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The People's Republic of China at the United Nations: Voting and
how it corresponds to Chinese foreign policy

(Master's Thesis)

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Declaration:

Herewith I declare that I have written the Master's Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.

Prague, 28. April 2014

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Student's Signature

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) and the People's Republic of China (China, PRC) have now had a shared history of direct involvement of over 40 years. During that time a lot has changed on the scene of global politics and there have also been changes concerning China and the UN as well as the relations between them. For some time now the PRC and its growing power has been among the top most discussed issues among politicians and economists but also among many scholars across various fields. To name a few, Samuel S. Kim wrote widely about China's foreign policy, Lubica Obuchová dealt with the topic of Chinese people of the 21st century, Rudolf Fürst questioned the current development of China, its security and economy as well as its relations to the European Union and the United States. Also Alexander Eckstein, a consultant on China at the US State Department and director of Centre for Chinese Studies wrote a number of studies on China's economy as well as the US-China relations or Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State and a Nobel Peace prize laureate who famously orchestrated the re-opening of ties between the US and the PRC also published a book called *On China* (2011), where he explores China's political development and provides memories of his own experience of dealing with China. All this growing interest in China started mainly due to reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980's¹, which enabled China to experience an incredible economic boom and consequently China's inclusion among the greatest powers of the world. One of the most well known authors, who concerned himself with this topic of China's growth, was Zheng Bijian, chairman of China Reform Forum and author of key reports drafted for China's national party congresses. In his work he introduced theories about China's peaceful rise to a great power status and actually even coined the term *peaceful rise*, since China's growth raised numerous concerns in the western hemisphere².

The UN, committed to maintaining world peace and security, has during those last forty years also witnessed many changes on the global scene, most noticeably after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, but also changes resulting from the rapid growth of international trade, increasing and faster interconnectivity between nations,

¹ RAMPINI, Federico. *Čínské století: Autentický průvodce zemí rudého draka*. 1. vyd. Karolína Křížová. Praha: Dokořán, s.r.o., 2008. ISBN 978-80-7363-128-4.

² BIJIAN, Zheng. China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status. *Foreign Affairs* [online]. 2005 [cit. 2014-02-21]. Available from : <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-power-status>

the overall growing interdependence etc., all possible to sum up under the popularly used term *globalization*. The acceptance of China as a new member of the UN and more so as the new permanent member (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1971 after having replaced Taiwan from its seat as the rightful representative of China³, marks the beginnings of international acceptance of the PRC as a new responsible power, who will share the duty of maintaining world order peaceful and secure.

China's "settling in" among the great powers on the international platform and its development as an indisputably major actor on this platform create a basis for this thesis. Understandably, China has become the centre of attention of many research papers but also the media and the attention is nowhere near to an end. Given China's rise of power and its placement as the second largest economy of the world having overtaken Japan in 2010⁴ along with being the most populous country of the world with its 1.3 billion inhabitants⁵, it is no wonder we may more and more often hear that the 21st century is referred to as the *Chinese century*, e.g. Federico Rampini, an Italian journalist and correspondent from Beijing, published a book called the *Chinese century*, which explores the background of and the obstacles to China's rise as a great power within the arena of international relations.⁶ The topic of China in the field of international relations is incredibly wide and too complex to be analyzed thoroughly. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis I have decided to focus on a narrower issue, which is China's voting behaviour at the UNSC and more specifically its veto power. In this thesis I will look into China's foreign policy making, the voting behaviour of China within the international organization and the philosophy behind the veto power. The core question to my research is: *Does China's use of its veto power at the UNSC correspond to its official foreign policy principles?* The reason why I chose to look into the issue of China's foreign policy and its voting behaviour within the UN is because it has recently become quite topical, due to the unprecedented triple joint veto used by China and Russia

³ Oct. 25, 1971 | People's Republic of China In, Taiwan Out, at U.N. *The New York Times: Learning Network* [online]. 2011 [cit. 2014-02-16]. Available from : http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/oct-25-1971-peoples-republic-of-china-in-taiwan-out-at-un/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0

⁴ HAMLIN, Kevin a Yanping LI. China Overtakes Japan as World's Second-Biggest Economy. *Bloomberg news* [online]. 2010 [cit. 2014-02-16]. Available from : <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/china-economy-passes-japan-s-in-second-quarter-capping-three-decade-rise.html>

⁵ China Overview. WORLD BANK. *The World Bank* [online]. © 2014 [cit. 2014-02-16]. Available from : <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>

⁶ RAMPINI, 2008

concerning the Syrian crisis⁷, when the criticism of the veto power raised anew but also because of my long lasting interest in the culture of China. By analyzing China's behaviour within the UN (specifically its voting behaviour) through the correlation to its foreign policy, I would like to find out, how China uses its UNSC permanent membership status and how China has grown as an indisputably significant partaker in international relations. I will therefore focus on how China's voting behaviour within the UNSC corresponds to its foreign policy objectives through which I would like to find an answer to whether the UNSC is used rather as a tool in order to achieve the individual national interests rather than primarily pursue the main aim of the institution, which is of course maintaining international peace and security.

This thesis will be divided into 4 main parts, the first of which will be a theoretical-methodological part focusing on the functioning and the implications of the veto power bestowed only upon the P5-USA, China, Russia, France and the UK⁸. As mentioned the veto power has been at the centre of attention lately, mainly due to the unprecedented triple joint veto of two of the P5's- Russia and China, in the matter of a resolution against the Syrian crisis. However, it was not only this one specific case that has aroused questions among political elites and international relations scholars. The issue of the impact of casting a negative vote to block a UNSC action is a matter of discussions ever since this mechanism has been put into order. In my first part I will therefore question the implications of the veto power and hand in hand with that goes the issue of the so called hidden veto. The second part of my thesis will focus on the foreign policy of China mainly from the time period following 1971 when China became a new member of the UN, after having overtaken the position of the Republic of China. I will introduce the main objectives of China's foreign policy, the most important and influential of which is still considered to be the sovereignty principle. It is specifically this principle which causes most of the trouble for the UN due to the internationally agreed upon rule of non-intervention into another state's matters. It has been one of the most common official explanations as to why various UN actions during crisis situations have been blocked and also one of the main reasons why there are so many criticisms and accusations aimed at the UNSC, whose importance has been marked as declining due to its ineffectiveness and inactive behaviour as a mere bystander during

⁷ WONG, Nicholas. China's veto on Syria: what interests are at play?. *OpenDemocracy* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-01-22]. Available from : <http://www.opendemocracy.net/nicholas-wong/china%E2%80%99s-veto-on-syria-what-interests-are-at-play>

⁸ UNITED NATIONS. *United Nations Charter* [online]. © 2014 [cit. 2.3.2014]. Available from : http://www.mofa.gov.iq/documentfiles/un_charter.pdf

atrocities happening in the world.⁹ In the third part I will elaborate on how China specifically behaves on the platform of the UNSC, meaning I shall be presenting the information of the specific cases of China's vetoes and hidden vetoes and the reasons for their casting. Through this information I will be able to find out how the voting behaviour and the foreign policy correspond, which will be the content of the fourth part of this thesis.

As for sources used to write this thesis, I will be coming out of various academic articles and books dealing with the question of China at the platform of the United Nations such as Joel Wuthrow's *Beyond the Veto* (2013), Susan Tieh's *China in the UN: United with other Nation's* (2004), Katie Lynch's *China and the Security Council* (2009), Christopher Holland's *Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty and Intervention* (2012) or Michael Fullilove's *China and the United Nations: A Stakeholder's Spectrum* (2011). Texts concerning the voting procedures of the UNSC and the veto power specifically are for example Sahar Okhovat's *The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform* (2011) or George Tsebelis's *Veto Players: How political institutions work* (2011). These listed titles will be the primary sources of my research along with the official web pages of the United Nation's Security Council, whose voting database I will be using to search for resolutions related to the topic of my thesis. Online news sites as for example Asia Times Online, which focuses specifically on Asia or online forums such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Diplomat Magazine but also many other media sources will be used to support and fill in the background information of this thesis.

⁹ BLÄTTER, Ariela. GLOBAL SOLUTIONS. *The Responsibility Not To Veto: A Way Forward* [online]. Washington DC, 2010 [cit. 19.2.2014]. Available from : http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/RN2V_White_Paper_CGS.pdf

1. Theoretical and methodological framework - Voting at the UNSC, the Veto Power and China

The theoretical foundation for this thesis was mainly drawn from the text of professor George Tsebelis *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work* (2011) from the University of Michigan, who first introduced his *Veto Player Theory* in 1995 in the British Journal of Political Science. This theory has since then been applied countless of times in various case studies in the field of comparative politics as a game theory tool to analyze political systems, and which I will partly apply on analyzing the voting procedures and the veto power within the UNSC. Furthermore I will be using Sahar Okhovat's text on the *UNSC: Its veto power and its reform*(2011), where he questions the philosophy behind the use of the veto power and its importance for the P5; Jan Wouter and Tom Ruy's *Security Council's Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?*(2005), in which they lay suggestions on how to reform the Security Council regarding the veto power abuse; Hans Köchler's examination of the *Voting procedure of the UNSC* (1991) , where he questions the consequences for the international relations, and other sources debating on the issue of veto power such as the Global Policy Forum. These theoretical foundations on the topic of the power of veto and the voting within the structure of the UNSC will be considered from the point of view of China, whose voting behaviour I shall be analyzing through its status as a permanent member with the power of veto. Apart from the above mentioned texts a very important source of data is of course the UNSC voting database, where I can find all the resolutions and voting information necessary and most importantly for the purpose of this thesis, the list of vetoes that were cast and why. I will consider this behaviour based on the foreign policy of China, which should give me some insight into how China uses the advantages of being one of the P5, thus having the controversial power of casting a negative vote along with what the consequences are.

The limitations to writing this thesis and limitations to a thorough analysis of China's voting behaviour within the UNSC is actually one of the methods of how the veto power is implemented, specifically the so-called hidden veto sometimes referred to as the "pocket veto"¹⁰. A hidden veto is a "*quiet threat of possible veto use*"¹¹. In other words it means that a

¹⁰ OKHOVAT, Sarah. *The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform*. Sydney, 2011. ISBN 9780980828672. Available from : http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/working_papers/UNSC_paper.pdf

member with the power of veto, i.e. a permanent member of the UNSC, threatens a passing of a resolution of the Council by implying it will use its power of veto during the official vote and thus block the action. Just like casting the negative vote, this threat of course also strongly influences the outcomes and actions of the Council. However, unlike the official casting of a negative vote (although an official veto has found its opposition as well), the hidden veto is viewed with more criticism and reproach. Its “behind the curtains” aspect and the fact that there is no official record of such vetoes, give it a sinister undertone and according to C. Nahory a Security Council program coordinator and writer for the Global Policy Forum (GPF), “*has very negative impact on the work of the Security Council*” as it also “*determines the way the Council conducts its business*”¹². The strategic role of a hidden veto is clear. What also comes to mind as a potential form of abuse by using a threat to veto is a possibility to use the power as leverage in the sense that the permanent members may exchange their support on different occasions. In other words if one member wants another to side with him on “adjusting” a resolution, that member may negotiate with the other by promising to take the other members side on a different occasion and not veto his interests in the future in exchange¹³.

Given the “hidden” nature of such a vote makes it extremely hard to back it by reliable data and unless it has been officially admitted or announced by the concerned country, information about the use of a hidden veto are mere speculations no matter how substantiated they are believed to be. The action of using a hidden veto can be considered as a form of manipulation of the voting results as it is used more during informal meetings rather than official meetings and it happens before the official vote.¹⁴ During meetings which are open to public scrutiny the P5 would presumably not have that much freedom to pressure (or perhaps even threaten to some extent) the other Council members because the international public image of the concerned state may be endangered. By threatening to use the veto power “*permanent members manage to keep an issue off the Council agenda or soften the language of a resolution without actually casting a veto*”¹⁵ or in other words they can persuade other Council members to shift their positions. In relations to China’s voting, the hidden vetoes are once again hard to support with evidence. However, from time to time threats of the possible

¹¹ NAHORY, Céline. The Hidden Veto. *Global Policy Forum* [online]. 2004 [cit. 2014-01-17]. Available from : <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/42656.html>

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ OKHOVAT, 2011

¹⁵ Ibid.

use of veto are made public such as the latest threat regarding blocking action against Syria, which in the end was indeed blocked by a veto¹⁶. In the part dealing with China's voting behaviour I will therefore also consider the hidden veto but with less emphasis. Having introduced the hidden veto as a limiting and complicating factor to writing this thesis, I will now explain the voting procedure of the UNSC itself and the application of the official veto power, which are more important as directive background information for the purpose of this thesis.

1.1 Voting procedure at the UNSC and the veto power

The UNSC has been under international scrutiny since its establishment and a number of proposals calling for the reform of this Council have been heard and rejected. The voting procedure has also been targeted as inefficient, unjust and in need of a change, especially regarding the power of veto. In this following section I will introduce the main aspects of the UNSC's voting system, its drawbacks and the role of the veto.

