelos: Die Türkei Debatte in Europa, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Fachverlage, Januar 2005, ISBN 3-531-14290-9, p. 114

<sup>87</sup> GÜNAY, Ceniz: Conditionality, Impact and prejudice in EU-Turkey relations- A view from Austria, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma, July 2007, p.50

<sup>88</sup>[http://www.strache.at/bilder/kampagne/Folder\\_HCStrache.pdf?PHPSESSID=f362c75d1d595cd4205de11d6b991c57](http://www.strache.at/bilder/kampagne/Folder_HCStrache.pdf?PHPSESSID=f362c75d1d595cd4205de11d6b991c57)

<sup>89</sup> Austria's October elections Implications for the Turkey debate, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document\\_ID=96](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=96)

<sup>90</sup> Zick-Zack der SPÖ zum EU-Beitritt der Türkei, <http://www.oevp.at/download/SPOEZickZackTuerkeiEUBeitritt.pdf>

towards all too quick membership of Turkey and wanted to postpone the membership by 10-20 years.<sup>91</sup>

The position of the current SPÖ on Turkey has been most clearly expressed in a motion presented in Austrian parliament on 15 December 2004. This resolution asked Austrian chancellor Schüssel to veto a possible European Council decision on Turkish accession negotiations: "Requesting the Austrian government not to consent to the start of accession negotiations with Turkey at the European Council on 16 and 17 December 2004, and to support instead further intensification of relations between the EU and Turkey in the form of a strategic partnership, built along the European Economic Area (EAA)-model, for which negotiations should start immediately."<sup>92</sup>

This position was led by Josef Cap, the SPÖ caucus leader, and adopted by Alfred Gusenbauer, the party leader. Josef Cap has argued that previous Social Democratic commitments to Turkish accession no longer mattered: "I am indifferent to what (Austrian) social democrats said before or did not say before. We have to devise politics now."<sup>93</sup>

Gusenbauer himself has supported Cap's position and claims that Turkey is not ready for the EU and the EU is not ready for Turkey. Instead he supports other forms of membership and emphasizes that Copenhagen criteria are not fulfilled. : "Turkey in the EU would spell the end of the EU, if that does not happen before anyway. What I understand as integration might not even be possible with 25 member states anymore. The pace of enlargement has been too high... It is not a problem for me that the majority is Muslim. But my reservations are, first, that really, Turkey means in fact two countries in one. Secondly, human rights remain an open issue. Despite progress happening in Turkey, I generally decipher a dilution of the EU membership criteria."<sup>94</sup>

With this position, the SPÖ became the most Turkey-sceptical social democratic party in Europe. However, within Austria, the SPÖ has the strongest institutional, personal, and political links to the Turkish community. Both ÖVP and SPÖ do not represent the opinion that the Islamic religion of Turkey is a problem and they share the idea that it would be wrong to oppose

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<sup>91</sup> Mag. MARCKHGOTT, Bernard: Analyse und Evaluierung eines möglichen Beitritts der Türkei zur Europäischen Union (unter der Berücksichtigung der Entwicklung der Türkei, der Identität der EU und der Positionen der österreichischen Parteien), Dissertation-Wien, Universität Wien, April 2007, A 092300

<sup>92</sup> Austria's October elections  
Implications for the Turkey debate, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document\\_ID=96](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=96)

<sup>93</sup> Austria's October elections  
Implications for the Turkey debate, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document\\_ID=96](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=96)

<sup>94</sup> The Austrian debate on Turkey, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story\\_ID=4&slide\\_ID=11](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=4&slide_ID=11)

Turkey's membership only on this basis. There is also a strong wing within the SPÖ that focuses on human rights, labour union rights, and women's rights around the world.<sup>95</sup>

In addition, there has also been internal division within the Party. Nevertheless, despite some pro voices, the party leadership's decision to oppose negotiations towards full membership with Turkey was not altered. Those pro-voices include prominent former SPÖ politicians who have also helped lead Austria into the EU, such as Hannes Androsch, a former finance minister, Franz Vranitzky, a former chancellor, and Peter Jankowitsch, a former foreign minister.

