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Role of Small States in International Relations:
Comparative Analysis of the Czech Republic and
Israel

(Master's Thesis)

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Declaration:

Herewith I declare that I have written the Master's Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.

Prague, 27 April 2015

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Student's Signature

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Abstract:

This study is titled *Role of Small States in International Relations: Comparative Analysis of the Czech Republic and Israel* and its main purpose is to analyze a typical small state's behavior in the international arena on the examples of the Czech and Israeli foreign policy. It is divided into four respective sections – a theoretical framework, historical background, and the two case studies, and it strives to answer a foundational question whether the Czech Republic and Israel can be considered small players in international relations based on the theoretical definition of the notion of a small state as well as the countries' current foreign policy approaches and tools.

Key words: Small state, international relations, foreign policy, the Czech Republic, Israel, Palestine, Zionism, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, United Nations, international organizations, great powers.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this study, called *Role of Small States in International Relations: Comparative Analysis of the Czech Republic and Israel*, is to analyze small states' theory, to evaluate and compare the foreign policies of the two respective countries, and to determine whether they behave as small states in the international arena.

The hypothesis shall be as follows: ***“the Czech Republic and Israel fulfill the theoretical criteria of small states and they act accordingly to this perception in international relations”*** – in other words, the Czech and Israeli foreign policy is typical to small states and they behave as such in the international arena. Therefore, the main goal of this study is to analyze whether Israel and the Czech Republic indeed act as typical small states and to determine whether this hypothesis can be considered true. Firstly, the analysis will be facilitated through an elaborate theoretical provision and then, secondly, the theoretical background will be applied on the case studies of the two countries' foreign policies – through a method of a comparative analysis. The theoretical part will be based mainly on definitions of small states and the archetypal foreign policy tools and approaches they may use as defined by various scholars (for instance, Robert Walt, Robert Keohane or Radka Druláková and Petr Drulák). On the other hand, the actual comparative analysis shall be based on the many international declarations, treaties, resolutions, or bilateral agreements as they follow and determine the foreign policy orientation of the two respective countries.

The study will be divided into four main chapters in order to produce a solution at the end. Firstly, a theoretical framework regarding small states will be provided. Namely, the study will attempt to define the notion of a “small” state as precisely as possible, providing the various categorizations of characteristics. However, it is necessary to embrace the idea that small states' definition is a fluid subject – as with many other international relations terms, there is none universally recognized definition of the notion. Therefore, the paper will attempt at providing a synthesis of the myriad of small states' characteristics and apply them at the cases of the Czech Republic and Israel; with some dimensions quite arbitrary and measurable and some relational and a subject to a deeper analysis. Similarly, the study will illustrate the foreign policy approaches and tools which are usually typical to small states. Hence, the main question will

consequently arise – do the Czech Republic and/or Israel behave as typical small states in terms of their foreign policy?

Secondly, the analysis will continue with a chapter about the states' historical origins and the consequences of those developments on the countries' current foreign policy. Even though the historical background behind the establishment of the state of Israel was vastly different from the peaceful declaration of Czechoslovakia, there still exist a few parallels between the states' histories which deserve attention.

Most importantly, chapters three and four will analyze the specific cases of the two states. In terms of the Czech Republic, the study will evaluate the country's membership in international organizations – as the state is an integral part of the international community, it has become a member of many international organizations; nonetheless, it will be namely the instances of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Czech European Union membership which shall be analyzed further in depth. In regard to these two supranational organizations, the main question which arises is to determine to what degree a small state such as the Czech Republic can actually influence the internal decision making. How much power can such a small state exert? The analysis of the Czech Republic will then consequently conclude with the overall conception of the Czech foreign policy and the country's relation with the world's great powers – namely, the United States, but also briefly Russia and China.

Lastly, in comparison to the Czech Republic, the Israeli foreign policy and the state's ability to exert influence in international relations shall be determined as well. However, as the Israeli case is somewhat special or controversial, the analysis will commence with the international community's approach towards the legitimization of the state. In other words, the position of the state of Israel will be illustrated also from the position of countries which do not recognize its right to existence. Israeli relation with its immediate neighbors as well as with the United States will be discussed profusely – in order to outline the isolation of the state in its own region and the limits to its incoherent foreign policy. Similarly, the position of Israel within the United Nations and the organization's approach towards the country will be evaluated as well. Should Israel be considered a small state in terms of its foreign policy?

Based on the comparative analysis of the two cases – the Czech Republic and Israel – the study will then conclude with an overall summary of findings; attempting to answer the foundational questions: should the two international players be considered as small states? Do they act as typical small states in terms of their foreign policy? What are the major similarities and differences between them?

2. Small States Theoretical Framework

In order to define and characterize a small state, this study will firstly provide some general theoretical framework of international relations theories. Small states theory will then be followed by an overview of the foreign policy theory which is most associated with such players in the international arena, because it is to be expected that great powers and small states are likely to behave differently – either in terms of the foreign policy tools they may use or the type of agenda of issues they may become involved in. Consequently, the theoretical explanation will be immediately followed by a chapter on the origin of the two states, namely, of the Czech Republic and Israel, as the establishment of the states and parts of their history have a direct effect on the countries' current foreign policy.

Most importantly, the theoretical chapters need to determine several outcomes. Specifically, *what constitutes a small state and what is a typical small state's foreign policy? How did the historical developments influence the current Czech and Israeli foreign policy?*

2.1. Small States and International Relations Theories

Regardless of any categorization of states according to the size of their population or territory, whether they are developed nations or agrarian developing societies, whether they feature democratic or authoritarian regimes, religious or secular, all states exist in the same international system – one which is anarchic and without a hierarchy. Nonetheless, throughout history the international system has transformed into a more sustainable one; in other words, states learned how to interact among themselves in order to preserve peace (and therefore themselves) and created channels for this to be possible in the long run.

Even though the focal point of this analysis will be small states theory and their foreign policy, it is indispensable to present a higher-level systemic approach to the international system as well. There are several main international relations theories (namely realism, liberalism, constructivism, institutionalism, Marxism, or feminism) – indeed, despite the anarchic nature of international relations, states do not exist in complete chaos. However, states may pursue different ideologies in their foreign policies, national interests, and rhetoric. Supposedly, there should be considerable difference between the types of foreign policy and national goals of great

powers, fully equipped economically and militarily, and those of a small state. Therefore, which of the theories or approaches are more likely to be preferred by small states?

Realism as an international relations theory could be certainly attributed to great states in history as an approach of their foreign policy to the international system – undeniably pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union under the Cold War realities. According to Stephen Walt and his publication *International Relations: One World, Many Theories*, realism “depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war” (Walt, pg. 31, 1998). Therefore, small states’ approach towards realism may be described as two-fold – states, especially the small ones generally incapable of self-defense, are more than aware of their realist surroundings, of the system in which they need to exist; any states’ main objective should be to ensure its existence and continuity. Small states recognize the dangers of the international system, the prospects of conflict and war and the struggle for power, however, they themselves cannot pursue realist approach to foreign policy as they are usually unable to physically, materially, and credibly put themselves in a position of power, which is crucial for any type of realist rhetoric.

Consequently, within the first debate on international relations theory, liberalism (as opposed to realism) appears to be a more suitable policy approach for smaller states. While both liberalism and neo-liberalism still hold a state-centric perception of international relations, they finally allow for ideas of cooperation and collaboration among states – namely through economic cooperation and the ever-growing interdependence of national markets and through international organizations which ultimately function as the forums that provide the states with the opportunity of deliberation and peaceful existence. Put differently, even though states (especially during the latter half of the 20th century with respect to Cold War) may have existed in realist power-dominated surroundings, small states in particular lived off the ideas of liberalism which allowed them to endure and ensure their own existence and pure survival. Without the space for ideas of collaboration between states and nations, how many small states would have made it through the 20th century?

Interestingly, it should be noted that the debate about small states and their preservation or survival have been one of the key topics in international relations for decades, regardless of which international relations theory prevailed at the time. In 1944, when World War II was

finally coming to its end, Eduard Beneš wrote a piece *The Position of the Small Nation in Post-War Europe* where he elaborates on the importance of safeguarding the European small states and their behavior in the international arena. He warns the international community (having witnessed the aggression of great powers towards small states or on the other hand, their complete indifference) that it is false to expect the small nations to disappear or to suggest that their existence is ultimately unfavorable (Beneš, pg. 390, 1944). On the same note, he claims that “a clear proof has been given to the world that, after all, peace is indivisible and that the insecurity of the smaller nations will always mean the insecurity of the Great Powers as well” and concludes with a statement that “the respect and maintenance of the independence of the small European nations and states are now and will be in the future vital to the peace of Europe and of the world” (Beneš, pg. 391 – 392, 1944). Consequently, following the same line of reasoning, it may be this exact indivisibility of peace among the small states and great powers which allowed for the small nations to survive even in the (neo)-realist surroundings of the latter half of the 20th century.

Nonetheless, since neither realism nor liberalism managed to correctly predict or even academically explain the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War, constructivist ideas started to play a more important role in the debate. Walt claims that “instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as highly malleable product of specific historical processes” (Walt, pg. 40, 1998). In other words, constructivism as a theory of international relations grants small states a much wider scope for deliberation – with constructivist (and subsequently structuralist, post-structuralist, institutionalist, or feminist) discourse in international relations, small states can finally uphold ideals of interdependence, globalization, institutionalism, cooperation and collaboration, they can emphasize the importance of rules and norms and therefore of international law, and suchlike.

In summary of the initial debate on small states and international relations theories, it should be noted that in spite of the changing realities of the international system over the course of history and a natural orientation of small states towards softer and more cooperative-in-nature foreign policy approaches, small states certainly needed to learn how to survive and to continue their existence in a power-dominated realist (or neo-realist) international system.

Even though they, themselves, cannot usually afford to pursue realist power positions in their dealings with other states, they necessarily had to acquire the skills to “persist” when the other states, especially the great powers, followed realist policies towards them.

2.2. Definition and Classification of States

In order to fully develop the theory of small states and their foreign policy, what constitutes a small state and which factors most likely influence the creation and orientation of their foreign policy, a more general theoretical framework is necessary. A state is consensually defined as a sovereign political entity with distinct territory and inhabitants, which is at the same time able to represent that entity outside of its territory and therefore enter into relations with other states (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 55, 2007). Nonetheless, states are not created equal.

The most basic division of states as initially described by James Rosenau classifies countries by three categories – whether states are small or large, according to their level of economic development and also according to their political establishment in terms of levels of democratization (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 56, 2007). However, through an analysis of the anarchical state of international relations, it becomes apparent that states have a variety of different characteristics, ranging from their origin, size of population, geography, natural resources, size of territory, level of economic development, level of political development and democratization, governance and type of political establishment, military power and strength, to the membership in supranational organization, which will inevitably influence the relative and absolute position any given political entity holds in the system. And similarly, many of these characteristics combined with the position of the state in the international system will necessarily have an effect on the given state's foreign policy.

Following the same line of reasoning, it is correspondingly problematic to define what constitutes a small state per se. There are several theories which categorize the states more or less arbitrarily; it is of absolute importance to note that there is no universally accepted and precise definition of the term. Scholars agree on general guidelines for the classification, however, the “smallness” of a state may also depend on a point of view. States were indeed not created equally and the result of an analysis greatly depends on the position from which any given state is being assessed. A state which is small according to most of the studied variables can still exert enormous power in some remaining areas. At the same time, if we abandon the absolute measurable variables, a state's smallness (or greatness) can also grow or shrink over time periods (for instance, a state may develop more technically proficient military power or obtain nuclear

capabilities which would inevitably change its position in the international system). In other words, it is necessary to keep in mind that a system of international relations where the main building blocks are sovereign states is not only an anarchic one, but also a fluid, dynamic, and ever-changing one.