“Article 27

- 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.*
- 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.*
- 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”¹⁷*

The paragraph above is taken directly from the Charter of the United Nations, first published in San Francisco in 1945 and amended several times to the current version, which has been in force since 1973¹⁸. There are 5 permanent members, whose ratification was introduced in the UN Charter by the members themselves (aka the dominant and victorious powers post-World War II) on October 24th 1945. In the Charter the drafters specified the

¹⁶ PATEL, Melan. UN resolution on Syria masks the real problem, the need to reform the Security Council veto. *Michigan Journal of International Law* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-03-02]. Available from : <http://mjilonline.org/?p=829>

¹⁷ UNITED NATIONS. *United Nations Charter* [online]. © 2014 [cit. 2.3.2014]. Available from : http://www.mofa.gov.iq/documentfiles/un_charter.pdf

¹⁸ Ibid.

purpose of the Council but also the dominant position of the P5 by assigning them the ability to veto a resolution. The remaining 10 non-permanent members (their number was increased during a reform of the UNSC in 1963¹⁹) were to rotate every 2 years and unlike the P5, these members cannot cast a veto that would have the power of blocking a resolution just by that one single negative vote. A resolution can be blocked either by one of the P5 or by at least a simple majority of UNSC members voting against it.²⁰

The UNSC's primary purpose is to maintain international peace and security. To fulfil it when facing an emerging conflict the Council usually first recommends to the parties to find an agreement in a peaceful way. When the conflicts escalate into armed clashes, the Council will aim to stop it as soon as possible, for example by issuing ceasefire directives, dispatching military observers or peacekeeping forces or separate the opposing forces to establish calm in order to seek for peaceful settlements. As the UNSC official website states, "*beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including: economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans; severance of diplomatic relations; blockade; or even collective military action*"²¹. Before taking any of the options stated above the Security Council takes a vote, meaning all the possible actions of the Security Council when dealing with a crisis are subject to veto.²²

1.1.1 The philosophy behind the veto power-its use and abuse

What should be stressed out from Article 27 are three important implications. Firstly to the sentence-"*a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting*". This regulatory mechanism requires all the Council members to refrain from taking action when they have evident self-interest in a certain situation. Despite the fact that this regulation has been acknowledged by all the UNSC members, compliance with it has not been so ideal. Secondly, within this article we will not find the veto power explicitly mentioned anywhere and interestingly enough, neither is it to be found in the rest of the UN Charter. The power of a negative vote is implied through the wording: "*including the concurring votes of the permanent members*". This careful formulation avoiding the direct term "veto" was adopted within the UN Charter in

¹⁹ UNITED NATIONS. *United Nations Charter*, © 2014

²⁰ The Voting System and Records. *The United Nations* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2014-03-09]. Available from : <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/voting.shtml>

²¹ What is the Security Council?. *United Nations: United Nations Security Council* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2014-03-09]. Available from : <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/>

²² OKHOVAT, 2011

1945 accompanied by numerous protests from smaller states, worried by the implications.²³ Nevertheless the veto power has been established, influencing the voting procedures and consequently the world events ever since. The formulation of the text gives each permanent member the power to block an action by a single veto, no matter whether all the other UNSC members have voted positively. As we could expect, this privilege power had to be strongly justified in order to have it inserted into the Charter. One of the leading defences of the veto power claimed it is a principle of unanimity²⁴, meaning no resolution should be put forward and no action should be done unless there was a consensus between all the permanent members in order to maintain peaceful relations between them. Thirdly, through Article 27, the UNSC works with a distinction between the “*procedural matters*” and the “*other matters*” (non-procedural or also called substantive matter)²⁵. What this creates is a possibility of a so-called double veto, when a permanent member can “*ask for a preliminary vote on the nature of a question and consequently veto it.*”²⁶ However, the double veto has not been used since the 1950’s based on an informal agreement between the P5²⁷.

With the power the P5 have, they are capable of some degree of censorship as to what matters shall or shall not be dealt with by the council officially. “*To prevent the Council from discussing taboo issues, permanent members carefully mould the monthly program of work during intense negotiations among the rotating president and the other Council members. Though the UN Charter does not provide a right of veto on procedural matters, the P5 insist on their right to set the boundaries of what may and may not be said. The P5 argue implausibly but unshakeably that the Council makes a decision on substance (rather than a simple procedural move) when deciding what goes onto the agenda, thus making such a decision subject to a veto.*”²⁸ In other words, the P5 have the power to control the agenda of the UNSC and in case of not being able to prevent a certain issue to be debated officially, they still have the power to veto any disliked resolution and thus block the intended action

²³ The Formation of the United Nations, 1945. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE. *Office of the Historian* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2014-03-08]. Available from : <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un>

²⁴ WOUTERS, Jan a Tom RUYS. EGMONT INSTITUTE. *SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: A NEW VETO FOR A NEW CENTURY?*. Brussels, 2005. Available from : <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep9.pdf>

²⁵ Kelsen, Hans. *The Law of the United Nations* [online]. 2000 [cit. 5.3.2014]. ISBN 978-1-58477-077-0.

Available from :

http://books.google.cz/books?id=BWPa0MB_AyQC&pg=PA246&lpg=PA246&dq=party+to+dispute+to+abstain+from+voting&source=bl&ots=P7Cigl3KCe&sig=TQgUZOs98MLylzFKszotf0w2HDM&hl=cs&sa=X&ei=n14XU8nmKcG34ATDyoDgAQ&ved=0CE4Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=procedural&f=false

²⁶ WOUTERS and RUYS, 2005

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ NAHORY, 2004

anyway.²⁹ The veto power has been a controversial matter right from the establishment of the UNSC in 1946. The infamous power of veto has been used since the very beginning by the P5 predominantly according to their own individual national interests or the national interest of the P5's closest allies³⁰. This of course meant the initial purpose of the veto "*preventing the UN from taking direct action against any of its principal founding members*"³¹ or as Hans Köchler described the function of the veto in his text titled *The Voting Procedure in the UNSC* (1999), as a kind of "*reassurance in the realm of power politics*"³², was and still is considered as being constantly abused by the P5.³³ The veto was inserted into the UN Charter as a clear-cut privilege of the P5, who for their own good reasons overruled the principle of sovereign equality among the member states of the UNSC when implementing the veto power and as many critics claim, this is the main cause for the inability of the UN to function as a democratic body, undermining its credibility as it is a disguised form of continuing power politics.³⁴

The UN has been criticised for decades and most strongly for being a passive bystander to atrocities happening in the world, which was attributed to the veto power as its fault and greatest deficiency. To give a specific example, the UN remained inactive because of blocked actions during the genocide in Rwanda (1994) or in Darfur (2004)³⁵. One of the greatest critics of the international inaction in response to genocide and mass killings happening in the world is the US ambassador to the UN Samantha Powers, who has been dedicated to raising awareness of human rights violations and the risks of inaction. Most recently she has as an UN ambassador openly criticised and denounced the UNSC and its continuing problem of inability to react to the crisis of Syria, due to Russia's and China's joint vetoes. She even went to the length of calling it a disgrace for the United Nations. "*We believe that 14 000 people were killed in Damascus on August 21 and the Security Council could not even agree to put out a press statement expressing its disapproval.*"³⁶ A solution to this

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ OKHOVAT, 2011.

³¹ Ibid.

³² KÖCHLER, Hans. *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council: Examining a Normative Contradiction in the UN Charter and its Consequences on International Relations*. 1991. Available from : http://www.i-p-o.org/Koechler-Voting_Procedure-UN_Security_Council.pdf

³³ HEHIR, Aidan. Time to end abuse of veto by big powers at UN. *South African Foreign Policy Initiative* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-02-18]. Available from : <http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2012/time-end-abuse-veto-big-powers-un>

³⁴ KÖCHLER, 1991

³⁵ BLÄTTER, 2010

³⁶ POWER, Samantha. THE DAILY CONVERSATION. *US Ambassador Power Speaks On Syrian Crisis* [online]. 2013 [cit. 20.1. 2014]. Available from : <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hOvUI0f6Oo0>

deadlock situation has been proposed through the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P)³⁷. However, this doctrine, which presupposes the limitation of the principle of sovereignty, has come to a halt on occasion because its effective use has been blocked by a veto.³⁸ It is not surprising there has been some loss of faith in the capabilities of the UN to guarantee the maintenance of peace and security in the world, but one also has to realize the obstacles the UN has come across. Here it is important to mention that we are mostly past the era of the traditional way of war making today and we have rather moved to a much-harder-to-resolve situation of intrastate conflicts. Additionally, from another point of view, the concept of national security shifted to a more individualistically based human security concept³⁹, where more emphasis is laid on the importance of a human being rather than a state by the international community⁴⁰ (meaning mainly the western hemisphere). These intrastate conflicts are more complicated to resolve because of the still largely revered principle of sovereignty and the implied agreement of non-intervention into another state's internal matter, where the veto power once again can play a very influential and determinate role. Despite the firm support of the R2P, its adoption by the UN in 2005 as an international norm⁴¹ and the general acceptance of this concept, there are still arguments that there *"is no common understanding when R2P has to be invoked, especially when it comes to concrete country cases"*⁴², the actual application of this norm is facing many obstacles. Including for example when China's much revered principle of non-intervention is endangered, it is usually being solved by the use or at least the threat of use of a veto, to which I will come once more when dealing with China's foreign policy objectives. Until the UN finds a way of solving this problem, it will remain in this deadlock position, facing criticisms and loss of faith in its purpose and usefulness.

There is however another side to this story as there are also those who do not feel the veto power is being abused but it is indeed a fundamental "brake" for the international society as it safeguards *"against the irresponsible and reckless use of unilateral armed force by any*

³⁷ LAW WEBSTER, Lucy. R2P and Goals the Public Could Support. *Global Solutions* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-02-19]. Available from : <http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/09/R2P-and-Goals-Public-Could-Support>

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ UNDP. *New Dimensions of Human Security: Human Development Report*. 1994.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ LUPEL, Adam. The Responsibility to Protect Principle is Not the Problem: Interview with Jennifer Welsh. *IPI Global Observatory* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-03-09]. Available from : <http://theglobalobservatory.org/interviews/641-the-responsibility-to-protect-principle-is-not-the-problem-interview-with-jennifer-walsh.html>

⁴² GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. *The Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights: Prospects and Challenges* [online]. Berlin, 2012 [cit. 20.1. 2014]. Available from : http://www.fes.de/GPol/pdf/report_unsc-workshop.pdf

*single great power.*⁴³ This was a remark made by the Russian president Vladimir Putin, who, and I am now disregarding the individual background intentions and reasons for supporting the preservation of the veto power, defends it by pointing out its primary purpose: “*The United Nations’ founders understood that decisions affecting war and peace should happen only by consensus.*”⁴⁴ Despite it also being used as a main argument against the intervention in Syria, where Russia has its individual national interests and is therefore not entirely unbiased, it does not mean the argument should be entirely rejected. International consensus on matters such as resolving the crisis in Syria is vital for future good diplomatic relations. However, one may argue with the concept of cultural relativism, that international consensus is nearly impossible, given the differentiating value systems, differentiating and sometimes even opposing national interests and of course different economical, political, historical and cultural backgrounds .

The debates about the power of veto are endless. There are plenty of discussions about UNSC reforms, about reforms of the voting procedures of the UNSC concerning the spread of the veto power to other states or even an entire elimination of the veto power, about legislature which would regulate the use of the negative vote or even discussions defending the necessity of the veto power in its current form. It is not the purpose of this thesis to find a solution to these debates and if there is further interest in the topic, Tom Ruys and Jan Wouters look into the issue in more detail in their article *Security Council Reform: New Veto for a New Century?* or David Bosco in his article in the Foreign Policy magazine *In defence of the veto power*, explains why it is practically impossible to abolish the veto and how it can sometimes come into handy. What I will use from these debates however is information which would help analyze how China uses its veto power or how it defends its use during voting at the UNSC.

1.1.2 The veto player theory, criteria and the empirical background

To help explain how my analysis of China’s voting behaviour and its correlation to China’s foreign policy will work, I will now introduce the main criteria I will be considering in my research. Firstly, I will explain those based upon the already introduced Tsebelis theory of veto players. The main proposition that George Tsebelis claims in his theory is that: “*in order to change the status quo a certain number of individual or collective actors have to*

⁴³ SEIFF, Martin. Why the UN Security Council Still Matters. *The Globalist* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-01-21]. Available from : <http://www.theglobalist.com/un-security-council-still-matters/>

⁴⁴ Ibid.

agree to the proposed change.”⁴⁵ When applying this on the veto power at the UNSC, we can look at it similarly: unless the majority of UNSC members (with no exception from the P5) does not agree to a certain proposed resolution, reform or action, the proposed resolution, reform or action cannot take place. Therefore, in the case of the UNSC, it would seem most welcome if the majority members, including the P5 would have the same interests, values and objectives, so that none of the members would prevent the UNSC’s activities. That of course is not the case and even cannot be the case as the UNSC members and considering simply only the P5 have different historical backgrounds, different cultures, mentalities and values, US and Russia even being very strong adversaries during the Cold War. Furthermore, concerning changes to status quo Tsebelis mentions in his text that if everyone in the governing institute would be of the same mind it would imply political stability or in other words that there would be very weak or no opposition. As always in political science, there are opposing arguments concerning the advantages of political stability among scholars. There are some who are in favour of political stability as they view frequent interventions to status quo as undesirable and there are those who see political stability as a cause of great inflexibility to external changes. Tsebelis believes that “*Decisiveness to change the status quo is good when the status quo is undesirable or when an exogenous shock disturbs a desirable process. Commitment to non-interference may be preferable when the status quo is desirable or if an exogenous shock is beneficial*“ and that “*no rational player given the choice would accept any outcome that he does not prefer over the status quo*“.⁴⁶

We can again apply this on the UNSC P5 voting situations, exchanging terminology from political stability to congruence among the P5, to find out whether there is opposition amongst the members preventing interference into certain situations or not. We can see from the P5 players’ voting behaviour that there is a certain degree of congruence among some of them as for example the USA and the UK and between China and Russia⁴⁷, but it should be noted, that similar voting behaviour is not always so definite and should not be seen as directive. We could expect the congruence between all the P5 members will not be as high and the use of veto should therefore be quite common. However, it has been noted that since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar international order the use of veto has

⁴⁵ TSEBELIS, George. *VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK*. 2011. Available from : http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4756/tsebelis_book.pdf

⁴⁶ TSEBELIS, 2011, pg 19

⁴⁷ LYNCH, K., China and the Security Council: Congruence of the Voting between Permanent Members. *China Papers* [on-line]. 2009, No. 5 [vid 2013-06-25]. Available at : <http://www.victoria.ac.nz/chinaresearchcentre/Research/China%20Papers/5.Lynch-China%20and%20the%20Security%20Council.pdf>

decreased and the P5 actors seem to cooperate with more unanimity than before.⁴⁸ Apart from certain sensitive issues each of the P5 members has, e.g. China and Taiwan, USA and Israel, the veto has been more often replaced by abstention, which as the UNSC has concluded when considering the effect of a P5 abstention on the voting procedure result, does not have the same effect as casting a negative vote but only expresses the dismay with the final resolution.⁴⁹ Despite the fact that the voting records of the UNSC are indicating a decrease in the frequency of the use of the veto, thus making it seem the P5 members have agreed on limiting the abuse of this power, it is also necessary to realize the hidden veto may be playing an important role in this change. It is therefore questionable, whether the power of veto has been replaced by closer cooperation and integration of the P5 states or whether it is the result of an increased use of the pocket veto instead. To summarize, there needs to be congruence between the various veto power holders in their opinions and interests regarding a certain matter (change of status quo, reaction to external shock) in order to successfully pass any kind of decision.

