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East Asia's Security System

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Declaration:

Herewith I declare that I have written the Master's Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.

Prague, 3 May 2013

.....
Student's Signature

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INTRODUCTION

With Asia's economic rise in the last decades, more importance is given in international relations to the region as a whole and East Asia as part of the region. As it is becoming a prominent region in international relations, Asia is attracting increasingly more attention, be it from economic, political, or security perspective. From the security perspective, since the end of the Cold War and thus the end of the bipolar structure, the East Asian region has also undergone a significant change. With growing interdependence of international relations actors in today's globalized world and with growing trade and business interests of actors as well as institutions, also the prospects of future development of security in the region is widely discussed. Security relations in East Asia are in this respect a hot issue among the international relations scholars.

The aim of this paper is to assess the security relations in East Asia. More specifically, the author's goal is to define the security system that is currently in place in East Asia. The author's objective is to answer the question, which countries constitute the system, subsequently to address the issue of the existing friction points among the security system actors and finally to assess the stability of the current security system in place and discuss the prospects for the future development in the security relations in East Asia in regards to the security system.

To define the term East Asia, yet alone the East Asian region or security system, however, is not an easy task. The definitions of East Asia are not coherent, the view on which countries constitute East Asia as a region vary depending on how the region is defined. It is exactly because of the lack of a generally accepted definition of East Asia that the term becomes vague and makes the study of East Asian security problematic.

According to the official classification of the United Nations, East Asia or Eastern Asia is a sub region of Asia. The sub region consists of China including Hong Kong and Macao, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (further on referred to as North Korea), Republic of Korea (further on referred to as South Korea), Japan, and Mongolia. (Composition, 2013) Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam are classified as South-Eastern Asia and further sub regions in Asia include Central Asia, Southern Asia, and Western Asia. (*Ibid*)

Among the international scholars, the view on what exactly constitutes East Asia varies. Whereas some authors define East Asia geographically by including only East Asia (North) but not South East Asia¹, in *Rethinking Security in East Asia*, the authors refer to China, Japan, Korea and the Southeast Asian region. (Katzenstein, Sil, 2008, p.5) And it is more often that the term encompasses both sub regions as well as the Pacific region. (Kang, Spring 2003, p.60)

The author's decision is to deviate from the geographical definition of East Asia and to formulate the East Asian security system on the basis of international relations theories. The theories chosen for the thesis are neo-realism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism. Rather than working with a geographically defined region, the author's decision is to apply the conceptual tools of these international relations theories, then, based upon the findings build a security system model that will take into consideration the biggest and most influential powers of the region. The chosen international relations theories will then also be used to make predictions about the stability of the current East Asian security system and future development scenarios based on the theories' assumptions about international relations coupled with the account of the security system actors' strategies and existing sources of conflicts in the region.

In order to achieve this goal, the thesis is structured in the following manner. The first chapter introduces the general assumptions of the three chosen international relations theories and the conceptual tools that these theories use to analyze international relations. These conceptual tools are then applied to East Asia. The last part of the chapter then combines the empirical data obtained from the application of the conceptual tools with the assumptions of the theories, and in conclusion the East Asian security system is defined.

The second chapter then analyzes the defined security system. First, the security strategies of the security system actors are introduced and evaluated. Second, major areas of tensions and security issues are analyzed. The author does not wish to provide a historical account of either the states' security strategies concerning the region or the security issues. Only the recent development concerning these areas is provided and the focus is put on the implications for the security relations among the actors and on the security system as a whole.

The last chapter of the thesis focuses on the future development. First, the stability of the security system from the perspective of the three chosen international relations theories is

¹ For example chapter *The Evolving Asian System* by Samuel Kim in *International relations of Asia*, Shambaugh, Yahuda 2008; or Kang in *Getting Asia Wrong* from 2003

assessed. Second, the author discusses the future development of the system with respect to Sino-US relations, the development of other security system actors as well as other actors which might join the system in the future and the prospect of building a security institution in East Asia in the future.

The conclusion then summarizes the findings on the East Asian security system, the friction points as well as the scenarios for the future development of the security system and assesses the importance of these findings with respect to the future of East Asia as well as with respect to the implications for international relations as a whole.

The author of thesis puts to use her knowledge from her previous works on East Asian politics such as Japanese and South Korean foreign policy, the effects of sanctions against North Korea and the North Korean nuclear weapons program in general.

In this respect, the author also draws on her experience from the semester spent at Seoul National University in South Korea and supports the thesis by renowned scholarly books available at the Seoul National University library or recommended by the university's professors, by scholarly articles from international relations journals provided in the university's study materials as well as from renowned journals found online and other internet websites related to the discussed topics. For recent events, credible online newspapers are used.

English transcription of Asian names, surnames and geographical sites is used throughout the thesis.

1 DEFINITION OF EAST ASIA'S SECURITY SYSTEM

Before we can discuss the security relations and the future scenarios for the security relations in East Asia, it is important to define the security system that is present in the East Asian region. The security system in this context is understood as the interplay of the key security players or actors in the region.

The aim of this chapter is thus to formulate a definition of the East Asia's security system, specifically, to answer the question, which East Asian countries form the security system in East Asia. The system will be articulated based on the account of different theories of international relations coupled with empirical data about the East Asian region.

In order to achieve this goal, the chapter is structured in the following manner. The first subchapter introduces the concept of security and security studies, and on this basis, security in the context of this thesis is defined. Second, different theories of international relations are discussed which then serve as a basis for the formulation of the East Asian security system. The theories included are neo-realism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism. The scope of the thesis does not allow for detailed analysis of each theory or concept. Simplification is, therefore, in order, and only basic assumptions of each theory and their conceptual tools are introduced. The second subchapter uses the conceptual tools discussed in the first subchapter and analyzes East Asia through these conceptual tools. The last subchapter's aim is to formulate the East Asian security system. It works with the information provided in the previous two subchapters as well as with the works and opinions of authors of scholarly articles that deal with the question of East Asia and East Asia's security. Here, the states that form the East Asian security system are identified.

1.1 THEORETICAL BASIS FOR DEFINING EAST ASIA'S SECURITY SYSTEM

International relations theories attempt to explain and, to some extent, to also make predictions about the future development of international relations. They work with different paradigms and assumptions, and so there are various lenses through which scholars can analyze international relations and security. Therefore, the first part briefly covers the issue of security itself before coming to the different theories of international relations, namely neo-realism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism.

1.1.1 Security and security studies in international relations

There are different definitions of security. Arnold Wolfers defines security as the “absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”. (Wolfers, 1952, p.485) Baldwin rephrases Wolfers’ definition to a less ambiguous “low probability of damage to acquired values”, which leaves the space open for inclusion of events such as earthquakes. Baldwin further identifies specifications of security, namely the referent object of security, security for which values, how much security, from what threats, by what means, at what cost and in what time period, with the referent object and values being the main specifications of security. (Baldwin, 1997, pp.13-17)

The original meaning of the term security that originated in the late 18th century, where the referent object is state, protected value is survival, and the threats are military, is a military notion of security. (Rolenc, 2012) This military meaning of security is emphasized greatly by neo-realism, as security is essential for the survival of the state (Baldwin, 1997, p.21)

The liberal or open notion of security includes plurality of referent objects, threatened values and threats, and especially since the 1980s the trend in security studies is of broadening the concept. (Rolenc, 2012)²

It is important to note, however, that security in other notions than military is not a new concept and could be seen throughout the history (Rolenc, 2012) and that the concept of security has not changed. Only the interpretations of the dimension differ today from the interpretations from the 1990s. (Baldwin, 1997, p.23)

The focus of security studies is the phenomenon of war. It assumes that war between states is possible and the use of military force has far-reaching effects on the states in question and its societies. Security studies can therefore be defined as “the study of threat, use, and control of military force”. (Walt, 1991, p.212) For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of security remains in the military notion of security.

² See for example Copenhagen School on security: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1232/1/WRAP_McDonald_0671572-pais-270709-mcdonald_secritisation_and_construction_of_security_ejir_forthcoming_2008.pdf, or for example the UNDP Human Development Report from 1994, Chapter 2 “New Dimensions of Human Security”: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en_chap2.pdf

1.1.2 Theories of international relations in general

Theories of international relations differ in their paradigms, general assumptions about international relations, epistemology, ontology, methodology and evaluation.³ Let us now explore the general assumptions and the conceptual tools of the theories chosen for the thesis.

Neo-Realism

Neo-realism, or sometimes referred to as structural realism⁴, works with five general assumptions about the international system. The assumptions are, that the main actors in the world politics are great powers and that they operate in an anarchic system⁵, that all states possess some offensive military capabilities, that states can never be certain about the intentions of other actors, that the main goal of states is survival by seeking to maintain territorial integrity and autonomy, and that states are rational actors in the international system. (Mearsheimer, 2007, pp.73-74)

As states are the main actors in the international environment, little role is ascribed to international institutions. Realists largely claim that international institutions have no affect on the behavior of international institutions. (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995, p.7)

Due to the anarchical nature of the international environment, the picture of the world politics according to (neo) realism is very pessimistic; states virtually operate in a self-help system and have little trust towards each other as the intentions of other states are not clear. Each state strives to become the most powerful actor in the system; the focus here is, therefore, on military capabilities of states. (*Ibid*, p.9) Another result of the self-help anarchic system is the tendency of weaker states to balance against each other, but the expectation is not that once balance is achieved, it will be maintained, but rather that once balance is disrupted, it will be restored. Therefore, balances of power recurrently form and reform (Waltz, 1979, p.128)

Furthermore, we can distinguish two separate strands of neo-realism, namely offensive realism and defensive realism. According to defensive realism, Kenneth Waltz argues that states should strive for appropriate amount of power. (Mearsheimer, 2007, p.75) Stephen Van

³Ontology is the study of reality, in international relations theories what reality is observed. Epistemology is the study of knowledge, how and if knowledge of reality can be observed. Methodology concerns the methods used in order to study international relations. For more information, see for example *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* by Dunne, Kurki and Smith in 2007, Chapter 1 and 2

⁴ A prominent author on neo-realism is for example Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (1979)

⁵ Anarchy in this sense means the lack of a centralized authority or an arbiter

Evera, a defensive realist, furthermore, introduces the so-called offense-defense dynamics in international relations and its impact on the probability of war. According to the dynamic, war is probable when offense dominates and conquest is easy because when conquest is easy states are more expansionist as their current borders are less defensible. At the same time, the incentive to strike is larger, arguments for preventive war carry more weight and states tend to adopt more dangerous diplomatic tactics (they tend to put less weight on negotiations and agreements) and tend to be more secretive. Last, but not least, easy conquest fosters arms race. When defense dominates, the results are the opposite. (Van Evera, 2004, pp. 44-52) According to defensive realists, however, even when conquest is easy and feasible, the costs are higher than the benefits, and therefore striving for power among states is limited. (Mearsheimer, 2007, p.76) Offensive realism on the other hand accepts that the benefits of conquest can be higher than costs and therefore offensive realism expects states to be constantly looking for opportunities to gain advantage. (*Ibid*, p. 77)

For neo-realists, the structure of the international system is defined by the distribution of capabilities across units (states). (Waltz, 1979, p.128, p.101) Although not confined to use by neo-realism, polarity, resting on the distinction between great powers and other states, has, therefore, its roots in neo-realism. (Buzan, 2004, p.32) Kenneth Waltz in his work discusses two structures, namely bipolarity, where two states form the system and multipolarity with more than three states constituting the system. (Waltz, 1979, p.163) John. J. Mearsheimer further develops multipolarity into balanced multipolarity and unbalanced multipolarity. Unbalanced multipolarity is defined by three or more states, where one aspires to be a potential hegemon, whereas in the balanced multipolarity none of the states is an aspiring hegemon. (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 337-338) Neither bipolarity, nor multipolarity could explain the structure of the international system after the end of the Cold War. The time after the end of the Cold War is considered to be unipolar⁶.

Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism

A liberal assumption put forward by Emanuel Kant that might be considered for study of security, is the democratic peace theory, which states that democracies do not fight each other and that democracy can constrain conflict by spreading norms shared by actors and by democratic institutions that constrain the actions of the state leaders. Furthermore, liberal

⁶ The idea, that has emerged now, is the classification of today's system as uni-multipolar, see for example The Lonely Superpower, foreign affairs, Foreign Affairs, Volume 78, No. 2, or America in the World, The Hedgehog Review, Spring 03

institutionalists believe that international trade creates incentives for maintaining peaceful relations, and that international organizations can constrain behavior of states. (Burchill, 2005, pp.58-60)

Neo-liberalism⁷ shares with neo-realism the assumptions that the international system is anarchic and that states are the main actors in the international system. Thus neo-liberalism adopts a state-centric perspective, which considers states to be unitary, rational, utility-maximizing actors. (Martin, 2007, p.100-112)

The key difference to neo-realism is, however, that neo-liberalism studies how co-operation among states and other actors might be achieved. (Neo) Liberals, in fact, allow for a range of situations under which states are motivated to cooperate and the main role in inducing cooperation among states is ascribed to international institutions. (Katzenstein, Sil, 2008, p.10) Institutions are now said to facilitate cooperation even though it is agreed that they cannot force states to alter their behavior. (Walt, 1998, p.39)

Neo-liberalists furthermore work with interdependence and its effect on international relations. Interdependence is said to have at least two forms, either as a process of increase in interactions due to trade, capital flows etc. (economic interdependence), or for example as the result of emergence of an external threat, be it an aggressor or a more abstract threat such as a nuclear threat.⁸ (Wendt, 1994, p.389) Interdependence implies interconnectedness of international relations actors as well as vulnerability which relates to the costs that can be imposed by the actions of one on the other and for disrupting the existing patterns of relations. (Keohane, 1990, p.37) The general assumption, as put forward by Robert Keohane, is not that growing interdependence among states renders power obsolete. On the contrary, military power and asymmetries in military vulnerability remain important in world politics. (Keohane, Nye Jr., 1987, p.730) However, interdependence is considered as an important trait of the 20th century that constraints the behavior of states. (*Ibid*) Interdependence can create incentives for a change of behavior, instigate cooperation (although this is also not automatic) yet at the same time as interdependence can have implications for power relations, it can reduce as well as generate conflicts. (Keohane, 1990, p.38) As for the means to measure interdependence, scholars mostly focus on trade and trade flows and its effects on

⁷ For works on Neo-Liberalism, see for example Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye: Power and Interdependence

