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Migration Flows in the Wake of the 2004 EU Enlargement: A Case Study of the UK and Poland

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Declaration

This thesis, *Migration Flows in the Wake of the 2004 EU Enlargement: A Case Study of the UK and Poland*, was composed solely by the author. Sources that were used are listed in the enclosed bibliography.

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List of abbreviations

A8	Countries that Acceded to the EU in 2004 (excluding Malta and Cyprus)
CSO	The Central Statistical Office of Poland
EC	The European Commission
EU	The European Union
EU-10	Countries that Joined the European Union in 2004
EU-15	Members of the European Union Prior to the 2004 Enlargement
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
LFS	Labor Force Survey
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NELM	New Economics of Labor Migration
NIN	National Insurance Number
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
TEU	The Treaty on European Union
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UK	The United Kingdom
US	The United States
USD	United States Dollars
WRS	Worker's Registration Scheme

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Introduction

Although the phenomenon of migration has been a part of the human experience since time immemorial, only lately, in light of the shifting migration patterns that have emerged since World War II, has its significance drawn wide academic attention. While some countries, such as the United States, have witnessed radical shifts in the source of their immigration flows, other countries, such as those in Europe, have transformed themselves from net sending countries to net receiving countries. In the years immediately following WWII, migration inflows within Europe were typically confined to countries in Northern and Western Europe. However, around the mid-1980s even Southern European countries, which hitherto had been net sending countries (primarily sending their workers to countries in the north), began attracting large flows of workers from around the world. These changing migration patterns drew the attention of scholars who attempted to develop theories that could account for both the initiation of the flows as well as the persistence of certain migration networks through time.

Recently, coinciding with the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, the topic of migration has once again emerged as an important issue for both academics and policymakers. Prior to enlargement, many media reports predicted that the opening up of internal borders would lead to older member states receiving massive inflows of migrant workers from the newer member states. And even though large inflows did occur after enlargement, these inflows were nowhere near as large as predictions indicated.[1]

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[1] Some media sources predicted that outflows from the new EU member states would exceed 40 million. See Borjas, 2005. Of course, flows of this size never materialized. It is now estimated that roughly 3 million eastern Europeans will take advantage of open borders in the 15 years

Using the case of Poland and the United Kingdom, this paper seeks to address some of the questions that have arisen in light of recent migration trends: Are certain theoretical models better than others at explaining and describing recent migration trends? Which of the prevailing theories of migration is consistent with recent empirical evidence? What were the observed migration patterns in both the UK and Poland respectively? How have recent migration inflows in the UK impacted the local economy? Are these impacts consistent with other historical migration shocks?

This paper examines the specific case of migration flows from Poland to the UK in the wake of the 2004 EU enlargement. Poland is used as a microcosm representing a window into larger trends that occurred throughout the newly acceding member states. As such, this paper sometimes oscillates between a specific analysis of Poland and a more general analysis of the acceding states as a group. Of the acceding countries (the EU-10), Poland witnessed the largest flows of outward migration in the immediate aftermath of enlargement. This was due both to its demographic size in relation to the other members of the EU-10 as well as prior migration networks that had long been established and that thus facilitated further flows.

Beginning with an analysis of the prevailing theories of migration, which attempt to both describe and predict the phenomenon, the paper moves on to an empirical analysis of both emigration flows from Poland and immigration flows to the UK in the years immediately following enlargement. The effects of these flows on the internal market of the UK are examined through a comparison with other exogenous migration

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following the 2004 enlargement. This revised number represents roughly 3% of the population of the acceding countries and roughly 1% of the population of the older EU member states. See the European Commission Report, 2006.

shocks that have impacted other countries in recent history. Finally, an attempt is made to evaluate the prevailing theories of migration analyzed earlier in light of the empirical evidence in order to determine the utility of the various theories. It should be noted that trends and flows of refugees and asylum seekers are not herein examined as the opening up of labor markets commensurate with the 2004 EU enlargement predominantly impacted labor migration as opposed to these other forms of the larger phenomenon of international movement.

This paper is divided into five chapters along with an introduction and a conclusion. Chapter 1 lays out the main theoretical models that migration scholars use in order to predict and interpret migration flows. Chapter 2 proceeds to an analysis of immigration trends in the UK, while Chapter 3 looks at both emigration and immigration trends in Poland. In Chapter 4 an examination of the impact of migration flows on economic conditions in the UK is offered. Finally, in Chapter 5 the theoretical models laid out in the first chapter are reviewed in light of the observed trends and patterns that actually occurred in the years immediately following 2004.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Models of International Migration

The study of international migration has generated a number of theories each seeking to explain and account for observed patterns of migration. Broadly speaking, while some theories take a micro-level economic approach, others employ larger units of aggregation. Some theories situate the potential migrant in comparative isolation from others, as a rational actor utilizing a cost-benefit model in order to maximize a human capital investment. Other theories judge such an assumption of isolation as a logical impossibility and therefore make a point of embedding the migrant within a much larger socio-historical backdrop. Are the forces of international migration to be understood as emanating from individual choices, from larger patterns within modern industrial societies or from something else entirely such as the historical trajectory of capitalism? Whatever the window of analysis chosen, modern trends in international migration appear to render relying a priori on a single level of analysis futile. The causes of international movement cannot be described from the perspective of a single theoretical model; instead, the complexities of the phenomenon require a nuanced approach incorporating a variety of models, units of aggregation and theoretical assumptions.

The theories examined in this chapter, while widely divergent in their assumptions, units of analysis and frames of reference, all attempt to account for the underlying forces of international movement. Theories in the field of neoclassical economics focus on wages differentials, relative employment conditions and the costs of migration associated with physical and psychological upheaval. Generally these theories envision migration patterns as larger reflections of individual decisions based on income maximization. The more recently developing field, referred to as the new economics of labor migration (NELM), approaches migration patterns from a slightly larger unit of aggregation, the family as opposed to the individual. Theorists working in this field understand the decision to migrate as a reflection of risk mitigation undertaken by families seeking to overcome local market failures or inefficiencies. While the aforementioned theories take a micro-level approach to the analysis, dual labor market theory and world systems theory each set out from a much larger and more structural perspective. The former understands migration as emerging from the structural requirements of modern industrial societies while the latter situates the phenomenon within the much larger forces of globalization and international market penetration.

Neoclassical Economic Theories: Macro-level Analysis

Classical economic trade theory understands international trade as a process by which factor prices tend to equilibrium.[2] Within this theoretical framework, differences in the relative endowment of mobile factors of production, specifically labor and capital, explain patterns of international movement. Perhaps the oldest and most widely used theory of international migration employs this understanding to account for the initiation of migration flows. Regions endowed with an abundance of labor relative to capital will have low market wage rates and high capital returns while regions endowed with a relative abundance of capital will have higher market wage rates and lower returns on

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[2] See Samuelson, 1948 and Borjas, 2005. The most well-known example of this theory is encapsulated by the Heckscher-Ohlin model for international trade

capital.[3] The relative abundance of labor in labor-rich regions causes workers to move to labor-scarce regions in search of higher returns for their labor. Commensurately, the relative abundance of capital in capital-rich regions causes capital to flow from these regions to capital-scarce regions where returns are higher.[4] This theory understands migration as a phenomenon driven by differences in relative regional wages. These differences, along with differences in the relative allocation of capital, impel international movement, which continues until a state of relative equilibrium is reached.[5]

An important corollary to this theory, which has already been intimated, concerns the movement of capital. While the model assumes that labor flows from labor-rich regions to labor-scarce regions, it also assumes that capital flows in the opposite direction. But the extension of the term does not simply cover physical or financial capital; it also includes human capital. Thus the international movement of human capital, i.e., managers, technicians, etc., follows the international movement of labor, only in the opposite direction. For this reason, the movement of labor must be kept conceptually distinct from the movement of human capital.[6]

Although the neoclassical macro theory provides an intelligible reference point for analyzing international labor flows, it nonetheless employs a variety of assumptions, which may or may not actually apply. International markets are judged to be efficient, labor markets are assumed to function in full employment, and migration flows are seen as a response to differences in relative wage rates across borders. In the absence of such

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[3] This phenomenon is represented by the familiar supply and demand curve.
[4] Economists often use the example of Japan, as a capital-rich and labor-scarce country, and China, as a labor-rich and capital-scarce country. In this simplified model, capital would flow from Japan to China while labor would flow in the opposite direction.
[5] See Harris and Todaro, 1970.
[6] See Massey et al., 1993.

wage differentials, the international movement of labor ceases. Flows of human capital respond to differences in rates of return of capital and are to be kept conceptually distinct from flows of labor. Furthermore, the theory assumes that labor markets are the primary markets influencing international migration.[7]

Neoclassical Economic Theories: Micro-level Analysis

Parallel to the macro theory of movement, the micro theory substitutes individual choice for labor market supply and demand as the primary cause of international migration flows. Under this framework, individual actors rationally calculate the costs and benefits of moving and migrate if the benefits outweigh the costs.[8] Investing in human capital is understood as the primary factor motivating migration decisions. Thus if an individual's human capital returns are greater elsewhere, minus the costs of moving, the potential migrant migrates.

Prior to migrating, however, the individual must undertake a number of investments in order to ensure a successful transition. The actual material costs of traveling must be factored in, as well as any psychological costs associated with uprooting oneself and moving to another location.[9] Additional costs include the effort necessary to familiarize oneself with a foreign culture, foreign labor market and

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[7] Thus, for example, if policymakers want to control these flows, they must attempt to regulate labor markets in both sending and receiving countries.
[8] See Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969 and Borjas, 2005.
[9] These psychological costs include, inter alia, leaving one's family, friends and social networks.

potentially a foreign language as well.[10] Furthermore the difficulty or ease of finding work in a destination market must be accounted for as well.