Tsebelis further distinguishes between collective and individual veto players, collective being referred to a political party or parliament and individual to a monolithic political party or a single powerful person, e.g. Russian president. For the purpose of my thesis, I will consider only the individual veto player as internal decision-making within China, along with being extremely hard to determine for its secrecy, is made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the only governing party of the country, and also because we are focusing on China as a unified entity within the UNSC, where the considered veto power applies.

According to Tsebelis, to be able to explain outcomes of the policy making process (initially the main aim of his theory), one needs to know what the **preferences** of the policy-maker are, the **identity** of the so-called agenda setter (the first mover, a veto player who presents the “take-it-or-leave-it to the other veto players and has thus significant influence on the outcome of the vote”⁵⁰) and what **the situation of the status quo** is. The veto player theory is a game theory and therefore many criticisms of it apply for the veto player theory as well, the strongest being that in game theory we perceive states as rational and unified actors. The rational behaviour theory states that actors are determined to maximize their own interest,

⁴⁸ KÖCHLER, 1991. Pg, 20

⁴⁹ SMITH, Ryan D., SETON HALL UNIVERSITY. *The Use of Abstention in the United Nations Security Council* [online]. 2008 [cit. 9.3. 2014]. Available from : <http://smithryb.tripod.com>

⁵⁰ TSEBELIS, 2001, pg 13

specified by their own utility function⁵¹. Being based on mathematical disciplines, the game theory is believed not to be efficient enough to explain the complexity of the events in international relations. Another important critique to the veto player theory in particular is the fact that Tsebelis assumes the knowledge and specification of policy preferences which are fixed. In other words it is a problem of measurement.⁵² Nevertheless for the purpose of this thesis, I will consider some of the propositions made by Tsebelis, supplemented by additional information from the other previously mentioned sources, while bearing in mind the critique of the game theories. What also has to be mentioned from Tsebelis's theory is his argument that the voting outcomes strongly depend on the number of veto players and their ideological differences, i.e. diverse preferences in policy making. Tsebelis claims as follows: "*the larger the distance among and the number of veto players, the more difficult it is to change the status quo.*"⁵³

When once again, applying all this on the topic of this thesis, the number of veto players is set in stone as there are only 5 permanent members, the amount of which is not expected to rise in the near future despite the occasional call for a reform concerning the veto power holders. The situation of the status quo will be considered from a slightly different point of view. I will modify the status quo situation criterion and look at it rather from the perspective of an emerged crisis (potential of conflict or a situation that falls under the UNSC authority) and how the P5 members stand up to it. As for the preferences, in the chapter dealing with China's foreign policy objectives I will solely focus on China's foreign policy with regards to issues that are dealt with at the UNSC and which are meaningful for the purpose of this thesis. For example I will not consider China's foreign policy towards all countries, only those whose situation is questioned at the UNSC and whom China considers as allies and has therefore been influenced by that relation during certain voting (e.g. North Korea). The identity of the agenda setter is also applicable for the case of the UNSC as the P5 most definitely influence the agenda of the Council. As mentioned in C. Nahory's article about hidden vetoes, the P5 have the ability to control what issues are taken up by the Council, therefore the issues considered as within an "exclusive sphere of interest" of one of the P5, it becomes a sort of taboo for the Council. Despite the fact that the P5's veto does not apply to

⁵¹ WIRKOLA, Elida. UNIVERSITY OF OSLO. *Reform of the UN Security Council and Veto Player Theory* [online]. Oslo, 2010 [cit. 10.3.2014]. Available from :

<https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/13023/MasteroppgavexElidaxRxHxWirkola.pdf?sequence=1>

⁵² GANGHOF, Steffen. *Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis* [online]. 2011 [cit. 10.3. 2014]. Available from : <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2003.tb00411.x/abstract>

⁵³ TSEBELIS, 2001, pg 36

procedural matters (only substantive), the P5 insists the Council has a right when deciding what goes into the agenda as it is according to them a decision on substance rather than a procedural move. This means they make the agenda setting into a decision subject to veto. Given the fact that all five of them have equal power in this case, I will only focus on China and its agenda setting, which encompasses its position towards for example Tibet or Xinjiang.⁵⁴

Perhaps to make it more clear, while bearing in mind China's preferences, the situation of status quo as I have modified it for the purpose of this paper and the reasons for China's influence on agenda setting, I will mark the pattern in China's voting behaviour (i.e. casting a veto or threatening with it) at the UNSC by finding out whether China has used its P5 status power when:

- protecting its national interests;
- protecting the interests of allies⁵⁵;
- or simply when it disagrees with a proposed action (for example based on its cultural values)

In the next part of this thesis I will focus on the specific idiosyncrasies of China and its foreign policy with regards to its application at the platform of the UNSC, including its involvement over the last couple of decades.

⁵⁴ NAHORY, 2004

⁵⁵ OKHOVAT, 2011, pg 3

2. China's foreign policy in the context of its membership at the UN

The Chinese foreign policy of today is not possible to mention without also looking at its status as a global power, attained mainly due to its importance in the world of economy. The most influential and directive factors influencing China's foreign policy in the last few decades have been, in my opinion, mainly these two issues: historical experiences with foreign powers and the impressive economic performance boosting China's confidence in approaching the international community. In this part I will introduce the evolution of China as an internationally involved actor but also the individual main objectives of China's foreign policy.

The perception of China as a giant on the international platform has been steadily growing and it has not been that long ago, that China even started to become regarded as a threat to the previously dominating Western powers.⁵⁶ There are discussions on the topic of China's rising power status and what it means for the world. Joseph Nye or John Mearsheimer both discussed the question of the implications of China's rise and various articles were published in the online issues of the Economist magazine, The Foreign Affairs magazine or New York Times. China has managed to build up its image through incredible economic growth, through a military build up but also through its increasing involvement into international affairs. Despite China's consequent boost of confidence and increasing thrive to achieve its ambitions; making its regional neighbours but also the wider international community perhaps a little tense with unease⁵⁷, China has been appeasing the other actors by issuing official statements of its peaceful intentions. The most famous of these statements were expressed by the already mentioned Zheng Bijian in his speeches between the years 1997 and 2004. Throughout these years, Zheng Bijian endlessly claimed the international community should not be worried about China's rise, as it is in China's interest to achieve development for no other reason but to ensure the well being of its own people.⁵⁸ In his speech from 2003, Mr. Zheng pointed out China faces many problems within its own country

⁵⁶ IKENBERRY, John. The Rise of China and the Future of the West. *Foreign Affairs* [online]. 2008 [cit. 2014-04-07]. Available from : <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63042/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-the-future-of-the-west>

⁵⁷ XIA, Ming. "China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"?. *New York Times* [online]. © 2014 [cit. 2014-03-27]. Available from : <http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html>

⁵⁸ China's Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2004. *Brookings Institution* [online]. 2005 [cit. 2014-03-26]. Available from : <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/events/20050616bijianlunch.pdf>

of 1.3 billion inhabitants. Given the large imbalances among the inhabitants, it was therefore China's duty to take action, mainly by actively participating in economic globalization and stop being reliant on outside help in order to be able to help its own people. "*China cannot afford and should not expect to rely on the international community. Its only option is to depend on its own strength.*"⁵⁹ By choosing this path, focusing on economic reforms and the development of the country, China has managed to reduce poverty significantly and even more, it managed to rise as a new economic giant. As a necessary supplement to Zheng's speeches about China's rise, he did not forget to emphasise China's strive for power is without the usual intentions of seeking hegemony, as such a path, according to Zheng "*is doomed to failure*"⁶⁰. Just like Zheng, students of China's foreign policy but also other official sources and political statements claim that it is not China's will and never has been to seek hegemony or occupy a different country's territory. However it has also been pointed out that with the gained power, China is not prepared to "yield" any part of its own territory, meaning China will not let go of the disputed territories it has with other nations either. This policy of protectionism and territorial integrity remains very strong and it has its roots in distant history.⁶¹

2.1 Historical remnants in today's foreign policy of China

China's foreign policy has undergone significant changes over the time of the existence of the People's Republic of China (e.g. a shift from self imposed isolation to openness and even fear from being isolated, inaction to much greater international involvement, keeping a low profile to the display of self confidence and renewed nationalism), but there are also many continuances in the foreign policy framework, present since the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) until this day. However, some issues influencing today's foreign policy of China have their roots even further back in history as for example the most revered objectives of China's foreign policy, which are of course national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both these objectives were strongly pushed forward right from the establishment of the PRC's foreign policy agenda and became part of the Mao Zedong ideological propaganda. China's attitude towards diplomatic relations with the outside world since 1949, the year of the establishment of the PRC, has been strongly influenced by

⁵⁹ China's Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2004. 2005

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Military expert: China will never yield on issues of territory and sovereignty. *Ministry of National Defense: People's Republic of China* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-03-26]. Available from : http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Opinion/2012-09/12/content_4399069.htm

ideological dimensions. Chairman Mao Zedong, the communist leader and founder of the “New China”⁶² has introduced numerous changes and reforms over his time of leadership, which has changed China’s position in the world with far reaching consequences. On the outset of the establishment of the PRC, Mao and the CCP made a few changes in the country’s foreign policy, in order to “*make a clean break with the foreign policy of the old and semi-colonial China and uphold the independence and sovereignty of New China*”⁶³.

The very first foreign policy documents of the newly established PRC and which are still affecting the modern day foreign policy were adopted by the National Committee during its first session under the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949.⁶⁴ There have been three main principles introduced by Mao, which defined the first few years of the New China’s foreign policy making and became the foundations for the future PRC’s foreign interactions and voting behaviour within international organizations such as the UN. The three reforming principals according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC were: “*Starting anew, putting the house in order before inviting guests and leaning to one side*”.⁶⁵ The principle of “leaning to one side” symbolized China’s ideological inclinations. It was explained by Mao as meaning “*whoever is not with us (the socialist-communist camp) is against us*.”⁶⁶ As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in relation to the creation of the New China’s foreign policy “*the principle [...] is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war*”.⁶⁷ We can see from the listed objectives, China wanted to make it clear that non-interference with its territorial issues was regarded with the upmost importance and that any form of imperialistic tendencies would be fought against (this was presumably aimed mainly at the US). Even today China is still very careful when taking part in multilateral decisions, not to establish precedence when considering any form of international intervention, so that in the future China would not have to face a threat of external interference into its own affairs. The first

⁶² Formulation of Foreign Policy of New China on the Eve of its Birth. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China* [online]. 2000 [cit. 2014-02-23]. Available from : <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18057.htm>

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Formulation of Foreign Policy of New China on the Eve of its Birth. 2000

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ DREYER, June Teufel. Chinese Foreign Policy. *Foreign Policy Research Institute* [online]. 2007 [cit. 2014-02-23]. Available from : <http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/125.200702.dreyer.chineseforeignpolicy.html>

⁶⁷ Formulation of Foreign Policy of New China on the Eve of its Birth. 2000

steps of China's new foreign policy, bounded by the ideological norms had somewhat restrictive results on China's diplomacy. Strict alignment to an ideological camp decreases the potential contact with the outside world only to those who are in the same camp. Such strict adherence to the "leaning to one side" policy was soon viewed as potentially harmful for the more distant future, as many newly independent former colonies of Africa and Asia held a conference in 1955 in Indonesia, which gave way to the establishment of the so called Non-Aligned Movement.⁶⁸ The Non-Aligned Movement membership indicated that its members were not willing to be officially part of either bloc created during the Cold War and that their main goal was to pursue economic development.⁶⁹ Around the same time, China started to be aware of the isolation it is imposing on itself even within its own region in Asia and decided to lift the isolation to some extent. As a contrast to the USA determination to cooperate only with democratic countries and the Soviet Union's will to internationalize the socialist revolution⁷⁰, China decided to approach the Non-Aligned countries for economic purposes without any ideological aspects. The PRC began stating it was open to cooperation and establishment of diplomatic relations with countries, who would accept China's principles of "equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty."⁷¹ These principles were further processed into what is today known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, listed out by the Chinese leadership in 1954, which was observed as China's reach out towards the non-communist countries of Asia⁷². The five principles were introduced as follows:

- "Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- *Mutual non-aggression;*
- *Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;*
- *Equality and mutual benefit;*
- *Peaceful coexistence*⁷³

⁶⁸ History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement. *Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-02-23]. Available from : <http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement>

⁶⁹ Dreyer. 2007

⁷⁰ SOFAR, Ken. China's Evolving Foreign Policy. *Centre for American Progress* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-04-02]. Available from : <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2012/03/08/11224/china-and-the-collapse-of-its-noninterventionist-foreign-policy/>

⁷¹ China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China* [online]. © 1998-2005 [cit. 2014-02-23]. Available from : <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm>

⁷² Principles of China's Foreign Policy. *Asia for Educators* [online]. © 2009 [cit. 2014-02-23]. Available from : http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm

⁷³ Ibid.

Even today these five principles remain a cornerstone of China's foreign policy making as they are included into the preamble of the Chinese Constitution⁷⁴. However, it is questionable whether the slogan-like foreign policy principles calling for peaceful coexistence, equality and friendly ties are not been contradicted by China's actions from time to time.

Starting anew and inviting guests only once the house has been put to order indicate Mao's will to re-establish and re-form the country before making any closer diplomatic connections as well as examine the contracts and relations the country has made so far under the previous government of Kuomintang.⁷⁵ In other words it was meant to be a fresh start for China, which however also further induced the partial isolation of the country. It was only in the year 1971 that China finally witnessed a few major events which brought about the end of this self-imposed isolation, the admittance to the UN being the most important influential factor, enabling China to openly discuss its socio-economic and political views on an international dialogue basis. The renewal of ties with the USA through the decision to invite Henry Kissinger to discuss Sino-US bilateral partnership for the future, the reinstatement of Chinese ambassadors into their former posts after being absent since the explosion of the Cultural Revolution (a massive 10-year anti-bourgeois campaign in China⁷⁶), and the establishment of relations with most of the countries of the world by the end of 1971, all had a major effect on ending the long-lasting diplomatic isolation of China.⁷⁷ It was however predominantly Mao's death in 1976⁷⁸ and consequently the end of the Cultural Revolution (which was a disastrous failure) that brought about a definite end to China's isolation as it slowly started searching for solutions to its severe economic situation.