#### **4.2.4. The Green Party**

The Green party is the only political party in Austria, which supports the Turkey's membership. As the opposition party, the Green party has never been responsible in the Council of Ministers of the EU and could freely express their political opinions. They point out that Turkey needs European perspective and should be connected with European community. Otherwise, fundamentalist powers might prevail in the country.<sup>96</sup>

They see positive sides of Turkey's membership as following: Turkey can be a bridge between civilizations, Turkey has already undergone many reforms which led to stabilization of the country and it could be a good example for the Islamic world.<sup>97</sup>

At the same time, there are also politicians who are critical and want to put off Turkey's accession since the East-enlargement was recent and it is too much for the European Union. Within the Green party the following belong to those politicians: Johannes Voggenhuber (The Greens), Austria MEP and Eva Lichtenberg MEP. According to Voggenhuber: "The discussion on Turkish EU membership is dominated by an instrumental way of thinking which assumes that Turkey can be democratically transformed, and that the EU shall take over the geopolitically exposed role of Turkey. Yet these arguments have nothing to do with the question whether Turkey has the same European project in mind as we do. It is eerie to witness the acceleration of a process (of accession) whose foundations have never been discussed in a public, democratic and parliamentary way."<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Türkei, <http://www.regio-press-medien.de/tuerkei.htm>.

<sup>96</sup> Mag. MARCKHGOTT, Bernard: Analyse und Evaluierung eines möglichen Beitritts der Türkei zur Europäischen Union (unter der Berücksichtigung der Entwicklung der Türkei, der Identität der EU und der Positionen der österreichischen Parteien), Dissertation-Wien, Universität Wien, April 2007, A 092300

<sup>97</sup> GINNAKOPOULOS, Angelos: Die Türkei Debatte in Europa, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Fachverlage, Januar 2005, ISBN 3-531-14290-9, p. 115

<sup>98</sup>The Austrian debate on Turkey, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story\\_ID=4&slide\\_ID=18](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=4&slide_ID=18)

The Green party except for the two mentioned politicians is for the Turkey's membership. The length of negotiations is, however, dependent on the progress of reforms and they state that their priority for the EU enlargement is the Balkan. The Turkey's accession should not be achieved at all costs, but rather only after fulfilling of Copenhagen criteria, which are taken as a precondition for the Turkey's membership.<sup>99</sup>

In conclusion, the issue of Turkey has been politicized by all major parties in Austria. All parties with the exception of the Green party have been against the Turkey's accession. This political campaign especially of far right parties FPÖ and BZÖ have fanned fears of Islam and xenophobic feelings within Austrian society.<sup>100</sup>

### **4.3. Other actors**

Besides political parties, there are also other players in the society which express their opinion on the Turkey's EU accession, namely the Catholic Church, business circles and media.

#### **4.3.1. The Catholic Church**

Catholic Church has a long tradition and plays a very important role in the Austrian society. According to the population census in 2001, 5 915,421 Catholics live in Austria which represents 73.6 % of population. From this reason, the Catholic Church is acknowledged as a corporate body.<sup>101</sup>

The central institution of Austria's Catholic Church is the 15-member Austrian Bishops' Conference, and it has long taken pride in its tradition of dialogue with Islam. Austrian has an estimated Muslim population of 300,000; the majority of Turkish origin Austrian bishops continue to refuse the accession of Turkey to the EU. The atmosphere of the debate in Austria in 2004 has been fuelled by controversial remarks by the Bishop of Sankt Pölten, Kurt Krenn who warned against an 'islamisation' of Europe. He has called Islam a "very aggressive kind of religion" that will not easily allow for the political unity with the Christian faith.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>99</sup>Türkei, EU: Beitrittsverhandlungen, [http://www.gruene.at/europaeische\\_union/tuerkei/](http://www.gruene.at/europaeische_union/tuerkei/)