Whereas the neoclassical macro theory essentially reduces the phenomenon of migration to the interaction between labor supply and demand, the micro theory posits an individual rational actor who decides whether to migrate or not depending upon the net costs or benefits of moving. “Differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration.”[11] Potential migrants calculate the wage advantages of moving, subtract from this the costs outlined above, and migrate if the advantages outweigh the costs over some time horizon.[12]

Although this theoretical framework does elevate wage differentials as the most important factor motivating the migration decision, it is important to note that the theory does make room for various other cost factors that may affect the ultimate decision. Nevertheless, the decision, “like all other human capital investments…[is] guided by the comparison of the present value of lifetime earnings in the alternative employment opportunities.”[13] Thus the decision making process may be summarized as follows: A potential migrant calculates the potential wage advantage from moving, multiplies this by the probability of finding employment in the destination country and compares the result with the present wage in the sending country multiplied by the probability of finding

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[10] One explanation for why there is not more international movement is that the costs of migrating are extremely high. Borjas (2005) examines the costs incurred by a migrant moving from Puerto Rico to the US and concludes that the total costs are equal to 25 times the migrant’s salary in the home region. It is important to note that insofar as Puerto Ricans are US citizens by birthright such costs are likely to be even higher when analyzing many other migration routes.
[11] John R. Hicks, 1932, *The Theory of Wages*, London: Macmillan, p. 76.
[12] See Borjas, 1990.
[13] George J. Borjas, 2005, *Labor Economics*, Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin: p. 315.

local employment. The costs of migrating are then subtracted and if the overall result is positive, the potential migrant becomes an actual migrant.[14]

Like the macro theory of international migration, the micro theory too is underpinned by a variety of assumptions. Just as the macro theory posited differences in wage and employment rates as the primary causes of international movement, the micro theory positions wage rates and perceived employment opportunities at the center of its analysis. However, instead of assuming full employment, the micro theory posits employment rates and the perceived probability of finding employment as central to the cost-benefit calculation. Additionally, both human capital investments that increase returns in receiving countries and reductions to the human costs of migrating will increase the likelihood of international movement.[15] Moreover, aggregate international migration flows are the simple product of decisions made at the individual level. Neoclassical economists presume that actors are rational and will always make the decision that maximizes their future earnings potential.[16] And, like the macro theory, the micro theory also assumes that international movement will cease in the absence of differences in wage and employment rates.

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[14] The equation outlined above also incorporates a discount factor that accounts for the greater value attached to present earnings over future earnings.
[15] One extension to this assumption is the idea that if the perceived conditions improve in the destination country, then migration costs are reduced and the probability of movement increases. An example of how prevalent this theory is in the popular understanding of migration flows is the notion that migrants are more likely to move to countries with attractive social benefit systems.
[16] This is another way of saying that the neoclassical economic approach assumes *homo economicus*, the rational self-interested actor, as the primary mover.

The New Economics of Labor Migration

In response to some of the perceived limitations of the neoclassical theories, a new theory has emerged in recent years. Referred to as the new economics of labor migration, this theory proposes that instead of positing an isolated individual as the primary decision maker, the family or household is a more accurate unit to begin with when analyzing migration patterns.[17] In many ways, this change in the unit of analysis represents an improved understanding of the factors influencing the decisions of potential migrants. The NELM crucially recognizes that migrants do not act alone but instead act as part of larger collective groups seeking not only to maximize potential investment opportunities but also to minimize risks and overcome constraints and barriers associated with various market failures or missing markets in their local economy.[18]

Households, unlike individuals, are in a position to diversify risk through sending one family member abroad while other family members remain in the local country. In this way, the allocation of household human capital can be spread out so as to mitigate the risks that may arise in the local economy. While some family members may stay, others may be encouraged to seek employment abroad in economic markets weakly or negatively correlated with those at home.[19] Thus, for example, should a shock hit the local economy depriving a household of expected income, the household can remain relatively insulated through the economic activity of the migrant it sent abroad. The family member in the foreign market can send remittances back home that may be used

[17] See Katz and Stark, 1987 and Stark and Bloom, 1985.
[18] See Borjas, 2005 and Katz and Stark, 1987.
[19] See Stark and Bloom, 1985.

to satisfy immediate consumption needs or even act as investment capital in the absence of local capital markets.

In addition to aggregating up from the individual to the household, another key insight of this theory is the fact that it is not only labor markets that affect the decisions of potential migrants. Other markets, such as credit or insurance markets, can also impact a household's decision to send a member abroad. If such markets do not exist or are insufficient, these local market failures, or missing markets, encourage migration insofar as the household's risk is thereby more safely spread out. Take the example of crop insurance. Whereas in developed countries, farmers can insure themselves against a potential drought or bad harvest by taking out insurance against just such a possibility, this opportunity does not exist in many developing countries. Moreover, in developed countries farmers can utilize futures markets in order to insure against the possibility of an unexpected drop in crop prices. Again, this avenue is missing in many developing countries. Without such opportunities open to them, households in such economies may opt to send family members abroad who then act as de facto forms of insurance against the possibility of negative local market outcomes.[20]

A final key insight from the NELM concerns wages and their impact on the decision to migrate. In contrast to the neoclassical theories, the NELM assumes that wage differentials are not absolute measures of the utility of various investment decisions. A wage increase means different things to different people in different environments. Thus analysts working within this framework posit that households do not simply migrate in order to increase their wealth in absolute terms, but also to increase their wealth relative

[20] See Massey et al., 1993.

to some reference group.[21] This phenomenon is called *relative deprivation* and it means that if certain households feel more or less deprived relative to a certain reference group, the probability that they will migrate increases or decreases accordingly.[22]

Even though the NELM represents a welcome opening up of the theoretical framework through which international migration may be analyzed, it too operates under a number of assumptions. Not only is the household assumed to be the proper unit of analysis, but also wage differentials are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain international movement. In the absence of wage differentials, a household may still decide to send a member abroad in order to insure themselves against various local market failures or missing markets. Furthermore, expected wage gains are not measured in absolute terms but must be measured against some reference group.[23] [24]

Dual Labor Market Theory

While the neoclassical theories and the new economics of labor migration may employ different units to analyze the phenomenon of international movement and the causes of its initiation, they nonetheless all model international migration essentially

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[21] See Massey et al., 1993
[22] See Stark and Taylor, 1989 and Stark, 1991. An extension of this theory is the idea that migration rates are more moderate in countries with relative income equality and more pronounced in countries with greater income disparity. One way to test this particular theoretical extension would be to try and find a correlation between migration rates and a country's position on the Gini Index.
[23] See Massey et al., 1993.
[24] An implication for governments of the NELM is that in order to regulate migration flows, policies cannot simply address labor markets. Insurance, capital and other markets also must be targeted. In addition, government policies that aim to develop traditional sending regions may exacerbate migratory flows if the gains from development policies only accrue to a certain segment of society.

within a micro-level framework of rational decision-making.[25] In contrast to this, dual labor market theory takes a more structural approach arguing that international movement arises not because of decisions made at the level of the individual or the household but because of the inherent labor demands that persist in modern industrial societies.[26] While earlier theorists argued that migration flows stemmed from push factors such as wage differentials, employment conditions or market failures in sending regions, dual labor market theorists argue instead that migration flows can more accurately be understood as arising from pull factors such as the perpetual need for cheap labor that exists in modern industrial countries. These pull demands are structural in nature, which is to say that they are necessary corollaries to the developmental patterns of advanced industrial societies.

Dual labor market theory asserts that because of various structural phenomena inherent in modern industrial capitalism, economies demand a perpetual supply of immigrant labor.[27] To begin with, it is not the case that wages simply reflect the interaction between labor supply and demand. They also confer a kind of social prestige upon the recipient. Thus a prospective employer cannot simply raise wages in order to offset a particular labor shortage. For if one category of wages is raised within a particular industry, all other wages on up the industrial hierarchy must also be raised in order to maintain the perception of the kind of prestige commensurate with a certain kind

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[25] It has to be admitted, of course, that the neoclassical macro theory does employ a more structural approach in its use of supply and demand analysis.
[26] See Piore, 1997.
[27] See Piore, 1997.

of work. This particular constraint upon an employer's ability to attract labor is called structural inflation.[28]

Another structural demand facing advanced industrial societies is the existence of a segmented labor force – i.e., there is both a primary and a secondary market for labor.[29] And while the primary market is characterized by secure employment, relatively high wages and opportunities for advancement, the secondary sector is characterized by insecure or fluctuating employment, low wages and little if any opportunities for advancement. Yet for all the problems associated with employment in the secondary sector, it is nonetheless a necessary aspect of modern societies.[30] The problem for employers, however, is finding native workers willing to take on employment in fields that offer few opportunities for career advancement and confer very little prestige within native communities.[31] These motivational pull demands, caused by the difficulty employers have in attracting native workers to the secondary sector, become more acute as the demographics of industrial societies develop and change. Societies with diminishing numbers of young people may find it increasingly difficult to fill various employment positions historically held by young people, for whom issues of prestige and motivation often carry little effect.[32]

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[28] Take the example of the restaurant industry. Should an employer in this industry looking for more dishwashers seek to attract employees by raising the dishwasher's wage, it is likely that everyone on up the chain, from line cooks to the wait staff, will demand a similar wage hike.
[29] Of course, as joke of the old economist goes: there are also grey and black sectors.
[30] To take just one example, the service industry, though situated in the secondary sector, is a vital aspect of advanced modern economies.
[31] Thus employers often resort to recruitment practices to fill vacancies in, e.g., the hotel, hospital and services industries.
[32] Historically, young people and women have often filled these employment vacancies. However, as women have become more powerful members of the primary labor force and as birthrates have been declining throughout Europe, vacancies in the secondary sector have become

The assumptions of dual labor market theory diverge quite meaningfully from those extending from the theories outlined above. Instead of push factors in the sending regions, dual labor market theory assumes that pull factors relating to structural demands in receiving regions are the primary factors influencing international movement. And because international migration is here understood as a demand issue, wage differentials between sending and receiving regions will have little effect on international movement. Furthermore, although inherent structural demands inhibit wage increases in the secondary sector, wages may still fall in this sector depending on the supply of workers.