After the succession crisis which followed Mao's death and the uncertainty of how to adapt the foreign policy to the new circumstances, Deng Xiaoping finally took the reins of the

⁷⁴ HOLLAND, Christopher. Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and Intervention. *Journal of International Law and Politics Online Forum* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-03-13]. Available from : <http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Christopher-Holland-China-the-Security-Council-and-Intervention.pdf>

⁷⁵ Principles of China's Foreign Policy. © 2009

⁷⁶ Cultural Revolution. *BBC: Special Reports* [online]. ©2014 [cit. 2014-03-31]. Available from : http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/cult.htm

⁷⁷ HARISH, Kapur. MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS. *Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao* [online]. Netherlands, 1985 [cit. 31.3. 2014]. ISBN 90-247-3081-3. Available from : http://books.google.cz/books?id=wmDEYFCU03QC&pg=PA263&lpg=PA263&dq=Towards+the+End+of+Isolationism:+China%27s+Foreign+Policy+After+Mao&source=bl&ots=AeEKBkkJZj&sig=GhQGU7A92BsBuWTOHATP7BpVjUU&hl=cs&sa=X&ei=l_gzU8iilc61hAe984HoBw&ved=0CGkQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=isol&f=false

⁷⁸ Mao Zedong. *Encyclopedia Britannica* [online]. ©2014 [cit. 2014-03-31]. Available from : <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/363395/Mao-Zedong>

country and managed to establish reforms, which started the rise of China to the economic giant and important political power it is today. Deng was one of the most prominent Chinese political figures, initiator of China's economic reforms in the 1980's⁷⁹, and was also strongly responsible for the new face and direction of China's foreign policy of the following years. Deng's foreign policy immediately took an abrupt turn. His diplomacy lacked the revolutionary terminology and was characteristic rather by a more low-key and pragmatic approach⁸⁰. It was his famous 24 Character Strategy introduced much later in his political career in the 1990's⁸¹ that has given the nation its new foreign policy guidelines, so much needed after the catastrophic consequences of Mao's reform policies and international dealings. The 24 Character Strategy is as follows:

*"Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership."*⁸²

What we can gather from Deng Xiaoping's approach is his effort to focus on the development of the country from the inside at first, something present in China's official public statements today as well. Admittedly the phrasing of the strategy has somewhat of a threatening air around it, however, it is necessary to realize the time of the issuance of this statement. It was after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the events happening in Eastern Europe, which have led to the fall of the socialist camp, all of which has forced China to slow down and reassess its approach to international relations in order not to make any rash decisions, which could potentially harm it in the future.⁸³ The post-Cold War foreign policy of China has been described as more moderated, more integrated and as slightly more engaged⁸⁴. Today, China is no longer willing to stay as silent or be in any way so isolated from the worldly events as it becomes more and more involved in cooperation in international affairs and even started pursuing its territorial ambitions more aggressively, as for example during November 2013, when it unilaterally launched an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), which overlapped

⁷⁹ RAMPINI, Federico. *Čínské století: Autentický průvodce zemí rudého draka*. 1. vyd. Karolína Křížová. Praha: Dokořán, s.r.o., 2008. ISBN 978-80-7363-128-4.

⁸⁰ HARISH, Kapur, 1985

⁸¹ Deng Xiaoping's "24-Character Strategy". *Global Security* [online]. © 2000-2014 [cit. 2014-03-13]. Available from : <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/24-character.htm>

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ HOLLAND, 2012, pg 5

disputed territories between China, Japan and South Korea⁸⁵. This action seemed very rash, as China has so far always progressed calmly in its development ambitions and has now for a long time worked on improving relations with both Japan and South Korea. It is not clear what has made China act so impulsively, and questions were raised whether it is the new leadership under president Xi Jinping, who is definitely more assertive and confident in gaining international respect and more authority for China as a rising global leader⁸⁶. It seems as though Deng is slowly being forgotten and isolation is no longer possible or desired.

2.1.1. Sovereignty, non-intervention and isolation

It has been during the Opium wars in the 19th century when China has been forced to open up its borders to international trade by the British Empire and has since then endured foreign intervention in its country, first by the Western powers, later on during the Japanese occupation. The Opium wars were long considered by the Chinese as the cause for all of China's later troubles and decline. The PRC's nationalistic propaganda also referred to it as the beginning of China's "century of humiliation"⁸⁷. Foreign intervention was ever since then strongly despised and unwelcome based on these historical experiences and it is not surprising it served as a very strong basis in the form of laying emphasis on the principle of sovereignty and non-interference for the creation of the New China's foreign policy and even today, it still plays a significant role in the foreign policy making process. With regards to China's status as a P5 member, sovereignty also plays an immensely significant role on its voting behaviour. It has been one of the core arguments of China on numerous voting decisions within the UNSC, where China vetoed or abstained as it reminded the Council of the internationally agreed upon principle of non-interference into another state's internal affairs. China's respect for sovereignty of other nations does put it into an uncomfortable position from time to time. China has been accused of abusing its P5 status to pursue its national interests, when it has refused to take part in imposing sanctions or issuing condemnation on rogue states (states whose behaviour does not comply with the international norms and are condemned for their behaviour by the international community "*for breaking international law and posing threat*

⁸⁵ Is the China-South Korea Honeymoon Over?. *The Diplomat* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-01-31]. Available from : <http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/is-the-china-south-korea-honeymoon-over/>

⁸⁶ PAAL, Douglas H. Contradictions in China's Foreign Policy. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-03]. Available from : <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/13/contradictions-in-china-s-foreign-policy/gw4w>

⁸⁷ Be careful what you wish for. *The Economist* [online]. 2011 [cit. 2014-02-23]. Available from : <http://www.economist.com/node/21534758>

to the security of other nations”⁸⁸), with which it also had business contracts and claiming it does not wish to disrespect the sovereignty principle. China’s use of the respect-sovereignty appeal is seen from two points of view by Western media. Either China uses it as a pragmatic tool, when its economic interests are under threat, or it uses it on occasions when it feels it can be potentially harmful in laying precedence for the future and China itself might someday be under international scrutiny and face intervention.⁸⁹ Fear of outside intervention has been part of China’s development ever since the first forced opening up of China to foreign powers. As China has evolved however, this fear of intervention has also driven China’s ambition to gain power in order to repel outside intervention in the future. This dismay to foreign intervention is still present. However, with the current quite dominant position of China in the Northeast Asian region and actually even on the entire global stage make it less vulnerable to outside criticism and condemnation. This is most visible when considering China’s poor human rights regime and how the international community is not really capable of doing anything about it.

2.1.2. China and Human Rights-Tibet, Xinjiang and Tiananmen

China is a signatory of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter and many other conventions regarding the issues of equality among all human beings etc. There are numerous articles and papers written about the China-Human Rights nexus and as it is not the main topic of this thesis I will not go into too much detail. However, it is necessary to mention it at least briefly as I believe it will firstly help explain China’s voting behaviour at the UNSC and secondly it will further underline why China is unwilling to let go of the sovereignty principle when it makes its foreign policy. If there is further interest in this topic however, I recommend Ann Kent’s *China, the United Nations and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance* (1999). It is precisely the limits of compliance as the title of the book says that has caused the problems when accusing China of violating human rights or protecting regimes that clearly violate human rights (North Korea serves as a perfect example). China, despite being a signatory and even a co-drafter of various human rights conventions, never fully agreed with the universal aspect of human rights but rather promotes cultural

⁸⁸ Rogue State. In: *Oxford Dictionary* [online]. © 2014 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/rogue-state>

⁸⁹ SOFAR, Ken. China’s Evolving Foreign Policy. *Centre for American Progress* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-04-02]. Available from : <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2012/03/08/11224/china-and-the-collapse-of-its-noninterventionist-foreign-policy/>

relativism into the equation.⁹⁰ Although it is not possible to claim China is as repressive towards its own inhabitants as it has once been (criticising the government is not as harshly punished as it once was and the level of censorship is also slightly lifted), there are still issues that do not fully comply with the universal human rights regime. I am of course speaking of China's stance towards Tibet and Xinjiang, the two autonomous regions of China which receive more attention by the media than China would appreciate. China is accused of "trampling on the freedoms" of Tibetans and Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang⁹¹. International media follow the tensions in these two provinces as news of people setting themselves on fire in protest of government repression in Tibet or news of police brutality against the Uyghur people, whom China blames of religious extremism and separatism, shock the world.⁹² China on the other hand is angered at the predominantly Western efforts to prevent it from doing this as it believes it is primarily China's business what happens on its territory. Secondly, China has been heard to say the West does not fully understand the reality as it does not "*see the real face of the Dalai clique and East Turkestan (Xinjiang, A/N)*"⁹³, and that China's effort to develop and help these parts of its country is difficult and furthermore hampered by the few extremist groups and terrorists, who block China's intentions of bringing prosperity to these provinces.⁹⁴ China has actually been quite aggressive in its reactions towards outside criticism of this issue and the chairman for the ethnic and religious affairs committee Zhu Weiqun has issued a statement, where he disapproves of the way the West has reacted and emphasised that China's development ambitions are not to be threatened: "*What should be developed should be developed, and when stability should be maintained it will be maintained -- (we) must totally disregard whatever the West says.*"⁹⁵

Another sensitive issue that needs to be mentioned in this thesis is the 1989 Tiananmen incident. It is in fact such a taboo issue for the Chinese, that when one attempts to write the words Tiananmen and 1989 online to research what happened, all the potentially

⁹⁰ MOORE, Greg. China's Cautious Participation in the UN Human Rights Regime. *Human Rights and Human Welfare* [online]. 2001 [cit. 2014-04-03]. Available from : <http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/volumes/2001/1-1/kent.pdf>

⁹¹ THOMAS, Natalie. China says it will win West over to its view on Tibet, Xinjiang. *Reuters* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2014-04-03]. Available from : <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/19/us-china-tibet-idUSBREA1I09520140219>

⁹² HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. *Tibet and Xinjiang* [online]. © 2014 [cit. 2014-04-03]. Available from : <https://www.hrw.org/tags/tibet-and-xinjiang>

⁹³ HONGMEI, Li. China has time on its side over Tibet, Xinjiang issues: Zhu Weiqun. *China Economic Net* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2014-04-03]. Available from : http://en.ce.cn/subject/exclusive/201402/19/t20140219_2333915.shtml

⁹⁴ THOMAS, 2014

⁹⁵ HONGMEI, 2014

harmful websites are blocked. Not only does this show censorship in China is still strong regarding certain issues, but it is mainly evidence of how sensitive this particular issue really is. It is specifically during this event that China's non-intervention principle was put most into practice as China put out a statement responding to the outbursts of criticisms, sanctions and condemnation by the international community, which said that "*foreign governments were not qualified to punish China*"⁹⁶. Despite the efforts of the Chinese government to censor the facts of the actual events, evidence of what has happened got under international attention. The response was immediate. Sanctions, bans and condemnations were fired at China from almost all over the world and it strongly affected the so far improving relations with the other international actors and the other powers within the UN. As for China's own foreign policy the Tiananmen incident has had its effect as well. China and the US were on their worst terms since the policy of rapprochement began, the country found itself politically isolated once more and it was since this incident that the modern post-Mao China was once again under stricter scrutiny for human rights violations. China retaliated by increasing anti-American sentiments, by cleansing the government of liberals and by installing a strict political censorship. The CCP has managed to hold its legitimacy and even managed to resist a wider political change after the massacre. The most commonly shared explanation for that is that China offered economic growth and development for political loyalty⁹⁷. In other words, the Chinese people gained some freedoms in return for political "un-freedom". By continuing with its successful economic reforms and the gradual liberalization of the market, China actually managed to break the imposed isolation, as its wealth began attracting outside companies⁹⁸ and in 2001 it was even invited to become a member of the World Trade Organization⁹⁹. Only an arms embargo from the EU is still in place. However, according to SIPRI reports, the interpretation of the embargo has varied and this has caused that some states took different approaches when dealing with China thus carefully bypassing the actual embargo¹⁰⁰. Also China's behaviour at the international arena did not seem to falter as it might have been expected. China did not accept the condemnations. It became if possible even more sensitive about any attacks towards its internal affairs or towards its human rights regime. The Tiananmen incident has undoubtedly changed China. It was unexpected but

⁹⁶ SOFAR, 2012

⁹⁷ Tiananmen Square and Two Chinas: Expert Roundup. *Council on Foreign Relations* [online]. 2009 [cit. 2014-04-03]. Available from : <http://www.cfr.org/china/tiananmen-square-two-chinas/p19544>

⁹⁸ RAMPINI, 2008, pg 110

⁹⁹ Tiananmen Square and Two Chinas, 2009

¹⁰⁰ EU arms embargo on China. *SIPRI* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-04-03]. Available from : http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/china

China managed to stand up due to its economic transformation, which, as China's political leaders realized, also brings along changes within the society and their demands. It is not the purpose of this thesis to find an answer to whether the economic liberation, reinforced by the Tiananmen incident, will one day bring about the collapse of the regime but it is certainly a very interesting issue to look into in further research.

Before I start introducing the aspects of the modern day policy of China, I will look into one last major topic, which has roots in China's history and belongs to the most revered foreign policy principles until this day. I am speaking of the One China policy of course, and as we will see in the next chapter, the topic of territorial integrity is still very much relevant in China's foreign but also domestic policies, its international cooperation and its voting behaviour at the UNSC.

2.1.3. Territorial integrity and the “One China” policy

Recognizing Beijing as the sole representative of the “whole” China (meaning it includes Tibet, Xinjiang but more importantly also Taiwan), which is what the One China policy is simply about, is also considered as the top priority of China's foreign policy objectives. Its insistence on international compliance with this policy has preordained with whom and to what extent China would cooperate in the future. After having replaced Taiwan at the UN, China has been even more adamant than ever before in persuading other states to recognize Beijing as the only legal government of the entire territory of China, which also includes the island of Taiwan. Taiwan, sometimes referred to as Formosa but also known as the Republic of China, has been holding the retreated Chinese Nationalist government since 1949, when the Kuomintang army lost to Mao Zedong during China's civil war and thus lost the rule over mainland.¹⁰¹ Just like mainland PRC, the Republic of China believed in the existence of only one legal representative of the whole territory of China and has itself been very active in promoting this to the outside world. Needless to say, Taiwan received a heavy blow in 1971, the year of its replacement at the UN. The idea of peaceful reunification is still very much present in PRC's rhetoric's, although, after having passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005¹⁰², where it codified its position towards Taiwanese sovereignty, it is not possible to rule out the rule of force nevertheless. It is a very sensitive topic for the PRC and even though

¹⁰¹ NÁLEVKA, Vladimír. *Světová politika ve 20.století, II.* 2. vyd. Praha: Nakladatelství Aleš Skřivan ml., 2000. ISBN 80-86493-16-4.