<sup>100</sup> GINNAKOPOULOS, Angelos: Die Türkei Debatte in Europa, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Fachverlage, Januar 2005, ISBN 3-531-14290-9, p. 47

<sup>101</sup> Katholische Kirche in Österreich, <http://www.katholisch.at/content/site/kirche/index.html>

<sup>102</sup>Main political parties oppose Turkey joining the EU, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/main-political-parties-austria-oppose-turkey-joining-eu/article-117845>

Other opinions are not expressed in such a radical way. However, Turkey is perceived as a threat to Christian religion and traditions which could lead to their dilution and change of “leading culture”. Austrian Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, the Chairman of the Austrian Bishops, also expressed his thoughts in this way: “Answers in black or white are usually too simplistic. It is not a question of faith; these are political questions, where Catholics can have different attitudes. Secondly, we say clearly, for membership negotiations to prove fruitful, it has to be ensured that the legal criteria, the human rights criteria, which are valid for Europe, are also fully adhered to in Turkey.” When Asked about a Christian 'leading culture' and its meaning for Muslims, Jews, and other non-Christians in Europe, Schönborn said: “A Christian leading culture (leitkultur) means for instance the Christian image of humanity. If, today, we are proud of the freedom of religion in Europe, then this is for sure also the fruit of the Christian image of humanity, and the foundations of the gospel, the bible, enshrining absolute respect for the conscience of the other, for the freedom of the other, even if the churches have not always practiced that in the past. But, according to the gospel, and to Jesus Christ, the message is clear: Respect for the decision of conscience, and the attitude of conscience, of the other. This is, for instance, a point which obliges us Christians to a tolerant attitude. This also asks from other religious communities to be convinced about this principle of the freedom of conscience, and the freedom of humans, and to adhere to these convictions.”<sup>103</sup>

#### **4.3.2. Media**

Position of the Austrian media in the Turkish debate can be described as slightly negative. Media attach a series of problematic issues to the negative development in Turkey (e.g. Cyprus negotiation or abolition of death penalty). It has reported about problems with Kurdish minority, restriction of human rights and financial limits. Consequently, it has been calculated that 14 milliard euro as netto-transfers flow into Turkey and 26 million Turkish farmers would have negative impact on agriculture budget. The consequences for labour market have also been pointed out as one of the drawbacks. The negative emotions also ignite the reports about the relationship between NATO (where Turkey plays an important role) and the EU as well as relationship between NATO and USA. Likewise, the other critical reports about disadvantaged Kurdish minority, military power or Armenian genocide do not contribute to good image of Turkey in Austria. Nevertheless, with respect to the fact that the open-ended negotiation with

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<sup>103</sup> ORF OE1 Mittagsjournal, 23 December 2004

Turkey does not guarantee full membership, it can be said that media maintain quite an appeasement position.<sup>104</sup>

### 4.3.3. Business circles

A less negative trend can be observed in the business circles. However, there is a tendency to avoid the solution of this question. The head of the Chamber of Commerce Christoph Leitl said that the accession date for Turkey is a political matter and from the economic point of view Turkey is not ready for the membership.<sup>105</sup> He appreciates the role of mutual trade as a bridge between both countries<sup>106</sup> but he also warns that “the EU should not enlarge further in the next two decades”, adding that given the 40 million Anatolian peasants, and 14 million unemployed within the EU, one should not encourage hopes for membership which the EU cannot live up to.”<sup>107</sup>

## Economic relations between Austria and Turkey

### *International Trade*

The table compares the Austrian-Turkish balance of trade with two other countries: main trade partner of Austria and main trade partner of West Balkan-Croatia. As it can be seen Turkey does not occupy such an important role in Austrian’s trade.