The current debate about small states categorization had been existent for decades now. For instance, in an attempt to provide a classification of states into distinct groups, as homogenous as possible, Robert Keohane, an influential American political scientist of the latter half of the 20th century, took apart the original definition as provided by Rothstein (an author of *Alliances and Small Powers*) which states: “A Small Power is a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics” (Keohane, pg. 293, 1969). Since such definition only focuses on the perceived “helplessness” of the small states and completely disregards the somewhat arbitrary measures such as population or territory size, Keohane, in his publication *Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics*, criticizes the statement by claiming that according to such definition, only two countries would possibly not qualify as small states – the United States and the Soviet Union. Every other country’s “margin of safety” was not wide enough at the time and even countries such as France, Britain, or Japan and Germany depended on their cooperation with the United States (Keohane, pg. 293, 1969). Such an argument is important because it illustrates the need for a narrower and more precise definition of a small state.

Nonetheless, having dismissed the original definition of a small state as inapplicable on the then-current international relations, when Keohane provides his own interpretation he does not take into consideration more specific or finer characteristics of such states – quite oppositely even, the author follows a more higher level systemic approach. According to the author, “a small state is a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system” (Keohane, pg. 296, 1969). While even from today’s perspective on international relations such a statement may be fully functional (in a sense that small states do indeed realize they lack the ability to single-handedly influence the happenings on the international arena on many issues), it is still necessary to include more factors into the definition.

According to Radka Druláková and Petr Drulák's *Tvorba a analýza zahraniční politiky* (*Creation and Analysis of Foreign Policy*) publication, there are four so-called objective criteria according to which we are then able to virtually rank and organize states – based on how much power they can exert through these four parameters: size of the state's population and territory, military power, and the country's economic might (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 62, 2007). At this point, studying the cases of the Czech Republic and Israel, it is viable to present these measurable categories.

Following data provided by the World Bank, the Czech Republic's population reached over 10.5 million people in 2013 and slightly over 8 million in Israel ("Population, total", 2015). The Czech Republic's territory size counts around 77 230 kilometers squared and Israel's territory (political controversies aside at this moment) points to over 21 640 kilometers squared ("Land Area", 2015). Interestingly, according to IMF's *World Economic Outlook*, in 2014, Israel's economy was about a third bigger than the one of the Czech Republic – with nominal GDP of Israel at around 290 billion US dollars and the Czech one slightly under 200 billion US dollars ("World Economic Outlook", 2014). And lastly, concerning the military might of the two countries, the Czech Republic's spending on military as a percentage of its annual GDP revolves around 1% of its GDP while Israel's, despite its decreasing trend, is significantly higher with figures around 5.6 – 6% of annual GDP ("Military Expenditure", 2015). While all of these indicators will be discussed at length in further sections, a table (presenting a comparison with the United States for better illustration) is provided below.

	Population Size	Territory (km sq.)	Annual GDP (US dollars)	Military Expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Czech Republic	10.5 million	77 230	200 billion	1%
Israel	8 million	21 640	290 billion	5.6%
United States	316 million	9,147,420	17 416 billion	3.8%

Nonetheless, objective criteria, or rather measurable parameters, are not the sole criteria for assessing smallness or greatness of states. There are also other, subjective, or relative, parameters which may be decisive – in general, it would be the perceptions the state itself, its

leaders and people, and the ones around it hold about the position of the state in the international system. Most importantly, small players in the international arena realize that they are not the ones creating policy on the utmost crucial international issues, they function rather as “policy-takers”; and secondly, small states generally recognize that they are not able to provide for the state’s security only by themselves alone (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 62, 2007). While in this case, the term security should be taken broadly – not only in terms of physical security as related to alliances or neutrality policy in peace and war times, but also in terms of more “mundane” responsibilities of a state, such as food or energy security.

Regardless of the size of a state, a country can be judged according to the degree by which it fulfills its main responsibilities as a state. And because there exists a certain hierarchy of the responsibilities, it should be emphasized that “none is as critical as the supply of security, especially human security” (Rotberg, pg. 3, 2004). When Rotberg elaborates on the concrete forms of human security a state needs to provide to its citizens in his work *The Failure and Collapse of Nation States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair*, it becomes clear that such an analysis is needed especially in terms of Israel’s security condition. The author posits that a state’s prime responsibility is to “prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion” (Rotberg, pg. 3, 2004). Inevitably therefore, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict poses serious constraints on Israel’s ability to provide its citizens with a full range of securities.

Similarly high on the hierarchy of public goods a fully functioning state, according to Western measures, needs to provide to its citizens is the political process and the related freedoms – “the right to participate in politics and compete for office, respect and support for national and regional political institutions, such as legislatures and courts, tolerance of dissent and difference, and fundamental civil and human rights” (Rotberg, pg. 3, 2004). Naturally, there are many other public goods a state should or may provide to its people, depending on the country’s establishment – ranging from education and healthcare, infrastructure, banking and financial system, and so on.

The perception of security in the two countries is indispensable to the analysis because regardless of the smallness or greatness of the Czech Republic or Israel in terms of their population or territory size, their economic and military expenditures are quite different. Additionally, and especially keeping in mind that Israel possesses nuclear capabilities, the countries rank substantially differently in peace and violence related studies. According to the *Global Peace Index*, which ranks countries based on various indicators assessing the “absence” of violence, the Czech Republic (as of 2014) scores as number 11 (out of 162 countries measured), while Israel ranks as 149th (“Global Peace Index”, 2014). Such a ranking is necessarily related to the overall situation in the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, it is not a ranking acceptable for a developed first world country which aims at providing its citizens with a full range of public goods, especially with human security. While Rotberg himself asserts that “violence alone does not condition failure” of the state, he adds that “the absence of violence does not necessarily imply that the state in question is unfailed” (Rotberg, pg. 4, 2004). In any case, this is to point out that even on the scale of a small state, higher military expenditures or better economic situation do not automatically indicate a more secure state.

Further research suggests that the classification of states into small and great powers is indeed more complex. While no universally accepted definition of a small state exists, some scholars claim that the sole “smallness” of a country’s territory and population does not yet constitute it a small state. For instance, Vandenbosch in *The Small States in International Politics and Organization* claims that the ultimate test should be the country’s military strength – and while some of the factors which determine a state’s military power are quite easily evaluated, such as the country’s location and natural resources, there are other factors, such as “technical proficiency, national psychology, cultural and political institutions”, which are “qualitative and variable” (Vandenbosch, pg. 293, 1964). Indeed, such an evaluation requires a much deeper analysis besides a state’s annual military spending as a percentage of its GDP; however, with an analysis of features such as national psychology, a researcher always runs the risk of a biased assessment.

2.3. Small States and Foreign Policy

According to Vandenbosch, a certain political science student once said that, *“A small state is a vacuum in a high pressure area. It does not live because of its strength but because nobody wants its territory, or because its preservation as a buffer state or as a weight in the balance of power is of interest to a stronger nation. When the balance disappears, the small state usually disappears with it.”* (Vandenbosch, pg. 294 – 295, 1964). Even though today’s international system may not precisely reflect such post World War II realist perspective, small states do indeed need to navigate the system more carefully than other players. What are the approaches and tools at their disposal in terms of their foreign policy?

As it was previously outlined, foreign policy of a state is shaped by many variables. And additionally, the factors influencing foreign policy of a small state may be quite different from those creating foreign policy of a superpower. Foreign policy of a state is most likely to be determined by the country’s position in international relations – “since small states are more preoccupied with survival than are the great powers, the international system will be the most relevant level of analysis for explaining their foreign policy choices” (Elman, pg. 175, 1995). It can be argued that a great state’s foreign policy will be less influenced by the international arena and more by its domestic processes and atmosphere than the one of a small state, which indeed needs to stay alert towards the situation outside of its borders as the repercussions may be crucial to its existence.

In order to complete the more general theoretical framework for small state’s analysis, it is of importance to elaborate on the foreign policy tools and approaches small states commonly hold. What are the usually stated commonalities among small states’ foreign policy in terms of their diplomacy?

Firstly, small states emphasize the existence of rules, morality, ordering, and international law (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 64, 2007). Small states tend to pursue more liberal or constructivist approach to international relations – quite naturally as a realist approach is mostly determined by power, exertion of influence and military strength, all of which are capabilities small states usually lack. The luxury of realism and realist policies is attributed

mainly to the great states – small states need the constructivist and idealist umbrella of cooperation and collaboration policies in order to ensure its own existence in the future. Secondly, in terms of balance of power and creation of alliances among states whether in peace or war times, small states tend to side with the seemingly stronger party (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 64, 2007). In other words, small states are fully aware of their deficit in decision making and their ability to influence any final decision, however, at the same time, in order to ensure their continuity and survival, they need to calculate beforehand, as precisely as possible, which of the parties to a conflict is most likely to end up a winner and side with such a party. Thirdly, small states tend to limit their participation in international relations per se; nonetheless, on the other hand, they try and enjoy the benefits and advantages of participation in the various international organizations (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 65, 2007). International organizations indeed represent unparalleled opportunities for small states since they allow them to occasionally influence some kind of supranational decision making (when the voting system is based on a one vote one country basis or when small states create alliances in order to outvote the rest of the countries) while at the same time, international organizations provide the states with a forum and tools for negotiations, deliberation, and soft diplomacy.

At this point, it is viable to add Robert Keohane's input on small states and their interest in alliances and international organizations. Despite the fact that the author indeed concurs that small states are powerless when acting alone or in opposition to great powers, he adds that "small states may promote international organizations quite rationally without believing that these institutions will promote their security in specific ways or restrain Great Powers from particular actions" (Keohane, pg. 296, 1969). The rationale behind such an argument is that whichever the case, small states' leadership generally recognizes that although they may not be able to influence international developments even when working as a group, it is still better being part of the game than being completely alone and virtually helpless and powerless.

Given small states' preoccupation with an actual physical survival of the country, usually lacking the necessary military means to achieve it, there are then several foreign policy options the states may select. The most commonly suggested choices for small states are entering or creating an alliance, remaining completely neutral and follow a non-alignment policy, or to join a system of collective security.

Firstly, an alliance is “a tool of collective security; a commitment between two or more states to cooperate on security issues, including mutual military support in case of an attack by a third party on any member of the agreement” (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 66, 2007). While small states enter such commitments out of fear for their own security and survival, they usually seek an alliance with a great power, a great military power in this case. And despite the fact that the sole entering into any kind of a supranational agreement forces the parties to the agreement to give up parts of their national sovereignty and the ability to freely choose their own foreign policy, there are advantages for both sides to the agreement – in the case of a collective security alliance as such, there are advantages for the great powers as well as for the small states.

From the point of view of a great power which already possesses all the necessary military capabilities, creating an alliance with a small state offers it new opportunities – in terms of realist politics, the great power obtains a new sphere of influence (or at least “ratifies” a previously existing informal one) as opposed to its opponents (if they exist) and at the same time they may gain an ideological supporter for the future (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 66 – 67, 2007). Additionally, from a more constructivist perspective, the great power may also gain access to a whole new market for its goods and services export which should be accompanied by a creation of new lasting ties or business ventures, hopefully advantageous for both parties.