¹⁰² Taiwan Brief. *Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2014-04-02]. Available from : https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/taiwan/taiwan_brief.html

its relations with Taiwan have improved significantly over the years, mainly through trade contracts, the issue of Taiwan's status as a sovereign state independent of the mainland is a taboo. A good example of how the Taiwanese question can stir up negative sentiments between countries is the Asian Cup event of 2004. Japan and the PRC were to play an important football match against each other. Disregarding the already tense atmosphere between the two countries going back to history (there are still strong anti-Japanese sentiments amongst Chinese who have not forgiven the cruel Japanese occupation in the 1930's¹⁰³), Japan has strongly offended China by issuing information pamphlets to fans going to China for the match, which depicted Taiwan as an independent sovereign state. The reaction of China was twofold. Beijing retorted firmly to the then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, however, its appeal to the angered Chinese fans was to respect the opponents and refrain from any violence or abuse and even went to the length of ordering police force to strengthen the security. Elevating the match into a political struggle, China's political relations with Japan froze once again, showing clearly how sensitive the Taiwanese question still is.¹⁰⁴

As there are more countries that recognize the PRC rather than Taiwan, it has been a struggle for the island to gain meaningful partnerships. Realizing it is fighting a losing battle against the PRC, Taiwan refocused its efforts on creating non-political ties with countries in fields like culture exchanges and predominantly trade. Instead of having embassies abroad, Taiwan is operating through their so-called Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO), which are now situated in over 70 countries¹⁰⁵, including those which do not legally recognize it. There are only 22 countries which officially recognize the Republic of China instead of the PRC and those are: “*Sao Tome and Principe, Burkina Faso, Swaziland, Dominican Republic, Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Solomon Islands, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia and Tuvalu*”¹⁰⁶. As we can see from the list, the countries included are not considered as major powers of the international system. However,

¹⁰³ The Sino-Japanese war. *The Economist* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-02]. Available from : <http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21579797-how-struggle-against-japans-brutal-occupation-shaped-modern-china-start-history>

¹⁰⁴ RAMPINI, 2008

¹⁰⁵ Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Prague. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* [online]. © 2012 [cit. 2014-04-02]. Available from : <http://www.roc-taiwan.org/cz/ct.asp?xItem=1454&CtNode=1121&mp=147&xp1=>

¹⁰⁶ Taiwan Brief. *Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014*

the PRC still attempts to gain their diplomatic recognition as well, mainly by offering trade incentives, something most of the concerned countries may find hard to resist in the future¹⁰⁷.

2.2. Modern day foreign policy

The section above identified the most important and most highly revered objectives of today's Chinese foreign policy making, which have their roots in distant history. I have explained China's position towards the sovereignty principle, its stance towards the question of non-interference into other state's internal affairs (including its relation to human rights) and the sensitive issue of territorial integrity, principles present continuously as a central message in any official statements regarding China's goals or interactions on an international level. Even though there have been occasions when China slightly loosened its stance towards these objectives as we will see later in the chapter of China's voting behaviour these principles have had their share of influence on the more to date approach to the world affairs. The foreign policy of China today has been indeed described as contradictory, as inconsistent, lacking integrated grand plan and still very much self-centred.¹⁰⁸ The inconsistency of the foreign policy can be probably assigned to China's dilemma on how to build its image since it has now achieved the status of a great power. I believe China is hoping for international prestige and perhaps even more dominance, despite its claims it does not seek hegemony, but the question is whether it is ready or in fact even willing to take on the responsibilities of a great power. China is still considered a developing country and as we have seen there are issues that are considered as taboo. The Diplomat magazine has addressed this new age of China's approach to foreign affairs and it nicely summarizes the potential outlook of China's foreign policy: *"we can expect to see Chinese foreign policy verge from being at times assertive and proactive; to in other situations being ambiguous and non-confrontational."*¹⁰⁹ I suppose it is safest to claim, that China's foreign policy of today is very much influenced by its national interests and predominantly by its economic interests, which does not entirely negate the official documents claiming China will strive for achieving a harmonious world, maintaining world peace and supporting the developing countries, however, it does give it a more pragmatic rather than slogan-like undertone.

¹⁰⁷ CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES. *The Gambia defecting from Taiwan – Misunderstanding the "One China" policy?* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2.4.2014]. Available from : http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CCS_Commentary_One_China_Gambia_YK.pdf

¹⁰⁸ HOLLAND, 2012

¹⁰⁹ BRADY, Anne-Marie. Chinese Foreign Policy: A New Era Dawns. *The Diplomat* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2014-04-02]. Available from : <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/chinese-foreign-policy-a-new-era-dawns/>

In this part which explores the modern-day foreign policy of China, I will examine the new principles that have joined the historical ones and also influence China's voting behaviour. I will look into how the economic success allowed China to be in the position it is in today and the constant economic drive which further affects China in its decision making processes. I will also focus on its switch to regarding multilateralism as a strategic form of cooperation and the never failing continuance of promoting China's peaceful intentions and wish for a "harmonious world"¹¹⁰ for example by supporting the Third World, to which China has long ago pledged to be its voice at the international platform.¹¹¹

2.2.1 Foreign policy of Peace and the Economic Drive

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC issued a brief on China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace in 2003, where it once again outlined the fundamental goals: *"preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favourable international environment for China's reform and opening up and modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common development."*¹¹² If we compare this statement to the list of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, we can see China's tone has not changed much since the 1950's and even today with the officially published concepts of a "Peaceful rise" and a "Harmonious world" it is most probable China's style of wording will not change much in the near future. The only significant change in the context between the two policies issued over 50 years apart from each other is in China's effort to achieve modernization by opening up to the outside world. Another significant shift in this more recent policy is in China's intensified focus on supporting the rest of the developing world, rather than solely focus on itself and by that gain an image of a responsible actor in the international community. To become a responsible actor, China first had to start developing good relations with the outside world and even became proactive in the previously mistrusted UN peacekeeping missions. Its emphasis on friendly neighbourly relations and meaningful partnerships has not only made it seem as a benign power but also served it in preventing external threats from neighbouring countries that could ignite conflicts inside China itself. To

¹¹⁰ CSIS. *China Balance Sheet* [online]. ©2014 [cit. 2014-02-23]. Available from : <https://csis.org/program/china-balance-sheet>

¹¹¹ WUTHROW, Joel. *Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-06]. ISBN 978-0-415-64073-2. Available from : http://books.google.cz/books?id=BxzLILhccTkC&pg=PA220&lpg=PA220&dq=china+and+yom+kippur+veto&source=bl&ots=afWpo0Yk9Z&sig=y8vfZfolGHY4gjcLoTj8JraxMfA&hl=cs&sa=X&ei=XIJAU97UG6_n4QS8r4HQDA&ved=0CF0Q6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=china%20and%20yom%20kippur%20veto&f=false

¹¹² China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China* [online]. 2003 [cit. 2014-04-02]. Available from : <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.shtml>

achieve this goal, China presented a three point approach where it promoted the idea of “*setting aside areas of disagreement with neighbouring states; focusing on confidence-building measures to promote ties; and engaging in economic integration and multilateral cooperation to address shared concerns.*”¹¹³

Economy has been the main driver of China’s international interactions but it also shaped the domestic political situation. With the collapse of the Soviet block and the gradual easing of the rigid communist or more precisely Maoist ideology, which China endured until Deng’s reforms and which have brought aspects of capitalism into the country, the legitimacy of the single ruling CCP came under question, more pronounced as we have already seen during the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989. According to studies published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies the regime in China faced a major challenge. It is not a surprise it became an important goal of the regime to ensure its own security. The goals of enhancing national prosperity, the unification of the country and the boost of prestige¹¹⁴, can be considered as very useful tools used by the CCP to preserve its position in power with as little protests from the general public as possible. It was principally the non-interference objective of China’s foreign policy which had helped it “keep its head low” on the global stage and focus on internal growth of its economy but also its military and it is also this low profile that has enabled the country to create relations with all kinds of regimes throughout the world and gain their economic partnerships. From another point of view, China’s late economic expansionism and its desperate search for natural resources have pulled China into relations with very unstable regimes, which are often under the radar of the international community.

2.2.2. China and multilateralism

Multilateralism in regional and international affairs has become another important aspect in China’s new style of foreign policy making. According to a number of scholars, whose papers are combined and published under a common title *China Turns to Multilateralism (2008)*, China’s approach to multilateralism has more layers, depending on the presence of China’s powers in the different geographic regions and also the policy issue areas. What that means is that China is more than active in promoting multilateralism in its own region, going even beyond simple economic multilateral cooperation and playing a key

¹¹³ CSIS. *China Balance Sheet* ©2014

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

part even in multilateral partnerships concerning the field of security. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is perhaps the best possible example of this fact. The SCO is an intergovernmental organization established in 2001. The members are China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and the main purpose of this organization is to build confidence and cooperation in the border areas, which basically means a sort of military cooperation.¹¹⁵ These countries are in close vicinity to China and are also strategically important for their large natural reserves.¹¹⁶ This tighter form of multilateralism is assigned only to the so-called “core region” of China.

Another good example of China’s core-region multilateral approach is the Six Party Talks group. This particular example shows how China raises its activity, when something concerns it directly. The Six Party Talks was initiated by China itself in an effort to resolve the Korean Peninsula situation (the instability of which threatens China as well given it shares borders with the rogue regime of North Korea and has many business deals with it) through peaceful dialogue and cooperation¹¹⁷. A less institutionalised form of multilateralism describes the second layer. It encompasses the larger region, further areas to be precise, and functions more on the basis of economic cooperation, which is not as hard to achieve. ASEAN+3 is a good example of such multilateralism. What is more important for the purpose of this thesis however, is China’s global multilateralism approach. China has been calling for multilateral negotiations when solving crisis situations and claiming multilateralism is the best feature of the United Nations, which China fully approves of as international crisis situations should be dealt with through means of peaceful multilateral dialogue rather than any form of intervention (military or economic in the form of sanctions), however, its diplomacy of multilateralism may seem more symbolic rather than substantial on certain occasions.¹¹⁸ A nice sum up of the multiplicity of China’s multilateralism approaches claims that:” *Chinese multilateralism is, therefore, a foreign policy with multiple levels of seriousness, commitment, and involvements of the Central Kingdom to the international coordination of national*

¹¹⁵ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Global Security.org* [online]. ©2000-2014 [cit. 2014-04-03]. Available from : <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/sco.htm>

¹¹⁶ WOUTERS, Jan a Sijbren de JONG. LUEVEN. *CENTRAL ASIA AND THE EU’S DRIVE TOWARDS ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION* [online]. 2011 [cit. 24.3.2014]. Available from : http://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp61-70/wp64.pdf

¹¹⁷ The Six-Party Talks at a Glance. ACA [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-01-30]. Available from : <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks>

¹¹⁸ WU, Guoguang a Helen LANSLOWNE. *China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign policy and regional security*. New York: Routledge, 2008. ISBN 0-203-94632-4. Available from : <https://am4wuhz3zifexz5u.onion.to/Library/English/China/China%20turns%20to%20multilateralism.pdf>

conduct.”¹¹⁹ What this statement claims is that China’s approach to multilateralism is inconsistent. It applies it where it sees benefits from it and disregards it, when it sees a potential threat or when it is not worth it. China has previously been more of a unilateral or bilateral fan. Its “turn” to multilateralism was therefore seen as a major change of its foreign policy, attributed mainly to “foreign policy learning”¹²⁰, in other words, China realized the benefits of multilateralism through past experience.

To conclude this part we can see that China’s foreign policy has come a long way. From an underdeveloped country with an ideologically constricted foreign policy which forced the nation into a self imposed isolation, to a country with a booming economy and rising patriotism whose foreign policy is more open to international cooperation in the form of multilateralism and whose newly gained self-confidence has influenced its international position, where it is becoming more proactive in achieving its ambitions, even taking on the role of a sort of “patron” to developing countries. China even started to focus its attention to building itself as a soft power, something unimaginable in the not so distant past. Through establishing the so-called Confucius institutes all over the world, it has been working on improving its image on the outside by introducing its beautiful culture and presenting the positive face of China.¹²¹ It has also had its effect on the Chinese however, both those living in China and those living in diasporas abroad. The newly revitalised patriotism and pride about being Chinese is quite visible these days and no doubt influences the perception of China as a great power.

The next half of my thesis will focus on China’s behaviour at the UN platform and later on the correlation between the foreign policy and the voting patterns. In the following pages I will therefore look into the specific cases of China’s vetoes and hidden vetoes, analyzing the main reasons that have led China to block an UNSC action, attempting to explain how the veto power has been used or abused by China and how it has influenced its image and status as a global power. The question I will also try to answer throughout the remaining pages of this thesis is whether sometimes China’s strong and rigid normative framework which is often ascribed to its foreign policy making along with its slogan-like and not very specific objectives does not sometimes collide with its interests and whether it is not in fact contradictory on occasions.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pg 267

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pg 282

¹²¹ *Hanban: Confucius Institutes Headquarters* [online]. ©2014 [cit. 2012-05-24]. Available from : <http://english.hanban.org/>

3. China's involvement at the UNSC, its vetoes and hidden vetoes

Over the last 43 years, the time in which China has been active as a permanent member of the UNSC, the PRC has cast a negative vote very rarely. What was rather more attributed to China's voting behaviour was abstention. This form of voting behaviour has in fact become so common in connection to China it has resulted in labelling China as "Mr. Abstention" in the media¹²². Abstention, to recapitulate, does not affect the outcome of the voting at the UNSC, unless more than the simple majority decides to abstain. It merely shows the unwillingness of the concerned state to sign up under a certain resolution, with which they do not agree, but not to the extent when they would regard the use of veto as necessary and block the resolution entirely. In the following pages I will be exploring China's voting behaviour at the UNSC and most importantly China's use of the veto power.