⁸ Emergence of a “common other” which is connected to identity and constructivism, see next subchapter

international relations⁹. Other scholars also work with the ratio of trade to GDP¹⁰. Economic integration agreements, such as preferential trade agreements, regional trade agreements, or trade blocks, or also international organizations are used to explain growing interdependence and its effects on the encouragement of peace. (Antov, 2012, pp.30-33)

Constructivism

Constructivism lies in the middle of rationalism and post-structuralism¹¹ in the sense that it adopts assumptions from critical theories about the mutual construction of structure and actors (social ontology) yet at the same time it states that we can reach an objective knowledge of the reality we observe (positivist epistemology). (Fierke, 2007, pp. 172-173)

Constructivism revolves around the assumptions that structure and actors mutually constitute each other, and that individuals are social beings that cannot be separated from a context of normative meaning which shape who they are. (Fierke, 2007, pp. 169-170) A prominent author on constructivism, Alexander Wendt, in his work “Anarchy is what states make of it” thus elaborates on the idea of anarchy put forward by (neo) realists and puts it in the frame of identities and social acts of actors in international relations. Anarchy according to Wendt only exists as a result of intersubjective meaning. (Wendt, 1992, pp.403-407) Structure only exists and has causal powers as a process through the actor’s practices. Strictly speaking, Wendt does not reject the neo-realist claim that the international system is anarchic but rejects their explanation of self-help and self-interested conceptions of security and states that self-help is not a constitutive property of anarchy and that it is produced by a process of interaction between the actors. (*Ibid*, p.396)

Concerning power, constructivism puts emphasis on normative as well as material structure (therefore power is understood in material as well as discursive sense), on the role of identity

⁹ See for example Havard Hegre “Size Asymmetry, Trade, and Militarized Conflict in Journal of Conflict Resolution (Vol. 48, No. 3 2004), or for example Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict in International Organization (Vol. 55, No.2, 2001)

¹⁰ For example Baldwin Interdependence and Power: A conceptual Analysis in International Organization (Vol. 34, No. 4, 1980), or John R. Oneal et al, The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflicts 1950 -85 in Journal of Peace Research (Vol.33, No.1, 1996)

The Trade-to-GDP ratio is the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP and it indicates the importance of international transactions relative to domestic transactions. Although there can be a lot of other factors influencing this ratio such as history, culture, foreign and trade policy, usually this ratio reflects a country’s integration in the world economy and it is said that countries with higher ratio are more sensitive to changes in trade and are therefore more dependent on trade (Shaw, 2007)

¹¹ For post-structuralism see for example International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Chapter 11 (David Campbell)

in international relations in forming interests and actions, and the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures¹². (Reus-Smit, 2005, pp.188-197) Power in this sense may come from hard military capabilities as well as in the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology and language. (Hopf, 1998, p.177) A structure of international relations can, therefore, be said to be constructed by the exchange of ideas. (Wendt, 1999, p.5)

Let us now look more closely at identity. For constructivism, identity of a state is essential in implying the state's preferences, interests and consequent actions, and to ensure at least some level of predictability and order. Constructivism treats identity as an empirical question based on historical context rather than treating states as having only one meaningful identity of self-interested states as neo-realism does. (Hopf, 1998, pp.174-175) Actors of international relations according to Wendt acquire relatively stable identities and the identities of other actors influence the way states behave towards each other. States for example act differently towards enemies than towards allies (according to the concept of us and the other; the importance of military capabilities is, however, not forgotten). Contrary to neo-realist balance of power, constructivist account of identity and its effect on international relations offer a concept of balance of threat¹³ in which states do not necessarily balance against power as long as it does not pose a threat to them. (Hopf, 1998, p.186) Growing interdependence and convergence of values may also instigate the creation of a collective identity which can in turn generate cooperation. (Wendt, 1994, pp.384-388) Another important concept is that of formation of an international society generated through the actions of states (members of the society, region, or system) with its own unique set of institutions and rules¹⁴. The boundaries of the society can shift with the expulsion or inclusion of members. (Dunne, 2007, p.134)

Another central concept to constructivism is socialization. The main assumption is that through international agents such as international organizations we can witness the process of the so-called socialization. The process of social interaction leads to the internationalization of normative understandings which in turn influence the formulation of identities and through identities also interests, and influence the creation, diffusion and compliance with norms. In other words the concept of socialization studies how social interaction can lead to states

¹² For the explanation of the mutual constitution of structure and agents, see for example Caleb Gallemore, Ohio State University, Theory in Action: Constructivism. In this video, IR theorist Caleb Gallemore explains the basic assumption of the mutual constitution of structure and agents using the Matrix movie and an alien invasion scenario as examples. The video is available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYU9UfkV_XI

¹³ For further account on balance of threat see for example Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 1987

¹⁴ Put forward mainly by Hedley Bull

complying with norms and practices that are inconsistent with their security interests¹⁵. (Johnston, 2003, pp.108-112)

1.2 POLARITY, IDENTITY AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN EAST ASIA

The author's decision, as already suggested, is to apply in the following subchapters the conceptual tools of the international relations theories discussed in the previous chapter. The author chooses to work with polarity (the distribution of military capabilities) in line with neo-realism, interdependence (based on economic growth and its relation with trade, trade flows, and institutions) in line with neo-liberalism, and with identities in line with constructivism.

1.2.1 Polarity in East Asia (Military capabilities)

Let us now explore the polarity by focusing on military capabilities. First, this chapter looks closely at the military expenditures and the nuclear weapons arsenal among East Asian countries. Second, it covers the US presence in East Asia and compares the US military expenditure to the East Asian countries.

Military expenditure

Figure 1 shows the changing military spending in the East Asian region¹⁶ from 1988 until 2011, coupled together with a comparison with other regions of the world, namely Africa, North America, South America, Eastern Europe, Western and Central Europe, and the Middle East.

The significance of figure 1 lies in the trend that the East Asian is showing in the past decade and a half. Together with the North American region, the East Asian region (green) shows a growing trend in military expenditures, whereas the other regions included in the graph, European regions, Africa and the Middle East, show stagnating figures for military

¹⁵ For more information on the concept of socialization in constructivist theory see for example National Interests in International Society by Martha Finnemore 1996

¹⁶ East Asia is here defined by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database. Asia and Oceania is further subdivided into Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and Oceania. The author here works with the East Asian sub region which is according to SIPRI defined to include China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor Leste, and Vietnam (Russia is in the SIPRI database included in the region of Europe).

expenditures. The military expenditures in East Asia are now almost comparable to Western and Central European region expenditures.




FIGURE 1 MILITARY EXPENDITURE REGIONS 1988-2011, CONSTANT 2010 BILLION USD, SOURCE: COMPILED FROM SIPRI MILITARY EXPENDITURE DATABASE 2012¹⁷

Figure 2 below concentrates on the military expenditures of the East Asian countries. What can be read from the figure is the military balance in East Asia. China constitutes more than 40% of the region's military expenditures, Russia¹⁸ 20%, Japan 17% and South Korea 9% of East Asian military spending. (SIPRI military expenditure database, 2012)

Several countries depicted in the figure show zero percent of military expenditure share, these are North Korea, Laos, Myanmar, Mongolia and Timor. Data on military spending for North Korea, Laos and Myanmar was not available and the numbers for Mongolia, and Timor were too low to register in the graph.

¹⁷ The graph is compiled using the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012. It is important to note here that for some regions the figures consisted by 10% of estimates where data was missing. This was the case with Africa in the early 1990s and the recent years or in the Middle East until 1996 and in 2011. In other cases, some figures were unavailable, or the estimate was considered too uncertain, such as in the figure for Eastern Europe in 1991, or Central Europe 1989.

¹⁸ The author included Russia in the military expenditures although SIPRI does not include Russia in the military expenditures for the East Asian region but in the European region. The issue with Russia's involvement in East Asia and its inclusion into the East Asian security system is further discussed in chapter 1.3.2 East Asia's security system definition

The unavailability of the figures for North Korea is important, especially when the type of the regime and its nuclear weapons program is taken into account¹⁹. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, however, some estimates of North Korean military expenditure go as up as 5 billion USD, which would translate up to 25% of its GDP. (The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula) This would account for 2% share of military expenditure in East Asia.

To sum up, according to figure 2, China is the biggest military spender with Russia constituting only half of China's military spending.




FIGURE 2 MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN EAST ASIA 2011, CONSTANT 2010 BILLION USD; SOURCE: COMPILED FROM SIPRI MILITARY EXPENDITURE DATABASE 2012

Let us now put this in the context of the development in the last decade. The following figure (figure 3) shows the military expenditure growth of the four biggest military spenders of the East Asian region from the year 2000 until 2011.

Impressive is the Chinese military expenditure. China's military spending grew by 170 percent in real terms since 2002, and by more than 500 percent since 1995. (Background

¹⁹ The same problem will be revealed later on in the section on nuclear weapons arsenal in East Asia and in the chapter on security issues in the East Asian security system in Chapter 2

paper, 2012) At the same time, it is noteworthy that the Chinese military expenditure has remained at around 2% of its national GDP.




FIGURE 3 MILITARY EXPENDITURE CHINA, RUSSIA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 2000-2011, CONSTANT 2010 BILLION USD; SOURCE: SIPRI MILITARY EXPENDITURE DATABASE 2012

The growth in military spending therefore reflects China's overall growth. (*Ibid*) Russia's military expenditure has also shown rise from 2000 until 2011. The increase in military expenditures, is however, moderate. Japan's and South Korea's military expenditure can, more or less, be regarded as constant.

Nuclear weapons

The following table shows the nuclear weapons forces for the East Asian countries.

Country	Deployed warheads	Other warheads	Total Inventory
United States	2 150	5 850	~8 000
Russia	1 800	8 200	~10 000
China	..	200	~240
North Korea
Total	~4400	~14600	~19000

TABLE 1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EAST ASIA 2012; SOURCE: NUCLEAR FORCES DEVELOPMENT (SIPRI)

It shows warheads deployed on missiles and other warheads either in reserve, in the process of dismantlement, or preparation. (Nuclear Forces Development, SIPRI) The United States is included here in the table for reference as its nuclear weapons arsenal is the biggest in the world. In East Asia, China and Russia among the East Asian states fall within the category of

recognized nuclear weapons states²⁰. It is noteworthy to mention North Korea, which has a place in the table, but there are only very few data available about its nuclear weapons capabilities. Not a nuclear weapons state²¹, North Korea is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Due to the type of North Korea regime, however, no data is available on the number of deployed or other warheads²².

Military presence of the United States in East Asia

This part shortly covers the military presence of the US in East Asia first from the perspective of the US bases in the region, second from the perspective of existing military alliances with the East Asian states and lastly the US military expenditure is put in comparison with the expenditures of the East Asian countries.

The number of US military bases around the world is difficult to estimate. The number varies from 700 to over 1000 worldwide and range from small drone sites to fully operational military bases. (Johnson, 2011) According to the Department of Defense report for the fiscal year 2012 baseline, the US maintained 666 sites²³ overseas, the majority of them being in Germany with 232 sites, in Japan where 109²⁴ sites are situated, and in South Korea where 85 sites are located. (Base Structure Report, 2012) The bases in Japan and South Korea are based on bilateral alliances with the respective states. The military alliance with Japan is based on the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security from 1960²⁵. The military alliance with South Korea is based on the Republic of Korea/United States Mutual Security

²⁰ Recognized nuclear weapons state are 5 states, the US, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China as stipulated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), The text of the treaty is available at: <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html>

²¹ Not officially according to the NPT

²² For more on the question of North Korean nuclear weapons program and its implications, see chapter 2

²³ Site is a “Physical (geographic) location that is or was owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by a DOD Component. Each site is assigned to a single installation. A site may exist in one of three forms: land only - where no facilities are present; facility or facilities only - where there the underlying land is neither owned nor controlled by the government, and land with facilities – where both are present”. (Base Structure Report 2012)

²⁴ The biggest concentration of US military bases is in Okinawa. The US military presence sparks a considerable amount of negative responses from the Japanese population due to pollution, military accidents and population abuse by the US military personnel, see for example: <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/10/21/editorials/more-problems-in-okinawa/#.UTya6tZ4-qE>, or <http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00501/>

²⁵ For the full text of the Treaty from 1960:

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/mutual_cooperation_treaty.pdf, or for more information on strategy of US towards Japan see the Strategy for the U.S.-Japan Alliance: <http://www.cfr.org/japan/strategy-us-japan-alliance/p28010>

Agreement from 1954 (signed 1953)²⁶. The US maintains several other bilateral alliances or agreements, for example with Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, or Australia²⁷. As for active military personnel, total of 43657 personnel²⁸ was employed in the Asia Pacific (including Australia) as of March 2011. (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2011)




FIGURE 4 MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN EAST ASIA 2011 INCL. USA, CONSTANT 2010 BILLION USD; SOURCE: COMPILED FROM SIPRI MILITARY EXPENDITURE DATABASE 2012

If we include the United States in the military expenditure overview, see figure 4 above, the superiority of the United States cannot be doubted. The countries included in the chart are the same as for figure 2. The United States' expenditure is included for the comparison. The share of US military expenditure constitutes 68%, almost 70% of the whole region²⁹. The

²⁶ For the full text of the treaty, see: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp, or for more information on the US-South Korea alliance see for example Council on Foreign Relations overview of the alliance: <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/us-south-korea-alliance/p11459>, or assessment of the alliance: <http://forum.eastwestcenter.org/ngs/files/2010/10/The-U.S.-South-Korea-Alliance-Doug-Bandow.pdf>

²⁷ For more information on the individual bilateral agreements see for example Assessing U.S. Bilateral Security Alliances in the Asia Pacific's "Southern Rim": Why the San Francisco System Endures by William T. Tow available at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10013/Tow_Final.pdf

²⁸ Personnel employed in army, navy, marine corps and air force

²⁹ The author is aware that the US military expenditure is not spent in its entirety on the East Asian region. The chart serves as a comparison of overall military expenditures of the countries and thus illuminates US dominance

information is important coupled together with the US military presence as outlined above. This gives the US a key role in the East Asian region in the military and security area³⁰.

1.2.2 Interdependence in East Asia (Economic growth, trade, integration)

First, let us assess the economic development in Asia. The Asia-Pacific is regarded as one of the most important and fastest-growing regions in the world economy, with East Asia being the accelerator of the growth. (Lo, 2006, p.9)

Figure 5 shows five countries with the highest GDP from the East Asian countries, namely China, Russia, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea (South) from the year 2000 until 2012 with the 2012 figure showing estimates of the states' GDP (in current billion USD³¹).