On the other hand, there are several approaches the small state can follow in terms of the relation with the umbrella great power – in an attempt to gain from the cooperation “something more” than was originally intended by the great power, a new advantage, the small state can position itself into the role of a “loyal ally”, especially for the future, and it can then expect the great power to reward it for its behavior (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 67, 2007). On the other hand, it can also function as an “unreliable ally” and threaten the great power it would leave the collective security alliance while expecting some kind of reward when it graciously decides to continue the cooperation at the end (in this case, the small state really needs to be certain that it possesses a feature which is at the moment indispensable to the great power); the small state can act as an “aggressive ally”, threatening its collaborators to provoke or unilaterally commence an attack on their opponents; a “gad-fly ally” constantly annoys the great power with its demands, and an ally which is “impotent” may threaten the great power it would collapse unless helped – which is a remarkable example when a small state can use its weakness and the perception others

may have about it in its advantage (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 67 – 68, 2007). In any case, whichever approach the small state chooses, they all have in common the small state's selfish pursuit of more benefits than initially agreed upon.

Secondly, contrary to becoming a part of a collective security alliance, states, either small or great powers, may choose to pursue a policy of neutrality. However, neutrality is typical to some small states rather than the big ones because behind the neutrality policy is the rationale to avoid any military conflict (which could be fatal in the case of small states rather than for great powers). Paradoxically, because a neutral state cannot be part of any collective security arrangement, it is responsible for its own defense in the case of need – hence, neutral states tend to have high quality military capabilities (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 70, 2007). While naturally there is a difference between temporary (only for a specific conflict) and permanent neutrality of a state, neutrality as such may pose additional constraints on the foreign policy of the state as it may be consequently excluded from other soft power arrangements than the sole collective security alliance.

Lastly, a collective security arrangement “represents a commitment among a group of states to cooperate on security issues, to uphold guidelines for a collective peaceful coexistence and to offer military help to the other members in the case of need” (Drulák and Druláková, pg. 70, 2007). Nonetheless, it should be noted that such an arrangement would probably not be a small state's number one choice as it heavily depends on the functioning of the international system – which is something a small state can barely influence and therefore tends to avoid.

In order to conclude, the small states' foreign policy theory suggests that the tools and approaches used by small states in the international arena indeed differ from those exerted by the great powers. However, further analysis is yet to determine the actual foreign policy strategies used by the Czech Republic and Israel. Do the countries act as typical small states in terms of their foreign policy?

3. Origin of the Two States and their Creation

It is not of absolute necessity to go deep into detail about the history of the Czech Republic and Israel, nonetheless, it is crucial to illustrate the basic outline of events that led to the creation of the countries and to outline some of the domestic and international developments especially of the latter half of the 20th century because some of the events had an enormous impact on the countries' current foreign policy. There were external powers that had an effect on the domestic developments of the countries, or at least tried to have a say, and depending on their level of input or the stance they held, the relationship between them and either Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic or Israel had been formed. Similarly, some of the international events of the 20th century had a significant effect on the internal developments of the two countries.

Not to claim there are many similarities between the emergence of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and of Israel in 1948, however, throughout their histories, the countries did indeed have to deal with issues of comparable topics – namely, minority and nation-determination issues. Each of the countries had a slightly different reasoning behind the beginning of their existence – for Czechoslovakia it was Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points and the stated principle of a nation's right to self-determination. Interestingly enough, it is argued that the concept of a Czechoslovak nation was fabricated by the founders of Czechoslovakia, still under the realities of World War I when it started to be clearer that the war would result in the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire – if there was a Czechoslovak state to be administered as a sovereign unit, without the concept of a Czechoslovak nation, there would have been more Germans than Slovaks in the newly established state. Therefore, even though, historically, the Czechs and Slovaks tended to deal with their adversaries and challenges to their existence quite peacefully, there are controversies surrounding the Czechoslovak history as well.

In any case, the developments of World War I were extremely important to Jewish people all over the world. With the increased interest of Britain in the territory of Palestine, 1917 marks a breaking point – it was a year of the Balfour Declaration, which was a letter written by a British Foreign Secretary of the time, Lord Arthur James Balfour, to a Jewish leader Lord Rothschild. The letter states that “*His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in*

Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country” (“The Balfour Declaration”, 1917). Therefore, in 1917, with this declaration, one nation promised another nation the land of a third one – in 1917, the British were not even yet technically, under international law, the nation responsible for the administration of Palestine; this status only emanated from the creation of the League of Nations. In 1917, the British were simply an occupying force. Nonetheless, from today’s point of view, the significance of Wilson’s 14 Points for the emergence of Czechoslovakia as a sovereign nation is comparable to the one of the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish nation.

According to the Covenant of the League of Nations (effective only since 1920), the British were assigned a mandate over the land of Palestine. Article 22 of the Covenant states that *“To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant”* (“The Covenant of the League of Nations”, 1924). In effect, Article 22 granted the British and the French an administration of the lands which emerged as a consequence of the World War I and a dissolution of large empires – while some nations could commence to exist as sovereign states (such as Czechoslovakia), others were put under the mandate of a third country until they were able to “stand by themselves”.

Contrary to the common belief that the struggle between the Jewish community and Arabs started only after the massive influx of Jews into Palestine following World War II and the establishment of a state of Israel, the conflict goes much deeper in history. With the Balfour Declaration and the later developments of the 1920s’ and 1930s’ in Europe, Jewish community already started settling in Palestine, which exacerbated the conflict between them and the Palestinian Arabs. In order to illustrate the influx of Jews into Palestine over this period of time, according to UN documents, the Jewish population in the land of Palestine increased from less

than 10% in 1917 to over 30% by the year 1947 (“The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 – 1988”, 1979). The document subsequently states that “Palestinian demands for independence” from the British mandate “and resistance to Jewish immigration led to a rebellion in 1937, followed by continuing terrorism and violence from both sides during and immediately after the Second World War” (“The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 – 1988”, 1979). In other words, the conflict between the Jewish community in Palestine and the Arabs had been clearly existent long before the establishment of the state of Israel.

World War II, Holocaust and ethnic cleansing then completely changed the perception of Jews by the international community which felt ashamed for the massacres it let Germany commit and out of a feeling of responsibility the international community realized the Jewish nation indeed needed a state of its own and that multilateral action had to be taken right away. At this time, it was the American pressure which played a decisive role while the role of the British changed for the rest of the course of the 20th century. According to the US Department of State’s official proclamation, the British “opposed both the creation of a Jewish state and an Arab state in Palestine as well as unlimited immigration of Jewish refugees to the region” because they wanted to protect their political and economic interests in Palestine, especially with respect to energy security questions (“Creation of Israel, 1948”, 2015). With the already ongoing immigration of Jews and the consequent problems it arose, the Arabs felt betrayed by the British, but at the same time – because of British reluctance to allow for a full-scale Jewish state (which is the Israeli interpretation of the Balfour Declaration of 1917), the Israelis felt betrayed as well.

The newly established peace-promoting organization of United Nations, which replaced the League of Nations, held the Jewish/Palestine issue as a priority from the very beginning – because of the British frustration with the developments in Palestine, they virtually transferred the issue over to the new international organization and a Special Committee on Palestine was created while their reports significantly influenced the debates in the United Nations General Assembly. In 1947, the committee’s report described the situation in Palestine as follows:

“The atmosphere in Palestine today is one of profound tension. In many respects the country is living under a semi-military régime. In the streets of Jerusalem and other key areas barbed wire defenses, road blocks, machine-gun posts and constant armored car patrols are routine measures. In areas of doubtful security, Administration officials and the military forces

live within strictly policed security zones and work within fortified and closely-guarded buildings. Freedom of personal movement is liable to severe restriction and the curfew and martial law have become a not uncommon experience,” (“The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 – 1988”, 1979). The report then continues by an assessment of the Jewish approach:

“The right of any community to use force as a means of gaining its political ends is not admitted in the British Commonwealth. Since the beginning of 1945 the Jews have implicitly claimed this right and have (sic) supported by an organized campaign of lawlessness, murder and sabotage their contention that, whatever other interests might be concerned, nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of a Jewish State and free Jewish immigration into Palestine. It is true that large numbers of Jews do not today attempt to defend the crimes that have been committed in the name of these political aspirations. They recognize the damage caused to their good name by these methods in the court of world opinion. Nevertheless, the Jewish community of Palestine still publicly refuses its help to the Administration in suppressing terrorism, on the ground that the Administration's policy is opposed to Jewish interests,” (“The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 – 1988”, 1979). Consequently, a major debate took place on the grounds of the United Nations – a solution needed to be manufactured quickly, before the official end of the British mandate, while at this point, the idea of a creation of state of Israel by partitioning the Palestinian land was fiercely opposed by the Arab community of states with the rest of the international community trying to accommodate both sides to the argument (balancing the shame of the developments of World War II in regard to Jewish people with the reports from Palestine where the Jewish hardliners were implementing terrorist acts in their fight for existence).

Finally, in November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly took a vote on a proposed plan for the future of Palestine, which was, according to the Resolution 181, to be divided between the Jewish and Arab states with Jerusalem¹ (a city with holy sites of both religions, the Jews and the Muslims) remaining under special mandate of the United Nations. Precisely, the resolution read that *“Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem shall come into existence in Palestine two months*

¹ A map of Palestine as presented in the Resolution 181 is to be found in Annex I.

after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948” (“Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine”, 1947). And arguably, the vote was preceded by massive campaigns and lobbying from both the Zionist movements and the Arab states.

The proposal required a two-thirds majority of the countries present to pass, and finally, the countries voting in favor of the resolution were: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Costa Rica, *Czechoslovakia*, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, *United States of America*, Uruguay, and Venezuela; countries voting against were: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, *Iran*, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen (in sum, the countries voting against the proposal were the Arab community of states); and countries abstaining were, among others, countries of the Latin American continent, *the United Kingdom*, and *China* (“The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 – 1988”, 1979). Put differently, two of the countries of the United Nations Security Council did not partake in the voting on the Palestine issue while at the same time, it could have been one of the last chances for the Soviet Union and the United States of America to vote in agreement before the Cold War broke out soon after. Hence, the Resolution 181 was adopted by a vote of 33 against 13, with 10 states abstaining.

The events in Palestine that followed the United Nations Resolution made it apparent that the “support” Jewish people gained from the international community functioned as a fresh impulse for their cause. The hostilities and violence from both sides intensified and the British, unable to perform their role as the mandate administrator, announced their plans to withdraw even before the previously agreed upon date. And consequently, as the British “progressively disengaged from Palestine, and the United Nations was unable to replace it as an effective governing authority, the Zionist movement moved to establish control over the territory of the nascent Jewish State” (“The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 – 1988”, 1979). Hence, come “May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency, proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel” and the British unceremoniously withdrew

the very next day (“Creation of Israel, 1948”, 2015). While additionally as a result of the United Nations Resolution of the future of Palestine, five neighboring Arab countries immediately attacked the Palestinian/Israeli state. Not only did the proclamation of a sovereign Israeli state had a deteriorating effect on the overall level of violence in the region, it marked only the very beginning of a series of wars which Israel was to face all throughout the rest of the 20th century until these days. Desolately, only by the year 1949, the Israeli campaign produced more than 700 000 Palestinian refugees (“The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 – 1988”, 1979). Similarly, the events which led to the creation of the state of Israel were also to determine Israeli relations with the outside powers – the complicated and hostile relations with the states of the Arab League until the birth of the Iranian theocratic establishment in 1979 which produced Israel’s main antagonist in the region, the mutually supportive relations with Central and Eastern European countries (due to pre-war Jewish diaspora), and with the withdrawal of the British out of the conflict, Israel gained its most important ally, the United States. In any case, in 1948, the state of Israel was officially born and the very next year it entered the United Nations community.