China's perception of the UN, collective security and multilateralism has changed over the decades, since China entered the international arena as a new global power. Despite China not being in comparison to the other P5 members an entirely proactive member, the importance of its presence and influence at the UNSC along with the importance of its perception of the Council in return is hard to disregard. As Susan Tieh, author of *China in the United Nations: United with Other Nations? (2004)* has written, it is useful to examine the relation of China and the UN, as China's attitude towards the UN can have significant influence on the potential actions of the UN (given China wields the veto power). This is of course applicable to all the P5 members. In other words, if China or any other P5 member for that matter does not see the UNSC as a meaningful platform for international cooperation in matters of international security, which is necessary for maintaining peace and stability, there is no sense in preserving the Council for any other reason than to use it as a tool for protecting the various national interests. Whether China truly believes in the purpose of the Council or sees its involvement at the international platform as a necessary precaution and a strategic partnership can be explored through its voting behaviour.

¹²² HUANG, Cary. For Beijing, it's no more Mr Abstention. *South China Morning Post* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-04-03]. Available from : <http://www.scmp.com/article/993890/beijing-its-no-more-mr-abstention>

3. 1. China's Vetoes

China's vetoes and hidden vetoes can indicate the correlation between China's foreign policy and voting behaviour most determinately. As I have presented in the first part of this thesis explaining the veto player theory according to Tsebelis "*no rational player given the choice would accept any outcome that he does not prefer over the status quo*"¹²³. If I apply this rational to the topic of this thesis we could say that interference into situations concerning sensitive issues through UNSC resolutions will be prevented by the concerned state through a negative vote. Analyzing China's use of vetoes should therefore indicate what issues are against China's interests as presented in its foreign policy. Having used official records of the Security Council's meetings, where China has voted negatively, I will now present China's reasoning behind each veto based on the subject of the voting.

3.1.1. New member to the UN

China's very first veto after its admission to the UN was against a draft resolution presented by India, UK, USSR, and Yugoslavia in 1972.¹²⁴ The purpose of the resolution was to recommend to the General Assembly to admit the People's Republic of Bangladesh as a new member of the UN. The veto had its origins in the Indo-Pakistani war, where China supported Pakistan and the USSR supported India. India's victory brought about the civil war between East and West Pakistan and consequently also the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 (former East Pakistan).¹²⁵ With the recommendation of accepting this new independent state into the UN, China was put under a dilemma. Pakistan has requested China to veto the admittance as a sign of support to Pakistan, China's long-term ally. However, China as a new member at the UN has apparently not been entirely certain about casting a veto at first, since the majority of the UNSC members agreed with the admittance and China would have acted as a sole veto caster. According to a news paper article from a Ludington Daily News issue from 1972, China has attempted to stall any action by accusing Bangladesh of violating two UN resolutions, which called for the return of all prisoners of war and the removal of foreign troops from Bangladeshi territory. After having failed in stopping the vote, China's

¹²³ TSEBELIS, 2011, pg 19

¹²⁴ Admission of new Members [Bangladesh]. *UNSC Veto list* [online]. 1972 [cit. 2014-04-05]. Available from : http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/10771

¹²⁵ India-Pakistan: 1971 war. *BBC News* [online]. ©2005 [cit. 2014-04-09]. Available from : http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1971.stm

Ambassador to the UN Huang Hua has cast China's first veto.¹²⁶ In the official statement which followed the veto China claimed that the continued occupation of Bangladeshi territory by Indian troops deems the admittance of Bangladesh to the UN as *legally untenable* and that is why it voted "no".¹²⁷ It was only 2 years later and after a tripartite treaty between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1974¹²⁸ that China stopped opposing the potential admittance of Bangladesh as a new UN member and Bangladesh finally received its membership the very same year. China has not acknowledged the new state until 1975, when it also created diplomatic ties with the new country.¹²⁹

3.1.2. Peacekeeping missions

China has been known to abstain during votes on establishing peacekeeping missions. Its distrust towards these missions, which it has seen as forms of western imperialism into the Third World, has however resulted only in two vetoes, both linked to the Taiwan question. After a long pause between casting vetoes since the 1970's, China has once again said "no" as a sole veto wielder to a draft resolution issued in 1997 which had the purpose of gaining authorization "*for 155 observers for the purposes of verification of the agreement on the definite ceasefire in Guatemala*"¹³⁰. The aim of this resolution was in other words to send additional peacekeepers to assist during the Guatemalan peace process as a result of the long-lasting civil war which Guatemala has endured since the 1960's until the late 1990's¹³¹. China's reasoning of its veto in this case has been straightforward. Due to Guatemala's diplomatic ties with Taiwan, China refused to support the extension of peacekeeping missions of the UN stating: "*Guatemala cannot expect on the one hand to do something that harms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China while on the other hand requesting China to*

¹²⁶ NEWSOM, Phil. *Why China Vetoed Bangladesh Entry into United Nations* [online]. Ludington Daily News, 1972 [cit. 9.4.2014]. Available from : <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=110&dat=19720901&id=p49aAAAAIBAJ&sjid=LEoDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6814,5115194>

¹²⁷ WUTHROW, 2013. Pg 48

¹²⁸ Simla Agreement: Tripartite Agreement Between India, Bangladesh And Pakistan For Normalisation Of Relations In The Sub-Continent. *Virtual Bangladesh* [online]. ©2014 [cit. 2014-04-07]. Available from : <http://www.virtualbangladesh.com/history/tri.html>

¹²⁹ ANEJA, Urvashi. China-Bangladesh Relations: An Emerging Strategic Partnership?. *Institute of Peace and Conflict studies* [online]. India, 2006 [cit. 2014-04-06]. Available from : http://www.fairbd.net/Files/1635130748IPCS_Special_Report_33.pdf

¹³⁰ Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes. *Global Foreign Policy* [online]. © 2005 - 2014 [cit. 2014-04-09]. Available from : <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/40069.html>

¹³¹ Guatemala profile. *BBC Timeline* [online]. © 2014 [cit. 2014-04-09]. Available from : <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19636725>

cooperate in peacekeeping.¹³² Based on the Chinese government's official statements, China believed it was "Guatemala's own fault" that China had to vote this way, as China had no objections to the contents of the resolution and would be willing to reconsider the voting if Guatemala were to reconsider its relations with Taiwan.¹³³ Guatemala is until this day recognizing the legality of Taiwan instead of the PRC. However, China has withdrawn its veto on the peacekeeping missions in Guatemala after it has received assurance Guatemala would not vote on the admission of Taiwan to the UN in the future¹³⁴.

China continued with its quest to undermine Taiwan's foreign relations as it cast yet another veto blocking an extension to a peacekeeping mission this time in Macedonia in the form of the United Nations Preventive deployment Force (UNPREDEP) mandate in 1999¹³⁵. The UNPREDEP's purpose was to monitor and report about the development of the situation in border areas with the potential of undermining peace and stability of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.¹³⁶ The veto was a response to Macedonia's establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, only a month prior to the voting at the UNSC. It was a decision made by the winning Democratic Alternative party (DA), whose election campaign included the promise of large foreign investments coming from Taiwan if the party won. The DA did succeed in the January 1999 elections and the new Prime Minister recognized Taiwan.¹³⁷ Unsurprisingly China immediately broke its ties with Macedonia and in February 1999 China decided to block the UNSC resolution, claiming however, that the reason behind the veto was because China did not see the necessity of spending more money on the already relatively stable Macedonia, when there are other countries in greater need of assistance¹³⁸. It has been a blow to the Council as the Macedonian preventive peacekeeping mission was considered successful. The Macedonian government itself criticised China's decision to use its territory disputes as a reason to block UN action and claimed the government had every right to establish ties with whomever it wanted. Nevertheless China felt affronted by

¹³² ROY, Denny. *China's Foreign Relations*. Rowman & Littlefield, 1998 [cit. 9.4.2014]. ISBN 0-8476-9013-X.

¹³³ TYLER, Patrick. China Asserts Taiwan's Ties To Guatemala Led to Veto. *New York Times: Archives* [online]. 1997 [cit. 2014-04-09]. Available from : <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/12/world/china-asserts-taiwan-s-ties-to-guatemala-led-to-veto.html>

¹³⁴ KOCHLER, 2012. Pg 24

¹³⁵ The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. *UNSC Veto List* [online]. 1999 [cit. 2014-04-05]. Available from : http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/201

¹³⁶ UNPREDEP. *UN: Completed Peacekeeping Missions* [online]. ©2000 [cit. 2014-04-09]. Available from : <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unpredep.htm>

¹³⁷ CASELLA, Alexander. Macedonia: Taiwan's lost gambit. In: *Asia Times Online* [online]. 2001 [cit. 2014-04-09]. Available from : <http://www.atimes.com/china/CG11Ad02.html>

¹³⁸ The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. *UNSC Veto List* [online]. 1999

Macedonia's sudden alliance with Taiwan and dismissed the concerns about the possibility of spill-over from the conflict in Kosovo.¹³⁹ China has once again used its veto power as a weapon in its diplomatic "war" with Taiwan.

3.1.3. Intervention and sanctions

In 2007 China cast its fifth veto, blocking a draft resolution regarding the situation in Myanmar. The resolution sponsored by the US and UK appealed to the government of Myanmar to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, end human rights abuses and take concrete steps for a peaceful democratic transition of the country.¹⁴⁰ The resolution did not pass as it was vetoed not only by China from but also the Russian Federation. The Chinese Ambassador to the UN at the time Mr. Wang gave a long speech at the Council before the vote was taken. He stated that China's main reason for disapproving of the resolution was that "*the Myanmar issue is mainly the internal affair of a sovereign State. The current domestic situation in Myanmar does not constitute a threat to international or regional peace and security.*"¹⁴¹ Mr. Wang emphasised the important role of ASEAN, which was invested in resolving the grave situation in Myanmar and gave numerous recommendations to the country as guidelines for improvement. Given that all immediate neighbours to Myanmar are members of ASEAN, China believed their opinion should be considered as an important criterion for the Council's decisions. Since the ASEAN members claimed they do not believe the situation in Myanmar is in anyway threatening to cross borders, China was satisfied to remind the Council that its primary purpose was to maintain world peace and security and not interfere with political situations within specific countries, which would exceed the mandate of the UNSC and potentially hamper the ongoing diplomatic efforts of the UN. Mr. Wang even warned the Council of the possible outcomes of its external interference, which if resulting in an increased turbulence would primarily affect innocent civilians.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ WINFIELD, Nicole. China Vetoes Macedonia peacekeepers extension. In: *Herald Journal* [online]. 1999 [cit. 2014-04-09]. Available from : <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1876&dat=19990226&id=nkQfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=yM8EAAAAIBAJ&pg=5908,6847404>

¹⁴⁰ Myanmar. *UNSC Veto List* [online]. 2007 [cit. 2014-04-05]. Available from : http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/14

¹⁴¹ China and Russia veto US/UK-backed Security Council draft resolution on Myanmar. In: *UN News Center* [online]. 2007 [cit. 2014-04-10]. Available from : <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21228#.U0aBB1fm7eN>

¹⁴² The Situation in Myanmar: Speeches. *UNSC Veto List* [online]. 2007 [cit. 2014-04-10]. Available from : http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.5619

On another occasion in 2008, the Security Council voted on a resolution which was supposed to impose sanctions against the regime of Robert Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe who, after having won elections led a “campaign of terror” against his opposition resulting in massive human rights violations.¹⁴³ The 2008 resolution demanded that the Zimbabwean Government ceased the attacks against its civilians, opened peaceful political dialogue with the opposition and removed restrictions against international humanitarian organizations. More importantly, the Council decided to launch strict sanctions against the rogue state.¹⁴⁴ However, a double veto exercised by China and Russia blocked the resolution. China’s official justification of the veto was set against two considerations. Firstly, China claimed it respected the expressed wishes to “not veto” by the regional organizations in Africa (African Union, SADC but also the neighbouring states of Zimbabwe), whose opinion on the matter of Zimbabwe China considered as substantial, given their direct regional ties.¹⁴⁵ Secondly, China claimed it vetoed because China wished to “*create a better environment for Zimbabwe internationally and domestically and could not imagine that without the veto, the inclusive government of Zimbabwe would have been established.*”¹⁴⁶ In other words, China did not believe the sanctions would improve the situation and help the country in any way. On the contrary, China’s distrust towards the effects of sanctions has been expressed on previous occasions, e.g. when China diluted sanctions imposed against the North Korean regime¹⁴⁷ or against Iran¹⁴⁸. China’s greatest concern when it comes to sanctions is that these constraints negatively influence civilians and not only the targeted regime. Furthermore, according to China sanctions may lead to increased retaliatory actions. Its reluctance to criticise the violation of human rights as one of the reasons for China’s veto has also been put forward by the media, claiming China more and more often disagrees with international condemnations

¹⁴³ Crisis in Zimbabwe. *International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect* [online]. ©2009 [cit. 2014-04-12]. Available from : <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-zimbabwe>

¹⁴⁴ Peace and security in Africa: Zimbabwe. *UNSC Veto list* [online]. 2008 [cit. 2014-04-12]. Available from : http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.5933

¹⁴⁵ Peace and Security - Africa (Zimbabwe). *UNSC Veto List* [online]. 2008 [cit. 2014-04-05]. Available from : http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/447

¹⁴⁶ China justifies veto of Zimbabwe sanctions. *Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa* [online]. 2009 [cit. 2014-04-12]. Available from : <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zfgx/t569372.htm>

¹⁴⁷ DYER, Geoff. US and China agree on N Korea sanctions. In: *FT* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-12]. Available from : <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/03c01ca8-85ae-11e2-9ee3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2yfH0SGII>

¹⁴⁸ DOWES, Erica a Suzanne MALONEY. Getting China to Sanction Iran: The Chinese-Iranian Oil Connection. In: *Foreign Affairs* [online]. 2011 [cit. 2014-04-12]. Available from : <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67465/erica-downs-and-suzanne-maloney/getting-china-to-sanction-iran>

of human rights violations in countries with which it trades.¹⁴⁹ However, officially China emphasised the threats of outside interference in the form of sanctions and the belief in importance of regional influence and assistance rather than international interference in the form of the UNSC as the most valid reasons for casting a veto.