FIGURE 5 GDP OF CHINA, RUSSIA, JAPAN, KOREA 2000-2011, CURRENT BILLION USD; SOURCE: IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK DATABASE OCTOBER 2012

Of importance here is China's growth; China's GDP has grown exponentially in the last decade. Second, with a much slower growth, ranks Japan, and on the third and fourth place are South Korea and Russia. Noteworthy here, however, is also the emergence of Indonesia as an important player in East Asia with the figure for 2012 coming near to South Korea, and mapping South Korea's growth since 2000.

³⁰ A widely debated issue now arising is the question of sequestration (cuts) in the US overall budget. For an overview of the effects of the impact of budget cuts, see for example: <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2012/9/sequestration%20singer/sequestration%20singer.pdf>

³¹ Figures for constant billion USD were not available

Overall, although the growth in Asia and the Pacific is said to have slowed down in 2012, economic growth is forecasted to pick up gradually and it is foresaid that Asia as a whole should remain the global growth leader (Asia and Pacific Regional Economic Outlook Update, 2012)

Trade, in the recent years, has increased substantially within Asia. Moreover, all Asian nations now trade more with each other than with the European Union or the United States and in the recent years, the ratio of the region's trade with itself to its share in the world trade has also been increasing. This being said, the United States still maintains a significant role in Asia's economy. (Petri, 2008, p.4) The following figure 6 depicts the growing trade within the region.




FIGURE 6 SHARE OF REGIONAL FLOWS IN ASIA TOTAL MERCHANDISE EXPORTS 2011; SOURCE: COMPILED FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2012, P.23

According to the figure, 54% of Asian exports flowed within Asia. A conclusion can be drawn here that the East Asian countries trade mainly with each other. The second biggest share of Asia's total merchandise exports holds North America, and the third place goes to Europe.

Regarding the trade-to-GDP ratio, significant is the value for Singapore, which in 2008 peaked at approximately 395% of GDP. The values for Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia were also above 100%, the value for Brunei was just below 100% and the South Korean ratio has been rising steadily from 57% in 2003 to 97% in 2011. The values for the

biggest economies, are not as big, but not insignificant either. China's and Russia's ratio is at about 50%, Japan's oscillated in the last decade between 20-30%.³² (World DataBank)

There are a number of trade agreements, bilateral and multilateral, present in Asia (thus also in East Asia) also referred to as “Spaghetti-Bowl” of Trade Agreements, (Shambaugh, 2008, kindle location 315 – 333) or “Noodle Bowl”³³. The figure below (7) shows the state of the Noodle Bowl of trade agreements present in East Asia in 2007³⁴ and illustrates the complexity of the East Asian trade relations through which the region becomes heavily interlinked and the East Asian states interdependent. (Baldwin, 2007, p.18)




FIGURE 7 NOODLE BOWL OF TRADE AGREEMENTS IN EAST ASIA; SOURCE: BALDWIN, 2007, P.5

The Noodle Bowl trade agreements architecture, however, is said to be fragile for three reasons. These include dependency on smooth functioning of the intra-regional trade, unilateral tariff tracking not subject to WTO discipline and without any substitute to WTO there is no arbiter to ease off tensions. (Baldwin, 2007, p.3)

³² For the graph depicting the trade-to-GDP ratios of east Asian countries see appendix 1

³³ For the visualization of the Asian Noodle Bowl as a whole see appendix 2

³⁴ The Baldwin's visualization includes multilateral free trade agreements such as ACFTA, AFTA, etc. but the bilateral links are listed separately. For more information on existing multilateral agreements, see for example WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information system: <http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx>, or WTO Preferential Trade Arrangements: <http://ptadb.wto.org/default.aspx>

As for institutions, there are a number of institutions in East Asia, for example Association of Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN, ASEAN + 1, ASEAN + 3), The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation, the Asia-Europe Meeting, the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit , or the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific³⁵. There are also a number of regional organizations focused on specific issues such as organized crime, telecommunications, public health, or energy security. (Shambaugh, Yahuda, 2008, kindle location 298-305)

When talking about the East Asian security architecture, what attracts considerable attention is the fact that the East Asian region lacks a regional security institution such as NATO in Europe. (Kelly, Watts, 2010, p.274) In 1954, South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was initiated by the United States based on the Manila Pact as a collective security response to communist expansion in South East Asia³⁶. As a collective security institution in East Asia, SEATO, however, ultimately failed and dissolved in 1977. The reason for the failure is understood to be the divergence of Asian views on the threat of communist expansion. (*Ibid*, 2010, p.279)

ASEAN, which brings together 10 South East Asian countries³⁷, and in its extended version of ASEAN+3 also Japan, South Korea and China, is also still considered more of a political and economic entity rather than a security-oriented organization. (Cossa, 2008, kindle location 4432) Neither ASEAN, nor other East Asian institutions were able to cope with the financial crisis in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, or were able to mediate the crisis in East Timor in 1999. (Simon, 2008, kindle location 2721) ASEAN's main contribution to regional security lies in its driving force for community building in the region and especially in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)³⁸. (Cossa, 2008, kindle location 4432) ARF is regarded as suitable to serve as a security instrument (*Ibid*, kindle location 4459) and useful because it allowed Japan and China to address existing historical issues, because China quite quickly

³⁵ The author does not go into detail on the individual institutions listed. The information is only provided as general characterization of the region, extensive information on the individual institutions is thus in the author's view unnecessary.

³⁶ For the text of the treaty see: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp

³⁷ Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
For more information on ASEAN, see: <http://www.asean.org/>

³⁸ For more information on ARF see: <http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/>

adjusted to the ARF thanks to its soft procedures, and because it linked Northeast Asia with Southeast Asia in the security talks. (Buzan, 2003, p.155) With the growing number of members of ARF, which now encompasses 27 participants³⁹ including the European Union and the United States, the applicability on the East Asian region is being questioned. (Cossa, 2008, kindle location 4459) Moreover, some of the region's security issues such as tensions regarding the Taiwan Strait or the Korean Peninsula were left out. (Buzan, 2003, p.157)

Cooperative arrangements and institution-building in East Asia is said to have a late start compared to for example Europe and North America, which does not necessarily mean it's a failure, but could show diverse interests and differences in political structure and economic development⁴⁰. (Friedberg, Winter 1993-1994, p.23)

Thus, it can be concluded that through trade, tourism, higher education, and institutions, Asia is becoming increasingly more interconnected and interdependent. (Shambaugh, 2008, kindle location 315 – 333) but from the perspective of institution building, the conclusion is that the region is still under-institutionalized. Although the emergence of ARF can be considered to be an impressive beginning attempt to build a regional security regime in the region (*Ibid*), the general assumption therefore is that there is no common security institution present in East Asia. Instead, it is argued that the United States and its network of bilateral security alliances and issue-specific coalitions⁴¹, even now, still play the main role of securing security in the region. (Cossa, 2008, kindle location 4315)

1.2.3 Identity in East Asia

Wendt's account of states' identity explains it as an outcome of interaction between states. Identity can thus be understood as an outcome of relations of states towards each other and therefore, as an outcome of historical processes. (Littlefield, 2011, p.8) Although for Northeast Asia, we can find commonalities in Confucianism as historical legacy that still influences the current identities of the states (*Ibid*, pp.8-10), it is often argued that a homogenous regional identity is missing in Asia – Asia is more scattered, it is a series of unequal island nations not close enough in their identities to generate institutional solutions.

³⁹ Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States, and Viet Nam

⁴⁰ See the following subchapter

⁴¹ For example the Six-Party Talks, more information will be provided in Chapter 2

(Ikenberry, Mastanduno, 2003, p.13) In Asia, there is a lack of cooperation memory and a tradition of feeling as a part of a distinct political entity. (Friedberg, Winter 1993/1994, p. 24) The concept of identity, however, can be broadened to include domestic processes and its effect on the interaction between the states. (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007, p.136) The author therefore, in the first part, concentrates on identity as the type of government the state possesses, democratic or non-democratic⁴². Moreover, interests are also said to influence identities of states. The author here makes a decision to discuss the interests of the biggest powers from the last two chapters, namely the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea. First, the author analyzes the ambiguous nature of Russian position in East Asia and then the competing interests of China and the United States and their perception by Japan and South Korea as well as Japan's and South Korea's interests and identities.

Domestic processes and identity

Since the end of the Second World War, the East Asian region has seen political development, especially in the field of democratization of the region. In Northeast Asia, we could witness democratization in several countries, namely Japan in 1947 with the new Constitution of Japan, South Korea in 1987 with the end of the military rule in the country and Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s. In Southeast Asia, several countries are also said to be on the road of democratization, namely the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, despite the difficulties and the challenges they are facing. (Lo, 2006, p.8) To assess the current political status of East Asia, the author has chosen to work with the reports composed by the Freedom House on Freedom in the world.

According to Freedom House, states are grouped into three categories, namely 'Free states', 'Partly free states', and 'Not free states'. Free states have political competition, respect for civil liberties, independent civic life, and independent media, whereas partly free countries show restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, often linked to corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife, or civil war. Not free countries do not show any basic political rights and show denial of basic civil liberties. (Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance: Map of Freedom)⁴³

⁴² Closely related to democratic peace theory

⁴³ For the methodology used to assess the freedom in individual states and the grouping of states into the categories see <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2013/methodology>

According to the statistics in the newest report on Freedom in the World 2013, in the Asia-Pacific region⁴⁴, the not free states in the Asia-Pacific region constitute 21% of the states in the region, 36% states are only partly free and 43% are free states. (Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance: Graphs and Charts)⁴⁵ The free (or electoral democratic) states are, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Bhutan, Indonesia⁴⁶ with the rest ranging from partly free to not free. Noteworthy, is the presence of communist countries like China, North Korea and Vietnam, which are said not to follow the democratization trend as outlined at the beginning of the chapter and are posing political and military threats and challenges to their neighbors (but not necessarily limited to neighbors only).⁴⁷ (Lo, 2006, p.8) Russia is identified here as a not free country⁴⁸.

Interests and identity

Russia and its interests in East Asia are a little ambiguous. Russia's influence in the region has been declining since the 1990s, specifically in the economic sphere. (Romancov, 2006, p.72) Another scholar suggests that Russia's foreign policy had always been inclined towards Europe rather than Asia, especially since the 19th century and strikingly so in the 1950s and 1980s (Brutents, 1992, p.1) It is argued that Russia, despite its efforts to move its foreign policy further eastward, maintains a low profile in the Northeast Asian region. (Amirov, 2010, p.1) Russia as a player in East Asia is also neglected by US policymakers who discuss the prospects of Russia becoming a partner in Europe or Central Asia, but fail to include Russia in similar plans for East Asia (Blank, 2010, p.Vii)

It has been argued, that the focus of United States has shifted to other parts of the world, namely to Middle East and Central Asia, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries of the Middle East-Southwest Asian region. This led to the impression that the Asia-Pacific region would likely be of secondary importance to the US. (Sutter, 2009, pp.189-190) This can be further supported by the negative impact of the 2008 financial crisis on America's image.

⁴⁴ The Asia-Pacific region in the classification of the Freedom House also includes the Pacific region with Australia, New Zealand, etc. The Freedom House does not offer a narrower focus.

⁴⁵ For detailed view of the findings, see appendix 3: Map of Freedom 2013

⁴⁶ The Freedom House also includes Mongolia and smaller islands of Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands as democratic free states

⁴⁷ China, while opening itself to trade and the international community in general remains a non-democratic country and it is the author's view that democratization trends are not visible.

The question of security dilemmas and challenges to the East Asian security system is dealt with in the second chapter of the thesis

⁴⁸ The Russian federation is, however, no longer a communist country.

(Yahuda, 2011, p.186) However, there is a change visible in the Obama administration. Although it is not unanimously agreed, the general belief is that the US has reprioritized its strategic policy and has returned its focus on East Asia and is now putting more emphasis on the South East Asian region. (Lyon, 2011, pp. 1-2) All of the above stated is further reinforced in the document Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense from January 2012. The goal of the United States foreign policy is the maintenance of its leadership in international relations which can also be applied to the East Asia as maintaining its leadership in the region while stressing the importance of the existing alliances. (United States of America, January 2012, p.2)

China is said to be pursuing the status of hegemon in East Asia as historically China saw itself as the central power of Asia and with its current economic and military rise in the recent years wants to resume the position. (Littlefield, 2011, p.15) It is worthy to note that China opposes hegemony and power politics in any form. (*Ibid*) It is in this context not surprising that a number of Chinese analysts perceive the United States as a long-term strategic security challenge and competitor.

Japan's position in international relations is not easy. There are several internal and external factors that shape Japan's foreign policy and its engagement in international relations generally and in East Asia specifically⁴⁹. One of these factors is also the current Constitution of Japan⁵⁰ that was enacted in 1947 as a result of the post-war US administration in Japan led by General MacArthur. Noteworthy in the Constitution is Article 9. The article stipulates that Japan as a state renounces war as well as the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes as the sovereign right of the nation and will therefore not maintain military forces⁵¹. (The Constitution of Japan) In 1954, the so-called Self-Defense Forces of Japan were created for the sole purpose of the defense of the state. This is also reflected in Japan's defense policy which consists of the Basic Policy on National Defense adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet in 1957. The policy includes the support to the United Nations and international collaboration, stabilization of the livelihood of people, building up of national defense capabilities and dealing with external threats based on the US-Japan agreement. (Fundamental Concepts of National Defense: II. Basis of Defense Policy)

⁴⁹ See for example Determinants of Japan's foreign policy in the 21st century by Věra Hojzáková (bachelor thesis, available at the University of Economics in Prague in Czech language).

⁵⁰ For the full text of the Constitution, see:

http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html

⁵¹ For the exact unabridged version of the text of Article 9, see appendix 4

Other basic principles of Japan's defense policy include exclusively defense-orientation of its national security policy, Japan remaining a non-military power that would not pose a threat to other countries, three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing or allowing nuclear weapons on the territory of Japan, and lastly the priority of politics over military also known as civilian control. (*Ibid*)⁵² The US-Japan alliance is regarded as linchpin of the foreign policy by Japan. (Hojzáková, 2011, pp.33-34)

Until recently, South Korea's foreign and security policy showed preoccupation with the situation on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's nuclear proliferation and the prospect for peaceful re-unification. (Snyder, 2012) However, the military alliance with the United States and cooperation with other countries of East Asia, namely Russia, China, Japan and the Asia Pacific is equally as important (Key diplomatic tasks)

Important here is the perception of the United States as a hegemon and China as a potential hegemon. Although, the conclusion cannot be drawn that the US presence in East Asia is well perceived by all countries in East Asia, its biggest allies, Japan and South Korea, support the US position. The US is ascribed an identity of the region's off-shore stabilizer, assurance provider and mediator (reflected in the military alliances the US maintains in the region). (Ikenberry, Mastanduno [2], 2003, kindle location 10954-10995) On the other hand, China's growth and aspirations, although officially peaceful, is regarded by Asian countries with fear as a threat to the region. (Littlefield, 2011, p.15) The perception of Japan in East Asia and more specifically by China and South Korea is also problematic because of the existing historical grievances between Japan and its Asian neighbors⁵³.