	Germany	Croatia	Turkey
2005	-10,624	702	-70
2006	-11788	686	45
2007	-12,832	854	82

**Table4: Balance of trade between the years 2005-2007 (in million EUR)<sup>108</sup>**

<sup>104</sup> GINNAKOPOULOS, Angelos: Die Türkei Debatte in Europa, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Fachverlage, Januar 2005, ISBN 3-531-14290-9, p. 116

<sup>105</sup> GINNAKOPOULOS, Angelos: Die Türkei Debatte in Europa, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Fachverlage, Januar 2005, ISBN 3-531-14290-9, p. 116

<sup>106</sup> Die Zeitung der Wirtschaftskammer Kärtner: Gute Geschäfte am Bosphorus  
[http://www.wkk.or.at/kw\\_online/2005/kw19.pdf](http://www.wkk.or.at/kw_online/2005/kw19.pdf),

<sup>107</sup> Why Austria is at such odds with Ankara  
<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/78/Id/9e8c2347-d2e2-4a1e-b0d1-6e3af0f22694/language/fr-FR/Default.aspx>

<sup>108</sup> Statistik Austria, [www.statistik.at](http://www.statistik.at)

## Foreign Direct investments

Unlike foreign trade, where Germany is the most important trade partner, in the foreign direct investments (FDI), the Central and Eastern Europe is the most important region.<sup>109</sup> The following graph illustrates the growing importance of this region since 1990s.




Figure 6: Change in the structure of FDI between the years 1993-2005<sup>110</sup>

As mentioned above, Central and East Europe represents an important region, which in represented 58 % of the total FDI in 2006.<sup>111</sup> Among these countries, Croatia as a candidate state of the EU, is an important recipient of FDI from Austria.

Despite the fact that Turkey played a marginal role in the past, the investments from Austria has enormously increased since 2006, when the Austrian company OMV invested 880 million euro in Turkey and acquired a third of Turkey's top gasoline retailer Petrol Ofisi. OMV is Austria's largest energy concern and is the driving force behind the Nabucco project for a gas pipeline. It will carry natural gas from the Middle East through Turkey and the Balkans to Vienna. The new "Nabucco" pipeline is aimed at making the continent less dependent on the (at present) dominating gas supplies from Russia. In this respect, Turkey plays an important role not only for Austria but for the whole Europe as a transition country for the gas supplies. The prime minister of Austria, Gusenbauer, said while in New York: "We will build the Nabucco pipeline

<sup>109</sup> BREUSS, Fritz: Österreichs Aussenwirtschaft 2007, FIW Kompetenzzentrum „Forschungsschwerpunkt Internationale Wirtschaft“ 2007, Wien 2007

<sup>110</sup> Österreichs Aussewirtschaft 2007, Univ. Prof.Dr. Fritz Breuss (WIFO)

<sup>111</sup> Austrian National Bank, Statistics, <http://www.oenb.at/isaweb/report.do?lang=DE&report=950.1>

at all events." Austria had to significantly reduce its dependence on Russia's energy policy and put its energy supplies on a broader footing. The Nabucco pipeline is "indispensable" in this connection. Bartenstein had previously described this pipeline as "Europe's most important energy project of all".<sup>112</sup>

The next investments after the OMV followed were Mayr-Melnhof, Gallaher-Austria in tobacco industry. In 2007, the agreement about cooperation in Tourism sector and Austrian firms Doppelmayr was signed and Tourisms-Consultant ATC entered Turkish market. With these investments, Austria occupied the third position among foreign investors in Turkey in 2006 and was more important than Germany. Between 2001 and 2006, Austria invested more than 911 million euro which, in comparison with the same period in China (231 million euro) is three times more.<sup>113</sup>

	Turkey	Croatia	Central and East Europe	EU 15	Germany	Total
2002	6	536	4 388	868	199	6 142
2003	14	469	3 642	1 990	667	6 078
2004	23	300	4124	1320	528	6 467
2005	27	568	5 151	2 667	1389	9 010
2006	860	-113	4 619	2 056	774	7 936
2007	2 777	4 897	10 674	745	204	14 042

Table 5: Austria's FDI in selected countries (in million EUR)<sup>114</sup>

#### 4.4. Public opinion

The Austrian public is more adamantly opposed to Turkish accession than any other EU member state. According to the most recent Eurobarometer from the autumn 2006, support for Turkish accession is just 5 %. How remarkable this is becomes obvious when one looks at it in a comparative European perspective: 19 % of Greeks supported Turkish accession in 2006. That is four times more support than in Austria.