China's vetoes against resolutions concerning the crisis in Syria are the most recent and have sparked discussions about the abuse of the veto power and the lost reliability of the whole UN organization afresh. In 2011 and twice in 2012 Russia and China cast triple joint vetoes against resolutions aimed at the regime of the Syrian president Bashar al Assad.¹⁵⁰ The three resolutions were not too different from each other and neither were the official statements of the opposing countries as to why they have cast the veto. In all three Council speeches, the Chinese ambassador to the UN Mr. Li Baodong, mentioned China's dismay towards the Council's disrespect of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the proposed sanctions and the inclinations of the potential use of military intervention to Syria hidden within the resolution were considered as a great threat to the stability of the country.¹⁵¹ It was especially this veto concerning the Syrian crisis that has cast a very negative light on China's behaviour at the UN and more generally speaking on China as a responsible global actor. China has faced numerous accusations following the vetoes, the most serious being that China along with Russia is "responsible for Syrian genocide".¹⁵² Nevertheless China stands behind its decision that foreign intervention into the Syrian crisis is not the right way to go and China's president Mr. Xi Jinping was heard to say that the "*political solution is the only right way out for the Syrian crisis and a military strike cannot solve the problem from the root.*"¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ MACFARQUHAR, Neil. 2 Vetoes Quash U.N. Sanctions on Zimbabwe. *New York Times: Africa* [online]. 2008 [cit. 2014-04-12]. Available from :

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/world/africa/12zimbabwe.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

¹⁵⁰ Middle East situation - Syria. *UNSC Veto List* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-04-05]. Available from :

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/77

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Russia, China 'responsible for Syria's genocide'. In: *Stuff.co.nz* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2014-04-12]. Available from : <http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/middle-east/6371166/Russia-China-responsible-for-Syrias-genocide>

¹⁵³ BEECH, Hannah. China's View on Syria Crisis: America's "Hidden Motivations" Are Leading It Astray. *Time* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-12]. Available from : <http://world.time.com/2013/09/13/chinas-view-on-syria-crisis-americas-hidden-motivations-are-leading-it-astray/>

3.1.4. Condemnation of aggression, amendment

Only a few months after casting its very first veto in 1972, China decided to cast a negative vote during a Council meeting dealing with a Middle East crisis. This veto however, is not very well documented and there is differentiating information as to what the veto concerned exactly. According to an official Security Council report very briefly mentioning a veto of September 1972, China together with the USSR blocked a draft regarding terrorist attacks against Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics and calling for ceasefire in the Middle East, which followed the massacre as a retaliatory action from Israel.¹⁵⁴ Based on information presented by Joel Wuthrow an Asian analyst from the China Security Affairs Group, this particular veto was only against an amendment presented by France, UK, Belgium and Italy to a draft resolution sponsored by a few countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. The amendment was supposed to change the wording and thus dilute the resolution which condemned Israel for its aggressions towards Syria and Lebanon and called for an immediate ceasefire in the Middle East. According to Wuthrow, China's veto on the amendment was based on the fact that it "*failed to condemn Israeli Zionism for its aggressive acts against Syria and Lebanon*"¹⁵⁵. A veto against an amendment rather than a full draft resolution explains why there is little information about it even on the official pages of the UNSC. China's involvement in the topic of the Middle East has never been too active and this veto even though it concerns only amendments, can be considered quite unusual for China who has since then rather consistently abstained or not participated during votes concerning the Israeli/Arab conflicts.¹⁵⁶

3.2. China and its hidden vetoes

I have now introduced all China's official vetoes cast since its admission to the UNSC until this day and in this next section I will introduce cases of the infamous hidden veto threats. As I have said at the very beginning of this paper, the task of collecting data concerning this subject is a little complicated. Nevertheless, some cases of use of this form of the negative vote have come to surface. With the decrease of the number of official vetoes

¹⁵⁴ Special Research Report No. 4: The Middle East 1947-2007: Sixty Years of Security Council Engagement on the Israel/Palestine Question. In: *Security Council Report* [online]. 2007 [cit. 2014-04-13]. Available from : <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-3748287.php#councilsrole>

¹⁵⁵ WUTHROW, 2013. Pg 18

¹⁵⁶ Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes. In: *Global Policy Forum* [online]. © 2005 - 2014 [cit. 2014-04-13]. Available from : <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/40069.html>

cast, one can only guess how many pocket vetoes have been used instead. According to Sahar Okhovat and his research on the veto power and the reform of the UNSC, the PRC and Russia have both been “*relying on pocket veto more than other permanent members.*”¹⁵⁷ I will not attempt to find out whether these two P5 members have indeed used the hidden veto more often than the others. However, this statement does indicate and furthermore even influence how China along with Russia may be perceived at the UNSC. If we add this to the accusations following the Syrian vetoes, we can assume the image of the two countries is rather negative especially in the western part of the hemisphere. Speaking only of China now, the use of hidden vetoes can be seen as a very strategic opportunity. Wuthrow explains why China is seen as a threat by Washington, London and “others in the international community” (meaning again predominantly the western hemisphere). He states the western powers are worried that China through its position as a veto wielder and its tendency to cooperate with rogue states will “*seek to protect its interests by preventing the international community from exerting pressure on rogue regimes.*”¹⁵⁸ As we have seen in the previous chapter, China does want to build a positive image of a respectable global power by constantly promoting peace, stability, multilateralism and also by developing its soft power skills. The hidden veto can therefore be the perfect tool to maintain this projected image and yet still protect national interests by deterrence and coercive purposes without actually casting a veto publically.¹⁵⁹ In the following pages we will see how China has used the veto power “off the record”.

3.2.1. North Korea's ally

I will start with the most obvious and most medialized partnership, which has indeed put China in a negative spotlight and that is China's partnership with the North Korean regime. China is known for having bilateral ties with regimes which are considered as rogue and its continual alliance and trusteeship of North Korea certainly brought about a lot of the international criticism. China has been North Korea's long term ally. It has supported it militarily since the beginning of the Korean war in 1950 and has since then been a sort of protector of the very isolated North Korean regime on the international platform.¹⁶⁰ With the endless provocations from the regime, gradating since the first nuclear test in 2006 however, China's patience is possibly running thin as it has agreed to stricter sanctions and issued

¹⁵⁷ OKHOVAT, 2011. Pg 16

¹⁵⁸ WUTHROW, 2013. Pg 1

¹⁵⁹ BLÄTTER, 2010. Pg 5

¹⁶⁰ BAJORIA, Jayshree a Beina XU. The China-North Korea Relationship. *The Council on Foreign Relations* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-01-26]. Available from : <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097#p2>

warnings to the regime that it will not tolerate “chaos on its doorstep.”¹⁶¹ It has been reported that China has used its veto power in the past to influence the Council’s activities on a number of occasions in the form of dilution of a strict response against the North Korean regime¹⁶², which implies the use of a threat to veto. However, China has not blocked all the resolutions condemning the regime and imposing various embargoes on the regime entirely.¹⁶³ This decision sends North Korea a message that despite China’s opposition to the use of sanctions and military intervention, holding nuclear tests and issuing military threats to South Korea, Japan and the US cannot be tolerated even by China. I should also note however, that although China stated it supports the Council’s decision on implementing an embargo on North Korea, there have been reports that China does not fully comply with them, especially in the luxury goods trade.¹⁶⁴ A very recent report claims that China has yet again shown its intention to cast a veto on a resolution, which was intended to “*prosecute the leadership in Pyongyang responsible for rights abuses in the North.*”¹⁶⁵ China said the international community should rather focus on diffusing the tensions on the peninsula rather than politicise human rights issues.¹⁶⁶

3.2.2. Selling the veto power

Following with the topic of protecting pariah states with which China maintains economic partnerships, we can also look at the cases when China blocked the UNSC from taking on action against Sudan in 2007 or against Iran in 2009. China’s big weakness is its shortage of natural resources. As this huge developing country grows even more, the search for resources has reached a level of national security priority and has led China to focus on building ties with numerous countries all over the world.¹⁶⁷ The connection between the PRC and some of these resource rich states has sometimes been contested as for instance in the

¹⁶¹ China warns North Korea, blames Japan for tension. *Reuters* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/22/us-china-korea-north-idUSBRE9AL0II20131122>

¹⁶² GOODENOUGH, Patrick. North Korea's Allies Resist Action in Security Council. *Global Policy Forum* [online]. 2006 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/202/42423.html>

¹⁶³ BAJORIA, 2013

¹⁶⁴ WUTHROW, Joel. Can China Get Tough on North Korea?. *The Diplomat* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : <http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/can-china-get-tough-on-north-korea/>

¹⁶⁵ China shows intent to veto North Korean rights report at Security Council. *Arirang News* [online]. 2014 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=159407

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ FRIEDBERG, Aaron. "Going Out": China’s Pursuit of Natural Resources and Implications for the PRC’s Grand Strategy. In: [online]. 2006 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : <http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=224>

cases of Sudan (China imports large quantities of Sudanese oil¹⁶⁸) and Iran (China has access to Iran's large oil and gas reserves¹⁶⁹). In 2007, the Council wanted to impose sanctions against Sudan for atrocities happening in Darfur and in 2009 the Council wished to curb Iran's nuclear programme through increased sanctions. Stating officially that China "*always believed sanctions and pressure are not the way out*"¹⁷⁰, the Council was forewarned China was considering vetoing the resolutions and the motions did not pass. However, following these "haggles", China did not resume its veto threats against resolutions aimed once again at these countries as the following resolutions have passed. In 2010 for example China signed under a financial sanction package aimed at Iran, who continued to develop its nuclear programme despite the warnings. Nevertheless it has been reported that China did so only after many incentives and assurances. Regarding Sudan, China has also abandoned its full protection of the state as it has urged Sudan to accept an UN-African Union mission to implement the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.¹⁷¹ It is often questioned why China sides along these pariah states and protects them by using its P5 status. Wuthrow explains it by giving three reasons as to why China cast or threatened with vetoes protecting these rogue regimes: North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Syria.

- a) North Korea and Myanmar are geographically neighbours to China and any instability potentially caused by outside pressure may lead to massive influxes of refugees.
- b) China is dependent on energy supplies from Iran and Sudan and any aggressive action from the UNSC e. g. in the form of a military intervention may cut the necessary supplies.
- c) China supports Russian led vetoes as for example with Syria and Zimbabwe in exchange for support on issues sensitive to China such as North Korea.¹⁷²

3.2.3. Violating Human Rights Condemnation

Another case of China's use of the hidden veto is against a proposed resolution denouncing human rights abuses and recommending investigation into the situation following

¹⁶⁸ NAVARRO, Peter. China's veto just part of business. *Asia Times Online* [online]. 2008 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/JG15Cb01.html

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ JACOBS, Andrew. China Opposes Iran Sanctions Sought by U.S. *New York Times* [online]. 2009 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/25/world/asia/25beijing.html?_r=0

¹⁷¹ FULLILOVE, Michael. China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum. *Washington Quarterly* [online]. 2011 [cit. 2014-03-13]. Available from : http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Fullilove,_China_and_the_United_Nations.pdf

¹⁷² WUTHROW, Beyond the Veto, 2013. Pg 70-71

the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009.¹⁷³ The UNSC has discussed the possibility of imposing sanctions and involving the International Criminal Court in the matter as a response to the Sri Lankan government's brutal attacks on the Tamil minority¹⁷⁴, whose rights have been violated since the 1983, the beginning of the civil war.¹⁷⁵ China alongside with Russia, close allies of Sri Lanka, stated they did not approve of the Secretary General to take further interest in the internal matter of Sri Lanka and opposed the motion to take it on the agenda of the UNSC. The UNSC only managed to issue a press statement on the situation in Sri Lanka in 2009 and express the Council's "grave concern".¹⁷⁶

What should also be mentioned to conclude this part of my thesis are China's veto threats against peacekeeping missions in Guatemala, Macedonia and Haiti, two of which did end up as an official veto as we have seen above. The vetoes were in question due to the countries' diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, China's veto threat against peacekeeping missions in Haiti in 1996 was not realized.¹⁷⁷ Quite contradictorily, China today supports the peacekeepers in Haiti, even though the country still did not switch its diplomatic relations to the PRC.¹⁷⁸ China's opposition towards peacekeeping (as a form of intervention) and more so towards diplomatic relations with Taiwan has been eventually easing, which could explain both China's rising involvement in peacekeeping missions around the world and China's consent on certain resolutions aimed at helping conflict torn states through peacekeeping despite the state's recognition of Taiwan. The reason why China's opposition has been easing has been explained by China's power rise. According to these theories the benefits of extending trade and diplomatic relations through demonstrating global responsibility have led China to reassess its foreign policy objective towards Taiwan's diplomatic ties.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷³ OKHOVAT, 2011 Pg 17

¹⁷⁴ WUTHROW, 2011. Pg 81

¹⁷⁵ Remembering Sri Lanka's Black July. *BBC News* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23402727>

¹⁷⁶ OKHOVAT, 2011. Pg17

¹⁷⁷ BATES, Gill a Chin Hao HUANG. China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping. *SIPRI* [online]. 2009 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIIP25.pdf>

¹⁷⁸ FULLILOVE, 2011. Pg 70

¹⁷⁹ The Dragon Brings Peace? Why China Became a Major Contributor to United Nations Peacekeeping. In: *Stimson* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-14]. Available from : <http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/the-dragon-brings-peace-why-china-became-a-major-contributor-to-united-nations-peacekeeping-/>

4. China's Voting Behaviour at the UNSC and its Foreign Policy

In this last section I will combine the outcomes of the previous parts and examine how China's voting behaviour correlates with its foreign policy. From the chapter dealing with China's foreign policy, we could notice that China's goal has mainly been to avoid problems, which could lead to outside interference. The effort to gain respect as a global power, yet still be considered a poor developing country, whose intentions are to develop peacefully but by any means, with no interference from the outside and without alienating anyone are visible in its voting behaviour. As we can imagine, this precise goal is hard to acquire. Peaceful development by any means unfortunately for China, included partnerships with regimes whose reputation was not good with the international community. Additionally, development which overshadows human rights violations cannot go unnoticed. Needless to say the simple fact that China can no longer be ignored as a major power can be hard to adjust to by the other powers of the international system, whose dominance may be threatened by the "newcomer". China's behaviour at the UNSC has therefore always been rather cautious and pragmatic. From the cast vetoes and the few examples of the surfaced hidden vetoes we can notice it has most often used its power to block action infringing sovereignty of its allies or an issue when Taiwan was somehow, even distantly involved in the matter. Fearing it might create precedence by voting positively for resolutions condemning human rights violations and calling for sanctions and intervention, China has approached the issues very carefully. Not wishing to create too much opposition when unnecessary, yet standing firmly behind its defiance towards outside interference, China cast its vetoes or used its power as a P5 to dilute resolutions so that it could both protect its allies and indirectly also itself. Using a scale of the level of China's engagement called *Stakeholder spectrum* of China at the UNSC created by M. Fullilove, director of Lowy Institute for International Policy, and adding tables I created based on the information from the previous chapters, we will be able to see the correlation of China's voting behaviour and its foreign policy perhaps more clearly.