1.3 EAST ASIA'S SECURITY SYSTEM

After laying down the theoretical basis and applying the conceptual tools, it is now time to define the East Asian security system. First, the conceptual tools and the empirical data are linked with theories of international relations. On this basis, the second subchapter then formulates the East Asian security system. To formulate the system, the conclusions from the

⁵² This low-profile foreign policy is, however, changing slightly in the recent years. The turning point for Japan's foreign policy in this respect had been the announcement of war on terrorism by the United States. Japan, as a reaction to these events, passed Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001 and in 2003 the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law which allowed for a limited presence of Japanese defense forces in the conflicts. (Hojzáková, 2011, pp.31-32)

⁵³ The question of these differing perceptions of identities based on interests and strategies of the countries and the security dilemmas this creates is dealt with in more detail in chapter 2

theories are coupled with works of international relations scholars as well as the opinion and decisions of the author.

1.3.1 East Asia discussed using international relations theories

Neo-realism views the balance of power as the key factor for formulating Asia's international relations. (Acharya, 2008, kindle location 901) As was shown in the chapter on polarity in international relations, the United States takes the lead with Russia, China and Japan ranking second third and fourth. From the distribution of power, the chapter on the military characteristics of the East Asian region has shown that the United States supremacy in (not only) military capabilities cannot be disputed. Coupled with its presence in the East Asian region and through its bilateral military alliances with the individual East Asian states, the dominance of the United States in the security system is also visible. From the perspective of neo-realism, the main actors are located in Northeast Asia.

While interdependence resulting from increase of trade in the region is useful for making predictions about the future development of the region, it is the author's conclusion that it cannot be used for the definition of the East Asian security system. Regarding institutions, the general view is that the region lacks a well-developed, multilateral institution and that the region itself does not seem to promote international institutions that could be counted within the security system. (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, 2003, p.13) With the absence of security structures such as the EU or NATO, the crucial pillar of the East Asian regional security system is constituted by the US bilateral alliance system and its military presence in East Asia. (Alagappa, 2002, kindle location 698-710) East Asian institutions, however, are important in fostering intersubjective understanding and in creating and sharing norms and easing the management of security affairs in the region. (*Ibid*, kindle location 564) Therefore, according to neo-liberalism, Southeast Asia's importance should not be overlooked.

As was already shown, we cannot say that there is a homogeneous identity in East Asia. The region is both politically diverse in regimes ranging from democratic to semi-democratic to non-democratic, and in culture. Identity can, however, explain a key aspect of today's Asia which neo-realism cannot and that is why the United States has not been balanced against by the Asian countries (and thus not expelled from the security system) but the rise of China is often perceived as a possible threat to security not only by the Asian countries but to the

United States as well⁵⁴. According to the realist logic, a power such as the United States seeking hegemony should be balanced against. (Acharya, 2008, kindle location 962) For the durability of this order, the countries of Asia must view United States as a benign power and the US thus must maintain its identity of a off-shore stabilizer, assurance provider and mediator (reflected in the military alliances the US maintains in the region) that enables it to remain the crucial player of the East Asian security system (Ikenberry, Mastanduno [2], 2003, kindle location 10954-10995) If regarded through the lens of interests and identity, the United States, Japan and South Korea can be grouped together as democratic states as a counter pole to China. As was shown, Russia's position is a little ambiguous through its long-term historical interest in Europe rather than East Asia.

Although the theories seem incompatible, authors of international relations have combined realism and constructivism (Nau, 2003) or realism, liberalism and constructivism together (Katzenstein, Sil, 2008) to better explain the dynamics in the region. The combination of realism and constructivism allows us to work with the distribution of power which enables us to analyze the polarity, and identity which maps out threat perceptions based on different identities and self-image. (Nau, 2003, p.214) Such an approach is very important in predicting existing realities in East Asia and is thus used to define the East Asian security system in the next subchapter and later used in the section on future scenarios.

1.3.2 East Asia's security system definition

Let us now formulate the East Asian security system. The author's goal is to build a security system or model based on the biggest and most influential powers in East Asia that have the capacity to actively participate in the region's security relations. In this respect, the author's decision is to concentrate on the great powers of the region and to disregard the little powers.

As has been suggested in the last subchapter, neo-realism is suitable in distinguishing the key players of the security system according to their military capabilities. In this sense, the main actors would be the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea.

As was already suggested, however, Russia's position in East Asia is ambiguous. Although, it could be argued that Russia should be defined as a great power in Northeast Asia alongside with the United States, China, and Japan (Romancov, 2006, p.72), the account of Russia's interests shows that although Russia is trying to change its foreign policy and move it

⁵⁴ The issue of the rise China will be further discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3

eastward, it is not successful and is not anticipated as a player in East Asian affairs. Furthermore, when talking about security system, or security architecture in East Asia, most scholars tend to not mention Russia⁵⁵. The neglect by international scholars coupled together with an identity oriented more towards the European region leads the author to the conclusion to exclude Russia from the East Asian security system⁵⁶.

Although China is usually not included in the security architecture by international scholars⁵⁷ and as has been shown before, China is not part of the alliance system led by the United States, much attention is paid to China when the security relations of East Asia are discussed⁵⁸ and the account of its interest shape its identity as a potential hegemon in the region. Thus it is the author's view that China should not be excluded from the East Asian security system.




FIGURE 8 SECURITY SYSTEM ACTORS IN EAST ASIA - MILITARY EXPENDITURE 2011, CONSTANT 2010 BILLION USD, SOURCE: COMPILED FROM SIPRI MILITARY EXPENDITURE DATABASE 2012

With the exclusion of Russia, what we are left with regarding the distribution of power, are the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea. The relative shares of the military expenditures of these great powers constituting the security system in the region (neglecting the insignificant powers) are depicted in the figure 8.

⁵⁵ For example Koga: *The US and East Asian Regional Security Architecture: Building a Regional Security Nexus on Hub-and-Spoke* (Asia Perspective, 2011), Kelly or Watts *Rethinking the Security Architecture of North East Asia* (VULWR, 2010), or for example *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific* (Yahuda, 2011) – Section II on the post-Cold War period or for example *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific* (Ed. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, 2003)

⁵⁶ The author on the other hand acknowledges Russia's involvement in territorial disputes with Japan or Russia's involvement in the Six-Party Talks which is the topic of chapter 2, sub chapter 2.2 Major security issues and the security system actors

⁵⁷ Koga and Kelly as per footnote 56

⁵⁸ China, mainly as a security dilemma or as a growing power among the East Asian countries is included in all major works on politics or security relations in East Asia (in some as a security threat or dilemma, in others as a growing power in East Asia), see footnote 56

When regarding polarity, the system is neither unilateral, nor is it multilateral. As argued, the United States enjoys supremacy of military capabilities and so it could be concluded that the system is unipolar with the United States as the region's hegemon. But the US supremacy is neither uncontested, nor unquestionable, nor easily maintained.⁵⁹ The general opinion is that the United States is not able to manage security affairs in the East Asian region by itself and thus has to rely on the support of the East Asian countries. (*Ibid*, kindle location 779) From this perspective, the author here suggests the label “uni-multipolar” with the United States as the leading power with several major powers (China, Japan, and South Korea) as more suitable to describe the present character of the East Asian security system.

If we link the distribution of power (polarity) with identity, we can see another pattern emerging within the system. That is a military alliance system (also backed by the empirical evidence from the characteristics of the region obtained from the application of theoretical conceptual tools) consisting of democratic states, namely the United States as the leading power, then Japan, and South Korea as the allied states.⁶⁰ At the other end is China, a fast-growing member of the security system which is not part of this “alliance system” but an important player in the security system in East Asia and an aspiring hegemon.




FIGURE 9 THE EAST ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM, SOURCE: OWN COMPILATION

⁵⁹ See for example Chapter 4 The United States in Asia: Challenged but Durable Leadership by Robert Sutter in *International Relations of Asia* (2008, ed. Shambaugh, Yahuda)

⁶⁰ This alliance system, which is not limited only to Japan, and South Korea, is by scholars of international relations labeled as “the hub and spoke system”. (Blumenthal et al., 2011; De Swielande, 2012)

The security system defined by the combination of polarity and identity as described above is depicted in the figure 9 with the alliance system comprising of the United States and its allies, Japan and South Korea, and China outside of the alliance system.

It is the author's decision to define the East Asian security system in this manner. Thus, when speaking about the East Asian security system, the United States, Japan and South Korea present the democratic alliance group or democratic alliance sub-system with the US as the leading state, and China as a counter pole.

2 EAST ASIA'S SECURITY SYSTEM – STRATEGIES AND CONFLICTS

This chapter works with the security system in Asia as defined at the end of the last chapter. The focus is put on the actors of the security system and their strategies regarding the region first and then on the challenges and security threats or dilemmas that are affecting the East Asian security system.

The chapter is therefore divided into two subchapters. The first subchapter looks at the actors of the security system, namely United States, China, Japan, and South Korea. Specifically, the subchapter's aim is to examine each actor's security strategy in East Asia.

The second subchapter focuses on the challenges to the security system. In today's world we can distinguish between traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats. Security threats are traditionally linked with military capabilities and military disputes and can therefore cover military capabilities such as nuclear proliferation, military development of a country, territorial disputes, or for example terrorism. Non-traditional security threats are non-military and can therefore include threats such as cyber war, environment and others. The decision of the author is to concentrate on the traditional security threats as it is the author's opinion that these have greater potential to influence the current security system in place⁶¹.

2.1 SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM ACTORS

Let us now look in more detail at the individual actor's strategy for East Asia. This section is not designed as a historical account of the states' security strategies. Focus is put on the recent developments in this area.

2.1.1 The Alliance subsystem (democratic group of the security system)

Here, the security strategies of the democratic states that form the alliance system of the security system in East Asia, namely the United States, Japan, and South Korea are discussed.

⁶¹ The future of the East Asian security system is the topic of Chapter 3

The United States of America

As was already determined, the United States of America is the key player of the East Asian security system and as has already been suggested, the interest of the United States is to maintain its leadership.

According to the National Security Strategy from 2010, the alliances with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Australia are the basis of security in Asia and remain essential to the US, Asian, as well as global security, and to the future of security and integration in Asia. (National Security Strategy, 2010, p.42) Moreover, the United States foresees further cooperation in the areas of mutual interests through the existing alliances, such as trade, investment, sustainable growth, combating violent extremism or nuclear proliferation, as well as the deepening of the relationships with emerging powers (such as China with which the US will strive to pursue a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship) and pursuing a stronger role in the regional institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the East Asia Summit. (*Ibid*, p.43) Indonesia is seen as an important future partner in regional and transnational issues including counterterrorism efforts, maritime security, peacekeeping, or climate change and disaster relief. (*Ibid*, p.44)

In 2011, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, established 6 priorities of the United States in the article “America’s Pacific Century” for Foreign Policy⁶², some of which map the National Security Strategy. The priorities included reinforcing bilateral alliances, deepening the relationship with emerging powers such as China, engaging in regional institutions, promoting trade and investment, maintaining a large military presence in the region, and spreading democracy and human rights values. (De Swielande, 2012, p.76)

The United States will also strive to expand the network of cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific and will “of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region”. (United States of America, January 2012, p.2)

Japan

In 2010, two important documents in relation to Japan’s national security strategy were drafted. In August 2010, the report “Japan’s Vision for Future Security and Defense

⁶² Full text of the article from Foreign Policy is available at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century

Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation”⁶³ was submitted to Prime Minister Naoto Kan. In December 2010, the currently primary document of Japan’s defense policy, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which sets out guidelines for defense force planning as well as basic principles and policies of Japan’s national security strategy, was adopted. (Jimbo, 2012, pp.1-2) Both documents work with the concepts of “Dynamic Deterrence”, or “Dynamic Defense Force” which stand for the achieving of credible capabilities through defense force in order to be able to meet Japan’s defense needs in the surrounding security environment. (Matsuda, 2011)

The NDPG foresees Japan’s greater involvement in international peace operations, in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Japan continues to see the US-Japan alliance as the linchpin to its foreign policy and crucial for Japan’s peace and security and will strive to further deepen and develop the alliance and will promote cooperation in other areas such as cyberspace security. Furthermore, according to the document, Japan will create a network of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and enhance the security cooperation with South Korea, ASEAN, Australia and India as well as promote confidence with China and Russia. (Japan. Ministry of Defense, 2010)

The Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan from 2012 for the region of Asia and Oceania confirms the principles set out in NDPG from 2010. The linchpin of Japanese diplomacy will remain the United States-Japan alliance. At the same time, however, Japan considers the strengthening of cooperation with other countries of the region equally as important. In this respect, Japan’s focus will be to build multi-layered networks with the East Asian and Pacific region countries by advancing bilateral and trilateral dialogues as well as multi-lateral frameworks. (Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Diplomatic Bluebook 2012, pp17-18)

Officially, the US-Japan military alliance is given the highest priority in Japan’s foreign and security policy. The reality, on the other hand, shows signs that Japan is not entirely satisfied with the status quo. The American military bases spark controversy and negative public opinion, especially the military bases in Okinawa⁶⁴ and Japan has been showing signs of

⁶³ For the full text of the document, see: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampoboue2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf

⁶⁴ The military bases in Japan’s Okinawa on one hand present job opportunities for the Japanese people, on the other hand, there are complaints concerning noise, social tension and criminality (specifically abuses of women by US military personnel), or military accidents in the Okinawa prefecture. See for example Robert Eldridge “The Okinawa ‘Base Problem’ Today available at: <http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00501/>,

pursuing a more independent policy in some areas of the US-Japan alliance⁶⁵. (Hojzáková, 2011, p.46)

South Korea

The Korean Peninsula still remains one of the hottest issues in South Korea's foreign policy. It is the belief of South Korea that the situation in North Korea presents a security concern not only to South Korea but to the international community as a whole and the South Korean government according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is committed to pursuing peaceful denuclearization of North Korea. (North Korean Nuclear Issue, 2011)

