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Propaganda in International Relations: A Case Study of
the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

(Diploma thesis)

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Declaration of authorship:

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research. All sources of citations and references are stated.

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Prague, December 5th, 2015

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List of Abbreviations

CDA - Critical Discourse Analysis

EU - European Union

OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

RF - Russian Federation

UN - United Nations

UN GA - United Nations General Assembly

USA/US - United States of America

Introduction

Propaganda has always been one of the significant instruments of power. Together with the development of new technologies and the rise in the importance of soft power, communication and media in politics and international relations, it is crucial to focus academic attention on its role, manifestation and possible implications. Contrary to the past, the battlefields where conflicts are taking place have shifted to the media and public space and wars are waged for the minds of people in modern history. It is therefore of vital importance that scholars strive to identify, expose and explain any propaganda and its hidden motives in information and psychological warfare and practice. It is alarming how people are manipulated and how basic human emotions and desires such as love, compassion, pride or fear are abused in order to achieve certain ends. I believe that helping people understand the latent meanings and motives of propagandists is an imperative for any scholar as it might be the only way in which to limit the power propaganda has over us. Several recommendations on measures to combat and address the negative effects of propaganda were concluded at the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting that took place in September 2015 in Warsaw¹ called “Extinguishing the Flame of Propaganda with Media Freedom and Pluralism”. Amongst others, one of these recommendations is a call to “*develop and support myth-busting initiatives and networks to confront and expose propaganda*”. This serves as only one of many examples of how the issue of propaganda and how to address it has gained a prominent place in recent political, expert and public debates. The ever increased attention to it is connected with events related to the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict that has already been taking place for about two years. Hardly anyone doubts at this moment that we are truly witnessing a “propagandistic war”. Information warfare is heavily applied, and within it also propaganda. “*It is used to undermine public discourse through half-truths, outright lies and the rewriting of history, thus fueling extremist ideas and conspiracies.*”² The use of propaganda in the conflict in and around Ukraine has been widely examined lately.³ I, also, want to contribute to these efforts.

¹ I came across the list of recommendations during my internship at the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations, OSCE and other International Organization in Vienna. A reference on the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 2015 is to be found on (OSCE 2015a).

² Quotation from the OSCE HDIM Event Concept (Ibid).

³ See for example the analyses of Russia’s information campaign compiled by The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence on (NATO StratCom COE 2014) or (NATO StratCom COE 2015).

The title of my thesis is “Propaganda in International Relations: A Case Study of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict”. The key objective of the thesis is to identify and further examine the role of propaganda in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. More specifically, it aims to analyse relevant President Putin’s and President Obama’s speeches during the period around the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and identify and provide a comprehensive assessment of the propagandistic techniques and strategies included within the speeches. The thesis offers a hypothesis that there are, indeed, propaganda strategies present in the speeches of both leaders. The work is motivated by several research questions that were compiled in line with the chosen methodology:

- 1) Are there features included in researched speeches that can be denominated as propagandistic?
- 2) What are the characteristics of discourse which prevail in speeches? What discursive strategies are used and how are they applied?
- 3) What are the main themes addressed?
- 4) What kind of understanding of these themes and related actions underlie the speeches?
- 5) By means of what arguments and argumentation strategies is the annexation of Crimea justified and legitimized?
- 6) Alternatively, by means of what arguments and argumentation strategies is the annexation of Crimea condemned?
- 7) How are people or groups of people named and referred to in the speeches?
- 8) What characteristics are attributed to them?
- 9) Are such characteristics and discourse presented overtly?
- 10) Are they developed over time? Are they being intensified or mitigated?
- 11) Who is the target group? To whom are the speeches addressed?
- 12) What are the main differences between Putin’s and Obama’s speeches relevant to the research of the thesis?