While the 1920s’ and 1930s’ were turbulent years for the Middle East in regard to the creation of a Jewish state, the same time period for Czechoslovakia were the years of its biggest glory. Czechoslovakia, since its creation in 1918, functioned as a first-class developed democracy with roaring economy, industrialization, and diplomatic ties with most countries of the world. Nonetheless, as it was previously outlined, there may have been some historical parallels between the two countries. Namely, an analogy could be drawn between the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the 1938 Munich agreement and secondly, in terms of the domestic developments and controversies, there could be a parallel between the so-called Plan D as implemented by the Israeli army in 1948 and Benes Decrees of the post-war Czechoslovakia.

Firstly, the importance of the Balfour Declaration for the Jewish nation and for the future creation of the state of Israel has been already illustrated. Indeed, until this day, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs displays this very document on their website – all to suggest the significance of the letter for the Jewish community; without the Balfour Declaration, would there have been a Jewish state created? On the other hand, taken from the international community perspective, the letter was written by one nation to another – promising the land of a third. The

Arabs, the population of Palestine of the time, had absolutely no say in a matter which concerned their homeland, their territory. There is a strong parallel with the developments of 1938 Europe – despite that fact that the realities of the pre-war circumstances were clearly completely different from those of 1917 when Britain became an occupying force of Palestine, an analogy can still be argued between the Munich Agreement of 1938 and the Balfour Declaration.

On September 29, 1938, the great powers of Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy collectively decided the fate of a small nation of Central Europe – without even the presence of Czechoslovakia to the negotiations of the agreement. In a vain effort to appease Hitler and prevent him from commencing a second deadly war in Europe, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini handed over to him parts of a country which was, put simply, not theirs to give away. Moreover, the agreement was worded in a manner which gave the Czechoslovak government full responsibility to comply with the deal – since the occupation was to start on October 1, the great powers of the “United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations” (“Munich Pact”, 1938). In other words, without any option to disagree, the Czechoslovak government had to give up parts of its sovereign country, the Sudetenland, because four other nations agreed to do so. Hence, how much say did the Arabs have in regards to the Palestine partition as vaguely promised by the Balfour Declaration? Yes, admittedly, the letter of 1917 was written quite vaguely, no clear promises had been made. On the other hand, the declaration was significant enough that the Jewish nation could have based their entire homeland campaign around it. In any case, the Munich pact, with the evolution of time, is regarded by the international community, even by the great powers in question, as one of the biggest mistakes in history. The Balfour declaration, on the contrary, is displayed by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs as one of the founding documents of the state.

Secondly, during the 1940s’, both of the countries’ domestic administrations created some controversies for the future. In the case of Israel, it was the so-called Plan D (or Plat Dalet, according to the fourth letter of Hebrew alphabet). Plan D was implemented by the Jewish military in March 1948 – well before the complete withdrawal of the British from the Palestine mandate. Nonetheless, Plan D was manufactured about a half a year after the adoption of the

United Nations 181 Resolution and it was implemented in order for the Jewish nation to gain control of the territories which were prescribed to it, as well as to gain as much outside territory as possible in the overall struggle for the Israeli state existence. According to the UNISPAL documents, the plan was “as simple as it was revolutionary: *'to gain control of the area allotted to the Jewish State and defend its borders, and those of the blocs of Jewish settlements and such Jewish population as were outside those borders, against a regular or pararegular enemy operating from bases outside or inside the area of the Jewish State'*” (“The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 – 1988”, 1979). Put simply, the decision was to gain as much territory as possible, regardless of the UN partition territorial plans. However, the quasi political quasi para military decision per se aside, the events which ensued – whether called the Israeli war for independence, an internal struggle, a civil war, or a guerilla conflict – have been described by the anti-Zionists as ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian Arab population.

While it seems quite natural that areas of conflict would produce refugees, Israel has been accused of using psychological means to terrify the Palestinian Arabs and to forcefully push them out of the territory desired by the Jews – “Palestinians allege that this was part of a deliberate policy to displace Palestinian Arabs to make room for immigrants” and at the same time, they also “charge that the terrorizing of the civilian population through military or psychological means was an integral part of this policy of expelling Palestinians” (“The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917 – 1988”, 1979). Officially, terrorizing of the civilian population was never part of the policy; nonetheless, the actual events may not have happened in an official manner.

Parallel with the Plan D could be the Czechoslovak Benes Decrees. The so-called Benes decrees were a series of presidential decrees from the World War II exile Czechoslovak government, dealing mainly with the post-war reconstruction of the state. Part of the decrees dealt specifically with property confiscation from the German and Hungarian minorities as an integral part of post-war reparations from the aggressor (Matuška, 2006). Regardless of the legal controversy of the decrees which runs till this day, there always will be the hidden story behind the actual implementation of the decrees. After the war was over and the decrees were ratified by the government, the overall sentiment of the Czechoslovak nation towards Germans caused many

personal catastrophes and misfortunes as people violently forced the German families in Sudetenland out of their homes.

Overall, this is not to judge the political or legal relevance neither of the Plan D nor the Benes decrees. This is to illustrate that in both countries' histories, in their struggles for survival or existence, there were somewhat shady chapters which the international community may find controversial till this day.

4. Analysis of the Czech Republic as a Small State

In order to analyze the Czech Republic as a small state in international relations and its foreign policy, the study will elaborate on the country's membership in international relations, namely, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as the European Union. Similarly, it will discuss the bilateral relations of the Czech Republic with great powers – especially the United States, but also Russia and China, as it is outlined in the Czech conception of its foreign policy. Combined, these two analyses shall determine the country's position in international relations. Having described the small states' theory background and their foreign policy tools and approaches, *does the Czech Republic indeed act as a typical small state?*

4.1. Czech Republic's Foreign Policy and Its Membership in International Organizations

Having described the origin of the Czechoslovak state (of which the Czech Republic is a legal continuation) and some of its historical domestic and international controversies, the foreign policy of the state was quite monotone for the rest of the 20th century. Ever since the communist takeover of 1948, Czechoslovak foreign policy had been painfully dictated from Moscow – waves of periods of democratization or of internal tightening of the regime were more or less domestic processes which had barely any effect on the country's foreign policy. Consequently, the period was characterized by positive relations with “friendly” socialistic states (the entire Soviet bloc, but also with countries such as Cuba, China, former republic of Yugoslavia, or some African states) and by a refusal of anything “Western”, that is, imperialism, capitalism, proletariat exploitation, and suchlike. In other words, an analysis of Czechoslovak foreign policy of the latter half of the 20th century would entail a long list of Czechoslovak “puppet” presidents, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and a series of proclamations produced by the Czechoslovak government “welcoming” any steps taken by Moscow and disclaiming any action produced by the countries of the Western bloc (if acknowledged publicly at all).

The turning point came with the year 1989 and the Velvet Revolution, fall of the Soviet Union, and the end of communist rule for Czechoslovakia. All of a sudden a complete reorientation of the country's foreign policy towards the West was implemented – which subsequently continued with the dissolution of the country into separate Czech and Slovak

Republics. As of 1989, the main drivers of Czech foreign policy became goals such as integration into the international community through opening up of the domestic market and becoming a part of Western-based international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Schengen agreement, and the European Union. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides an alphabetic list of international organizations the Czech Republic has become a member of, including the year of admission – the most important (or rather foreign policy-significant) organizations are illustrated in a table below:

Name of an International Organization²	Year of Admission
Bank for International Settlements, BIS	1993
Council of Europe	1993
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD	1993
<i>European Union</i>	<i>2004</i>
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA	1993
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	1993
International Criminal Police Organization, INTERPOL	1993
International Development Association, IDA	1993
International Labor Organization, ILO	1993
International Monetary Fund, IMF	1993
<i>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO</i>	<i>1999</i>
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD	1995
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE	1993
United Nations, UN	1993
World Trade Organization, WTO	1993

It is necessary to keep in mind that the year 1993 signifies the break-up of Czechoslovakia – hence, legally, the beginning of the Czech Republic’s membership in most of the international organizations. There are many other multilateral platforms of which the Czech

² Data retrieved from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

Republic has become a member of, nonetheless, the two biggest achievements of the foreign policy reorientation in terms of becoming a part of the Western community were the joining of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999 and becoming a member of the European Union in 2004 (“Multilateral Policy”, 2004). Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the most acute questions in regards to the Czech Republic’s membership in NATO and the EU are: What is the level of contribution of the Czech Republic to these international governmental organizations? Are the small states in general able to truly influence the decision making process?

4.2. The Czech Republic and NATO

The Czech Republic joined NATO on March 12, 1999, with the official aim of “fulfilling of the North Atlantic Treaty, safeguarding the freedom and security of its members by political and military means, safeguarding the common values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes and promoting these values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area” (“NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, 2004). While the official goals and aims of joining the North Atlantic Treaty may be slightly vague, it was one of the biggest achievements for the Czech Republic’s foreign policy post-Cold War – joining NATO meant that the Czech Republic has officially, and with final vigor, ended its former Warsaw Pact curse and has taken on new Westward obligations. The most important obligation, and advantage, emanating from membership in NATO is stipulated in Article V of the founding Washington North Atlantic Treaty of 1949: *“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”* (“NATO Treaty”, 1949). Put simply, it is specifically the Article V which ensures the members to the agreement that if they were to be attacked by an outside party, they would be protected by all of the parties to the treaty. In other words, by joining NATO, a military collective-defense coalition, the Czech Republic gave up its right to neutrality and parts of its sovereignty in terms of an independent foreign policy. All security and military-related decisions of the Czech government, ever since 1999, must be made in accordance with the stipulated NATO objectives or aims.

In terms of the ability of small states to influence the decision making process on the level of an international governmental organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the level of input depends heavily on the system of the decision making process per se. In the case of NATO, the decisions are produced through a consensus of all the 28 member countries – consensus is applied on all levels of negotiations and consultations among the states

ever since the establishment of the organization in 1949 (“Consensus Decision-Making at NATO”, 2014). Nonetheless, the crucial difference is that in 1949, there were only 12 founding member states (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States) and hence, a consensual decision must have been necessarily much easier to reach than nowadays with 28 member countries. Still, there is no voting mechanism on the grounds of NATO. Is this more or less favorable to the status and influence of small states within the organization?

Certainly, favoring a consensual decision making system over a voting mechanism where decisions would have had to be taken unanimously (on a one vote one country basis) prevents an organizational deadlock, which, in the case of a military alliance, could seriously hinder its effectiveness. In an organization consisting of 28 member states, there would be a high possibility of at least one state voting “against” a motion. This would have given small states a much bigger role in the organization. Arguably, the consensual decision making helps the entire structure appear more coherent to the outside world – with no voting, there is no record of who voted in favor for or against which proposal; simply, the alliance manages to look as if speaking and acting in “one voice”. However, internally, consensual decision making process creates a variety of opportunities for different types of “persuasion” tactics. Consequently, it could be alleged that some member countries display larger negotiation potential than the other ones. In the case of NATO, the amount of how much the countries contribute to its budget³ may be one of reasons for the inequality among the states. Even though the stated goal for the countries is to contribute to the NATO budget with an equivalent of 2% of their annual GDP, studying the statistics it becomes apparent that the founding states contribute more than the more newly joining countries; for instance, in 2010, the United States contributed with 5.4% of their annual GDP, United Kingdom with 2.7% of their GDP while countries such as the Czech Republic or Slovak Republic with 1.4% and 1.3% of GDP respectively (“Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense”, 2011). Keeping in mind the vastly different sizes of the countries’ economies, it may be only logical that countries such as United States or the United Kingdom would feel more entitled to the decision making process – simply based on the amount of money they contribute.