However, South Korea seems now to be on the path of becoming a more prominent contributor to international security as it expands its contribution to peacekeeping and stabilization operation. In this respect, in line with the 2010 Defense White Paper, the contributions to international stability are the third priority of the South Korean government after the defense of South Korea and the Korean reunification. (Snyder, 2012) In order to achieve these security objectives, the National Defense Policy is based on eight key tenets which include the development and deepening of the military alliance with the United States, on all-directional defense posture and on the improvement of the capabilities as well as the image of the military. (Republic of Korea, 2010)

Under the Lee Myung-bak administration, the key tasks of the South Korean diplomacy, as articulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in line with the strategic paradigm of "Global Korea" were 'Security diplomacy that the public can trust', 'Diplomacy that contributes to global co-prosperity', 'Diplomacy that secures engines for future growth' and 'Diplomacy that serves the public'. (Key diplomatic tasks) Within these tasks, the focus is put on the stability on the Korean Peninsula and on the security alliance with the United States and strategic cooperative relations with China, Japan, and Russia as well as with the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, other tasks include greater involvement of South Korea in the international community, closer cooperation in various fields, and foreign policies brought closer to the people. (*Ibid*)

or Mochizuki, O'Hanlon "Solving the Okinawa Problem" available at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/12/solving_the_okinawa_problem

⁶⁵ More specifically for example in the question of the relocation of the Futenma base, see for example Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart "The US Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy" available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf>

South Korea experienced a change of leadership with the presidential elections held in December 2012. The new South Korean president is Park Geun-hye and there are expectations of change in South Korea's foreign policy and security strategy with the new president. (Yoo, 2012) The change should be visible mainly in South Korea's policy towards North Korea, which, in contrast to Lee Myung-bak's policy, should be focused again more on cooperation, confidence building and improvement of the bilateral relation.⁶⁶ (*Ibid*) Concerning the relations with the United States and the bilateral military alliance, President Park is most likely going to emphasize the importance of the US-ROK alliance as well as the ROK-China cooperative partnership. (Han, 2012) Park is, however, also expected to confront the United States on key issues concerning the bilateral alliance such as burden sharing concerning the budget and the renegotiation of the ROK-US nuclear cooperation agreement and is expected to emphasize ROK interests within the alliance. (Park, 2013)

2.1.2 China

With China's military as well as economic growth as illustrated in the first chapter, it is only logical that the world pays great attention to China's security strategy in general as well as in the East Asian region.

China's security strategy and diplomacy have undergone significant changes since the mid 1990s in the sense that they became more pro-active, practical, and constructive. (Gill, 2010, p.1)

The new security diplomacy that began to be formulated around the end of the 1990s and early 2000s incorporated new security concepts of China acting as a responsible great power and China's Peaceful Rise or Peaceful Development. The aim of these concepts were to show China as a growing regional as well as global power, yet not a disruptive power that would pose a threat to the international community and was thus ultimately aimed to give security assurances and proof of its benign intentions. (*Ibid*, pp.4-8) In the mid 2000s a new concept of Harmonious World emerged. Though different wording, this security diplomacy concept did not differ much from the other two concepts mentioned earlier. (*Ibid*)

All of these concepts mentioned above can also be found in the 2010 National Defense Policy of China. According to the document, China pursues peaceful development, promotes a

⁶⁶ The current situation on the Korean Peninsula is discussed in the following chapter 2.2 Major security issues and the security system actors

harmonious peaceful world, and strives to contribute to world peace. (People's Republic of China, 31 Mar. 2011)

The concept of Peaceful Development according to the White Paper on China's Peaceful Development from 2011 is defined through the upholding of world peace, achieving development with its own efforts, opening itself to the outside world, and promoting mutual benefit and common development with other countries in order to achieve a harmonious world. (People's Republic of China, 6 Sept. 2011)

Concerning the defense policy, it is based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence⁶⁷ and the nature of the defense policy is purely defensive. The main tasks of the defense policy are the safeguarding of national sovereignty and interests, prevention of separatist movements for Taiwan independence as well as the Tibet independence, upholding the no first use of nuclear weapons, maintaining social harmony and stability, modernization of national defense and the armed forces, and maintaining of the world peace and stability. (People's Republic of China, 31 Mar. 2011)

Taiwan remains the main potential mission of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and in its military strategy the national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unification are the key strategic objectives of China. (United States of America, May 2012, pp. 2-3)

It can be concluded that China's strategy includes multilateral and bilateral diplomacy aimed at curbing the threat perceptions and convincing others of its peaceful rise, creation of space for modernization of its military, nurturing of trade relations, and creation of an economic network in the region. (Goldstein, 2003, p.83)

2.2 MAJOR SECURITY ISSUES AND THE SECURITY SYSTEM ACTORS

The focus of this chapter is to illuminate the existing security issues that plague the East Asian security system and to show what the security system actors' interests are in these issues, how the actors interact in these issues and what the implications for the security and stability in the region are.

⁶⁷ The 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-existence are "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence" formulated in the agreement between India and China in 1954. For the full text of the treaty see: <http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20299/v299.pdf>

2.2.1 Major territorial disputes

There are multiple territorial disputes still not resolved with the majority of them located within the security system itself. The author here picked for the analysis the most prominent territorial disputes in which the author sees major implications or security concerns for the security system as well as for East Asia as a whole. First, the East China Sea issue is discussed. The following part focuses on the China-Taiwan relations and its implications. Lastly, the issue of the South China Sea, where China (and Taiwan) and other Southeast Asian countries, as well as the United States are involved, is discussed. The author gives only a brief account of the disputes (the author does not wish to focus on history) with the interests of the states involved and its impact on security in the region⁶⁸.

The East China Sea

The territorial dispute over East China Sea involves China, Japan and the United States stationed in Japan. (Auslin, 2012, pp.2-3)

The East China Sea dispute revolves around the Senkaku Islands⁶⁹ which are under effective control of Japan but are claimed by China as well as Taiwan. (McCormack, 2011) The strategic significance of the disputed territory lies in its location at the heart of the Northeast Asian region and from an economic perspective in the sources of natural resources that go with the exclusive economic rights connected to the land. (*Ibid*)

The territorial dispute is marked by tensions between China and Japan, mainly due to China's maritime provocations. The state of the dispute worsened in September 2012, when the Japanese government bought off the disputed islands from private owners, the Japanese

⁶⁸ The author is aware of other territorial disputes such as the South Korea and Japan dispute over Dokdo islands (called Takeshima by Japan), the Kuril Islands dispute between Russia and Japan and other territorial disputes. For more information on the Dokdo islands issue see for example Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice by Sŏg-u Yi (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011), the official position of South Korea available at: <http://dokdo.mofat.go.kr/upload/english.pdf>, or the Japan's official position available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html>.

For more information on the Kuril Islands dispute see for example Resolving the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute: Hokkaido-Sakhalin relations by Brad Williams (Routledge 2007) or The Southern Kuril Islands Dispute by Dmitry Gorenburg (PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 226, CNA Strategic Studies/Harvard University, September 2012) available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_226_Gorenburg_Sept2012.pdf

⁶⁹ The Senkaku Islands are also known as Diaoyu or Diaoyutai in China and Taiwan. For a map of the disputed territory, see Appendix 5 East China Sea territorial dispute map

For more information on the historical origin of the dispute and its evolution see for example Territorial Disputes Among Japan, China, And Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands by Seokwoo Lee

Kurihara family. This triggered a negative reaction from China in form of riots, demonstrations as well as dispatch of patrol boats by Beijing into the area (where also the Japanese coast guard was stationed). (Wieland, 2012) Since then the relations between China and Japan have been deteriorating with China trying to demonstrate its claim of the disputed islands by sending vessels, military ships and aircrafts near the area, and has been accusing Japan of escalating the maritime tensions (a reaction to Japan's claim that China used a missile-directing radar to lock on to Japanese military ships). (Buckley, 2013)

The security concerns over the tensions between China and Japan include the impact if the tensions escalated into a conflict. If free maritime navigation would be disrupted, China's, Japan's, South Korea's, and possibly Russia's trade routes would be affected⁷⁰, and the US might be required to increase the number of military forces stationed in Japan and in Asia. (Auslin, 2012, p.1) The commitment of the United States in this matter, however, remains unclear. Officially although the US acknowledged that the US-Japan security treaty covers the disputed islands, the US maintains neutrality in the dispute. (Barnes, 2013) Yabuki Susumu concludes that China and the United States will not fight due to the structure present in East Asia and at the same time that Japan should not depend on the US in this matter. (Yabuki, 2013)

The Taiwan Strait

The relations between China and Taiwan towards each other are the basis for cross-strait relations and as such the Taiwan issue presents a potential flashpoint in the region⁷¹. According to China, Taiwan is an integral part of mainland China (One China Policy⁷²), and a breakaway province currently maintaining its de-facto independence from the mainland government. (Taiwan Defence & Security Report, 2012, p.27)

⁷⁰ For a map of East Asia's shipping routes, see Appendix 6 East Asia shipping routes

⁷¹ Taiwan was under Japanese rule from 1895 until 1945 when it was transferred back to the Republic of China (ROC) which was established on the mainland in 1912. With the civil war breakout on the mainland and the winning of the communist government the People's Republic of China (PRC), the ROC relocated its government to Taiwan. For more information on the history of Taiwan see for example A Short History of Taiwan: The Case for Independence by Gary Marvin Davison (Greenwood Publishing Group 2003)

⁷² The recognition of Taiwan by the international community is limited. According to the ROC government, 23 nations maintain diplomatic relations with ROC. Most states adhere to the so-called One China Policy which stipulates that officially Taiwan is regarded as part of the People's Republic of China. The Policy includes the sovereignty over Taiwan, the potential of the use of force in case of independence claims by Taiwan, and cross-strait relations. For more information see for example CRS Report for Congress "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy – Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, Taipei by Shirley Kan (Congressional Research Service, 2009) available at: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30341_20090817.pdf

Taiwan's significance lies in its position next to shipping lanes connecting Japan, South Korea, and the coast ports to the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East⁷³. (*Ibid*)

From 2000 until 2008 with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP⁷⁴) the China-Taiwan relations were rather strained with the more pro-independent and sovereignty seeking policy of the party. (Roberge, Lee, 2009) Since 2008 the Kuomintang (KMT⁷⁵ or Nationalist Part) is at power (the party was re-elected again in 2012) and since the return of the Kuomintang party which pursues closer relations with the mainland China, the tensions between China and Taiwan have eased and the mutual relations have improved. (*Ibid*)

The United States is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act from 1979⁷⁶ which stipulates that the US promises to ensure that Taiwan's democratic status will not be altered by the use of outside force (and also provides a basis for general US-Taiwan relations). (Taiwan Relations Act, 1979) The US provides Taiwan with arms and the former US president George W. Bush pledged in 2002 assistance to Taiwan's defense. (Roberge, Lee, 2009)

With China's rise and military capabilities development, concerns over a military clash over Taiwan are rising. If Taiwan were to declare its independence officially, China's options include the possibility of invasion, missile barrage, or a naval blockade. (Taiwan Defence & Security Report, 2012, p.27) Such a military clash with Taiwan could in turn trigger a China-US military conflict. (Yang, 2010, p.16) The clash would pose a dilemma for the US policy because in fact if it backed the Taiwan efforts in the conflict, the US would find itself in a conflict with China as stated before, and if the US would not come to Taiwan's aid, it would raise doubts in Japan and South Korea over the US security commitments to their countries. (Taiwan Defense & Security Report, 2012)

The South China Sea

In the South China Sea, seven countries are involved in territorial disputes, namely China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Indonesia. China claims four groups of islets and atolls and the adjacent waters, namely Paracels, the Spratlys, the Macclesfield

⁷³ For a map of East Asia's shipping routes, see Appendix 6 East Asia shipping routes

⁷⁴ Official website of the Democratic Progressive Party (in English) see: <http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.cz/>

⁷⁵ The Kuomintang official website see: <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/index.aspx>

⁷⁶ The text of the act is available at: <http://www.cfr.org/taiwan/taiwan-relations-act/p8454>

Bank and Pratas⁷⁷. The significance of the South China Sea lies mainly in international navigation, maritime routes and safety, and in natural resources. (Thuy, 2011, p.1)

The interests of the countries involved in the South China Sea lie mainly in the reserves of oil and gas that can be found there and it is precisely here that risks of conflicts emanate. These include the possibility of conflicts between China and Philippines, or for example between China and Vietnam over natural gas or oil in which also the United States might find itself involved. (Glaser, 2012, pp.2-3) This claim is supported by the account of tensions between China on the one hand and Philippines with Vietnam on the other hand. Recent examples of tensions are for example the 2012 spring and summer standoff between China and Philippines over Scarborough Shoal or two incidents in which China cut cables of Vietnamese oil exploration vessels which contributed to tensions between China and Vietnam. (Lawrence, MacDonald, 2012, p.12)

Although China's official maritime foreign policy states that the issue of sovereignty is set aside and that China pursues joint development with other claimants according to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea⁷⁸ and it was believed that the tensions have become less contentious in the early 2000s, recent developments especially since 2007/2008 are sparking doubts and cast controversies on the peacefulness of China. (Thuy, 2011, pp.6-15) It is said that China with its economic growth and growing military capabilities has been increasingly showing growing assertiveness in the matter of sovereignty (for example the issue of harassment of US surveillance vessels, dispatch of patrol vessels, etc) in the South China Sea issue and is now considering the South China Sea as a "core national interest". (Lawrence, Lum, 2011, p.27) The risk of conflict according to Glaser is significant. (Glaser, 2012, p.1)

⁷⁷ For the territorial claims by all of the countries involved see Appendix 7: South China Sea territorial disputes map

For more information on the territorial disputes of China in the South China Sea see for example China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Islands by Chi-kin Lo (Taylor&Francis, 2004)

⁷⁸ The Declaration was signed in 2002 and sets out principles such as that of cooperation, adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, freedom of navigation and promotion of confidence building measures in the South China Sea issue. For more information on the Declaration see for example Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN'S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 34, No. 4, August 20, 2012 available at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Carlyle_A_-Thayer/3813 or Nguyen Hong Thao. "The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Note". Ocean Development & International Law. Vol. 34, Issue 3-4, 2003

The text of the declaration is available at: <http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea>

The risks of conflict are however, not limited only to China and the countries involved in the territorial disputes. There are also growing tensions between China and the United States when it comes to the issue of the South China Sea because of the US military operations within China's exclusive economic zone. (*Ibid*, p.2) In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that it is in the US interest to keep the freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime common, and to maintain compliance with international law in the South China Sea, and that the US will oppose the use of threat and will promote confidence building measures in line with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. (Clinton, 2010) However, the statement was by Chinese officials regarded as a de-facto attack on China. (Lawrence, Lum, 2011, p.28) Although the tensions have eased since then (*Ibid*), it cannot be disputed that the South China Sea disputes are of great security concern for the region and the United States.