<sup>112</sup> Austria step up pressure for construction of Nabucco gas pipeline, <http://www.wieninternational.at/en/node/5169>

<sup>113</sup> Wirtschaftskammer Österreich: EU-Aktuell, Beitrittskandidat Türkei, [http://portal.wko.at/wk/format\\_detail.wk?AngID=1&StID=292841&DstID=558](http://portal.wko.at/wk/format_detail.wk?AngID=1&StID=292841&DstID=558)


<sup>114</sup> OeNB, <http://www.oenb.at/>



Country	In Favour
Austria	5
Germany	16
Cyprus	19
France	22
Luxembourg	17
Poland	40
Portugal	40
Sweden	46
UK	30

**Table 6: Public support for membership of Turkey in selected countries 2006**<sup>115</sup>

The same result shows the survey conducted by the “Gesellschaft für Europapolitik” in Austria from October 2005. Only 8% of respondents answered that Turkey is ready for membership and 32 % answered that Turkey should never join the EU.



**Figure 7: Austria’s public opinion about Turkey’s preparedness for the EU membership**<sup>116</sup>

<sup>115</sup> Source: [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf)

<sup>116</sup> Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, [http://cms.euro-info.net/received/3456\\_Tuerkei.pdf](http://cms.euro-info.net/received/3456_Tuerkei.pdf)

The trend towards rejection of Turkey's accession to the EU is present not only in Austria but also in other European countries. This trend increased since the beginning of 1990s from 42 % to 47 % in 2000.<sup>117</sup> The rejection of Turkey in Europe in 2006 amounted to 59 %.<sup>118</sup>

The objection in Austria lies from the end of 1990s ranges between 50 - 60%. As mentioned above, Austrians are more sceptical towards Turkey's membership than European average. Therefore, the question is why exactly Austria?<sup>119</sup> The major turning point in this regard was 2004 and parliament election. The current public mood does not have its roots in the distant past. Rather, it is a reflection of the recent behaviour of the Austrian political elite, and the direction in which they have chosen to take the public debate.<sup>120</sup> Given that Turkey's membership is not seriously supported by any significant political, cultural, intellectual or business lobby in Austria and that Turkish question has not been discussed in a balanced and neutral fashion, but has been charged with rightwing and xenophobic overtones, it is not surprising that public support for Turkey's accession has further diminished.<sup>121</sup> Until 2004, all the major political players had supported a sober discussion of the pros and cons for Austria of each individual enlargement decision. This situation is also reflected in public opinion. Whereas in 2002 disapproval for Turkish membership was around 32% which is nearly the same result for the support of Croatia in that year with 34%,<sup>122</sup> after the change of political situation the support for Turkey was only 10 % in 2005 following the next decrease in the year 2006 by 5 %.<sup>123</sup>

Since then, Austrian politicians have made little effort to explain their position on Turkey to the public. There were no visits by Austrian ministers to Ankara or Istanbul in 2006 or 2007. Austrian institutions have produced little serious research (compared to the Netherlands, Sweden or Germany) about contemporary Turkey. Nor has there been much exchange in other fields, from culture to academia, despite a new and very active Turkish ambassador in Vienna. This

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<sup>117</sup> European Commission: Eurobarometer 38, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb38/eb38\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb38/eb38_en.pdf), , [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb53/eb53\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb53/eb53_en.pdf)

<sup>118</sup> European Commission: Eurobarometer 66 [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf)