It should be noted that dual labor market theory assumes that governments can do very little in the way of regulating or controlling international labor flows as these flows are embedded within the very structure of industrial societies.[33] However, governments could attempt to fill structural shortcomings by encouraging employer recruitment strategies that target foreign workers capable of meeting local labor demand.[34]

World Systems Theory

Like the dual labor market theory, world systems theory takes a macro-level approach to analyzing international flows of workers. Yet instead of attributing international migration to inherent structural deficiencies within national economies,

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more acute. See Hanson, 2007. It is for this reason that the demographic changes currently impacting Europe through its declining birthrates will likely have large economic implications.

[33] See Massey et al., 1993.

[34] These foreign recruitment policies would provide local economies with foreign workers who complement, as opposed to compete against, their native counterparts. In other words, foreign labor recruitment schemes under the dual labor market theory enable local economies to satisfy demand gaps or holes that exist within the native labor market.

world systems theory takes a more historical and global approach. The theorists working within this framework argue that capitalist market penetration from core countries into peripheral countries creates an uprooted population prone to migrate due to the upheaval such market penetration causes.[35] As companies in modern industrialized countries expand operations outward in search of additional natural resources, land, labor or consumer markets, local economies in these peripheral regions, which hitherto had remained outside the purview of capitalist market forces, are incorporated into the global economy and thereby irrevocably altered.[36]

World Systems theorists argue that the practice of European colonialism begun in the sixteenth century initiated this process. Yet whereas formally this process was overseen through colonial government outposts, today the process is perpetuated through the activities of multinational corporations and the neoliberal government policies that support and enable their activities.[37] The key insight of this theory is that once global market forces impact peripheral regions, local economic systems become disrupted. This disruption creates a kind of void in local labor markets as workers realize that employment opportunities formerly available to them are no longer available. To take just one example, imagine that a company in a core country seeks to buy land in a peripheral region in order to expand productive output. If previously that land had been used for agriculture, then suddenly, through global market forces, those who work the land are driven out and forced to find employment elsewhere.[38]

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[35] See Wallerstein, 1974 and Morawska, 1990.
[36] See Castells, 1989 and Petras, 1981.
[37] See Massey et al., 1993.
[38] Another example of how this process occurs can be seen in the creation of foreign factories. As the demand for cheap labor drives companies in core regions to build factories in peripheral

In addition, world systems theory also notes the compounding traffic that develops between these peripheral and core regions as migration networks are formed and companies in the core regions begin catering to the needs of those arriving.[39] The development of migration networks leads to increasing migration flows between the regions as costs are reduced and employment and living conditions in the receiving country become more predictable.[40]

As with the theories outlined above, world systems theory operates under a number of assumptions. International migration is seen as a structural effect of capitalist market penetration from core regions to peripheral regions. Implicit in the theory is the notion that migration flows follow flows of capital investment but in the opposite direction. As sustainable networks are created between core and peripheral regions, these flows become more pronounced. Since international migration is seen as a necessary effect of globalization (and not as an effect of wage or employment differentials), these flows are very difficult to regulate.[41] [42]

To summarize, it is important to note that even though the theories outlined above differ in how they approach the study of international migration, they are not necessarily incompatible. Mutual exclusivity is not a feature of any one of these theories. In fact, it

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regions where wages are lower, local productive relations are disrupted causing workers in these regions to seek employment elsewhere.

[39] For example, there are now many companies and stores in the UK that cater directly to Polish consumers. See Fomina and Frelak, 2008.

[40] Studying the rise of migration networks that spring up as traffic increases between sending and receiving regions is called "network theory."

[41] They risk alienating multinational corporations who may decided to move operations elsewhere. Moreover restrictive government regulations regarding international flows of capital run the risk of igniting international trade disputes.

[42] An important corollary to this theory is the notion that foreign military intervention also creates similar patterns of migration. However, instead of workers uprooted from historical modes of production, military intervention creates a flood of refugees who then have a moral claim to being resettled in core regions.

seems reasonable to assert that international migration may result from a number of causes. Potential migrants may act rationally in order to increase expected returns on human capital. Or they may act within a more collective framework in which risks are spread out and local market barriers superseded. Additionally, migration may also arise due to the structural requirements of modern industrial economies or due to the penetration of multinational corporations on an international scale. It is not necessary to reduce the phenomenon to the simple axioms of a single theory. Indeed, the complexity of international movement calls for a comprehensive approach in which the tools of each of the theories are incorporated in turn.

Chapter 2: Examining Recent Migration Flows to the UK

Having outlined the most influential theories regarding the study of international migration, it is time to move to an examination of an actual recent migration flow. This chapter focuses on Polish migration to the UK in the wake of the 2004 enlargement of the European Union.

The proximate cause of the influx of Polish workers into the UK labor market beginning in 2004 was the elimination of barriers to the free movement of people commensurate with Poland's accession to the EU.[43] The free movement of people has long been a contentious issue for European policymakers as it has been both rhetorically and legislatively tied to issues of security and external border controls.[44] While the Treaty of Rome called for the creation of a single market within the then European Community, its construction was slow in getting realized. Governments were content to allow the free movement of goods and capital; however, the free movement of people was never entirely politically palatable.[45]

Opening national markets to foreign goods and capital was seen as something distinct from the sensitive issue of opening national labor markets. For this reason, Jacques Delors, as head of the European Commission, called for a renewed commitment

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[43] Article three of the TEU states: "The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the preventing and combating of crime."

[44] See Menz, 2009. The argument is that the Europeanization of migration policy, i.e., the attempt to harmonize migration policy across the EU, has gone hand in hand with the increased securitization of the Union whereby more stringent external border controls have come to complement looser internal controls.

[45] The EU's four fundamental freedoms included the free movement of goods, services, capital and people.

to the creation of a single market in the 1980s – a call that was finally realized legally with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.[46] In 2004, when the EU was enlarged with the accession of ten Central and Eastern European states, the EU's *acquis communautaire* was extended to cover these new member states.[47]

Commensurate with joining the EU was the ability of citizens of new member states to travel and work freely throughout the EU.[48] One of the immediate consequences of enlargement, therefore, was an inflow of migrants from the accession countries (EU-10) to the older EU member states (EU-15). This inflow, however, was not spread out evenly. On 1 May 2004, the date when the enlargement officially came into effect, only the UK, Ireland and Sweden granted unrestricted labor market access to citizens from the new member states.[49] Thus from 2004, the UK experienced a sharp increase in the number of incoming migrants. Accordingly, the 2004 enlargement of the EU can be interpreted as an exogenous shock on the UK labor market – the importance and meaning of which will be examined later.

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[46] See Marsh, 2008.

[47] The EU *acquis* refers to all the legislative acts and court decisions that together constitute the body of law of the European Union.

[48] Older EU member states, in accordance with the accession treaties, were able to restrict labor market access for a period of seven years. Only Sweden, Ireland and the UK allowed unrestricted access. The UK did, however, require workers from eight of the EU-10 (the A8) to register with the UK Home Office under the Worker's Registration Scheme (WRS) within 30 days of starting employment. See the European Commission Report, 2006.

[49] See note 42 above. On 1 May 2006, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Finland opened their labor markets to citizens from A8 countries. Italy followed in July 2006. France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Belgium also reduced restrictions in 2006. See Zaiceva, 2006. Regarding restricted market access to nationals from the acceding states, see EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/editorial/abc_c02_r1.htm.

Recent Demographic Changes in the UK

When estimating the impact of enlargement on the UK labor market, it is important to note that the UK had been undergoing a steady increase in its immigration rates prior to 2004. Since the mid-1990s, large numbers of migrants, primarily from states within the Commonwealth, had been migrating to the UK. This inflow, along with the 2004 shock of additional migrants from the A8 countries, has had the largest impact on recent UK population growth.[50] Even though the country's population grew by a mere 8.2% from 1971 to 2006 (from 55.9 million to 60.5 million (see Figure 1)), much of this growth occurred after the mid-1990s.[51] Thus while the UK's population grew by 2.8 million people between 1971 and 1999, from 1999 to 2006 the population grew by another 1.8 million. During the period covered, outward migration rates as well as birth and death rates remained relatively constant. According to statistics provided by the Bank of England, from 2005 to 2006, roughly two-thirds of this population growth was driven by an increase in inward migration (see Figure 2).[52] And most of this increase in turn can be attributed to the inflow of migrants from A8 countries (see Figure 2).