My intentions are not to assess the ethics of propaganda in general or in this particular case, to decide, whether it is good or bad. As Vincent argues, “*whether labelled truthful propaganda, public diplomacy, or something else, the legitimacy of such messages rests in the eye of the beholder or, in this case, message sender*“ (VINCENT 2006, p. 255). There is, however, no doubt that there is a certain level of information asymmetry present

which tends to be more favourable for a propagandist. The aim of the thesis is to reduce such asymmetry and shed more light on the possible hidden motives of a message sender.

For my analysis I chose the political speeches of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and the President of the United States of America Barack Obama. I believe that the conflict in and around Ukraine is not solely an internal conflict but, rather, a conflict in which several other powers are more or less overtly involved. Investigating the speeches of two high-level representatives of Russia and the USA can, therefore, prove useful in understanding the modalities of the conflict. Their positions are quite different and thus well comparable, they refer frequently to each other within the speeches and for the sake of comprehensive analysis one can draw on research on the use of propaganda in the past, for example during Cold War, by the United States and the Soviet Union, a historical predecessor of the Russian federation. The statements for the analysis were selected from a period around annexation of Crimea which took place in March 2014 and which has been widely debated since then. They were selected in line with the methodology on the basis of their relevance to the topic of the thesis, conflict in general and more specifically, to the annexation itself. Fourteen fragments by Putin and eighteen by Obama are included more broadly in the analysis for the sake of intertextuality and depiction of main themes. Of these, three speeches for each of the speakers were selected for detailed analysis. A complete list of statements as well as a more detailed justification for the selection of particular speeches for the analysis is provided later in the thesis.

In order to achieve the stated objective and answer the established questions, qualitative research will be applied. Based on an extensive review of literature, I will apply critical discourse analysis (CDA), more specifically a discourse-historical approach to CDA defined by Ruth Wodak. In line with the critical theories in general, the approach acknowledges that absolute objectivity in academic research is not achievable as research and the researcher him- or herself is necessarily conditioned to historical, geographical, cultural and personal variables. Accordingly, I will make my argumentation transparent and justified while being aware of this subjective aspect. I also overtly manifest a goal of the thesis, equivalent to one of critical theories, which is to strive for emancipation of a person, in this case through reducing the control propaganda might have over people by helping them to expose it and understand the hidden motives behind it. The method is concerned with the use

of language and its conditionality and with identification of present discourses. Particular attention is paid to the historical, cultural and social background of the problem under investigation. This is one of the main reasons why I find Wodak's discourse-historical approach to CDA suitable for examination of propaganda as historical experience, cultural values and group norms (etc.) are often anchored in propaganda in order to achieve certain ends. Without an understanding of the historical background, it would thus be impossible to comprehensively investigate it. I will draw upon the procedure that Wodak developed for the investigation of national identity issues and the construction of the division between "us" and "them". After reading Putin's and Obama's speeches I believe this procedure will prove useful in the analysis as the division between "us" and "them" is very often used for propagandistic purposes and fueling emotions. This interdisciplinary approach is very important for the selected approach. No single precisely defined theoretical approach, nor categories or tools can be applied in the research. The CDA in general is rather eclectic; concrete methods and tools are applied according to the object under investigation. This is why I complement my methodology with other commonly used techniques in propaganda, specifically those listed under "ABC's of propaganda" by Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee and those defined by Onişoru. Combining these approaches will give rise to a comprehensive methodology for analysing propaganda and de-constructing the hidden meanings and motives relevant and suitable for my own analysis.

In line with the step-by-step procedure proposed by Wodak, I will first put the problem under investigation into a theoretical framework. The first chapter will define the basic terms relevant to propaganda as an understanding of them is necessary for general comprehension of the phenomenon and for how they will be used in later parts of the work. I will, in particular, seek a definition of propaganda itself, independently as well as in comparison with the terms that are frequently interchanged with it. I will be concerned with how the propaganda and its dissemination work, what are the methods of propaganda, who is a propaganda agent and who a target audience. This chapter explores the role of propaganda throughout history and aims to explore briefly the research of the phenomenon. The last part of the chapter is devoted to prominent propaganda strategies and commonly used techniques. The second chapter introduces and justifies in more detail the applied methodology. I will outline the theoretical background of the selected approach through a definition of critical theory and discourse analysis. I will then shed more light on the critical

discourse analysis and the elements common for all the various approaches. The discourse-historical approach defined and described by Ruth Wodak and her proposal of step-by-step procedure will be illuminated. It all will be accompanied by comments related to the problem under investigation and my own analysis.