2.2.2 The Korean Peninsula – nuclear proliferation and the prospects of unification

The issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the situation on the Korean Peninsula is in the author's opinion the most critical flashpoint in the region especially in light of the most recent events.

Overall, the concerns of states involved in the efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear weapons program⁷⁹ revolve around the stability and peace, specifically avoiding escalation of the tensions on the Korean Peninsula that could lead to an armed conflict or an all-out war in which the powers could find themselves dragged into and thus around maintaining the status quo. (Hojzáková, 2013, p.11) Among the involved states, however, we can find differences in strategic interests connected to North Korea. While all the countries are concerned over the nuclear issue, South Korea, China, and to some extent Russia are very much concerned over the impact of a possible armed conflict, specifically in regards to the problematic of refugees and humanitarian crises. (*Ibid*) Japan is notorious for the inclusion of other questions in the talks on denuclearization of North Korea, such as the abduction of Japanese citizens in North Korea and their return to Japan which has always been put as first priority in Japan-North Korea relations. (Wada, 2009) Russia, furthermore, is interested in countering the US military presence in the region which it sees as a threat. (Hojzáková, 2013, p.11)

⁷⁹ These include the countries involved in the Six-Party Talks, which apart from North Korea are South Korea, US, Japan, Russia, and China.

The question whether a full-scale war will break out is disputed. The general view, however, is that a nuclear North Korea would pose conventional as well as non-conventional military threats to South Korea and would ultimately lead to the offsetting of the military balance in inter-Korean relations as well as in the region. Also, there is a growing concern over North Korea trading with nuclear materials with other (failed) states. (Moon, 2008, pp.30-32) Other concerns include the fear of North Korea's possible lashing out when cornered and of North Korea's stressing that it possesses nuclear weapons which could mean that they feel either invulnerable or that they are losing faith in their conventional weapons. (Cha, 2012, p.235)

The North Korean quest for nuclear weapons starts as early as the 1950s but the international community started to perceive the North Korea. nuclear energy program with doubts in 1970s and 1980s. (Hojzáková, 2013, p.5) Since then the North Korean nuclear weapons program issue witnessed up until the current events 2 crises, namely the crises in 1994 and 2003, the latter of which culminated in North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons⁸⁰. In 2005, the North Korean regime officially declared that it produced nuclear weapons. What followed were a series nuclear weapons tests in 2006 and 2009, and several missile tests⁸¹. (*Ibid*, pp.5-6)

The efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear issue so far constituted of a range of engagement policies such as the Six-Party Talks, the South Korean Sunshine Policy, and humanitarian aid on the one hand, and of sanctions on the other hand. The author does not go into detail on all of these policies⁸² but would like to highlight the Six-Party Talks. The Talks

⁸⁰ The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970. Its main pillars are the non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. According to the NPT, only Russia, China, United States, France and the United Kingdom are considered to be legitimate nuclear weapons states. The withdrawal of North Korea from the treaty was possible because the treaty does not specify the case of withdrawal. The text of the Treaty is available at: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf>

⁸¹ Missile tests performed by North Korea were an issue also before 2000. Missile tests are included because they are perceived to be part of the nuclear weapons program and because they have implications on the security relations in as well as outside of the region. To be regarded as a nuclear weapons state, not only nuclear warheads but also the ability to deliver these on missiles is needed. For more information see Moon, Chung-in. "The North Korean Nuclear Dilemma and the Six-Party Talks: A South Korean Perspective." North Korea's Nuclear Issue: Toward Peace and Security in Northeast Asia. Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, 2008. 23-44. Print. NIDS International Symposium on Security Affairs 2007-08

For more information on key developments in (including but not limited to nuclear weapons program) North Korea's see for example North Korea profile by BBC available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15278612>

⁸² For a comprehensive work on these different policies and their evaluation see Handling Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of North Korea by Věra Hojzáková (Individual Project, University of Economics, Prague 2013) Chapter 2

were launched in 2003 and are a platform of discussion among the 6 members, namely both Koreas, Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. In several rounds, the Talks yielded several successes such as the conclusion of the Joint Statement of 2005 in which North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program, and to return to IAEA inspections in return for security assurances by the United States and South Korea and provision of a light water reactor, or the adoption of the Action Plan in 2007 which envisaged the closure of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor⁸³. The Six-Party Talks, however, ultimately failed when in 2009 North Korea announced its withdrawal. The reasons for the failure of the Talks lie mainly in the differing interests of the involved parties. (Ceuster, Melissen, 2008, p.90) The significance of the Six-Party Talks lay also in the fact that it included all the major powers of the security system and that this platform could be used to address other pressing issues in the region. (Han, 2008, pp.80-81)

The most recent events regarding the North Korean nuclear weapons program include the December 2012 launch of a missile that brought a satellite into the orbit of Earth. (Phillips, 2012) The December launch was condemned and criticized by the international community. However, in February 2013, North Korea is said to have performed a third nuclear test twice as big as the nuclear test from 2009. (North Korea Profile, 2013) As a reaction to the third nuclear weapons test and not heeding the threats of a pre-emptive strike by North Korea against its enemies, new sanctions were agreed on in the United Nations Security Council⁸⁴. (Gladstone, Sanger, 2013) Since then, tensions have been escalating. North Korea cut the hotline with the US military at the Demilitarized Zone and the Red Cross line connecting North Korean government with the South Korean government, proclaimed to be in a state of war with South Korea, has been readying missiles on standby and also closed down the Kaesong industry complex⁸⁵. On April 2, 2013, North Korean government announced their intention to restart the Yongbyon reactor to bolster their nuclear power capabilities and develop the North Korean economy. (Associated Press in Seoul, 2013) The hostile rhetoric seems to have been tampered down by a speech Kim Jong-un delivered on March 31, 2013 which focused on economic development and the importance of nuclear power to support such development. (North Korean Leader Dials down Hostile Rhetoric, 2013)

⁸³ For the map of North Korea nuclear facilities see appendix 8. For more information on the Yongbyon facility see for example: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/yongbyon.htm>

⁸⁴ The text of the United Nations Security Council resolution 2094 is available at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10934.doc.htm>

⁸⁵ For more information see Reuters articles on North Korea available at: <http://www.reuters.com/places/north-korea>

In rising tensions, the US has been answering the threats articulated by North Korea, stressed that the United States will defend itself and South Korea in case of an outbreak of war. (North Korea Nuclear, 2013) In light of the growing tensions, the United States has been performing training drills with South Korea, flew two radar-evading B-25 bombers on practice run over the North Korea territory. How this conflict will play out is uncertain at the moment⁸⁶. However, a conclusion can be drawn that it is a very delicate issue and poses a great security concern for the whole region.

Although not a question with the highest priority but also discussed are the implications of the possibility of future re-unification of the Korean Peninsula. The risks connected to North Korea and the potential of war on the Peninsula have to be broadened to include the costs of unification. In case of peaceful re-unification of the two countries on the basis of succession of leadership to South Korean leadership, the balance of power in the region would be offset in favor of South Korea changing the economic landscape of the region. (Kwon, 2009, p.3) The costs, however, could be remarkable, overtaking the costs of the unification of Germany. (Beck, 2010) A democratic unified Korea might not be favored by all countries. Specifically, China is said to favor the status quo because reunification of the Korean Peninsula might bring the US influence closer to its borders. (Hojzáková, 2013, p.19)

2.2.3 China's rise, the Sino-US power struggle and Japan's war legacy

This chapter aims to give insight on the remaining tensions and issues in the system. These include the rise of China and the Sino-US power struggle which follows from that and Japan's ambiguous position in the East Asian security system largely due to its World War 2 legacy.

China's rise and the Sino-US power struggle

As was already suggested in chapter 1, China's interest is to resume its position as the leading state in the East Asian region as it once was. Last chapter has shown that China officially proclaims its rise in international relations as peaceful and does not want to pose a threat to the international community.

The perception by other states in East Asia, as well as in the international community is, however, different. China's peaceful rise as articulated in its official foreign policy statements is gradually put into question in light of China acting more assertively in its public statements

⁸⁶ At the time of the writing of the thesis the situation is still developing

and its actions⁸⁷. (Taiwan Defence & Security Report, 2012, p.49) It is therefore not surprising that China's appearance as a major power is under surveillance by other states and the implications its ascendance has on world economy, international relations and security is a source of debates in the international community⁸⁸.

The concerns over China's rise are not limited only to the United States. Japan, South Korea, and to some extent also Russia have at some points raised concerns over the stability in the region with China's rise, especially with its economic rise. (Ateba, 2002, p.3) It is also agreed among the Chinese analysts that China's overall rise poses security dilemmas for Japan, especially Chinese actions and weapons development. (Christensen, 2003, p.38) From the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, Japan has been concerned about China's activities in the waters surrounding China and Japan. These include the military exercises and missile tests of China during the presidential elections in Taiwan in 1996, or incidents in the East China Sea in the recent years as mentioned earlier. (Hojzáková, 2011, p.36)

Coming now to the question of implications of China's rise, the issue revolves around the current security system arrangement in place. The United States currently enjoying the status of the region's hegemon and China aspiring to become a hegemon creates a power struggle which can be, to some extent, considered as a security dilemma between China and the United States.

More specifically, it is said that China's ambitions pose threat to the Asian allies of the United States, which in turn puts strain on the US military strategy and challenge the US national security interests. (Blumenthal et al, 2011, p.14) Furthermore, the concerns of United States include the question of China's nuclear ambitions and China's wish to exclude non-regional powers from East Asia which would of course include the United States. (Renic, 2012) A conclusion can be drawn that the growth of China raises concerns over the durability of the Pax-Americana established in the region, the forward deployment of US forces and the future of the alliances of US in the region. (Impact of the Rise of China on Regional Security)

As has already been suggested in chapter 1, China does not support the US hegemony and perceives the US as a challenge. Although, a military conflict with the United States is not

⁸⁷ As has already been shown in the previous chapter on territorial disputes

⁸⁸ The answer to the question whether the China is a threat to East Asia or not is not united. In this chapter, the question of perception of China's rise by other actors is discussed. The issue of China being a threat or not through the lenses of theories is further discussed in chapter 3

expected in the foreseeable future, tensions and the possibility of a limited conflict over Taiwan are not excluded. (Yan, 2010, p.148)

Japan's World War 2 legacy and its impacts on security relations

Japan's World War 2 records⁸⁹ have been and to some extent still are shaping the foreign policy of Japan and its relations with its neighbors, namely China and South Korea. It is one of the reasons why Japan adopted a low-profile foreign policy and instead of military pursued the development of its economy and promoted economic relations with the Asian states. (Hojzáková, 2011, pp.11-14)

Japan is, however, as already argued, trying to pursue a more pro-active role in international relations since the end of the Cold War and more obviously so in the 21st century. (*Ibid*, p.46) Despite the article 9 clause in Japan's Constitution and the military expenditure fixed at 1% of GDP, Japan's military expenditure is third after China's and Russia's military expenditures in East Asia⁹⁰ and Japan's aim now is to increase its defense budget and boost Coast Guard. (Reynolds, 2013)

Japan's historical legacy as well as its growing military and persuasion of a more pro-active policy raise concerns among its neighbors, China and South Korea. For both countries, the main problem is in their view Japan's reluctance to provide an apology for its actions during the Second World War. (Cossa, 2012) Due to the mistrust rooted in Japan's war time history, Japan's actions in the military sector such as defense budget increase are closely watched by neighboring countries. (Reynolds, 2013)

Sources of tension between China and Japan are for example the visits to the Yasukuni shrine dedicated to the memory of Japanese soldiers who lost their lives during World War 2 by Japanese prime ministers⁹¹. Although this matter is not related only to Japan's relations with its neighbors, it is nevertheless an issue aggravating the relations between China and Japan. (Hojzáková, 2011, p.20) Another hot issue is connected to the question of Japan's controversial history text books depicting Japan's role during the war which saw the Japanese

⁸⁹ To see the historical account of Japan's World War 2 involvement see for example History of Japan by N. Jayapalan (Atlantic Publishers & Dist., 2000)

⁹⁰ See chapter 1.2 Polarity, Identity and Interdependence in East Asia

⁹¹ The issue of the Yasukuni shrine was particularly visible during Prime Minister Koizumi's term as he visited the shrine continuously despite China's official objections. For more information see for example: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19987251>

imperialism and colonization merely as advance instead of aggression⁹². (Soh, 2001) These two issues contribute to tensions in the bilateral relations and cultivating mistrust between the two countries. (Hojzáková, 2011, p.36)

Interestingly enough, even though earlier in the thesis, it has been argued that China opposes hegemonic power in the region and sees the US as a challenger, it is also argued that China would fear the break-down of the US-Japan alliance or a significant upgrade of Japan's role within the alliance as China views Japan with greater mistrust than the United States. (Christensen, 2003, p.27)

The same argument also applies to the relations between Japan and South Korea who would also not want to see a more influential Japan in the region. (*Ibid*) A hot topic in Japan-South Korea, however, also remains the question of the so-called comfort women⁹³. The problematic of the history textbook also applies to this case. (Soh, 2001)

The conclusion can be drawn that Japan as a member of the security system is perceived with caution and a lot of mistrust by the other actors of the security system.

⁹² For more information see for example *The Forgotten History: Textbook Controversy and Sino-Japanese Relations* by Weilu Tan available at: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/7824/1/Tan_Weilu_BPhil.pdf

⁹³ "Comfort women" is a label ascribed to South Korean women forced into prostitution for Japanese soldiers during the Second World War. For more information on this issue see for example Amnesty International: <http://www.amnesty.org.nz/files/Comfort-Women-factsheet.pdf>

3 PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

This chapter of the thesis covers the prospects for the future development of the security system in East Asia.

Two main areas of interest are discussed, namely the question of stability of the current security system and what the prospects of change of the current security system are.

In this respect, the first part of this chapter focuses on the stability question. Theories introduced in the first chapter are combined with the security system here, coupled together with the findings on security strategies and security issues in the region. Furthermore, apart from making general predictions regarding the East Asian region, the growth of China is by the author deemed of high importance and, therefore, the author's decision is to handle this issue and its impact on stability in East Asia and stability of the security system separately.

The second part of this chapter then analyzes the prospects for a change of the security system now in place. First, two key variables are identified and discussed. Second, the prospect of the creation of a security institution in the region is evaluated.