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[50] The A8, or eight accession countries, refers to eight of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 (excluding Malta and Cyprus). The A8 countries are: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

[51] In contrast, the US population grew by 44.6% during the same period. From 1971 to 2004, population growth in the UK ranked 31st out of 38 European countries measured by the Bank of England. See Blanchflower et al., 2007. It is important to add here that because migrants tend to be young, liberal migration policies can in some ways counteract the labor market constraints that are effected by low rates of population growth.

[52] To place this fraction in context, from 2005 to 2006 inward migration accounted for roughly one-third of the US's net population growth. See Blanchflower et al., 2007.

Figure 1: Population Change in Selected Countries (as a percent), 1971-2004



(Source: Blanchflower et al. 2007)

Figure 2: Annual UK Population Growth (percentage change on previous year)



(Source: Blanchflower et al. 2007)

Post-2004 Migration Flows into the UK

To obtain accurate data on the number of recent migrants into the UK, three sources are of use: The UK's Worker's Registration Scheme (WRS), the UK Labor Force Survey (LFS) and the National Insurance Numbers for the UK (NIN). Although there is some variation between the data offered by the three sources, it is safe to assume that by

2006 the upper threshold on the number of migrants from A8 countries in the UK was half a million, with some 60% of these coming from Poland.[53]

Regardless of whether or not these migrants were in pursuit of income maximization, risk mitigation or were instead taking advantage of gaps in the local UK labor market, the main proximate cause was the ease with which they could enter the country. The rather liberal immigration policies employed by the UK in the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement, relative to other EU member states, most definitely created an inviting environment for prospective migrants. To use the terminology of neoclassical migration theory, with migration costs to the UK low relative to other EU states, the probability of rising migration rates increased. It is important to note, however, that many other factors played a part – factors that will be examined later.

According to the WRS, from 2004 to 2006 roughly 486,000 migrants entered the UK from A8 countries.[54] Of these, some 60% were Polish.[55] The next largest sending countries among the A8 were Lithuania, whose nationals represented roughly 11% of incoming A8 migrants, and Slovakia, whose nationals represented roughly 10% of the incoming A8 migrant stock.[56]

The LFS provides slightly different numbers. In 2006, roughly 350,000 A8 nationals lived in the UK, 240,000 of which arrived after the 2004 enlargement. Although the gross numbers vary, the percentages of A8 migrants from Poland according to the LFS correspond to the percentages provided by the WRS. The LFS indicates that while

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[53] See Blanchflower et al., 2007.

[54] Self-employed migrants need not register with the WRS.

[55] See Fomina and Frelak, 2008.

[56] Interestingly, during the same period Ireland's inflow of migrants were similarly segmented with roughly 54% coming from Poland, followed by Lithuania (19%), Latvia (9%) and Slovakia (8%). See Blanchflower et al., 2007.

roughly one-third of all migrants who entered the UK from 2004 to 2006 were from A8 countries, a massive 20% of all these migrants came from Poland. Although these percentages are measured against the whole stock of migrants in the UK, not merely those from the A8, it is clear that of those from the A8, a majority of them came from Poland.[57]

Turning to the numbers provided by the NIN, it appears that between 2004 and 2006 approximately 380,000 migrants registered for a national insurance number. The NIN numbers also are consistent with the notion that the UK experienced a massive exogenous shock to its labor market after the 2004 enlargement. For while roughly 12,000 A8 nationals registered a NIN in 2002, this number rose dramatically to 270,000 in 2005.[58] Putting these numbers together produces the following table:

Table 1: Estimated A8 Immigrants in the UK after 2004

	Indicated data	Scope	Period covered
WRS	486,660	Employed workers	May 2004 – Sept. 2006
LFS	265,000	All ages 16-64	May 2004 – Sept. 2006
NIN	382,100	Those claiming taxes or benefits	April 2004 – Mar. 2006

(Source: Blanchflower et al. 2007)

Thus while the data do not completely align, they do allow for a top and low end estimate of the number of migrants who entered the UK from A8 countries in the years immediately following the 2004 EU enlargement. Somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000 people from the A8 entered the UK between 2004 and 2006.

[57] All of these data are provided by the Bank of England. See Blanchflower et al., 2007.
[58] See Blanchflower et al., 2007.

The Emergence of Patterns in UK Immigration Flows

One of the interesting patterns that emerges through the data presented above is the plethora of migrants from certain specific A8 countries. For while it is the case that certain counties sent a large number of nationals to the UK, other countries did not experience the same rates of outward migration after their EU accession. Of the entire migrant stock in the UK from the A8, only 5.1% came from the Czech Republic, 1.1% from Estonia and 0.1% from Slovenia – by comparison, again, over 60% came from Poland.[59]

One immediately salient question revolves around whether there is any correlation between the propensity of a country's citizens to migrate and relative standards of living and employment rates. By comparing these A8 incoming migration flows to the UK with these national economic indicators, a few noteworthy patterns begin to emerge. It seems that the propensity to migrate is indeed correlated with living standards, as measured by GDP per capita, and the probability of finding employment, as measured by unemployment rates in the country of origin.[60] It seems that countries with lower per capita GDP and higher rates of unemployment were more prone to send their nationals to the UK after the 2004 enlargement. Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Poland all suffered from relatively low GDP per capita rates as well as high levels of unemployment. And while unemployment rates correlate slightly more weakly than standards of living with regard to migration propensity, the connection is nonetheless apparent (see table 2).

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[59] WRS data indicates that roughly 24,000 Czechs, 5,000 Estonians and a mere 400 Slovenians registered to work in the UK from 2004-2006. See Blanchflower et al., 2007.
[60] See Gilpin et al., 2006. Other studies have also uncovered correlations between GDP per capita, unemployment rates and the propensity to migrate; see Borjas, 2005 and Pedersen et al, 2004.

Table 2: WRS Registrations from the A8 and Economic Indicators

	WRS registrations as % of population	Population (2004) (millions)	Unemployment rate (2004)	2005 Euros per head at 1995 exchange rates
Lithuania	1.60	3.4	11.4	2,500
Latvia	1.25	2.3	10.4	3,100
Slovakia	0.92	5.4	18.2	4,200
Poland	0.79	38.6	19.0	4,200
Estonia	0.42	1.3	9.7	4,000
Czech Republic	0.24	10.2	8.3	5,200
Hungary	0.14	10.1	6.1	5,000
Slovenia	0.02	2.0	6.3	11,400

(Source: Gilpin et al., 2006 and Blanchflower et al. 2007)

Tying the propensity to migrate to the economic indicators of per capita GDP and unemployment is not a recent academic pursuit. There is quite a body of evidence to suggest that the probability of migration is indeed affected by differences in income and employment conditions. In fact, studies indicate that if wage differentials between sending and destination countries increase by ten percentage points, the probability of migrating rises by seven percentage points.[61] Furthermore, a positive correlation also has been shown to hold between employment conditions in sending countries and migration rates. Thus if employment rates grow by ten percentage points in sending countries, the probability of migration falls by two percentage points.[62]

These results suggest that not only are there certain patterns to migration flows from the A8 to the UK, but moreover, a kind of self-selection process is at work. Workers living in regions with relatively low standards of living along with relatively inefficient employment conditions exhibit a greater propensity to migrate. These patterns would seem then to corroborate the theories put forth under the neoclassical economic models.

[61] See Naskoteen and Zimmer, 1980.
[62] See Borjas, 2005.

Individuals, seeking to maximize the returns to their human capital, move from regions with low returns on human capital and high levels of unemployment to regions where the inverse holds.

However, caution must be exercised when attributing explanatory preeminence to a single theory. For just as it may be the case that income maximization and self-selection is occurring, it may also be the case that A8 migrants are insuring themselves against various emergent risks in their home countries commensurate with EU accession. Furthermore, it may also be the case that rather than push factors impelling migration, pull factors within the UK could be attracting these workers. The UK, as a liberal market economy, has a high demand for workers in the secondary sector; and migrants, typically young and mobile, satisfy this demand more than adequately.[63] And as discussed above, the UK suffers from anemic population growth; therefore, it lacks a large supply of the kinds of workers most likely to fill positions in the secondary sector, i.e., young people. It must be remembered that the UK, per accession treaty regulations, had the opportunity to limit the inflow of A8 labor migrants for a period of seven years. The fact that it did not take this route is likely a testament to the structural demands inherent to its economy.

Finally, a world systems theory explanation for A8 migration patterns cannot be ruled out either. When Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU, they became the beneficiaries of EU development funds and increased inflows of foreign direct investment. Such capital flows, according to the world systems perspective, would have brought a form of economic disruption to the A8 countries and caused an upturn in

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[63] Menz (2009) makes the claim that because the UK is a liberal market economy, it is more amenable to large inflows of unregulated labor. By contrast, Germany, which Menz describes as a "coordinated market economy," takes more care to regulate its internal labor market and thus pursues direct recruitment initiatives rather than a more laissez-faire approach.

migration rates flowing in the opposite direction. Of course, because of various institutionally constructed barriers to the free movement of workers elsewhere, the UK offered an appealing destination.

Chapter 3: Examining Recent Migration Trends in Poland

The history of Poland cannot be written without mentioning its status as an historically profound emigration region. Perhaps due to the extreme levels of poverty prevalent in Poland during the late 19th century, or perhaps due to a kind of collective psychological paranoia regarding the condition of local governing institutions, the Polish emigrant population swelled dramatically in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[64] It is important to note that at this time Poland, qua independent political entity, did not exist. Its territory was divided among three neighboring states: Austria, Prussia and Russia. Conditions varied widely from region to region in Poland, and this affected in many ways the migration patterns of the time.[65] Interestingly, it was the wealthier regions, or those with the most fertile farmland, in Silesia and Galicia, which experienced the greatest outflows of migrants. Between 1870 and 1914, roughly 3.6 million Poles emigrated. And between 1911 and 1914 an estimated one-quarter of Galicia's population left the region.[66] Needless to say, the emigration tradition in Poland is strong.