³ A summary of the countries’ contribution to NATO budget as a percentage of their GDP can be found in Annex II.

Overall, it seems there are more reasons to believe that the consensual decision making mechanism only subtracts from the influence the small states could possibly exert in the military alliance. On the other, it has been profoundly debated that the small state's biggest preoccupation is with its own survival and existence – from this point of view, being a part of a military structure such as NATO, being under the protection of an umbrella military organization, the advantages stemming from such an alliance may simply outweigh the correlating shortcomings. According to one of *Atlantic Council of Finland's* conferences, “membership in an Alliance bestows clear advantages for small states in operational issues, in decision-making, and in international political visibility” (“Small States and NATO”, 2004). On the other hand, the disadvantages may be summarized as firstly, the circumscribed ability to produce foreign policy independently and secondly, the reduced potential to influence the decision making process within the organization. It is a political decision of any small state to determine whether the added value of being a member of such an organization indeed overcomes all of the corresponding pitfalls.

4.3. The Czech Republic and the European Union

Once the Czech Republic's accession to NATO was fully implemented, another foreign policy goal was given a priority on the agenda – becoming a full member of the European Union. Prior to the accession, a referendum was held in June 2003, and according to the Czech Statistical Office's data, 77.33% of the people voted in favor of the Czech Republic joining the European Union ("Referendum on Accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union held on 13-14 June 2003", 2015). Therefore, triumphantly, the Czech Republic took part in the historically unprecedentedly massive enlargement of the European Union of 2004 and there is no doubt that it came to represent one of the small states of the Union. According to the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the country embodies about 2.1% of the Union's population and around 1.2% of its overall GDP ("Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky", pg. 9, 2011). Indeed, from the point of view of arbitrary as well as relational indicators, the Czech Republic's position within the European Union is that of a small state.

And even though the 2004 enlargement was crucial due to its volume, according to a study called *Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?*, from the point of view of small states, the significance of the post-Cold War enlargements lays elsewhere. Supposedly, "the enlargements in 1995, with Sweden, Finland, and Austria, and in 2004, with Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, and Malta, *changed the balance between small and big EU member states*" (Thorhallsson and Wivel, pg. 651, 2006). Arguably, all the newly-accessing states did so under the rationale that joining an institution such as the European Union would bring them sufficiently enough rewards and advantages to offset the related curtailing of their powers. Whether this was the case at the end would be a political statement. However, are there any commonalities between the positions of small states in the Union? How much can the small member states influence the decisions taken?

It appears as if, similarly to the case of NATO, the size of the various countries' economies plays the decisive role in determining how much power the states can exert towards their fellow member states. Quite naturally, the great powers attempt to exert as much power as possible, despite the system of the institutional checks and balances which should assure that

each and every state of the Union does not get left behind. According to Thorhallsson and Wivel, and in accordance with the previous findings of this analysis, small states are consensually to be expected to “favor institutionalization of interstate relations in regional and world politics, because all members of international institutions are usually subject to the same rules and face the same sanctions if they break the rules” (Thorhallsson and Wivel, pg. 655, 2006). However, in spite of the general expectations, the authors at the end concur with the primacy of the great powers even in institutionalized settings. Even though the “rules of the game” are applied to all the members of the Union equally, they indeed do not have the same starting line – the great states within the European Union have a “better chance of influencing the integration process, particularly in issue areas where large and costly resources are necessary to implement decisions” (Thorhallsson and Wivel, pg. 658, 2006). Put differently, however equal the playing field for the states may be, the countries do indeed possess different ranges of tools – the great powers have inevitably more power in terms of the resources which they can devote to their cause while the small states need to prioritize to which cause they can afford to dedicate their time, personnel, and most importantly, money. Hence, as the small states cannot simply afford to exert their influence across the board of all negotiations, it could be assumed that they will prioritize among policy areas and among the particular policies in question.

Consequently, what would be the policy areas of the European Union system to which small states in general decide to devote their time and resources? Arguably, “small states tend to be proactive in EU negotiations where they do have important economic and political interest at stake” while it could have been observed that the small states do not exert much influence in terms of the European security policy (Thorhallsson and Wivel, pg. 659, 2006). Put differently, for a small state of the European Union to exert their resources on a topic or a particular policy area, the state needs to be certain that it will enjoy the advantages or make use of the consequences of the decision taken.

Nonetheless, security policy in terms of the European Union mechanism has become a topic of controversy. The European Union as a player on the international scene soon realized that in order to strengthen their overall position, they needed to display a coherent and unified foreign policy. The so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy came into existence with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 – that is, well before the grand enlargements of 1995

and 2004. According to the Maastricht Treaty, as signed on February 7, 1992, the overall goals of the common foreign policy of the European Union shall be: *“to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all way; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”* (“The Maastricht Treaty”, pg. 7, 1992). In other words, the countries joining the European Union post-1992 knew well the constraints which will be put on their sovereign foreign policy as the treaty specifically says that the states “shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations” (“The Maastricht Treaty”, pg. 7, 1992). Nevertheless, even with the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty which was, among other issues, focused on making the common foreign and security policy of the Union more clear and coherent, the CFSP has been a target of much criticism. The European Union, especially with the international developments of the last decade, has been internally fractured about most of the acute international issues.

Namely, the European Union has recently encountered many difficult debates on the hot topic of Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia - and the Czech Republic managed to play quite a particular role in this debate. In the eyes of the European Union, the Czech Republic must have become somewhat of a black sheep – in terms of the Ukrainian crisis, all of the other former Soviet satellite countries seem to cooperate and agree with the common EU stance, namely, the European sanctions against Russia. However, it needs to be remembered that unlike countries such as Poland or the Baltic states, the Czech Republic had – prior to the second half of the 20th century – no negative experience with the “imperialist” or “tsarist” Russia; the public opinion about Russia has been mostly shaped by the puppet communist rule. And consequently, the current public debate about the Ukrainian crisis has been quite fragmented – a feature which is perfectly mirrored in the different positions of the Czech foreign policy elites as there exists a “pro-Russian president, a mild prime minister, and a relatively hawkish minister of foreign affairs” (Ehl, 2015). In other words, neither the Czech Republic’s public has a coherent opinion nor the governmental officials share a common stance – hence, how can the European Union present a unilateral view on an international issue when in instances such as this an agreement cannot be reached even within a single country?

On a similar note, the Czech Republic recently acted against the conventional European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy in regards to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Stubbornly, in November 2012, the Czech Republic voted *no* "against the Palestinian Authority's bid for semi-statehood at the United Nations", while it was the only European Union country to do so (Winfrey and Muller, 2012). One of the more general reasons stated for this behavior is that the Czech government "distanced itself from the European mainstream on issues ranging from diplomacy and security to economic policy, often siding with Washington rather than fellow EU members" (Winfrey and Muller, 2012). In terms of the bilateral relations between the Czech Republic and Israel, the two countries have long shared a history of mutually friendly relations, the Czech Republic supports the Israeli cause and in return, Israel calls the Czech Republic its main ally on the European continent.

While these may be only minor examples, they provide a sufficient illustration of the dysfunction of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. There have now repeatedly been instances when even small countries such as the Czech Republic do not adhere to the conventional European policy – therefore, it could be argued that the European Union supranational authority did partly curtail the states' ability to produce their sovereign foreign policy, however, as it has been illustrated, the CFSP is not "set in stone", if existent at all, and the states can exert their own foreign policy orientation even if it is in contrary to the European one. Supposedly, the small states are not likely to overturn the general concepts of the European common policy, however, they do not need to invest and spend valuable resources and time on lobbying the other states in order for them to change the basic course of the European foreign policy, rather simply, the small states always have the option not to agree with the rest of Europe. As long as the state decides that their bilateral relations or economic interests with a third party in question (as, for instance, in the Czech Republic – Israeli case) have a higher priority for them on the policy agenda, and as long as the states are capable of facing any potential consequences, CFSP of the European Union can only exist as a concept. International relations theorists may have many examples of great powers challenging existing institutional systems or set-ups and breaking the rules of a game, nonetheless, when even a small state such as the Czech Republic does not honor the requirement to adhere to parts of the common European foreign policy, that mechanism therefore becomes highly debatable.

Interestingly, in 2013, the Association of International Affairs conducted a survey trying to answer European policy-related questions by inquiring the Czech policymakers about certain European topics. Overall, the general view was that the Czech Republic, as a small state, is not able to influence the negotiations and decision making processes at the EU level – in other words, Czech policymakers do not believe that the country is “capable of either formulating or asserting its interests in the EU” (Dostál, pg. 5, 2013). On the other hand, the respondents optimistically concur that this situation shall change in the future – about two thirds of the Czech policymakers believe that the “Czech ability to influence events in the EU” will increase⁴ (Dostál, pg. 15, 2013). Posing a rhetorical question – will the overall optimist sentiment of the Czech policymakers have any real effect on the Czech influence within the European Union? Will the Czech Republic further strive to strengthen its European position?

⁴ A graphic representation of the survey can be found in Annex III.

4.4. Overall Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic and its Relation with the Great Powers

The Czech government has been currently undergoing negotiations and debates concerning a renewal, or rather updating, of the official Czech foreign policy concept. The last official mission of the Czech foreign policy dates back to 2011, when it was ratified by the government on June 20 – the document lists the priorities of the Czech foreign policy as follows⁵: *“to strengthen the security of the Czech Republic, analyze the threats and to act upon them; to enforce the Czech economic and trade interests abroad, including energy security; to strengthen a positive image of the Czech Republic abroad; to cultivate good relations with the neighboring states and to strengthen regional cooperation; to support an effective and economically and politically strong European Union; to maintain and strengthen the transatlantic ties; to support the respect for human rights and democracy in the world (through a use of tools of transformation and development cooperation); and to support the European integration of the East and South-East Europe”* (“Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky”, pg. 7, 2011). While the list may appear a bit general or vague, the priorities could be considered as standard for a developed European small state. Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic states its priorities concerning the world’s greatest powers – the United States, Russia, and China; in other words, there is an institutional official basis of the bilateral relations of the countries. And despite the fact that the wording of the declaration is comparably “vague” as the one of the overall conception of the country’s foreign policy, clear variances are detectable in regard to the Czech position towards the three great powers.

In terms of the relations between the Czech Republic and the United States of America, the bilateral ties go as far as to the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1918 – it has been outlined before that the Czechoslovak state was born out of a concept of a nation’s right to self-determination, which was first articulated by US president Woodrow Wilson. As the Czechoslovak state was originally founded on principles and values which corresponded to those of the United States, such as democracy and freedom, the relation between the two countries was substantially positive during the interwar period. At the end of the World War II, American

⁵ The original Czech version of the foreign policy priorities can be found in Annex IV.

soldiers liberated a minor Western part of the republic – the Czechoslovak state soon fell under the Soviet umbrella of socialistic and communist states. Hence, between the period of 1948 until the Velvet revolution of 1989, there were no official diplomatic ties between the two countries because the Cold War completely separated the ideologies and paths of the former collaborators.

However, in terms of the modern history of the Czechoslovak state/the Czech Republic, the end of communism portrayed complete turnaround of the country's foreign policy orientation – and the relation between the US and the Czech Republic could have been reinstalled based on the pursuit of the same values and principles as the one of the interwar era. Notably, “Vaclav Havel inaugurated the new era during his first visit to the United States in February of 1990 in his new function as the then President of the newly free Czechoslovakia when he delivered the famous speech to the joint session of the US Congress” (“Czech – U.S. Relations”, 2015). In this speech, the first president of Czechoslovakia, a former dissident and a political prisoner of the communist regime, highlighted the pace of changes of the then-current world, emphasized the shared values between the Czechs, Slovaks, and the American nation, and commenced a new era of relations between the countries.