3.1 PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SYSTEM

Let us now look at the prospect of stability in the region. First, the stability of the current security system is assessed using the lenses of the theories of international relations applied in the beginning of the thesis, namely neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism applied generally on East Asia. The second part of this chapter covers the issue of China's growth and its impact on East Asian stability (also from the perspective of international relations theory).

3.1.1 Theories of international relations and stability

When assessing the stability in the international system, the most stable type of polarity for neo-realists is bipolarity. There are 4 reasons to this claim, namely that there are fewer opportunities for conflict in bipolarity as there are fewer conflict dyads possible involving great powers, power is equally distributed among the great powers, bipolarity discourages miscalculation, and lastly that bipolarity does not magnify existing anxieties and security dilemmas. Balanced multipolarity is more prone to war than bipolarity and unbalanced multipolarity presents the most dangerous distribution of power. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p 346)

For Kenneth Waltz (neo-realism), unipolarity appears as the least stable configuration of international relations, the weaker states are predicted to increase their strength or ally with other to bring the distribution of power back into balance. The view of unipolarity according to Kenneth Waltz is rather pessimistic. (Waltz, 2000, p.27-28) There are, however, also more optimistic views on unipolarity, advocated by hegemonic stability theory. (Buzan, 2004, p.38)

The East Asian security system, as defined here, does not entirely fit any of these categorizations. The author's label of the current system was uni-multipolar, with the United States being the leading power with Japan and South Korea as allies, and China as a strategic partner slowly aspiring to become the region's hegemon. What can be seen in East Asia are attempts to balance the rise of China. The rise of China might in the author's opinion suggest that the current situation is becoming unbalanced⁹⁴.

Regarding peace and stability in the region, it is precisely the security competition between China and the United States, the tensions over the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan, and the strained relations and mistrust between China, Japan, and the United States as discussed in the previous chapter that sparks concern of international relations scholars and thus the East Asian region is labeled as dangerous. (Christensen, 2003, p.24) In this respect, Asia and its future development is by international relations scholars compared to the developments of relations in the 19th century Europe resembling the balance of power relations of that time and thus deemed unstable and ready for great power conflict. (Friedberg, Winter 1993-1994, p.7)

Mearsheimer, in this sense notes that the region is not "primed for peace" and that the United States is the continuing guarantor of peace in the region through its deployment of military forces in the region and through the military alliance with the East Asian countries thus constituting the critical variable in the East Asian security system. (Mearsheimer [2], 2001, p.377) Moreover, the analogy of Asia being doomed to follow the path of 19th century Europe is also contested on the grounds by the different distribution of power (the US dominance in the region) and the fact that the security system actors through their interactions have created a strong security dynamic. (Buzan, 2003, p.150)

Furthermore, realism ignores other factors behind East Asia's stability and peace, namely institutions, the spread of regional norms and economic growth and interdependency in the region. (Acharya, 2008, kindle location 943) Optimists suggest that the level of

⁹⁴ The question of the development of the security system regarding China's rise is the topic of chapter 3.2.1 China's rise and its impact on stability

interdependency makes the outbreak of conflict less likely and can be applied to the East Asian region as well. (Buzan, Segal, Summer 1994, p.11) However, there are limitations to the neo-liberal as well as constructivist theory of interdependence and identity. In chapter 1, the interdependence through trade was illustrated. It was however noted that the interdependence relations are fragile and the ties among the East Asian countries are less developed. (Friedberg, Winter 1993-1994, p.19) Moreover, the level of involvement varies in the region and this uneven interdependence might result in power relations reassertion. (*Ibid*, pp.11-12) Thus, it is argued that the arguments for decline of war in terms of democracy, interdependence and institutions cannot be applied to East Asia. (Buzan, 2003, p.163) As was already shown in the first chapter, the East Asian region lacks a common identity that could promote effective institution-building and the region is also politically diversified. This makes the creation of international society and the socialization theory when applied to the East Asian region seems limited⁹⁵. (Buzan, Segal, Summer 1994, p.15)

Overall, the view on the stability of East Asian security system is not united. While some authors view the arrangement of the US as stabilizer in the region relatively stable and benign for the immediate future even though the region is plagued by security issues (Mearsheimer [2], 2001, p.400; Buzan, 2003, p.170), even these authors conclude that the existing power structure is not sustainable in the long-term (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.385) and that East Asia is moving out from the existing pattern. (Buzan, 2003, p.171)

3.1.2 China's rise and its impact on stability

From the security issues discussed in chapter 2, the rise of China and the impact on stability and peace in the region and the future of the security system are attracting a considerable amount attraction.

The view on China's aspirations is not united. Although China has achieved a significant rise economically as well as militarily, there are still doubts concerning its hegemonic ambitions. These are for example the fact that despite the concerns of the surrounding countries, China might not be pursuing the role of a regional hegemon, China still has relatively weak military capabilities in some areas (for example China lacks a fully operational aircraft carrier), and lastly the opposition China would have to face from the United States and Japan. (Taiwan

⁹⁵ Institution building prospects are discussed in more detail in chapter 3.2.3 Prospects for East Asian security institution building

Defence & Security Report, 2012, p.46) Although China's army is the largest in Asia, it is not the most capable and cannot be measured against the capabilities of the United States. (Cossa, 2008, kindle location 4344)

Nevertheless, the rise of China is of concern to and not limited to the rest of the security system actors in East Asia. Among the international relations scholars the view on the possible dangers China's rise poses to the security system is not united.

According to offensive realism, China is expected to pursue the quest for becoming the most powerful state in the region with the aim of becoming the region's hegemon and push the US presence out of Asia, which might in turn provoke containment policy from the United States with the end result resembling relations between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. (Mearsheimer, 2007, pp.-83-84) Defense realism on the other hand predicts China's rise to be peaceful, behaving cautiously not to trigger a conflict that could escalate. (*Ibid*, p.84)

However, one has to remember the constructivist assumptions of ideology, internal institutions and national political character that form the identity of the state and which has implications on the interaction between states. In this respect, if China's slow democratization could lead to the convergence of China's internal identity toward that of the United States or Japan, this might facilitate confidence building through multilateral institutions and through trade. (Nau, 2003, pp.230-231) The socialization theory in this respect offers an account of the change of China's behavior through its participation in ARF. The change can be seen in the shift of China's ARF diplomacy towards the greater empathy with institutions and multilateralism. (Kang, 2003, p.133) However, it was already argued that the record of institutions in East Asia is limited, and that despite the growing interdependence among the East Asian countries, this interdependence is fragile. In this respect, there is doubt whether the East Asian institutions in their developing stage are effective enough to constrain China's behavior and its growing assertiveness and hegemonic ambitions. (Goldstein, 2003, p.59)

A conclusion is drawn that most strands of international relations theory anticipate rising tensions and disruption of the distribution of power in the region. (*Ibid*)

3.2 PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM

The discussion on the stability of the current security system took into consideration the existing power struggle between China and the United States and the existing security issues between the main actors, as well as of the main actors with the rest of East Asia. In this respect, a conclusion is often drawn, that the existing power structure is not sustainable and that progressively the East Asian region is moving out from the existing pattern. (Buzan, 2003, p.171) The focus of this chapter is to discuss the possibilities of the form the future development can take.

In the light of the ongoing power struggle depicted in chapter 2 and the discussion on the implications of China's rise on stability of the region, the author's opinion is that the Sino-US balance of power has the biggest potential to shape the future of East Asia's security system. There are, however, also other factors to be taken into account and that is the evolution of the other actors' position, namely Japan's and South Korea's position in the system and their ability to influence the security system as well as the possibility of other actors joining the system such as Russia. In the long-term the region might become bipolar with the United States and China being the two powers with the US backed by Japan and South Korea (a more powerful South Korea if in the long-term future the Korean Peninsula would re-unite) and with the possibility of Russia joining the security system most likely siding with China rather than the United States. Lastly, in light of the lack of security institutions depicted in chapter 1, the prospects of security institution building are discussed in the last subchapter.

3.2.1 Number one variable: The future of the Sino-US relations

Barry Buzan in his article from 2003 identifies the Sino-US interplay as the key variable for the future development of the region. (*Ibid*, pp.164-167) It is the author's view, that with China's rise and the continuing US presence the region can progressively become bipolar, which according to the realists would mean a much more stable formation. This, however, only applies in case the US maintains its dominance in the region. It was argued earlier in chapter 1 that the US functions as the region's stabilizer. Without the US, the author's conclusion is that the security system would become unbalanced multipolarity with China aspiring to become the region's hegemon, according to neo-realism the least stable distribution of power. In this respect, we might consider the future of US presence in the

region, as well as the future of Chinese internal development and the Sino-US relations as key for the future development of the security system.

The US interests in East Asia include providing reassurance of its commitment to East Asian allies, deterrence of threats emanating from North Korea and China, and influencing Chinese military and strategic planning. (Davis et al, 2012, p.31) The question of continued presence with respect to how much military presence is needed in the region is, however, disputed. While some perspectives emphasize the need of US military presence to provide security assurances to US allies and limit Chinese military modernization, other perspectives either argue that the US military presence is necessary but more burden sharing and more responsibilities should be adopted by Japan and South Korea or some perspectives go as far as adopting the view that the US military presence is not as crucial as US capabilities and that the decrease of US military presence might actually help moderate Chinese military modernization through confidence building and decrease of security dilemmas perceived by China. (*Ibid*)

Other rationales include the arguments that United States has deep-rooted interests of maintaining peace in the region and thus the withdrawal of its troops could lead to the destabilization of the region, an arms race and a possible conflict escalation. (Mearsheimer [2], 2001, p.387) Last, but not least, the future deployment of military forces of the US in different regions of the world is said to be dependent on the emergence of a potential hegemonic power which can be contained only with American help (*Ibid*)

The current ‘pivot to Asia’ formulated in the current US security strategy as described in chapter two suggests that the US has renewed its interest in the East Asian region and is striving to strengthen and expand the network of alliances throughout the East Asian region. Chapter two also pointed out the current security issues which in the author’s view will help explain the ongoing US military presence in the region.

First, as was already suggested in one of the rationales, the US goal is to maintain its position as the leading state in the region. Although as was shown China’s hegemonic aspirations are doubtful due to its lack of military capabilities, its overall growth is considered to be posing a challenge to the US position in the region. In this respect, the US presence (be it militarily or non-militarily) would be expected to continue. From the security issues discussed in chapter two, the current tensions arising from the North Korean nuclear weapons program and military rhetoric will, in the author’s opinion also help shape the future position of the United

States in East Asia. The United States' and South Korea's reaction to the North Korean escalations was to strengthen the US presence in South Korea and the bilateral ties. Furthermore, while there are areas of friction in the bilateral military alliances of South Korea and Japan with the United States, neither of the two countries call for complete withdrawal of US forces. (Taiwan Defence & Security Report, 2012, p.48)

Last, but not least, the withdrawal of United States from the East Asian region seems unlikely from the perspective of its economic interests in the region and the fact that it would essentially be the end of its position as the region's hegemon. (Buzan, 2003, p.168) The author thus identifies herself with the view that the US is to maintain its influence and military presence in the region for the foreseeable future and will thus continue to shape the security system in East Asia.

The future of China's development as shown in the previous subchapter is not clear at the moment. The prospects include positive scenarios in which China's economic growth further open up China not only in economic terms but also in political terms which then further foster democratization and turn China into a peaceful and satisfied power. At the same time, however the future development might result in China becoming a threat to the security of its neighbors or the security system in place. (Friedberg, Winter 199-1994, p.22)

The question arises, what the US policy options are for dealing with the emerging China in the East Asian security system. The perspective on the effects of US military presence differ by emphasizing the role of military forces for deterrence purposes, or on the contrary moderating the Chinese behavior by decreasing the number of military forces stationed in the region. The two prominent policy options for the US policy towards China are thus either engagement, or containment. This view is, however regarded as simplistic, as there is a variety of approaches put forward by different scholars and as most scholars argue for a mixture of the approaches rather than pure engagement or pure containment. (Byman et al, 1999, p.422)

It is argued that the United States has so far pursued policy of engagement and refrained from isolating China by maintaining full economic relations and encouraging dialogue at almost all levels while at times deviating from the pure engagement policy by adopting sanctions or by threatening to impose them, or using its military presence in the region to "send a signal to Beijing". (*Ibid*, p.425)

Containment approach is in line with the neo-realist assumptions about international relations. In this case, China is expected to strive to become the region's hegemon to best secure its survival which would essentially lead to the disruption of status quo in the region. (Mearsheimer [2], 2001, p.402) This perspective relies heavily on history of international relations and argues that rising hegemonic powers are generally aggressive and thus it seems unlikely that China would evolve in the direction of prudence and democracy. (Byman et al., 1999, p.429) In this respect, engagement policies by the United States are seen as misguided and containment policy is called for. (Mearsheimer [2], 2001, p.402)

Engagement on the other hand works with the assumption that by providing security assurances of the US intentions to China, promoting China's integration into the world economic and political system as well as international institutions and thus by rising interdependence and socialization the risk of use of force and posing a risk to the international society would be minimized. (Byman et al, 1999, p.427) The advocated logic here is that in order for the US to accomplish its strategic goals in the region, it is necessary for the US to engage China. However, the recommendations also include the combination of engagement with balancing. In this respect, it is argued that the US should engage China in order to balance against it because by engaging China, the US can balance against it while at the same time not appearing to be too confrontational. (Blumenthal et al, 2011, pp.14-15)

Other approaches combine engagement and containment. This can come in the form of conditioning (*Ibid*, p.428) or what Segal called "constraint", which works on the basis of carrots by engaging China economically while at the same time using sticks in the form of containing China militarily and politically. (Buzan, 2003, p.170) The conditioning approach further stipulates that economic ties would also not be maintained unconditionally; sanctions could be imposed to punish or deter specific actions by China. (Byman et al, 1999, p.428)

Last but not least, another policy option includes the condition of transformation of China's internal processes towards a democracy. As long as China would remain an authoritarian country, the US would rely on containment approach and would use a variety of economic and political tools to promote democratic principles in China.

It is obvious that these above stated policy options depend on the future development of China's political status as well as the theory of international relations the analysts choose to adopt. The author's opinion however is, that a combination of engagement by providing security assurances, integrating into the international community while at the same time using

sticks to punish and deter unwanted behavior (thus the combination of engagement and containment policies) is better suited for the future of the bilateral relations and for the future development of the security system.