Like other countries in the Soviet Bloc, Poland's migration policy was quite restrictive in the years between 1945 and 1989. A region that might otherwise have been

[64] Norman Davies (2001) argues that although much of Poland's emigration during this time was driven by a desire to realize better economic conditions, it cannot simply be reduced to this kind of economic analysis as the basic psychology of Polish inhabitants was undoubtedly affected by the political situation in the region. That said harsh economic conditions often create strong migration flows.

[65] It should also be noted that peasant emancipation occurred at different times in different regions and that these emancipation patterns also impacted migration flows.

[66] Most of these emigrants ended up in Germany and the US, a trend that created a much larger network phenomenon that explains to some degree why the US and Germany remained top destination targets for Polish emigrants in the years subsequent. See Davies, 2001. Davis also notes labor recruitment schemes set up between Brazil on the one hand and Germany and Russia on the other in the 1890s. Predictably, many of those who signed up to emigrate came from Poland.

a prime target for Western European countries seeking to augment their local labor supply was instead internationally isolated. Migration costs were extremely high in the sense that returning to Poland was often an impossibility – a fact that complicated migration decisions. In the postwar period, roughly six million Poles emigrated.[67] Germany and the US were the primary destination countries – perhaps due to pull reasons or perhaps due to networks established in the 19th century, as intimated above. Germany's *Aussiedler* program, which made it relatively easy to obtain German citizenship by claiming German ethnicity[68], and the US's policy of leniently granting refugee status to those from communist countries facilitated these movements.[69] An interesting effect of Poland's postwar migration trends was the creation of a largely homogenous ethnic society due to the country's ability to attract ethnic Poles from other regions of the Soviet Union and its policy of expelling those deemed inimical to the proper functioning of the state, viz. Poles of German ancestry.[70]

Recent Immigration Trends in Poland

Although quite small by international standards, Poland does have an emerging immigrant population. Estimates from Poland's Central Statistical Office (CSO) indicate

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[67] See Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010.
[68] The *Aussiedler* program was effective in Germany until 1991.
[69] Germany was by far the top destination country, with only ten percent of Polish emigrants arriving in the US during the postwar period. This phenomenon may be partially explained by the much higher migration costs associated with traveling to the US. See Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010.
[70] See Menz 2009 and Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010.

that at the end of 2009 there were over 90,000 residence-card holders[71] (roughly 0.24% of Poland's overall population) and around 200,000 total foreigners in the country.[72] The majority of Poland's non-EU immigrant population comes from its Eastern European neighbors, namely Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Moldova and Armenia, and Asia, namely Vietnam and China.[73]

Since the 1990s, as the differentials between Poland's emigration and immigration rates have narrowed, a few noteworthy trends have emerged. Although travel restrictions between the Soviet Union and Poland were eased in 1979, it was not until after the break up of the Soviet Union that large inflows of migrants from the region began arriving in Poland. Perhaps due to push factors regarding economic conditions in Russia, or perhaps because of close cultural ties and established migration networks, in the late 1990s the number of migrants entering Poland increased to roughly nine million per year.[74]

In the early 2000s, however, in line with Poland's imminent accession to the EU, the country absorbed the EU's *acquis* and a shift in migration trends subsequently occurred. Because EU migration policy has been securitized and lies within the realm of the EU's policy on Justice, Freedom and Security, external border controls have been

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[71] Residence-card holders include migrants granted temporary residence permits and settlement permits. EU citizens and refugee applicants are not included.

[72] See the CSO's *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2010*.

[73] Armenian migration to Poland has long been an historical phenomenon. Beginning in the middle ages and continuing on up to the present day, many Armenians, perhaps due to difficult economic and political conditions at home, have settled in Poland. Thus sustainable migration networks have grown up between the two countries. Poland and Vietnam established political and economic ties in the 1970s, which enabled many Vietnamese to enter the country for work or educational purposes. Regarding China, the boom in the Polish economy since the turn of the 21st century has encouraged many Chinese companies, especially in telecommunications, to invest in the Polish market. These companies bring with them highly skilled workers who typically only stay temporarily. See Davies, 2001; Menz, 2009; and Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010.

[74] See Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010.

tightened while internal controls have been eased.[75] An effect of this has been a reduction in the number of settlement permits and an increase in the number of temporary residence permits in Poland in the years following its accession to the EU. Obtaining a settlement permit in Poland requires staying in the country for a continuous period of five years, while a temporary residence permit can be obtained much more easily. As a result, the number of settlement permits declined by roughly 2,000 while the number of temporary residence permits rose by over 5,000 in the period between 2004 and 2009 (see table 3).[76]

Table 3: Total Residence and Settlement Permits Obtained in Poland from 2004 to 2009

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Temporary residence permits	25,425	22,625	22,376	23,240	28,865	30,567
Settlement permits	5,094	4,064	3,255	3,124	3,625	2,938

(Source: Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010.)

During this period, Ukrainians were by far the largest recipients of both types of permits. However, perhaps as a reflection of growing optimism in the Polish market, Chinese immigrants experienced the largest relative rise in the number of temporary residence permits. While in 2004 only 415 Chinese nationals obtained temporary residence in Poland, this number rose dramatically to 1,963 in 2009.[77] The declining number of obtained settlement permits coupled with the growing number of temporary residence permits is indicative of two recent trends in Polish immigration. First, contemporary migration into Poland is becoming more temporary in nature with many

[75] See Menz 2009.
[76] It should also be noted that like many countries, Poland has a large grey market for undocumented immigrants working in seasonal sectors such as the construction industry. This fact obviously complicates the collection and aggregation of accurate data.
[77] See Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010.

migrants preferring to move back and forth between home and destination countries. This trend highlights the growing phenomenon of return or circular migration whereby migrants no longer approach the migration decision as an irrevocable act but instead as something that can easily be undone or revised.[78] Second, the numbers indicate that in recent years Poland has become a desirable transit hub for migrants seeking to move to other destinations inside the EU.[79]

As a final note, Poland emigration and immigration rates have been converging in recent years as Poland has become a desirable destination country for migrants, who are perhaps seeking to take advantage of Poland's relatively more bullish economic conditions as compared to other EU countries.[80]

Recent Emigration Trends in Poland

As stated above, when Poland officially joined the EU in May 2004, the UK was one of only three countries to open their labor markets to workers from A8 countries. An immediately apparent result of this was a shift in Polish emigration away from Germany as a destination country in favor of the UK (and, to a lesser extent, Ireland). Before 2004, over 35% of Polish emigrants moved to Germany; however, this number dropped to around 20% after accession – reflecting undoubtedly the rise in immigration costs

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[78] Micro-level causes of repeat and return migration include the attempt to correct mistakes arising from incomplete information regarding conditions in the destination country as well as the "stepping stone" phenomenon whereby migrants view moving as merely a temporary act to improve their future employment opportunities through the acquisition of career specific knowledge or perhaps language skills. See Borjas, 2005.
[79] See Menz, 2009 and Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010.
[80] This convergence can be seen in table 4 below.

commensurate with Germany's relatively more restricted borders. In the UK, however, the reverse happened with the percentage of Polish emigrants rising from below 10% before 2004 to over 30% after (see figure 3).[81]

Figure 3: Destinations for Polish Emigrants Before and After Accession (as a percentage of total emigration stock)



(Source: Migration Policy Institute and Poland's Central Statistical Office, 2008)

Regarding the overall number of Polish emigrants, rates rose dramatically in the years immediately following EU accession before falling again in the late-2000s. This fall began to occur in 2007 and roughly coincides with the onset of the most recent global financial crisis.[82] Indeed it appears that with the economies of Western Europe falling into recession many Poles decided to return home, perhaps to take advantage of Poland's relatively strong internal market. Thus while emigration numbers peaked in 2006, with

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[81] Even Sweden experienced an increase in the percentage of Polish migrants entering its country. However, likely due to the lack of strong historical migration networks existing between the two countries, the increase in the number of Polish immigrants in Sweden after 2004 was still comparatively small.

[82] From 2007 to 2008, the number of approved WRS applicants from Poland fell from 35,800 to 10,150. Moreover, from 2008 to 2009 the number of NIN registrants from Poland fell 36%. These numbers indicate that more and more Poles decided not to leave Poland. See Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010.

close to 47,000 Poles leaving the country, they started falling the next year. By 2008, the number of Poles leaving the country dropped to just over 30,000 (see table 4).[83] It must be noted here that Poland was the only EU country not to fall into recession during the most recent economic downturn. Such reasoning leads to the claim that Polish emigrants, faced with declining economic and employment opportunities in their destination countries as a result of the recent crisis, opted to return home where conditions were comparatively more buoyant.[84]

Table 4: Emigration and Immigration Rates in Poland from 2004 to 2009 (in thousands)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Emigration	18.9	22.2	46.9	35.5	30.1	18.6
Immigration	9.5	9.4	10.8	15.0	16.0	17.4

(Source: Migration Policy Institute)

These numbers are roughly commensurate with Poland's net migration rate as tracked by the OECD (see table 5).[85] Not only are emigration and immigration rates converging rapidly in Poland, but also it appears that the country could very well become a net receiving country in the near future.[86]

[83] See Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010. It must be noted that inflow and outflow migration numbers from Polish statistical agencies are sometimes disputed. See Bijak and Korys, 2006.
[84] As mentioned above, this reasoning aligns with that offered by migration scholars who claim that migration rates correlate with standards of living, as measured by per capita GDP, and employment conditions (see table 5).
[85] See the OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.
[86] See note 75.