<sup>119</sup> European Commission: Eurobarometer 47-58, Brusel, Publisher between 1997-2002

<sup>120</sup> A referendum on the unknown Turk, Anatomy of an Austrian debate [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document\\_ID=101](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=101)

<sup>121</sup> GÜNAY, Ceniz: Conditionality, Impact and prejudice in EU-Turkey relations- A view from Austria, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Roma, July 2007, p.52

<sup>122</sup> European Commission, Eurobarometer 57, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57\\_austria.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57_austria.pdf)

<sup>123</sup> European Commission, Eurobarometer 63, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_en.pdf),

contrasts sharply with Austrian behaviour towards other accession countries, such as Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.<sup>124</sup>

On the whole, there is little knowledge about Turkey. Looking at Austrian schoolbooks Austrian students do not learn about modern Turkey. The books are also criticized for the creation of stereotypes, as there can be found sarcastic faximiles without comments. The only reference to Turkey is about how Austria conquered Turkey and from this arises that Vienna might have been had today Turkish city with mosques, turbans and Harems.<sup>125</sup> As far as the exchange programs are concerned, between 1995 and 2001, only 38 Austrians went to Turkey for an academic exchange financed by the Austrian government, while in the same period, 3,561 Austrians went to Great Britain.<sup>126</sup>

Unlike Germany, Austria has no academic centre for Turkish studies. There has also not been any study analyzing the effects of Turkish membership in the EU. Wolfgang Schüssel, in a guest commentary in the Kronen Zeitung in October 2004, called for an "honest, unmasked analysis on the impact of Turkish accession to the EU, complaining there had "not yet been enough material to answer questions of immigration, the labour market, costs, the results on regional funds, or agriculture." However, the government has not commissioned any studies on the impact of Turkish enlargement on Austria or the EU. There is also no official cultural centre to promote contemporary Turkish culture (unlike other countries such as Poland or Bulgaria).<sup>127</sup>

#### **4.4.1. The polls' results**

A detailed analysis of existing polls conducted by the European Commission in 2006 shows that the big obstacle for Austrians are cultural differences between Turkey and Europeans. 84 % Austrians answered that cultural differences are too significant to allow joining the EU. There is also higher fear of immigration (81 %) than European average (66%). It also shows that some of the arguments used elsewhere to bolster support for the Turkish accession do not convince most Austrians. Only 18 % Austrians think that Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region. Austrians also do not believe that Turkey's accession to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values.

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<sup>124</sup> A referendum on the unknown Turk, Anatomy of an Austrian debate  
[http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document\\_ID=101](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=101)

<sup>125</sup> GINNAKOPOULOS, Angelos: Die Türkei Debatte in Europa, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Fachverlage, Januar 2005, ISBN 3-531-14290-9, p. 118

<sup>126</sup> A referendum on the unknown Turk, Anatomy of Austrian debate  
[http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story\\_ID=20&slide\\_ID=10](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=20&slide_ID=10)

This outcome is rather surprising with regard to Austria's traditional role as a mediator between East and West.




Figure 8: Austria's public opinion on selected issues in 2006<sup>128</sup>




Figure 8: Austria's public opinion on selected issues in 2006<sup>70</sup>

<sup>128</sup> European Commission, Eurobarometer 66, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf)

#### 4.4.2. Attitudes towards Turkey's EU accession by profession

Sceptical attitudes are pervasive across the Austrian population, whether one looks at students, managers, pensioners or housewives. The greatest support for Turkey is among students and the lowest - among unemployed people.




Figure 9: Attitudes toward Turkey's EU accession (by profession)<sup>129</sup>

<sup>129</sup> What the polls tell us, [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story\\_ID=20&slide\\_ID=8](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=20&slide_ID=8)

# Conclusion

The main aim of this thesis was to explain the Austrian's attitude and the reasons for rejection of the enlargement of the European Union by Turkey.