As we can see below China is very reluctant to participate as a cooperative partner on issues concerning human rights violations, North Korean issues and imposing sanctions on or intervening in any way into rogue states with whom China trades or has closer relations with. Additionally, when Tibet or Taiwan come up, China is resolute on protecting its territorial

integrity. On the other hand, China has progressed to regarding international cooperation and finding solutions on a multilateral platform more positively, after realizing the strategic potential of taking active part in maintaining international security through multilateral negotiations. The strategic outcome lies mainly on the fact that China's involvement in more of the UNSC activities such as the peacekeeping missions helped China in gaining a more respectable image of a responsible actor ready to take on the role of a global power.

Scheme 1: China's Stakeholder Spectrum at the UNSC

Engagement

Chinese Diplomats: Their quality and professionalism has risen over the years and so has the active cooperation in more and more issues.

Peacekeeping: Despite initial disapproval of peacekeeping, China is becoming more involved.

Responsibility to protect: Generally, China agrees, however it fears the implications to the principle of state sovereignty.

Security Council Behaviour: Usually abstains unless it involves Taiwan or Tibet related issues.

Iran: China is known for friendly relations with rogue states, especially after the Tiananmen incident. Iran also holds valuable natural resources. The question of its nuclear program is a contradictory issue and China is hesitant on how to proceed.

North Korea: The question of the North Korean regime is always tricky. China after North Korea's endless provocations is becoming more reluctant to keep on protecting it.

Human Rights: The most sensitive issue of China's international engagement are human rights violations, where China is rather hostile towards any international attempts to influence China's human rights regime.

Disengagement¹⁸⁰

Source: Fullilove, M. China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum. *Washington Quarterly*. 2011

By looking at the vetoes and hidden vetoes individually, we can see that China is most protective of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, which have been part of China's foreign policy even before the PRC came into existence. China's veto against Bangladesh's membership and against the amendment concerning Zionist aggression, both cast in the first year of China's UNSC membership, are rather unusual and do not fit China's voting pattern. Nevertheless, China's defence of the Bangladesh veto has been based on strict adherence to a

¹⁸⁰ FULLILOVE, 2011

legality issue (Bangladesh still hasn't fulfilled conditions from previous). As we could notice from later vetoes, China often reminded the Council of the extent of its mandate determined by the UN Charter, stating the UNSC has no right to be involved in certain issues as it does not threaten the international stability and peace and furthermore it can be dealt through regional engagement. Regarding the other veto of 1972, it could be simply understood as China's distaste to Israel's military attack against its neighbours. Apart from these two vetoes however, China's voting behaviour focused basically only on protecting the sovereignty principle and territorial integrity. From the following seven official vetoes, China decided to step up against infringement into sovereignty five times and twice when Taiwan was involved in the matter. However, the number of times when China did decide to be openly active in opposition is very small compared to the other P5 and it is questionable why China decided to veto in those specific cases and abstain or cooperate in others. The rare and seemingly random vetoes make China's manner of voting seem rather inconsistent, especially if we consider that China has gradually come to accept similar resolutions later on, as in the case of Guatemala's peacekeeping missions, sanctions against Iran or acceptance of Bangladesh as a new member for example. It appears that China uses its veto power, when all other means of negotiations fail and the stakes of being in opposition are not too high or when the matter involves something truly threatening to China's national interests.

Table 1-Official vetoes in correlation to declared foreign policy

Subject of veto	Official statement	Background reason	Foreign Policy
Bangladesh membership (1972)	Legally untenable	Alliance with Pakistan	-
ME Ceasefire (1972)	Insufficient condemnation of Zionist aggression	-	-
Guatemala peacekeeping (1997)	Taiwan relation	Taiwan relation	One China policy
Macedonia peacekeeping (1999)	Unnecessary involvement	Taiwan relation	One China policy
Burma-human rights (HR) condemnation, pressure to release polit. prisoners and start political transformation (2007)	Sovereignty, UNSC involvement exceeds mandate	HR violation condemnation –fear of creating precedence Alliance with Burma Geographic proximity	Sovereignty and non-interference
Zimbabwe-HR condemnation, sanctions (2008)	Sovereignty Effect of sanctions negative, Regional influence rather than international	Alliance with Zimbabwe Fear of creating precedence	Sovereignty and non-interference

Syria-intervention, HR condemnation, sanctions (2011, 2012)	Sovereignty Effect of sanctions is negative	Sovereignty Aligning with Russia	Sovereignty and non-interference
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Table made by the author, source of information: UNSC information database

Table 2-Hidden vetoes and their effect

Subject	Stated reason	Background information	Result
North Korea-sanctions, intervention, HR condemnation, prosecution of Kim Jong Eun (2006-2014)	Sovereignty, non-interference Preference of a peaceful regionally found solution Sanctions are a double edged sword	Alliance Borders-refugee inflow, nuclear war on borders not acceptable nor is the consequent US presence in region	Resolutions diluted or off the agenda
Sudan-condemnation, sanctions (2007)	Sanctions and pressure are not the right way	Natural resources	Off the agenda
Iran nuclear programme-sanctions (2009)	Sanctions and pressure are not the right way	Natural resources	Off the agenda
Sri Lanka HR violation condemnation (2009)	Sovereignty, non-interference	Alliance, fear of creating precedence	Off the agenda
Haiti peacekeeping (1996)	Taiwan relations	Assurance from Haiti not to vote for Taiwan membership at UN	Negotiated conditions

Table made by the author, source of information: UNSC information database

China's veto history is not as rich as it is in the case of the other P5. As mentioned previously China's vetoing strategy does not appear very consistent. What is however consistent is China's abstention strategy, which allows China to "*send a message and yet avoid the necessity of taking sides and alienating allies.*"¹⁸¹ What that implies is that China, while carefully protecting its national interests, does not abuse its veto power exceedingly and that China's voting is cautious, pragmatic and defensive rather than influential. In other words "*China works hard to protect its national interests but generally in a way that incurs minimal political costs.*"¹⁸²

With China's growing confidence encouraged mainly by its economic success, yet challenged by inner social unrest with a much more forward society than ever before, the Chinese leadership faces a dilemma, which also influences its foreign policy making and consequently China's UNSC voting behaviour. The question is, whether China should or even

¹⁸¹ LYNCH, 2009

¹⁸² WUTHROW, 2013 Pg2

can keep on pursuing its adherence to the non-interference principle? By abstaining, vetoing or influencing resolutions responding to crisis situations involving human rights violations in order to protect itself from potential outside interference will not prevent the West from criticizing China's domestic affairs. On the contrary, after having read many news reports¹⁸³ following China's vetoes against cases of human rights violations and especially after the latest Syrian crisis vetoes, the Western media have been quick to explain the reasons behind the vetoes as being connected to China's poor human rights regime, stating that what China truly means by stating that we should respect national sovereignty is that China feels threatened similar resolutions may one day be aimed at China and therefore wishes to prevent them. Disregarding China's official statements of believing in peaceful negotiations and regional involvement rather than international (meaning Western based), China is becoming viewed with more and more distrust by the international community. Giving official statements involving grandiose notions of a peaceful rise and of pursuing world peace through international dialogue seem unsurprisingly very untrustworthy. By maintaining this mask, China's image may be harmed. On the other hand, if we look at the evolution of China's foreign policy, its regard for the sovereignty principle has very deep roots in very distant history and I believe it should not be cast away simply as an act of protecting itself from outside criticism of human rights violations, as there is also a strong historically and culturally based reason for adhering to this principle. Nonetheless, China should reconsider and readjust its foreign policy and its voting behaviour, as it can no longer "keep a low profile and hide its brightness"¹⁸⁴ as Deng Xiaoping once recommended. China's increasingly widespread interests and global involvement have made that impossible and China needs to incorporate that into its policies in a more pragmatic and consistent style.

¹⁸³ E.g.: C. Hileary's article *Why Russia, China Vetoed the UN Resolution on Syria* in Middle East Voices (2012), N. Wong's article *China's veto on Syria: what interests are at play?* In OpenDemocracy (2012) or M. Schiavenza's article *Why China will oppose any attack on Syria* (2013) in Quartz

¹⁸⁴ YUWEN. How to understand China's foreign policy. *Foreign Policy* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2014-04-23]. Available from : http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/23/how_to_understand_china_s_foreign_policy

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to find an answer to the following question: *Does China's use of its veto power at the UNSC correspond to its official foreign policy principles?* By using the voting database of the UNSC, I concentrated on cases when the PRC has opted to use its veto power. By comparing it with the foreign policy of the PRC, I wanted to find out whether China's behaviour on the platform of the UNSC corresponds to its claimed goals. I looked into the voting pattern of China only to find that compared to the other P5, China has cast a veto only rarely, bearing in mind that the PRC has joined the Council only in 1971. I have come to acknowledge China is more known for its abstaining strategy rather than straightforward opposition. However, if we also consider the possibility of using the so-called hidden veto, China's influence on certain resolutions may have been stronger than first meets the eye. Unfortunately, the hidden vetoes are not easy to back with reliable sources of information and therefore it should be kept in mind, that the voting behaviour cannot be determined to its full extent. Nevertheless, from the gathered data of the few official vetoes and the surfaced information of hidden vetoes along with the knowledge of the overly used abstention from voting, we could still ascertain some useful information. Based on the information found from analyzing the voting pattern, China does not appear to be abusing its veto power for protecting its national interests too excessively. As abstaining has become a more typical strategy for China's UNSC behaviour, casting a negative vote sends a certain message. Blocking mainly those resolutions which infringe the sovereignty principle and resolutions aimed to help countries which had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, show us China's foreign policy principles of respecting national sovereignty and non-interference into another state's matters along with strict adherence to the One-China policy are the most protected. The abstention on the other hand is linked closely to China's wish of maintaining peaceful friendly ties with everyone, including rogue regimes (most usually for the purpose of economic cooperation), which is also present in its foreign policy statements. By abstaining China does not alienate anyone and neither does it set precedence in voting for something which might pose a threat to China itself in the future.

China has accepted the role of a P5 member at a rather difficult time for the country, still recovering from the reforms enforced during Mao's rule. Over the 43 years of China's membership at the UN, we could see how China has gradually overcome its isolationist policies and rose into an economic giant willing to take a larger part on the stage of world

politics, while also working very hard on preserving itself from too much outside interference. China's behaviour has changed over the decades of its membership. It has become more confident as an international power, and thus more involved in decision making. As I have introduced throughout this thesis, we could notice the growth of China's confidence as an indispensable actor in international affairs but also its hesitance when its sought image of a respectable actor was at risk due to the UNSC's focus on China's allies, directly but also indirectly threatening China's national interests. As we could see, the aim of reaching an image of a responsible global power, e.g. by taking active part in the UN peacekeeping missions since the 1990's or being more active in promoting multilateral peaceful negotiations in solving crisis situations, has been slightly tampered by China's alliances with rogue regimes violating human rights of their own people and by the vetoes China cast as a result of that. Today China has reached a status of an important global power, an economic giant no longer able to keep a "low profile" which has been part of its development strategy since the Deng reforms and the foreign policy needs to adjust to that. As a veto wielder at the UNSC, China has been given a very responsible duty of decision making when it comes to maintaining international peace and security. China's approach to resolving crisis situations however, is different to that of the other P5 powers, which sometimes puts it into opposition. China will always protect its sovereignty and block any form of intervention into internal affairs unless there are major domestic political changes, which I do not see coming in the near future. It will be challenging to maintain this approach however. As I have mentioned, inter-state conflicts have been replaced by the more common intra-state conflicts (separatism, oppression of minorities, political opposition etc.). When we look at information from various sites, e.g. Heidelberg Institute for Conflict Research, dealing with topics of preventive diplomacy and recognizing signs of potential future conflict escalation, we can see that there are still many states, whose inner stability may be threatened in the near future by intra-state conflicts and the UNSC will have to address them. China's unwillingness to accept the UNSC's interference into intra-state matters which do not have international consequences (because it would exceed the Council's mandate) should not or perhaps even cannot continue if China truly wants to be seen as a responsible global power and avoid future condemnation. Without claiming China should take an abrupt turn and start agreeing to interventions, I believe China should reconsider its official positions, interests and values and refocus its efforts on playing a more proactive role at the UNSC when met with an intra-state conflict, rather than play its abstention strategy or veto on the basis of respecting the sovereignty principle.

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APPENDICES

Table 3: China's foreign policy development

Time period	Foreign Policy	Implications
<i>19th-20th century of humiliation: Strict future adherence to protection of national sovereignty and non-intervention</i>		
1949 - PRC established	<i>"leaning to one side, starting anew and inviting guests only once the house has been put to order"</i>	Strong ideological links, self-imposed isolation
	<i>"protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war"</i>	Non-intervention, sovereignty, territorial integrity (Taiwan conflict)
1954	<i>Five principles of Peaceful coexistence</i>	Ideology stopped playing a major role, Non-aligned movement partnerships, focus on developing partnerships based on economic development, increase of influence
<i>In between: Sino-Soviet schism, Great Leap Forward, Cultural revolution</i>		
1971-China becomes a UN member	<i>UNSC permanent membership with the power of veto, Sino-US ties established, Diplomatic relations with most of the countries in the world, Chinese ambassadors reinstated in posts around the world</i>	China begins to take part in international affairs as a new major power
Late 1970's-1980's	<i>Deng Xiaoping's low key pragmatic approach to foreign policy, major socio-economical reforms</i>	Beginnings of China's transformation into an economic power
<i>1989 Tiananmen: international condemnation and sanctions fired against China and its human rights violations, isolation of China</i>		
1990's	<i>Deng's 24 Character Strategy, "keeping a low profile and hiding one's brightness"</i>	Increased concentration on domestic development, led to breaking the isolation due to China's growing economic importance and influence
Late 1990's - today	<i>"Harmonious world, Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, Peaceful rise"</i>	Started investing heavily into Third World countries, building multilateral ties (ASEAN approach, Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and friendly peaceful ties with all nations, Started building image of a responsible actor (e.g. involvement in peacekeeping)

Table created by author, based on sources used for writing this thesis