Despite some minor ups and downs, the ties between the two countries seem to be getting stronger ever since the “re-establishment” of a democratic regime in Czechoslovakia, and then later on of the Czech Republic. As was previously debated, the Czechs were committed to their foreign policy reorientation and as a result, they joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999 – hence, they became part of a Western-based umbrella military alliance, informally headed by the United States. And as one of the high points of the Czech-US relation, “after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Czech Republic proved that it is capable of fulfilling its allied commitments” as it partook in several of the allied operations in third countries, including Afghanistan and Iraq (“Czech – U.S. Relations”, 2015). A similarly high point in the bilateral relations was when “the US Congress placed the Czech Republic on its list of countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program, which establishes a non visa regime between the US and the respective countries, and, thus, *removed the last unnecessary barrier to Czech-US relations*” in 2008 (“Czech – U.S. Relations”, 2015). And while there was a lot of controversy regarding the Bush administration's foreign policy in terms of its interventionist tendencies, and there was the related criticism emanating from the European Union countries, the

Obama administration, on the other hand, and the Czech administrations keep quite a positive relationship throughout. The good relations between the Czech Republic and the Obama administration was ceremoniously commenced by a speech which president Obama held in Prague in 2009, soon after his first election to the office, when he quite famously gave his vision of a world without weapons of mass destruction.

According to the official sources, that is, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the relation between the US and the Czech Republic has been primarily based on three pillars: “cooperation in the field of security and defense, economic cooperation, and shared values” (Czech – U.S. Relations”, 2015). Put differently, the pillar of shared values was established under the realities of World War I and the emergence of Czechoslovakia as a sovereign independent state; the field of security and defense has been achieved by the Czech accession to the North Atlantic Alliance; and lastly, the economic cooperation could have started after the Czech Republic adopted a capitalist-system market and opened up to the outside world – through the joining of the European Union market towards the current negotiations of the free trade agreement between the US and the EU.

The good overall relations between the two countries and the determined Czech orientation towards the West in general can be well detected in the official conception of its foreign policy (even as of 2011). The conception, when foreseeing the relations between the US and the Czech Republic, is filled with phrases such as “common social and cultural values”, “respect of basic human rights and freedoms”, “a common viewpoint on most of strategic questions”; and it culminates with a statement that the “United States remain a key ally for the Czech Republic on issues of security-military cooperation and for developing the collaboration under NATO” (“Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky”, pg. 14, 2011). The wording of the conception of the Czech-US relations is even more important when compared to the wording of the predictions for the relations with Russia or China.

The Czech Republic’s relation with Russia has been damaged by the legacy of communism and the puppet Soviet rule of the latter half of the 20th century. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Czech Republic’s orientation towards the West tried to limit any political influence of Russia, however, there remained economic ties which were firstly, hard to break, and secondly, for the newly developing capitalist market undesirable to end as well. The Czech

conception of foreign policy was written and ratified by the government in 2011, therefore, before the crisis in Ukraine commenced – with the newly developing conception of 2015, changes in the wording and predictions for the bilateral relation with Russia are to be expected.

Nonetheless, in terms of its relations with Russia, the Czech Republic expected a “good and mutually advantageous relation” and to “develop a balanced economic exchange and energy cooperation”; while at the same time, the Czech Republic was said to “continue the dialog with the Russian civil society, especially in the area of support for human rights” (“Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky”, pg. 14, 2011). On the first sight, there are considerable differences between the predictions for the US-Czech and for the Russian-Czech relations – the US-Czech friendship is, even in the official documents, based on mutually shared values, interests, and viewpoints while the Russian-Czech relation is rooted in the necessary economic cooperation (especially because of the European energy security issue) with a mild reference to a human rights concern. The conception suggests the Czech Republic should cooperate with the Russian civil society organizations in order to improve the many human rights issues (ranging from a freedom to assemble, censorship, or LGBT rights) in the country; however, the interesting part of the conception is that in regard to China, there is no mention of human rights or of the need to develop a functioning civil society within the country.

The conception bases the main relation between China and the Czech Republic in the economic sphere – it bluntly says that that Czech aim “is to further deepen the mutual economic exchange with an emphasis on mitigating the negative trade balance” of the Czech Republic (“Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky”, pg. 14, 2011). And additionally, the conception carefully words that the Czechs see the rising potential of China as an “opportunity” for both – without any necessity to discuss the values the countries do not share. Therefore, in other words, the official Czech policy stance is that a socialist/communist China should be taken an advantage of, whatever the human rights situation in the country. It could be pragmatically argued that the Czech Republic cannot afford not to take this advantage; in any case, the varying position of the Czech government towards the three great powers becomes obvious.

Overall, the official conception of the Czech foreign policy can be considered quite standard for a small European Union country. It is based on the Czech main national goal, which is to ensure the country’s continuing existence; as well as on the country’s interest to be a part of

a functioning, developed, secured, and an economically-thriving international community, in terms of either the European Union system or the NATO military umbrella of states - the two international organizations which most influence the foreign policy of the country. The Czech Republic realizes its limited potential to influence the international relations system, however, that is not suggest that it blindly follows any European common foreign policy concept without evaluating its possible benefits for the country – as it has been illustrated, at times, the Czech Republic values its bilateral relations with outside states more than its obligation to follow the Common Foreign and Security Policy directives of the European Union. And in terms of the Czech relations with the world's great powers, namely the United States, Russia, and China, the official conception of the Czech foreign policy clearly outlines that the US is considered as the country's main ideological and political ally, while the relations with Russia and China are based primarily on the necessary economic exchange.

5. Analysis of the State of Israel as a Small State

In terms of the analysis of the state of Israel, its role as a small state in international relations and its attitude towards international organization, the study will firstly evaluate the emergence of the state of Israel per se and the controversies regarding its recognition as many members of the international community refuse to legitimize the Israeli right to existence. Similarly, Israeli position within the United Nations and the country's approach towards the organization will be discussed as well. Finally, combined with an analysis of the Israeli relation with its neighbors and the US-Israeli bilateral relationship, the country's standing in the international system shall be determined. *Compared to the case of the Czech Republic, can Israel be considered a small state in the end? Do the countries behave similarly in the international arena?*


5.1. Recognition of the State of Israel and its Significance

In three years, the state of Israel will celebrate 70 years since its establishment. Nonetheless, even such a long history does not ensure a controversy-free existence, especially in the case of the Israeli state.

Firstly, it is of importance to emphasize that Israel is not a state recognized by all members of the international community. Despite that fact that the country entered the United Nations in 1949, until this day the legitimacy of the state is not accepted by quite a few countries. A United States' House of Representatives resolution 1249 from June 5, 2008, urges the government of Iraq to recognize the state of Israel – but at the same time, it presents the international community with reasons for the recognition of the country as well as it provides a list of states which have not done so yet. According to the resolution, the state of Israel should be recognized by all members of the international community because of the approved United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 from 1947 “which provided for the establishment of an independent Jewish state”; because the United States recognized the state of Israel and it became its “most reliable ally” in the Middle East; because “*Israel signed bilateral peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994*, and has continually expressed its desire to establish peaceful relations with all other Arab states”; and among other further reasons, because “Iraq's

recognition of Israel would have a significantly positive impact on promoting security, stability, and potentially a long-term peace in the Middle East region” (“H. Res. 1249”, pg. 1 – 2, 2008). The resolution then proceeds to list the countries which have not yet recognized the Israeli statehood: “*Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Chad, Comoros, Cuba, Djibouti, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Morocco, Niger, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen*” (“H. Res. 1249”, pg. 1 – 2, 2008). For the sake of complexity, it should be noted that the Maldives have since recognized Israel and the two countries resumed diplomatic bilateral relations (“Israel renews diplomatic ties with the Maldives, a Muslim country”, 2009). In any case, it is easily observable that the Muslim international community of states in general principally refuses to recognize the Israeli right to existence.

Secondly, the list of countries which do not accept the Israeli statehood becomes the more essential once put on an actual map⁶:



⁶ The map is the author’s original creation – based on the H. Res. 1249 list of countries which have not yet recognized Israel.

As it can be observed, with the notable exceptions of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, Israel does not have a friendly state in its neighborhood. And it would still be up to a debate to what degree these three countries could be labeled as “friends” of the Israeli cause. Quite the contrary, virtually the entire Arabian Peninsula consists of Muslim countries which are not sympathetic to the Israeli cause and therefore quite naturally side with the Palestinian Arabs; however, the same goes for most of the Middle Eastern and North African countries – with the occasional Asian or Latin American additions.

This is part of the reason that Israel has been perceived as a small state for the purpose of this study. While the arbitrary measures such as population or territory size would automatically classify Israel as a small state per se, the relational dimensions of the definition could go against this assumption. Indeed, as was previously debated, Israel has quite a large economy in terms of its GDP and, more interestingly, it spends large amounts of resources on its military capabilities. Combined with the fact that the country possesses nuclear weapons, these relational criteria would stand against the fact that Israel fulfills its role as a small state in international relations. However, the map of the “enemies” of the state of Israel suggests to what degree the state of Israel must be necessarily dependent on its allies, and namely, the United States. Israel has been isolated in its own neighborhood and it would not have been able to achieve much as a sovereign power without the alliance with some of the countries of the Western world.

5.2. Israel and its Neighbors

Having illustrated the international perception of the state of Israel, it shed some light on the current status of Israeli foreign policy. However, the number and type of countries which have not yet recognized Israel as a sovereign and legitimate state is not the sole factor which influences and shapes the country's policies.

In the case of the Czech Republic, the foreign policy history could have been quite simplified – due to the country's belonging to the Soviet bloc for more than 40 years; the state's foreign policy during that period had been, put simply, determined for it from above. On the other hand, after the fall of communism, there was a complete reorientation of the country's policies and it remained Westward-leaning until today. Comparatively, what have been the factors which most influenced the creation of Israeli foreign policy goals?

Firstly, Israel's first goal has always been the survival of the country, strengthening of the state, and a reinforcement of its position – given the controversies surrounding the establishment of the country (which never fully waned), Israel's ever-present foreign policy goal must have necessarily been the country's international recognition and support. Secondly, the status of Israel's bilateral relations was heavily dependent on the current developments in the region – namely, the history of Israel's military conflicts.

The list of Israeli wars is indeed more than extensive – chronologically the most important military conflicts involving Israel began in the late 1940s' when the country started its fight for independence; Israel, still under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion, invaded Sinai alongside of France and the Great Britain in 1956; in 1967, the Six-Day War led to Israeli acquisition of new territory, including the West Bank and Gaza, which constitute a point of controversy until this day; then, the wars of Attrition and Yom Kippur War followed which finally led to a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt; or first and second war with Lebanon (Bateman, pg. 391, 2002). Besides the inter-state wars, Israel also had to face two Palestinian uprisings, known as Intifadas. During its existence, Israel has been at war with most of its neighbors – therefore, the signing of a peace agreement with Egypt and then later on during mid 1990s with Jordan became ground-breaking points in Israeli history which then further shaped the country's foreign policy.

Israel's peace agreement with Egypt emanated as an outcome of the Camp David negotiations of 1978 as the two countries explicitly recall the negotiation's resulting framework for peace in the treaty ("Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt", 1979). Specifically, according to the Article I of the peace treaty, the two states agreed that as long as Israel withdraws "all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine", "*the state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them*" ("Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt", 1979). With heavy contribution of the US Jimmy Carter's administration, the significance of the agreement however goes much deeper than the sole withdrawal of armed forces from a disputed territory or an arrangement about navigation of the Suez Canal – it established peace between two countries which had been on a hostile path ever since 1948 and through extension, Egypt therefore became the first Arab country to officially recognize the Israeli state. The actual meaning of the treaty was somewhat amplified when it brought a shared Nobel peace prize to the leaders of Egypt and Israel.