The conclusions to the character of Austria's foreign policy and its role in the European Union are following. Austria is a member of the European Union since 1995. This later accession was not motivated by neutrality concept in the foreign policy of Austria but by complicated historical relations with Germany. Within the European Union Austria belongs to sceptic-countries. The scepticism was aggravated by the sanctions in 1999 (when Jorg Haider's centre right party was part of a coalition), which were viewed as being too harsh.

The sceptical position is also reflected in attitude towards enlargement. The main concern among Austrian people is the influx of cheap labour from the East. This fear is given by the uncertainties in the labour market accelerated by the globalisation. However, this attitude seems to be quite paradoxical given the fact that Austria benefited from the Eastern enlargement the most of the EU countries.

Despite the fact that Austrian population remains especially sceptical towards enlargement, it is apparent that Austrian preferences with regard to potential new members are vary. Unlike Turkey, which from Austrian perspective is at lowest priority among potential candidates in the EU, the Western Balkan countries are much more welcomed due to historical linkage and the economic relations. Austria is an important trading partner with Western Balkan, Austrian companies often following the pioneering business activities of Austrian banks and insurance companies have established a considerable presence in the region by now. Furthermore, Austria is very active in stabilisation programmes in this area. This favouritism was obvious during the Austrian presidency, when accession of the Balkan countries were one of the top priorities and in October 2005 when Austria opposed the decision to start accession negotiation with Turkey unless talks with Croatia were also started.

As for the second part of the thesis, this describes relations between Turkey and the European Union. I came to the following conclusions. It is necessary to take into account that rejection of Turkey as a member is not limited to Austria, but is also true in many European countries. The reluctance towards Turkey's membership is not a new issue. Turkey has been striving for membership in the EU since 1963. Owing to this fact Turkey can be considered as a

rather unique potential member of the European Union. Furthermore, though Turkey was given a candidate status in 2005, it does not mean that it will lead to the full membership. This fear of Turkey's accession incited the debate about creation of an additional criterion - absorption capacity that should be met prior to accession of a country to the EU.

This debate about Turkey stems from the fact that Turkey has been seen as "the other" due to its different socio-cultural practices given by religion, historical development and also location (as only 8% of the country lies geographically in Europe). Besides these different practices the fears are enhanced by the size and economic situation in Turkey which gave rise to questions about financial and institutional impact on the European Union.

As for the social and cultural matters, European Union highlights common European heritage such as common history, Christianity, evangelic individualism, humanism, rationalism and secularism. Given the vast differences in cultural and religious norms, the issue is the fit between Turkey, which would be the only Muslim country in the EU with 99, 8 % of Muslim population, and the other member states.

Furthermore, if Turkey wants to fulfil the requisite commitments to the principles of liberty, democracy, and respect for human rights, it will have to make significant strides in following areas: freedom of expression, on civilian control by the military and on the rights of non-Muslim religious minorities. Further, progress is also needed in the fight against corruption, the judicial reform, trade union rights, and women's and children's rights.

The next set of issues arising from Turkey's membership is in connection with Turkey's location. With Turkish accession, the Union's borders would extend to the Turkey's neighbours – that is to the Southern Caucasus states (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) and to Syria, Iran and Iraq. These countries are presently a source of tensions and bring problems to the EU's external relations such as terrorism, migration, human trafficking, narcotics and arms proliferation. Thus, if these countries become direct neighbours of the EU, it will be necessary to take certain steps in order to strengthen the Union's foreign policy concerns especially in this region. On the other hand, Turkey has been a member of many Western institutions and holds a considerably important position within the member states of NATO due to its military expenditures. Thus, on a positive note, Turkey could contribute to European Foreign and Security policy.

Regarding Copenhagen criteria in the economic area, Turkey is prepared for accession and is able to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. However, the performance of Turkish economy measured by GDP is still low. In terms of size, Turkey's

economy is comparable to Poland and is large in comparison to its close or remote Balkan neighbours. But in relative terms with 8440 GDP per capita, it is below the European level.