Table 5: Net Migration Rates and Economic Conditions in Poland since 2000
(Net migration rates measured per 1,000 inhabitants; GDP/capita measured in USD at PPP)

	2000	2005	2008	2009
Net migration rate	-0.52276	-0.34062	-0.39343	-0.02621
Unemployment rate	16.2	17.8	7.2	8.2
GDP/capita	10,570	13,785	18,024	18,910

(Source: OECD)

Among many other factors contributing to the increase in Polish emigration rates after 2004, the fact that the Polish economy was reeling with high unemployment rates while the economies across Western Europe were experiencing a period of sustained growth goes some way to explaining the numbers. Conversely, with the onset of the global economic crisis, the reverse occurred as relative conditions began to improve in Poland. Indeed, it appears that Polish emigrants were attracted back home for similar reasons as those that initially impelled them to leave. As the net migration rate in Poland was declining, both employment conditions and standards of living were improving (see table 5). According to some reports, of the total stock of A8 immigrants in the UK that arrived after 2004 (not only of Polish origin) over half had left the country by 2006.[87]

Regarding the demographic makeup of Polish emigrants, it appears that the most are young and fairly well educated. This would correspond with normal predictions regarding those most likely to migrate.[88] Although assessments of the education level of Polish emigrants are not completely clear, it seems that most Poles who arrived in the UK had some sort of "qualification" – however, just what the extension of the term

[87] See Fomina and Frelak, 2008.
[88] Clearly, one of the reasons young people are more prone to migrate is the fact that they often lack binding family and professional commitments. Furthermore, in line with the neoclassical model, if migration is seen as a human capital investment, then the returns diminish as one gets older, which therefore decreases the probability of migrating.

"qualification" refers to remains uncertain.[89] Regardless, young Poles were much more likely to emigrate than their older counterparts. According to data provided by the WRS, from 2004 to 2006, 82% of WRS applicants were between the ages of 18 and 34.[90] This is unsurprising given the natural proclivity for mobility exhibited by young people, who typically lack the kinds of family and career commitments that preclude older people from migrating.[91]

Young people are highly mobile and often view stints abroad as a way to advance future career opportunities. Thus while Polish migrants in the UK often find work below their skill levels in secondary sector industries such as construction, manufacturing, hotels and restaurants[92], they evidently are not discouraged about the lack of prestige associated with such jobs.[93] They likely view their stay as temporary and value other benefits commensurate with living in the UK more than the actual job they find themselves in.[94]

Polish Migration and the Emergence of Patterns

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[89] Precise levels of education remain unclear because the LFS classifies foreign qualifications simply as "other." See Blanchflower et al., 2007 and Fomina and Frelak, 2008.

[90] Additionally, 43% of WRS applicants were between the ages of 18 and 24. The ratio of males to females was 58 : 42. See Blanchflower et al., 2007.

[91] Borjas (2005) argues that within the US, young college graduates are much more likely to cross state boundaries. His claim is that this group is more prepared to learn about and take advantage of employment opportunities in other markets.

[92] While A8 migrants in the UK are often employed in these industries, non-A8 migrants in the UK typically find work in the public sector as nurses or other kinds of caregivers. See Blanchflower et al., 2007.

[93] Part of the reason that Poles find themselves working below their skill level in the UK is likely due to their lack of proficiency in English. See Fomina and Frelak, 2008.

[94] In the case of young Poles, e.g., the possibility of acquiring greater fluency in English may be another factor influencing their decisions.

While Polish emigration rates spiked dramatically in the years immediately following Poland's accession to the EU, they began falling again around the time of the onset of the recent financial crisis. The proximate cause of the spike was the sudden elimination of labor restrictions, coupled with strong economic conditions in the UK and relatively weak conditions in Poland. With unemployment rates much higher in Poland than in the UK at the time of accession, it is likely that relatively poor local employment conditions drove many Poles away from home.

Polish emigrants, regardless of their skill levels, largely found work in the secondary sector in the UK – a sector that was growing rapidly at the height of the mid-2000s financial bubble.[95] This demand in the UK labor market needed to be filled, and Polish immigrants (as well as other A8 migrants) were able to meet some of that demand. Although Poles in the UK largely found work below their skill and education levels, they nevertheless put in a much longer work week than their native counterparts.[96] This work ethic might indicate that Poles saw their stay as temporary and as an opportunity to accumulate as much savings as possible.

Shortly thereafter, however, migration rates leveled off and began declining. Aside from the obvious fact that employment conditions fell in the wake of the crisis, thereby reducing the desirability of the UK as a destination country, it is also the case that opportunities in Poland began expanding as a result of its accession to the EU. Perhaps due to increased capital flows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and EU

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[95] According to some estimates, at the time of Poland's accession to the EU, the UK labor market suffered over 650,000 reported vacancies. See Fomina and Frelak, 2008.
[96] While native workers in the UK work 36.5 hours on average per week at a wage rate of 11 pounds, Polish immigrants working in the UK work 41.5 hours per week at a rate of 7.3 pounds per hour. See Fomina and Frelak, 2008.

development funds, after 2004 Poland became a more attractive place for young Poles to try to find work. This rise in development assistance and FDI reduced some of the push factors driving Poles out of the country as more employment opportunities opened up at home.[97] [98]

From the perspective of the NELM, emigrating Poles might have been driven by a desire to increase their standing relative to other Poles. And by extension, they might also have been driven by a desire to overcome some of the relative deprivation they felt towards other EU nationals. Through migrating, young Poles could acquire language and cultural skills that they could then market upon returning from the UK. This could both increase their perceived standing amongst their Polish peers as well as within the larger EU population.[99]

Finally, it might also be argued that the very accession of Poland into the EU solidified the country's status as a peripheral country within the Union. As such, it sent workers displaced by recent Polish development trends into the secondary markets of other more highly developed EU countries. Consistent with this theory, most Poles that

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[97] Development funds are implemented under the European Cohesion Policy, the goal of which is to reduce regional imbalances in the EU. The funds target regional competitiveness and employment, convergence, and European territorial cooperation. The flows are administered from two structural funds (the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund) as well as the Cohesion Fund. From 2007 to 2012 Poland, as the largest gross beneficiary of EU development funds, received 63.7 billion EUR. By Comparison, in the same period the Czech Republic received 26.7 billion EUR while Hungary received 25.3 billion. Employers can access these funds by applying under various operational programs. See The Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency: http://www.paiz.gov.pl/europeanfunds.

[98] In 2003, inward FDI flows into Poland amounted to 4.5 billion USD. By 2007, this amount had increased to 23.7 billion. See UNCTAD: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.

[99] One of the problems with attempting to accurately measure a migrant's sense of relative deprivation concerns the reference group. The migrant might measure his standing relative to his friends, his fellow countrymen, those residing in the destination country or some other group.

migrated came from rural regions.[100] And the regions of the UK they migrated to were urban regions in the south and southwest of the UK.[101] As of 2006, London received a larger percentage of A8 immigrants than any other region in the UK.[102]

[100] For an analysis of the origin and destination regions of recent Polish migrants in the UK, see Fomina and Frelak, 2008.
[101] See Blanchflower et al., 2007.
[102] The idea that migrants are attracted to cities, especially global cities like London, follows both from common sense and from a world systems perspective. Not only do global cities have established migration networks that new migrants can call upon, but they also offer much greater employment opportunities. See Massey et al., 1993; and Wallerstein, 1974.

Chapter 4: The Impact of A8 Migration on the UK

Having laid out some of the empirical evidence regarding recent migration trends in Poland and the UK, it is now time to examine some of the effects of these flows on the UK economy. Before doing so, a summary of the broader academic literature on the effects of migration on labor markets and economic conditions will be provided.

Reviewing the Academic Literature

Despite fears among the general population of migrant receiving countries that wages and employment conditions are strongly, and negatively, impacted by immigration, the academic literature on the topic suggests otherwise. Some studies suggest that a 10 percent increase in the immigrant population of a host country will drive down native wages by a mere one percent.[103] Such a reduction in wages is almost statistically irrelevant. Other studies have found similarly negligible effects. Analyzing the wage effects of immigration in the US, Altonji and Card (1991) found that a 1% increase in the immigrant population resulted in a 1.2% reduction in wages and had no effects on employment rates.

Meanwhile, analyzing the effects of low-skilled migration on the costs of labor-intensive services such as housekeeping, gardening and the like, Cortes (2006) found that a 10% increase in a host region's migrant stock reduced the price of these services by 1.3%. The reduction in the price of labor-intensive services is likely due to the wage impacts of a larger labor supply. As Cortes notes, this 10% labor supply increase is

[103] See Friedberg and Hunt, 1995.

commensurate with a drop in low-skilled native wages by 0.6% and a drop in low-skilled immigrant wages by 8%. Thus the impacts of this kind of migration, while incurring small negative wage effects on directly competing native laborers, are mostly felt within the immigrant community itself, especially by immigrants who arrived earlier and therefore experience the largest reduction in wages.[104] Of course, the resulting reduction in the price of labor-intensive services means that the larger native population benefits from this kind of migration. Although the real incomes of low-skilled natives fall while those of high skilled natives rise, the overall economic impact of such supply shocks is minimal.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that those who experience the largest negative effects due to immigration are those, typically low-skilled natives, who directly compete with immigrants.[105] Borjas and Katz (2005) found that in the US, from 1980 to 2000, immigration increased the total labor supply by 10% while native wages declined by between 3 and 4%; however, this decline rose to 9% for native workers who did not graduate from high school. The reason for this discrepancy in wage effects is that immigrant workers primarily belong to a different labor market skill group than that of natives. They generally do not compete with one another and in fact often complement one another on the labor market.[106] As dual labor theory stresses, migration trends are demand sensitive. Potential immigrants respond to changes in labor market demand and thus act more to alleviate bottlenecks than perpetuate surplus excess.