3.2.2 Other variables: The future of Japan, Korean Peninsula, Russia

Japan's position in East Asia as advocated in chapter 1 and 2 is influenced by its internal processes as well as by outside relations with the United States and the relations with its neighbors, mainly with China and South Korea. Japan's foreign policy is undergoing changes to become a more pro-active actor in East Asian international relations but the reality suggests a reactive nature of Japan's foreign policy. (Hojzáková, 2011, p.46) Japan in theory might possess the capabilities to influence the current security system. However, its structural problems and historical legacy suggest that Japan will most likely adhere to the status quo unless pressured by external events. (Buzan, 2003, p.167)

Regarding the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the opinion on whether nuclear proliferation in general poses threats to the international community is not united⁹⁶. The concerns over a nuclear North Korea, as already shown in chapter 2, revolve around peace and stability in the region. Military experts suggest that a full-scale military attack or escalation of the conflict into an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely. (Cha, Kang, 2003, pp.17-18) As such, it is argued that the development on the Korean Peninsula could have a local impact, but not determine the development of the whole region. (Buzan, 2003, p.167) However, another facet of the issue should be analyzed and that is the implications for the regional balance of power if North Korea were to develop into a full-fledged nuclear weapons state⁹⁷. Such a development would most likely strengthen the alliance system between South Korea and Japan with the United States (to the disdain of China) and at the same time might start an arms race in the region with the possibility of Japan and South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. (Hojzáková, 2013, p.10, 20) The impact of reunification of the Korean Peninsula was briefly mentioned already in chapter 2 in terms of economic costs and disruption of the status quo. The author agrees with the opinion that

⁹⁶ See for example "More will be worse" by Scott Sagan in *The spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (Sagan, Waltz, W.W.Norton 2003) or a lecture by Sagan and Waltz "A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster? Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xupuaqu_ruk

⁹⁷ It was argued in chapter 2 that North Korea cannot yet be regarded as a fully fledged nuclear weapons state.

Korea at least for the foreseeable future is not likely to determine the future development of the whole region (*Ibid*, p.167), especially when the costs of reunification are considered.

It was argued in the first chapter that due to Russia's historical interests being directed towards the European region rather than Asia, and despite Russia's current attempts to orient its foreign policy towards the east, Putin's focus on anchoring Russia's new position in Asia (Nation, 2010, p.33) and promoting the partnership with its East Asia countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea (Amirov, 2010, pp.9-10), the conclusion can be drawn that Russia does not constitute a member of the East Asian security system. However, the possibility of Russia's future inclusion into the security system is not rejected (some authors as it was shown already ascribe Russia the role of an East Asian great power) and in fact Russia could as well re-emerge as a major security player in East Asia in the future (although it is unlikely for the foreseeable future because of domestic disarray). (Buzan, 2003, p.167) The inclusion of Russia would alter the existing power balance in the current security system. The author does not at the moment anticipate that Russia would join the US-led military alliance that exists between the US, Japan, and South Korea. In this case, Russia might politically align itself with China, in which case the balance against the US led alliance might be enlarged. At the same time, growing Russian involvement might also trigger balancing behavior from the East Asian powers, and it is said that Russia in its current relatively weak state cannot afford antagonistic relations with the East Asian powers and will therefore pursue strategic partnership with China and normal partnerships with Japan and engage further in the international community in East Asia. (Nation, 2010, p.53)

3.2.3 Prospects for East Asian security institution building

As was shown in chapter 1 in the part on interdependence, the lack of a general security institution in the region is striking. The reasons for this, articulated in the first chapter, include the diverse interests of the East Asian countries as well as the lack of a common East Asian identity, lack of a common historical legacy, and lastly the political diversity among the East Asian countries ranging from full democracies to authoritarian countries⁹⁸. There is progress visible with respect to ASEAN and the ARF and there was considerable hope vested in the Six-Party Talks, where the political will to come together and address a common security issue manifested itself and as was argued could be enlarged to encompass other areas of

⁹⁸ See chapter 1.2 Polarity, identity and interdependence in East Asia

interests. But overall, it can be said that the political and security area is still underdeveloped in the East Asian relations. (Nanto, 2008, summary)

The question whether a collective security treaty or a common security institution is needed in the region is debated. Conservative American international relations have so far disapproved of the idea of an institutionalized collective security regime and favored a looser informal concert of great powers formation in East Asia. (Kelly, Watts, 2010, p.277) Recent studies on security relations in East Asia, however, point out the need of a security regime or a common security institution. The arguments include the necessity of a security regime for the ongoing US presence in the region (Buzan, Segal, Summer 1994, p.19) or that with China's emergence, both China and the United States will need to be bound in a security alliance that would bind the two countries together in a strategic partnership. (Kelly, Watts, 2010, p.284)

The applicability of a security institution or a security regime is also questionable. Overall, it is said that a security regime in East Asia seems possible despite the difficult historical legacy. (Buzan, 2003, p.165) There are however, conditions that need to be fulfilled, questions to be answered, and obstacles that need to be overcome in order to successfully launch such a project.

The conditions for a successful creation of a common security regime are said to include China's development into a dominant power, or a great power perceived as benign by others, and the ongoing US presence in the region and the US participation in the effort. (Buzan, 2003, p.165)

The overarching problem is the different development in the northern part of East Asia and the southern part in respect to both the security cooperation and existing security issues. Southeast Asia in this respect is said to have moved from conflict formation to security regime mainly in the form of ASEAN. This, however, cannot be said about Northeast Asia, where conflict formation remains. There seems little prospect that either East Asia, or Asia as a whole, will be able to form a security community. (Buzan, 2003, p.163) This presents an underlying question of which countries should be then included in the security institutions, whether the whole East Asia or only the current security system actors as defined in this thesis. The formation of a security institution by including countries from the here defined security system would not change the security system per se. The inclusion of Southeast Asian countries would mean a change to the security system and would (according to neo-liberalism) enlarge the system to encompass the whole East Asia. This would, according to

the author's opinion, reflect the growing importance of the Southeast Asian countries as outlined in the first chapter of the thesis. Apart from the Southeast Asian countries, the inclusion of other states, such as Russia, the Pacific region, or the South Asia countries and the impact of the inclusion of these countries also would have to be discussed.

Several issues create obstacles to the formation of a collective security regime that in the end could jeopardize the effort. These include the existing security issues and the differing security interests of the Northeast Asian states in these issues. Creation of a collective security would in the end mean binding together of non-allies (for example the participation and possible position of Japan in the collective security arrangement) which could in turn foster disagreement on the rule of law. (Kelly, Watts, 2010, pp.287-288)

The belief is that the security regime, even if successfully formed, would in the nearest future of several decades not be a strong security regime with a security community structure resembling the EU. The reason for this is China's authoritarian regime; only if China were to democratize would this be seen as plausible. (Buzan, 2003, p.166)

In conclusion, so far, the evidence suggests that the efforts to build a common security institution have been unsuccessful and there are still a lot of obstacles remaining. (Buzan, Segal, Summer 1994, p.19) The author would, however, conclude that the efforts should not be abandoned.

CONCLUSION

The importance of East Asia in economics as well as in political and security terms is undisputable. The aim of the paper in this respect was to assess the current security relations in East Asia.

The first chapter included an account of the basic assumptions and the conceptual tools of these theories. The conceptual tools applied were polarity (military capabilities), interdependence, and identity. The account of military capabilities showed the dominance of Northeast Asian countries in the area. The biggest military spenders of the region were China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, with Russia and China possessing nuclear weapons capabilities. However, the presence of the United States in terms of alliances with Japan, South Korea and several other countries of East Asia, the number of US military forces stationed in the East Asian countries, the military expenditure and nuclear weapons capabilities showed the US dominance in East Asia.

The part on interdependence illuminated the ongoing trend of trade relations among the East Asian countries. The share of East Asian countries' exports that flow within the region accounts for 50%. Coupled together with relatively high trade-to-GDP ratio mainly for the Southeast Asian countries this leads to the conclusion that through trade the East Asian region is becoming more interdependent. Striking, however, is Asia's relative underdevelopment in terms of regional institutions. There are a number of economic and political institutions (listed in the thesis) but a conclusion is drawn that the region is under-institutionalized and neither of those can be regarded as a security institution.

The section on identity showed that there is also a lack of a common identity in the region. East Asia, as well as whole Asia, is diverse in historical development, culture and political development. Political development in East Asia showed progress of democratization within the region. However, the area is still diversity in the political status of countries ranging from authoritarian to full democracies. The interests as another factor influencing identity of a state, showed the ambivalent interests of Russia. Russia's foreign policy was throughout history directed towards Europe rather than East Asia and although recently Russia's foreign policy is attempting to turn towards the East Asian region, Russia has not yet been successful in gaining more influence in East Asia. As for the other East Asian actors, there is a clash of interests visible between the United States with Japan and South Korea as its allies on one

hand, and China on the other hand. The US interest is to keep its position of dominance over the region and China's interests are that of a potential hegemon of the region. The US hegemony is perceived as challenge by China, but a benign identity of an off-shore stabilizer, assurance provider and mediator is ascribed to the US by Japan and South Korea. The Chinese interests of a potential hegemon coupled together with its economic and military growth are however perceived with caution by the other East Asian states.

With no security institution to take into account, the author works with the neo-realist and constructivist theories to define the security system currently in place. The author's decision, furthermore, is to combine the two theories. According to polarity, the security system actors would be the US, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea. When taking into consideration the identities of these states, Russia falls out of the equation and what is left is what we could loosely call a "democratic camp" (or also the alliance subsystem) lead by the United States and followed by Japan, and South Korea as the US allies, and China as the counter pole to the democratic camp. The author's decision is to define the East Asian security system in this manner.

The second chapter subsequently worked with the defined security system in terms of the actors' security strategies and the existing security issues. The security strategies reaffirmed the claims on the interests of the actors and the current structure. With the pivot to Asia, it is in the United States' interest to keep its dominance in the East Asian region and to strengthen the existing ties as well as promote the expanding of the network towards the Southeast Asian region. Although there are issues existing within the alliances with Japan, and South Korea, both countries regard their military alliance with the US as crucial and neither of those countries calls for the ending of the arrangements. The security strategy of China foresees China's peaceful rise and meaningful integration in the international community and hegemony by another state in the region is opposed. However, as already suggested this peaceful rise of China is put into question.

The section on security issues gave an insight on the difficult relations among the security system actors. There are a number of flashpoints in the region – territorial disputes in the East China Sea, South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait issue, the North Korean nuclear weapons program, as well as the security dilemmas in the relations between China, and the United States, and security dilemmas concerning Japan's position in the system - in which the risk of rising tensions are great. The territorial disputes contribute to tense relations among the actors,

and China's growing assertiveness in the issues support the fear of China's growth and the possibility of a future conflict in which the United States might find itself drawn into. The North Korean nuclear weapons program in the time of writing of the thesis experienced yet another crisis and escalation of tensions between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States. The main areas of concern over the North Korean issue revolve around maintaining peace and stability in the region. As already argued, China's growth poses a security dilemma for the United States as well as for Japan, and South Korea due to the uncertainty of the future development. Japan's historical legacy creates tensions in the bilateral relations with China and South Korea.

The third part of the thesis analyzed prospects for future development. The view on the stability in the region and stability of the security system is not united. The United States is ascribed the main role in stabilizing the region and curbing the existing security issues in the region. Although it was shown that the region is becoming increasingly interdependent, the evidence suggests that these relations are fragile and thus it cannot be said that interdependence is the only force behind relatively peaceful relations in East Asia. With the emergence of China, it is said that the region might be growing out of the existing patterns.

The future development is said to be highly dependent on the future of the Sino-US relations (Sino-US balance of power). While it is argued that it is in the interest of the US to maintain its military presence in the region, the US has several foreign policy options it could use to interact with China. Regarding the rest of the actors, a conclusion is drawn that Russia might be able to influence the security system in the future, but due to its current relative weakness, it is not going to pursue any radical foreign policy that would antagonize the relations with East Asian powers in the immediate future. The development on the Korean Peninsula, in the author's opinion also has the potential to shape the future of the security system. A nuclear North Korea would offset the military balance in the region as well as possibly trigger an arms race or pursuing of nuclear weapons capabilities by South Korea, or Japan. Re-unification of the Korean Peninsula (in democratic terms) would also offset the power balance in the region. However, such prospects are not applicable for the immediate future as the economic costs of the unification would be enormous. Lastly, the prospects of building of common security in the region show that at the current states of affairs, the building of a common security institution has many unresolved questions regarding membership and obstacles in the form of diverging interests and antagonistic relations among actors and thus seems unlikely for the immediate future. In conclusion in the long-term future perspective,

the security system could evolve from the current changing composition to a bipolar structure with the United States as one pole and its allies in form of Japan and South Korea on one hand, and China as the second pole with possibly Russia on China's side.

As already argued and proven in the first chapter, Asia and East Asia as part of the Asian region is experiencing substantial growth in trade relations within the region as well as with the rest of the world, is modernizing militarily and is also undergoing political democratization. Overall, the conclusion can be drawn that East Asia is increasingly becoming a prominent actor in international relations and is thus attracting gradually more attention. Understanding the current security relations, the future development and the implications for the future of global development is therefore vital for future interaction among the East Asian states as well as with other parts of the world.

Although not discussed in the thesis itself due to the scope of the paper, it is also important to remember that the developments in security relations have a global impact. The rise of China and the East Asian region as a whole does not have implications for the East Asian region only but also globally. In today's globalized world security tensions, conflicts or even breakout of war would spread easily outside of the region and could easily include most of the world. In this respect, however, also changes in power distribution (polarity) can influence global affairs. This is because the security system in East Asia now contains the United States, by most international relations scholars labeled as the world's superpower, as well as the world's great powers China and Japan. We can anticipate growing China's influence in world affairs and global issues and that the relations between United States, Japan, and China will affect the development of international relations as a whole.

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
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
APPENDIX

Appendix 1 Trade to GDP Ratio for East Asian countries




Source: compiled from World Bank World Development Indicators Databank

Appendix 2 "Noodle Bowl" of trade agreements Asia



Source: United Nations ESCAP, <http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/pillar.aspx>

Appendix 3 Map of Freedom 2013



Source: Freedomhouse 2013, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Map%20of%20Freedom%202013,%20final.pdf>

Appendix 4 Constitution of Japan, Article 9

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.

The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized

Source: Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet,


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Appendix 5 East China Sea territorial dispute map




Source: The Chosunilbo 2013, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/10/04/2012100400428.html

Appendix 6 East Asia shipping routes




Source: Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-ship.htm>

Appendix 7 South China Sea territorial disputes map



Source: Japan Focus, 2008, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-ian-storey/2734>

Appendix 8 North Korea nuclear facilities



Source: Global Nuclear Containment Watch, <http://www.globalnuclearcontaminationwatch.com/>