Given its size and level of economic development, Turkey's accession would undoubtedly have an important impact on the EU budget, since Turkey would be eligible for significant support under the Common Agriculture Policy and Structural policy. These costs are difficult to calculate, but an attempt of the Centre for European Studies to estimate them shows that the impact of Turkey's accession would remain manageable for European budget.

Turkey's accession to the EU would also have implications for EU decision making. As a large country, Turkey would play a relatively bigger role in the EU than many other entrants. It is assumed that Turkey will enter the EU after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which proposes institutional changes and is now in the process of adoption. Unlike in the European Commission where impact of Turkey will be minimal (as its composition will be based on equal rotation between member states), Turkey's accession would significantly affect the allocation of seats in the European Parliament and distribution of voices in the decision making of The Council of the EU. The significant impact of Turkey's accession on the EU voting in the Council of the EU was also confirmed by the study from Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén, who concluded that the distribution of power would be largely affected and the biggest losers would be the medium-size countries, as for example Austria.

As for the third part of the thesis, it deals with the Turkish debate in Austria, I came to following outcomes. Austria has been a particularly interesting case with regard to the question of Turkish accession. As is generally known, Austria together with France, Greece, and the Greek Cypriots are considered to be hardliners on the Turkish question. When the decision about opening negotiation talks with Turkey was made by Council on 3 October 2005, Austria was the only country which opposed it and tried to hinder, delay and stop opening of accession talks with Turkey. This stance has several reasons which can be divided into two categories.

First, despite relatively positive relations between Turkey and Austria from the 18 th. century, which reached the peak in the First World War where two countries were allies, the memories of the siege of Vienna in 1529 and the battle of Vienna in 1683 are overriding and still in the centre of attention. Moreover, the image of Turkey is negatively influenced by the Turkish immigrants in Austria, who came as guest workers after the signing of the bilateral agreement in response to a labour shortage in Austria in 1964. Those immigrants, who had been meant to be temporary, had become long term and now they account for 22 % of population. This makes Turkish immigrants one of the largest groups of non-EU foreigners in Austria. But it does not mean that these people are fully integrated. On the contrary, Turkish immigrants fare worse than



the other migrant communities especially in labour market and education where they tend to have higher unemployment rates, lower wages, and less educational success than Austrian host society. This is given by the fact that first Turkish immigrants had a rural background and a low level of education but also to certain aspect by Austria's policy of assimilation in its homogeneous society that still experiences conflicts with minority groups and puts pressure on the minorities which results in the hostility toward them.

Second, the negative perceptions of Turkey in Austria were aggravated by the political discussions which started with the EU parliament election on 12.Juni 2004. When the Democrats FPÖ, currently in the opposition, attacked the ruling Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) for 'going soft' on Turkey by failing to block the opening of accession talks, leading OVP chancellor knew that this topic might be used in the election by the FPÖ party and suggested the referendum about Turkey's accession. The result of this suggestion was that all Austrian parties, with the exception of the Green party, have clearly dismissed Turkey's membership. The most negative stance was voiced by the far right parties FPÖ and BZÖ, which portrayed Islam as a major threat to Austrian, Christian and European culture and with its xenophobic slogans contributed to the fostering of negative feelings towards Turkey's accession

The influence of these political discussions is reflected in the trend towards rejection of Turkey's accession to the EU. According to the results of Eurobarometer: Whereas in 2002 disapproval for Turkish membership was around 32% which is nearly the same result for the support of Croatia in that year with 34 %, after the change of political situation the support for Turkey was only 10 % in 2005 following the next decrease in the year 2006 by 5 %. With this outcome, Austrian public is more adamantly opposed to Turkish accession than any other EU member state.

In addition, these political discussions contrast with the lack of knowledge about Turkey in Austria. Austrian schoolbooks do not depict modern Turkey, there is no academic centre for Turkish studies, no study about the impact of Turkish accession to the EU on Austria has been conducted yet, and there is also no cultural centre to promote Turkish culture.

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