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[104] See Ottaviano and Peri, 2005.
[105] See Cortes, 2006.
[106] See Ottaviano and Peri, 2005 and Manacorda et al., 2006.

One of the implications of migration's effect on wages is that income is thereby redistributed from labor to the owners of capital.[107] As native wage rates fall, albeit slightly, production costs fall as well and benefits accrue to the owners of capital. This transferred surplus is called the *immigration surplus*.[108] The benefits to native companies from reduced wages offset the reduction in native wages. However, because many of the benefits accrue to owners of capital, the immigration surplus is unevenly distributed in the local economy.[109] The immigration surplus refers not only to the pretax income gain accrued by native companies through cheaper labor, but also to the potential increase in labor productivity, efficiency and innovation as well as the actual increase in overall market demand that occurs as migrants begin participating in normal patterns of exchange.[110] Migrants are a source of both cheap and potentially more productive labor; furthermore, their presence benefits other local businesses as demand rises for the normal services associated with everyday life.[111]

While migration undoubtedly creates a surplus, the benefits of which admittedly are distributed unevenly, to measure the overall effect of migration on a receiving region, fiscal transfers must too be taken into account.[112] On the one hand, if migration effects an increase in the overall socially dependant population, then it is possible that fiscal

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[107] See Borjas, 2005.
[108] The immigration surplus is measured as a proportion of GDP. It is calculated through measuring labor's overall share of national income, the ratio of foreigners in the labor market, and the percentage change in wages due to a 1% increase in the number of immigrants in the labor market. The immigration surplus will be greater the more wages fall as a result of immigration. Thus the surplus will vary depending on how one measures the wage effects of immigration. See Borjas, 2005 and Hanson, 2007.
[109] "Immigration redistributes income from labor to capital" (Borjas, 2005, p. 338).
[110] See Hanson, 2007.
[111] Just like everyone else, migrants participate in local market transactions and thus benefit local businesses. In addition, the cultural benefits of migrant groups should not be ignored. The emergence of ethnic restaurants, etc., adds to the character and richness of the host region.
[112] See Hanson, 2007.

transfers outweigh the immigration surplus and thus result in a net fiscal loss.[113] This can happen when immigration is primarily a function of asylum seeking and or family connections. Such migrants may receive more in the form of government benefits and services than they give back in the form of taxes. This would create more of a burden on public finances. On the other hand, if the fiscal transfer of migrants is positive, i.e., if they pay more in taxes than they receive in social benefits, then the net effects of immigration are likewise positive. Studies show this positive benefit to be the case with regard to high-skilled immigration – they increase productivity as well as generate net positive fiscal transfers.[114]

The Impact of Exogenous Shocks on Local Labor Markets

The rise of incoming flows of migrants coming to the UK beginning in 2004 represented an exogenous shock to the UK labor market. As has been mentioned, the proximate cause of this shock was the opening of labor markets that occurred with the accession of the EU-10. Because the UK was one of only three EU-15 countries to open its labor market to workers from the new member states, the UK in turn experienced a high rate of incoming migrant flows. Had Germany, for example, also opened its labor market, then, due to established migrant networks between Poland and Germany, the UK

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[113] This effect can also arise through the practice of remittances. By sending surplus income out of the country, the positive economic benefits of migration for a receiving country are reduced. However, it may also be the case that this money is then funneled back into the receiving country's economy through investments or increased exports. For this reason the true economic impact of remittances remains ambiguous. See Blanchflower et al., 2007.

[114] "Employment-based permanent immigrants and highly skilled temporary immigrants have a positive net impact on the US economy. They generate a positive immigration surplus (by raising US productivity) and make a positive net tax contribution (by adding to US government coffers)" (Hanson, 2007, p. 21).

likely would have witnessed a much weaker flow of immigrants. In the event, however, Germany did not respond in kind and thus the UK absorbed upwards of half a million incoming migrants in the two years immediately following the 2004 enlargement of the EU.[115]

Of course, 2004 is not the only example of an exogenous migration shock impacting a local market. Thus before proceeding to an examination of the economic effects of these flows on the UK, it might help to briefly look over some of these prior shocks.

In 1980 the US experienced what has become known as the *Mariel* flow. In April of that year, Fidel Castro allowed all Cubans who wanted to move from Cuba to the US to depart from the port of Mariel. Roughly 125,000 Cubans left, most of whom arrived in Miami. And even though Castro's decision caused a massive exogenous shock to the local Miami labor market, the economic impacts were hardly measurable. In fact, wage and employment trends in various other US cities, such as Houston, Atlanta and Los Angles, in the years immediately following the boatlift were indistinguishable from those observed in Miami. Moreover, relative to these other cities, wage and employment rates for unskilled black Americans actually improved.[116]

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[115] As was noted above, one explanation for why Germany acted to restrict access to its labor markets is that its economy is more centrally coordinated than the UK's economy and thus its government policies regarding migration tend to involve managing flows and recruiting workers to those sectors of the local labor market that are specifically experiencing shortages. By contrast, the UK, as a more liberal market economy, trusts more in the natural allocation of migrants to those sectors most in demand. See Menz (2009) for a nice discussion of the differences between the UK and the German economies and how these differences impact the two countries' respective policies towards immigration.
[116] For a good analysis of the effects of the *Mariel* flow, see Card, 1990.

Another *Mariel*-style study of the effects of exogenous migration shocks was carried out in France. In the year following Algeria's independence in 1962, some 900,000 Algerians of European origin, representing roughly 2% of France's entire labor force, flowed back into the French labor market. Yet the impacts of this repatriation were minor. Unemployment rates among the non-repatriated French labor force rose a mere 0.2% for every 1% increase in the proportion of repatriates in the local market. Furthermore, the same proportional increase in the supply of foreign labor resulted in a decline of wages by only 0.8%.[117] Such impacts are minor and when measured against the effect of the immigration surplus become inconsequential.

Further studies have been carried out in Germany, examining the impact of flows of Turkish workers in the late 1980s, and in Israel, examining the impact of flows of Russians in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[118] The results of these studies are remarkably similar. Exogenous shocks to the supply of labor markets resulting from heavy incoming migration flows have little if any effect on local economic outcomes and the employment conditions of native workers. Furthermore, in the cases just mentioned the migration flows were much heavier than those that occurred in the UK in 2004. This fact, along with the idea that these migrants were generally unable to return to their countries of origin, unlike those moving in the wake of the 2004 EU enlargement, means that the impact of A8 migrants on the UK labor market was likely even more negligible.

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[117] See Hunt, 1992.
[118] See Blanchflower et al., 2007.

The Impact of A8 Immigrants on the UK Labor Market

It appears that A8 migrants in the UK arriving in the wake of looser labor restrictions in 2004 played a complementary role in the local labor market. Instead of competing with natives for jobs and negatively impacting employment conditions, the European Commission found that A8 migrants filled holes in the local labor market that natives themselves were either unable or unwilling to fill.[119] Additionally, the Commission noted that those EU-15 countries that had not imposed labor restrictions on workers from the EU-10 all experienced high economic growth, reduced unemployment and rising employment levels.[120] Thus the recent flow of A8 migrants has tended to make receiving labor markets more efficient. This corresponds to the notion that migrants respond to economic shocks and relative regional disparities in market and employment conditions. As such, they often improve local labor markets in that they enable a more efficient allocation of productive resources.[121]

A8 migrants in the UK generally found jobs in the low-skilled service and construction sectors and did not represent a threat, i.e., did not compete with, native employment patterns.[122] Demand was high for workers in these sectors and A8 migrants were able to satisfy at least some of this demand.[123] With the exception of the agricultural and fisheries sectors, in the wake of the 2004 enlargement employment rates actually

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[119] See the European Commission Report, 2006. Meanwhile, in 2005 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) noted that in most sectors of European economies, very little direct competition exists between natives and migrants.
[120] See the European Commission Report, 2006.
[121] Borjas, 2001.
[122] See Fomina and Frelak, 2008.
[123] According to some estimates, even two years after the 2004 enlargement, 30% of UK employers were still reporting vacancies. See Fomina and Frelak, 2008.

increased across all other UK economic sectors.[124] Furthermore, the UK did not experience a rise in claimant unemployment rates indicating that A8 migrants were there to work, and not to extract social benefits.[125] The EC noted that in those EU-15 countries that had imposed restrictions on labor mobility levels of undeclared workers rose, which magnified local fiscal and social problems.[126]

It should be noted that beginning in 2007, unemployment rates began to rise in the UK.[127] One of the questions associated with this rise is whether or not it was a structural effect of migration flows.[128] However, according to the Bank of England, there is no correlation between those regions in the UK that experienced the largest rate increases in unemployment and those regions that absorbed the largest immigrant flows. In fact, the very opposite appears to be the case. Those regions that saw the highest rise in immigration levels actually experienced the smallest increases in their unemployment rates.[129] This finding is consistent with the notion that immigrants, as highly mobile and responsive, tend to flow to those regions with the most promising employment conditions. They are a flexible, demand-responsive labor force capable even of