The second Arab country which recognized Israeli's legitimacy as a state was Jordan. On October 26, 1994, the two countries signed a bilateral peace treaty, quite similar to the one between Egypt and Israel, and therefore entered a new phase in the Arab-Israeli relationship. Both the peace agreements are crucial as the partners to the treaties, both Egypt and Jordan, are immediate neighbors of Israel and the cessation of hostilities and establishment of diplomatic relations were essential to the progress of the Middle East peace project in general.

The Israeli-Jordan peace treaty was quite an elaborate and comprehensive agreement which outlined many of the bilateral challenges, including "boundary demarcations, water issues, police cooperation, environmental issues and mutual border crossings" ("Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty", 1994). Importantly, except for the clear demarcation of the territorial boundary between the two neighbors, the countries also agreed they "will refrain from any acts of belligerency or hostility, will ensure that no threats of violence against the other party originate from within their territory, and undertake to take necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism" ("Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty", 1994). Nonetheless, none other Arab country of the region (except for the case of Turkey which recognized Israel back in 1949) decided to follow the examples of Egypt and Jordan and therefore, Israel retains unfriendly, sometimes even hostile and aggressive,

relations with most of the countries of the Middle East – the opposition against Israel in the region being led mainly by Iran, Syria, and Iraq.

Undoubtedly, the country's relations with its neighbors must have necessarily influenced the state's foreign policy. Given the Israeli struggle for existence and international recognition, combined with their rhetoric of a country searching for peace and solutions, the signing of peace treaties with two of its neighbors brought a new momentum for the country's foreign policy. The agreement could have been used as examples of Israeli "good faith" – especially because the countries had been previously at war. Nonetheless, the Israeli tussle commenced not only with its independence declaration in 1948, but was exacerbated with its admission to the community of the United Nations.

5.3. Israel and the United Nations

Israel was received by the United Nations community of states on May 11, 1949, through a General Assembly resolution 273, which labeled Israel as a “peace-loving” state and decided “to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations” (“GA Res. 273”, 1949). And ever since the country’s admission, which was expectedly far from a unilateral decision of the international community, there have been debates surrounding the position of Israel within the organization and in turn, the organization’s perception of and attitude towards the country.

In line with the two camps of states (those who have recognized Israel and those who fight against it), the organization’s decisions or recommendations tend to tilt one or the other way. Consequently, the Arab community, which consistently lobbies for anti-Israeli or pro-Palestinian resolutions, would “complain” that the United Nations are under the influence of the United States and the pro-Israeli Jewish lobby and that the organization has lost its legitimacy as it produces biased decisions and recommendations. On the other hand, Israel protests by displaying the number of anti-Israeli General Assembly resolutions.

For instance, arguably, one of the most “famous” proofs of the UN discrimination against Israel is a UN General Assembly resolution 3379 from 1975 – in the midst of the Cold War, the Soviet bloc lobbied alongside the Arab community of states and a “vaguely” named resolution on “elimination of all forms of racial discrimination” was passed. The resolution made a parallel between the South African apartheid regime and the Palestinian situation and at the end determined “*that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination*” (“GA Res. 3379”, 1975). Given that Zionism was one of the driving forces behind the establishment of the state of Israel per se, Israel, along with the United States, viewed the resolution as gravely biased and discriminatory. And because the resolution was waived by the United Nations General Assembly following the end of the Cold War, Israel received a stronger argument for their side.

Unfortunately, the debate about the United Nations possible bias towards any of the parties of the conflict continues until this day – and both parties are consistently ready to use and interpret any decision or proclamation of the international community in order to support their own cause. Recently, the discussion involved even the UN Secretary General. In 2013, Ban Ki-moon allegedly admitted, in a UN-sponsored meeting in Jerusalem with Israeli students, that

there exists an anti-Israeli overwhelming environment in the organization – however, as the “rumor” spread, the Secretary General had to deny this statement and claimed there is no discrimination against the state of Israel on the grounds of the United Nations (Shwayder, 2013). At this moment, Ban Ki-moon went a little further and assured the international community that any “incitement against any group of people, any religion or tradition is unacceptable” at the United Nations (Shwayder, 2013). In any case, an analysis whether the United Nations as an organization tends to favor either side of the conflict would require enormous research of every UN General Assembly resolution or Security Council US veto, which is not a primary object of this study; however, it is to illustrate the complicated position Israel holds within the organization – constantly in opposition to a considerable number of states.

Overall, in terms of Israeli foreign policy, the country lacks a coherent and complex approach. Unlike the Czech Republic which every few years officially presents a conception of its foreign policy where it outlines its primary national aims and the goals it wishes to achieve within the various international organizations and in terms of its bilateral relations with third countries, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not produce any similar declaration. According to *MITVIM, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies*, an independent think tank, Israel indeed “lacks a coherent foreign policy” which only degrades the country’s position in international relations (“Guiding Principles for a New Israeli Foreign Policy Paradigm”, pg. 1, 2015). Moreover, the institute provides concrete foreign policy suggestions – such that would elevate the status of the country while at the same time contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Firstly, the institute recommends that, because of the seriousness of the Palestinian conflict and its direct correlation with Israel’s security and its position in international relations, Israel should follow a strictly pro-peace policy and “commit to resolving the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts as one of its central goals” (“Guiding Principles for a New Israeli Foreign Policy Paradigm”, pg. 1, 2015). The proposal quickly abandons vague rhetoric when it further suggests that Israel should “*take the initiative to promote the two-state vision, to honor its obligations from previous agreements and to refrain from unilateral measures (including settlement expansion)*” (“Guiding Principles for a New Israeli Foreign Policy Paradigm”, pg. 1, 2015). The report further alleges that the international support Palestine receives suggests that it

indeed is Israel who should change its approach to the issue, specifically, it suggests that “Israel must find less antagonistic ways to respond to Palestinian diplomatic activities on the world stage that distinguish between legitimate, non-violent political actions of a neighboring entity and terror activities of non-state actors” (“Guiding Principles for a New Israeli Foreign Policy Paradigm”, pg. 2, 2015). While ambitious, given the current electoral developments in Israel, such recommendations seem unlikely to be implemented any time soon.

In terms of a more multilateral regional foreign policy, the proposal suggests that Israel should restructure its approach to its neighbors, which are mostly “unfriendly” Arab states in opposition to the Israeli cause. As it has been previously discussed, because of its position and actions taken towards the Palestinian Arabs, the country became isolated in its own neighborhood – “Israel has developed a mentality of a secluded island, which is defensive and isolationist in nature and which views the world as a hostile place” (“Guiding Principles for a New Israeli Foreign Policy Paradigm”, pg. 2, 2015). And through the use of more open and inviting regional policies, the report suggests that Israel should take advantage of its unique geographic position.

In order to summarize Israeli foreign policy, the position of the country in the region, and the country’s standing at the United Nations, it is necessary to re-emphasize the state’s primary cause, which is the legitimization of Israeli existence. Because of this, the country fought many wars, and despite that fact that some groundbreaking achievements were accomplished (such as the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan), Israel faces enormous opposition from the Arab community of states. Combined with a lack of a comprehensive official foreign policy, Israel makes itself strongly dependent on the ideological support of its ally, the United States.

5.4. Israeli Bilateral Relations with the United States

Israeli partnership with the United States has become the backbone of the country's foreign policy; much has been written about the potency of the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States. The relation developed soon after the declaration of the state of Israel – President Truman of the US administration recognized Israel on the very same day of its establishment and then later on, under the realities of the Cold War, an extremely tight relationship developed between the two countries. As it was outlined, at the UN, the Soviet Union used to side on many issues with the community of the Arab states – naturally, Israel put itself into a position of an asset in the Middle East which the United States could not have afforded to disregard.

According to the US Department of State, the two countries developed a solid and tight relationship “anchored by over \$3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually” which Israel receives from the United States (“U.S. Relations With Israel”, 2014). Besides such significant financial cooperation, the two countries' relation is governed by a number of agreements on a variety of topics – ranging from military and judiciary cooperation, fighting terrorism, investment, agriculture, aviation, science and research, technology transfers, and suchlike. However, possibly the most important pillar of the bilateral relationship between Israel and the United States is a Free Trade Agreement, which the two countries conducted in 1985 and it states that the two parties to the treaty agree to “eliminate the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce on trade between the two nations in products originating therein” (“Israel-US Free Trade Area Agreement”, 1985). Historically the first free trade area agreement for the United States provided the basis for economic cooperation and future interdependence of the two countries.

Nonetheless, even the uncritical relation between the US and Israel has commenced to acquire defects and it transformed itself into a “more ambivalent, critical, and much more balanced” one (Saltzman, Ben-Ami, and Pinkas, pg. 4, 2015). After the end of the Cold War, the significance of Israel as being the US Middle Eastern ally consequently declined because the alliance lost (from the US point of view) its main enemy, the Soviet Union. And while Israel supported the US war on terror in the region, Obama's administration's foreign policy changes seem to further diminish the status of Israel.

In terms of the US foreign policy innovations brought by the Obama administrations, the US started to seek somewhat of a rapprochement with the Muslim and Arab states of the region – “Obama called for a new beginning and a reshaping of the relationship between the Muslim world and the US and the Western world” (Saltzman, Ben-Ami, and Pinkas, pg. 5, 2015). Combined with the reduced military presence of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States seem to have partly distanced itself from the developments in the Middle East – all to the disappointment and detriment of Israel. Similarly, the US famous “pivot to Asia” and their preoccupation with the rise of China suggest the decreasing priority of ties with the Middle East. And moreover, the MITVIM report suggests that “this process of disengagement is also in line with a move towards ‘energy independence’, that is the move to reduce US dependence on oil from the Gulf” (Saltzman, Ben-Ami, and Pinkas, pg. 5, 2015). Analyzing the forecasts about US energy security, the country should be able to achieve full independence in less than 10 to 15 years – consequently, a lessened interest in the countries of the region could be expected.

On the other hand, there may be developments outside of the Middle Eastern region which could possibly tilt the scales back in favor of Israel. With the Ukraine crisis and growing tensions between Russia and the Western world, Israel may be able to re-assert its position in terms of the US-Israeli relations. According to the report, such developments combined with “the crisis in Syria, Iran's nuclear program, and Russia's growing influence in the international system – could lead to a kind of new Cold War that could bring about more change in this critical regional system and remake America's attitude toward Israel once again” (Saltzman, Ben-Ami, and Pinkas, pg. 5, 2015). However, even at the US domestic level, Israel needs to fight a new battle.

Not only that the support for Israel has been becoming more and more of a partisan issue in terms of the US politics, also a new Jewish lobby emerged in Washington. In other words, the AIPAC⁷'s position may be endangered by a new, more “dovish” Jewish lobby – “J Street's establishment in 2008 led to the expansion of the American discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the two-state solution” (Saltzman, Ben-Ami, and Pinkas, pg. 6, 2015). The relationship between the countries has been gradually changing and the emergence of a new Israeli lobby allows for these changes to be legitimized. With its establishment, a new discourse

⁷ The American Israel Public Affairs Committee

about the Middle East and its challenges could have taken place – a discourse which finally sees the possibility of a compromise on both sides.