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[124] See Fomina and Frelak, 2008.
[125] See Gilpin et al., 2006. One of the arguments for this is that had there been a large incentive for A8 migrants to extract social and claimant benefits, Sweden, which imposed no restrictions on benefits for A8 migrants, would have received a much larger share of immigrants than it in fact did. The European Commission (2006) reported that welfare expenditures after enlargement did not increase relative to years before.
[126] See the European Commission Report, 2006.
[127] From 2005 to 2006, the UK unemployment rate fell from 4.7% to 2.9%. In 2007, it rose to 5.3%. See: http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=uk&v=74. The source for indexmundi is the CIA World Factbook.
[128] It is likely that global demand effects stemming from the recent financial crisis have much more to do with rising UK unemployment rates than any supply surpluses caused by post-2004 migration flows.
[129] See Blanchflower et al., 2007.

improving a country's overall economic conditions.[130] Their very flexibility enables them to respond to demand and other economic shocks more quickly than native workers, who are often tied to specific locations due to family and other considerations.[131]

According to the European Commission, the overall effect of A8 migration in the wake of the 2004 enlargement was negligible. Flows were too small to significantly affect local labor markets – even in the UK, which absorbed the heaviest flows.[132] Moreover, A8 migrants complemented the native workforce, acted to mitigate labor market inefficiencies and thus improved overall employment conditions.[133] [134] Of course, it is important to qualify the kind of improvement that migration effected. Indeed, though the economic benefits of A8 migration were positive, they were undoubtedly small and unevenly distributed. The largest beneficiaries were the migrants themselves along with owners of capital who were able to exploit the slight downward pressure on wages. And though overall loses were negligible, those in direct employment competition with migrants were negatively impacted the most.[135]

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[130] The Bank of England claimed that increased migration flows in the UK actually increased supply slightly more than increasing demand and thus resulted in an easing of inflationary pressures (see Blanchflower et al., 2007).

[131] See Hanson, 2007. In fact, it is for this reason that many economists such as Hanson note the benefits of illegal immigration. In that illegal immigrants are not tied to employment contracts, they are much more capable of quickly responding to regional economic shocks and other market disruptions than their legal counterparts, whose legal status is typically tied to an employment contract.

[132] With the exception of Austria and Ireland, EU-10 nationals represented a mere 1% of the labor force in all EU-15 countries in 2005. See the European Commission Report, 2006.

[133] See the European Commission Report, 2006 and the IOM, 2005.

[134] It should also be noted that with regard to the high numbers of Polish immigrants in the UK, many opportunities opened up for local businesses seeking to take advantage of the growing consumer power within the Polish immigrant community.

[135] See the IOM, 2005. These findings are consistent with the larger academic work on the subject of migration more generally. See both Borjas, 2005 and Hanson, 2007.

Chapter 5: Evaluating the Theories

As this paper has attempted to show, migration is a complex phenomenon the causes of which simply cannot be reduced to the tenets of a single theory. Instead, a nuanced, multifaceted approach that takes into consideration a variety of theoretical models is required. Theoretical myopia, or adhering to one explanatory model, limits the analysis and precludes one from acknowledging the complexity of observed events. There is not a single cause transforming potential migrants into actual migrants. Situations vary and the same model that may adequately explain one observed trend may be insufficient with regard to another.

The Neoclassical Approach

The neoclassical micro approach to migration studies posits a rational and self-interested actor maximizing a human capital investment in an environment of complete information. Wages and employment opportunities are compared across potential destination regions and against the home region. If these indicators, minus the costs of moving, supersede those found in the home country, then the potential migrant moves. Although this theoretical approach is limited in that it ignores decisions made at the household level as well as the larger structural causes of migration trends, it nevertheless does provide a certain insight into the phenomenon. The information available to migrants is seldom full and complete; however, with regard to emigration trends from the A8 after 2004, it does appear to be the case that the heaviest relative migration flows originated in those countries with the weakest standards of living and employment conditions. This suggests at least some theoretical validity to the model.

The neoclassical macro model also provides some insight into the phenomenon. Indeed, the relative weakness of employment conditions in Poland, as well as the other main sending countries in the A8, suggests an abundance of labor supply relative to demand. And with demand for immigrant labor strong in the UK in the years immediately following enlargement, these inequalities were able to move a little closer to equilibrium.

The New Economics of Labor Migration

Unfortunately, however, the neoclassical models cannot account for other trends observed in recent European migration flows. The theoretical model offered by the new economics of labor migration, though still mired in a rational-choice milieu, expands the decision making process from the level of the individual to that of the household. Furthermore, it introduces the idea of risk management, or a household's attempt to overcome local market constraints.

The question that the NELM poses is the following: were there missing markets in Poland at the time of its accession and did this fact exacerbate migration flows? This is not a straightforward question, as although markets in Poland were not nearly as developed as those in the UK, they were not entirely absent either. Yet the majority of migrants from Poland originated in rural regions, where markets would likely be the most compromised. Even if these markets were not actually compromised by Poland's accession, they were nevertheless relatively nascent – after all Poland had only recently emerged as a market economy – and this perhaps accounted for some of the flows west.

Furthermore, as local markets in Poland developed through FDI and EU development funds in the wake of accession, many Poles began returning home. Obviously there are other explanations that could account for this return migration (such as structural issues associated with the onset of the financial crisis), but the fact that Polish markets were developing quite rapidly undoubtedly contributed to luring some migrants back home.[136] Aspects of local Polish markets that were missing around the time of accession began emerging shortly thereafter as capital started flowing into the country.

Dual Labor Market Theory

Turning to the models offering a more structural approach, the dual labor market theory assumes migration to be driven largely by demand, specifically demand in the secondary sectors of migrant receiving countries. Much can be learned about recent A8 migration flows through the prism of the dual labor market approach. Although many A8 migrants had higher education qualifications, once in the UK they ended up finding work below their level of qualifications in the secondary sector. The secondary sector was

[136] It must be admitted that the NELM is a theoretical model better suited to explain migration patterns from sending countries much less developed than the A8.

where demand was highest, and the UK, as a liberal market economy, structurally sought to satisfy this demand through the importation of foreign workers.[137]

Additionally, the regions in the UK where A8 migrants settled experienced much more moderate rises in unemployment levels than those experienced in regions that did not absorb many migrants. This trend further exemplifies the notion that A8 migrants were pulled to those regions with the highest labor demand. And that demand was quite high in the UK. In the years and decades leading up to the 2004 EU enlargement, the UK's population growth had been extremely weak. With a drop in the overall number of young people came a commensurate rise in the overall demand for the kinds workers who can replace these young people, i.e., secondary sector migrant workers.

World Systems Theory

The final theory looked at, world systems theory, also offers insight into post-2004 migration trends from the A8 to the UK. The accession of Eastern European countries into the EU disrupted traditional productive relations as acceding countries were required to internalize the legal and economic system of the EU in general. Moreover, by acceding, countries such as Poland became the beneficiaries of increased FDI flows and EU development funds. According to the world systems approach, as these funds flowed into the Polish economy, productive relations were altered and development patterns intensified. This disrupted the local economy and magnified the push factors driving Poles out of the country. Indeed, the majority of Polish migrants

[137] In the UK, many employers noted the laudable work ethic, reliability and higher productivity rates of A8 migrants relative to their native counterparts. See Dench et al., 2006.

were from rural regions where opportunities for employment would have been the most negatively affected by economic disruption. In addition, preexisting migrant networks and the emergence of companies catering to the specific needs of migrants helped accentuate these flows.

Conclusion

This paper examined migration trends in the aftermath of the 2004 EU enlargement. After reviewing the leading theoretical models that attempt to account for the causes of migration flows, an analysis was made of recent immigration patterns in the UK. The UK provides an interesting case study in that the country received many A8 migrants after enlargement due to its relatively unrestricted labor policies. These attractive policies made finding employment in the UK relatively easy and thus undoubtedly reduced migration costs for potential migrants. Following this analysis, this paper proceeded to examine recent emigration trends in Poland. In many ways, Poland represented a microcosm of the larger emigration trends occurring throughout the A8 countries after 2004. As such, Poland provides a window through which the larger phenomenon may be understood. An attempt was then made to describe some of the impacts of A8 migration on economic conditions in the UK. These impacts, though positive, are generally viewed as having had an almost negligible effect on local economic conditions. Finally, the observed patters of A8 migration flows were put up against the prevailing theoretical models in an effort to determine the explanatory power of each model in turn.

It is apparent that when searching for a theoretical cause to explain the patterns of recent A8 migration flows, each of the models examined provides its own unique perspective. By incorporating as many theoretical models as possible into the analysis, a more comprehensive and richer understanding of the phenomenon can be gained. Because the causes of migration are complex and multifaceted, the approach to migration studies must be as broad as possible. A narrow approach risks reducing the phenomenon to a single factor. Furthermore, the models used are not mutually exclusive and can in fact complement each other. And as has been shown, it is not one, but instead many diverse factors that propel and facilitate migration flows.

While individual choices undoubtedly play a part in the decision making process of potential migrants, so too does the perspective of larger units of aggregation, such as the household. And yet, it seems tendentious to remove from any analysis of international migration the larger structural forces of modern industrial societies and global market systems. Relying a priori on a single theoretical model reduces any analysis of migration to an oversimplification. Only through a varied approach that incorporates an array of theories is it possible to begin to understand the underlying forces that drive the international movement people.

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