Most importantly, the report raises one significant point – that is, in the words of the former Israeli Consul General in New York, “the US is Israel’s strategic asset, and not the other way around” (Saltzman, Ben-Ami, and Pinkas, pg. 14, 2015). While Israel likes to see itself as an asset of the United States, it has been already emphasized that it is Israel which is dependent on the material and ideological support of the United States – arguably, it is more than likely that the United States’ position in international relations would not have suffered much without the existence of the state of Israel. Over the course of time, the country received enormous amounts of financial and technological support from the United States, as well as support in the form of the great power’s Security Council’s veto power on pro-Palestinian UN resolutions. Without the sometimes unconditional US support, it is “hard to imagine the state of distress in which Israel would find itself” (Saltzman, Ben-Ami, and Pinkas, pg. 14, 2015). Israel needs the United States as it has traditionally struggled to find allies elsewhere. Especially with the changing nature of the US-Israeli bilateral relation, the need of Israel to keep such an ally has been more obvious than before.

Nonetheless, even though Israel is a country quite isolated in its own foreign policy, or the lack thereof, and despite the waning US-Israeli relation, Israel appears to have quite stable relations with the European Union – the Czech Republic being one of its most reliable allies. It has been already illustrated that the two countries’ bilateral relation, as long as the Czech Republic or former Czechoslovakia was exercising sovereign and independent foreign policy, has only blossomed over the years.

Interestingly, possibly the latest assurance of the warm relations between Israel and the Czech Republic came from President Zeman this last March when he gave a speech in the United States at the AIPAC policy conference. Even though the main topic of his speech was the need to take multilateral and strong action against the growing Islamic terrorism, the Czech president reassured Israel of the Czech commitment to its issue. Addressing the pro-Jewish American lobby, president Zeman said that “your discrimination is our discrimination, your victims are our victims” and rephrasing a famous line of President Kennedy, Zeman added that “now we all must say: ‘I am a Jew’” (Zeman, 2015). Through such political declarations, combined with the Czech

voting record on Israeli-related issue at the UN, the Czech Republic indeed acts as quite a reliable ally of the Jewish nation.

6. Analysis Outcomes

Overall, the main purpose of this study was to determine whether the Czech Republic and Israel can be considered as small states, as small players in international relations, given the theoretical framework for small states and the countries' current foreign policy approaches.

Firstly, based on the arbitrary dimension of small states' definition – the countries' population, size of territory, economy, and their military spending, the analysis already suggests considerable differences. While in terms of the states' territory and population sizes not much discussion is necessary, it is the alterations in the volumes of the countries' economies and the amount spent on their military which raises additional inquiry. Israel's economy is about a third bigger than the one of the Czech Republic; moreover, the country spends almost 6% of their GDP on its military structures (as opposed to the incomparable 1% of GDP spending of the Czech Republic). Additionally, given that Israel possesses nuclear capabilities, arguably there is a difference not only in the volume of military spending, but also in its nature. Therefore, the first analysis suggests that, especially in comparison with the Czech Republic, Israel may not be accounted for as a small state. Nonetheless, on the other hand, compared with the United States which are undeniably a great power, Israel lacks behind in all dimensions of the small states' characteristics. In the case of the relational definition, when a state is constituted a small player in international relations unless it is a great one, Israel could be still considered a small state, as well as the Czech Republic.

Secondly, there were many differences resulting from the states' foreign policy approaches and tools analysis. Being a member of many international organizations, the Czech Republic is an integral part of the international community – partly contrary to Israel. Specifically because of the Czech heavy involvement in the various international organizations, it can be asserted that the Czech Republic is indeed a typical small states – as a small player it chooses to influence the developments in international relations through its multilateral networks; with a rationale that through its international organization memberships it can achieve more than it would have acting on its own.

Even though the Czech Republic attempts at times to exert its influence internationally, for instance, when it does not completely adhere to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of

the European Union or when it gives its bilateral relations a higher priority, it can be asserted that the country acts as a quite typical small state. It fulfills all the arbitrary and relational criteria of the theoretical definition and at the same time, it realizes the limits of its foreign policy.

On the other hand, the case of Israel is more complicated and unclear – while the country does not seem to consciously act as a small state and historically, it tried to improve its power position, its foreign policy outcomes isolated the state so completely in its own neighborhood that at the end, the country can hardly exert much influence internationally. There may be a gap between the Israeli rhetoric and “image” where the international community sees the state of its military and the actual power and influence the country may have. Importantly, there are still many countries, especially Arab states, which until this day question the legitimacy of the existence of the state of Israel per se and consequently, this must have had an enormous effect on the country’s foreign policy in terms of its shortcomings and occasional incoherence.

Even though this is a purely theoretical construct, however, it still should be considered in what position the state of Israel would have been today if it had not been for its lifelong relationship with the United States. The US is clearly a key ally for both countries, nonetheless, the Czech Republic became much more intertwined with the entire international community that it is not so heavily dependent on one sole great power. Especially now, when the US-Israeli relation seem to have slightly deteriorated, it become more apparent that the structure of Israeli foreign policy needs rethinking.

In other words, Israel may not be a typical small state in terms of the theoretical notions, however, it has become so isolated in its own neighborhood, it chose not to integrate in many international organizations, and it is heavily dependent on one key ally. Such as analysis emphasizes the country’s weaknesses and points to its possible inability to exert much influence internationally.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, this study analyzed the role of small states in international relations – on the particular cases of the Czech Republic and Israel, especially in terms of the countries' foreign policies. The main purpose was to determine whether the two states in question indeed behave as small states in the international arena and to summarize the most significant similarities and differences between the two countries.

The study was divided into four respective chapters and firstly, it provided a theoretical background for the analysis. Given the small states' academic theories, it became apparent that there is no universally accepted definition of the term "small state". However, the study provided a synthesis of the various theories in order to derive at a solution. As a result, the paper concluded there were two different sets of characteristics a small state may hold – arbitrary dimensions, which were measurable, and the more relational one, which provided more space for deliberation.

Secondly, the origin and the creation of the two states were debated. The brief historical background of the two states' establishment was necessary as it naturally, as well as some of the later developments, influences the countries' current foreign policy. Moreover, not to suggest there are many similarities between the historical developments of the Czech Republic and Israel; a few parallels were acknowledged. Indeed, the countries had to historically resolve issues of similar topics, namely, the nation's right to self-determination (which is a challenge still present for the state of Israel) and national minorities.

Thirdly, the analysis continued with the case study of the Czech Republic. The country's position in international relations was determined through its membership in the many international organizations – especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. The Czech Republic indeed is an integral member of the international community and the analysis of its foreign policy, combined with its attitude to the great powers, suggests that the country act as quite a typical small state. At times, it may try to assert more influence on specific international issues; nonetheless, the country is a small state in terms of its size, population, economy, military spending, foreign policy approaches and tools, capabilities, and mindset of the people.

Fourthly, and more controversially, the analysis progressed to the comparison with the state of Israel. The case of Israel is special because of the approach of the international community towards the state – not all states recognize the Israeli right to existence. Consequently, the countries' position in its own region is questionable because the evaluation illustrated the isolation of Israel, which is at times further deepened by the country's own foreign policy. Moreover, the state's extreme dependence on its alliance with the United States more push it to a position where they may easily lack the tools to exert much international influence.

In conclusion, the paper summarized the findings and outcomes of the analysis – both of the theoretical part and of the case studies of the Czech Republic and Israel. It determined that the Czech Republic mostly acts as a typical small state in international relations and that while Israel may try and assert more power at times, the incoherence of its foreign policy and the vulnerable structure of its foreign relations do not yet place it in a more advantageous position. It may not behave as a typical small state and it may have the economic and military tools to abandon this category and eventually become a great power; however, its own foreign policy does not yet make it feasible.

Therefore, to summarize the outcome of this study's analysis, the paper's hypothesis was therefore proven only partly – in the case of the Czech Republic, the country indeed acts as a small state with its quite archetypal foreign policy tools and approaches. Even when considering the theoretical arbitrary and relational definitions of small states, the Czech Republic passes all criteria. On the other hand, the analysis illustrated that the instance of Israel is somewhat more complicated – it does not act as a typical small state, it has the military and the economic potential to become a great power, nonetheless, the shortcomings in its foreign policy and its position in international community (with many states who do not yet acknowledge the country's legitimate right to existence) block it in a condition of an isolated small state in the Middle East.

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
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Annex I: Map of the intended UN Palestine Partition



Source:

“Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine.” United Nations General Assembly. United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine UNISPAL. Division for Palestinian Rights. United Nations. November 29, 1947. April 5, 2015.
<<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253>>

Annex II: Defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP of NATO member states

Table 3: Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product

Tableau 3: Dépenses de défense en pourcentage du produit intérieur brut


Country / Pays	Average / Moyenne 1990 - 1994	Average / Moyenne 1995 - 1999	Average / Moyenne 2000 - 2004	Average / Moyenne 2005 - 2009	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010e
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Based on current prices / Sur la base des prix courants									
Albania	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.5	2.0
Belgium	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1
Bulgaria (a)	//	//	//	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.7
Croatia	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.6	1.5
Czech Republic	//	//	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.4
Denmark	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4
Estonia	//	//	//	1.6	1.4	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8
France (b)	3.3	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.0
Germany	2.1	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4
Greece (c)	3.9	4.1	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.9
Hungary (c)	//	//	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1
Italy (c)	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
Latvia	//	//	//	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.2	1.0
Lithuania	//	//	//	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	0.9
Luxembourg (c)	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.5
Netherlands	2.3	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4
Norway (d)	2.8	2.2	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.5
Poland	//	//	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.9
Portugal (c)	2.3	2.1	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6
Romania	//	//	//	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3
Slovak Republic	//	//	//	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.3
Slovenia	//	//	//	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6
Spain	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1
Turkey (c)	2.8	3.2	3.2	2.0	2.2	1.8	2.0	2.1	1.9
United Kingdom (e)	3.7	2.7	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7
NATO - Europe *	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Canada	1.8	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5
United States (e)	4.6	3.3	3.4	4.5	4.1	4.2	5.1	5.4	5.4
North America	4.4	3.2	3.2	4.2	3.9	3.9	4.7	5.0	5.0
NATO - Total *	3.5	2.7	2.6	3.0	2.9	2.8	3.1	3.3	3.3

Source:

“Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Press Release. March 10, 2011. April 8, 2015.

<http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110309_PR_CP_2011_027.pdf>

Annex III: Perceived ability of the Czech Republic to exert influence in the EU



Source:

Dostál, Vít. "Trends of Czech European Policy: Study of European Policy Elites." Association for International Affairs. 2013. April 10, 2015.
<<http://trendy2013.amo.cz/wp-content/themes/trendy/files/paper.pdf>>

Annex IV: Czech Republic's foreign policy priorities

3. Priority zahraniční politiky České republiky

Základní priority české zahraniční politiky pro následující období:

- *posilovat bezpečnost ČR, analyzovat hrozby a působit proti nim;*
- *prosazovat hospodářské a obchodní zájmy ČR v zahraničí, včetně energetické bezpečnosti;*
- *posilovat pozitivní obraz a vnímání ČR v zahraničí;*
- *rozvíjet dobré vztahy se sousedními státy a posilovat regionální spolupráci;*
- *podporovat akceschopnou a ekonomicky a politicky silnou Evropskou unii;*
- *udržovat a posilovat transatlantickou vazbu;*
- *podporovat dodržování lidských práv a demokracii ve světě (s využitím prostředků transformační a rozvojové spolupráce);*
- *posilovat evropskou integraci východní a jihovýchodní Evropy.*

Source:

“Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky.” Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky. June 20, 2011. April 10, 2015.

<http://www.mzv.cz/file/675937/koncepce_zahranicni_politiky_2011_cz.pdf>