The third chapter contains the empirical part of my work. First, I will provide the reader with a brief history of Ukraine in relation to the current events and more detailed modalities of the conflict of the last two years. Thus, the requirement for historical background will be satisfied. After that, a comprehensive analysis of propaganda in the speeches of President Putin and President Obama will be conducted while applying the chosen methodology and theoretical and historical background information. In line with the chosen methodology and in order to answer the research questions, a broader analysis of the main themes and an understanding of them included in all the fragments under investigation will be provided as well as a detailed analysis of three selected speeches by Putin and accordingly for Obama. In the case of detailed analysis of Putin's speeches, I draw my conclusions from the original data, not from translations, in order to be able to identify culturally conditioned meanings. Though I, myself, do not speak and understand Russian extensively, I will use the help of an expert, a Russian language tutor, in this regard. This requirement for an analysis of transcripts in their original languages is also one of the reasons I decided to write my thesis in English as it is useful for the flow of analysis while referring to the original quotations. At the very end of the thesis, the findings of the analysis will be presented and research questions answered. Transcripts of speeches used for detailed analysis form appendices to the thesis. They have their lines numbered so they serve as a reference for an analysis.

The thesis and its analysis are based on an extensive review of literature as well as personal field experience. I will draw in particular on books and papers by prominent foreign scholars with a focus on propaganda or communication in more general terms such as Jowett and O'Donnel, Vincent, Onişoru, Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee or McQuail, to list some. Czech literature is also included when quoting Ladislav Bittman or Jan Křeček. The historical background of Ukraine is largely based on an extensive book by Paul Robert Magocsi. The historical, cultural and social context of the ongoing conflict draws mostly on online resources, articles and commentaries. I will take into account the online resources of various media: BBC, Washington Post, New York Times, RT News,

Sputnik News (former Voice of Russia), and others. Sources on American and Russian history, culture and values were also substantively applied when conducting the analysis. Cambridge History of Russia (Suny, Ronald Grigor, et al.), Dějiny Ruska (Švankmajer, Milan, et al.) or a book on comparison of the USA and the Russian Federation with regard to their security and strategy culture by Eichler and Tichý were used in order to understand the history of Russia and its relation to Ukraine and the USA. Authors like for example Michael Foley were examined in the case of the United States. A book on culture in international relations by Zuzana Lehmannová (et al.) and particularly the chapters on Russian and American culture proved to be very helpful in order to understand what possible beliefs, values or attitudes are anchored in a particular cultural environment. My knowledge about critical discourse analysis and various related approaches was gained by numerous papers on the topic. Logically, I concentrated most on Wodak's work but I also examined Fairclough's, Ten van Dijk's or Jäger's approaches to CDA in some detail. When examining and selecting the relevant statements by Putin and Obama, I turned to the official sources, thus the "President of Russia" website and its part on "Transcripts" and the website of the "White House - President Barack Obama", its sections "Speeches & Remarks" and "Statements & Releases". Apart from that, I will draw on my personal field experience as I was an intern at the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations, OSCE and other International Organizations in Vienna in the period September 2015 - December 2015. I was part of the Czech delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and I was present at numerous meetings in which the conflict in and around Ukraine was discussed and during which I could hear the rhetoric and various arguments that Russian and American ambassadors, as well as others, presented in this regard. Thus, it gave me a good picture of and context for the topic and of relevant positions as well as possible hidden motives.

As one of the steps of comprehensive analysis, Wodak urges the investigation of multiple genres and public spaces. The analysis of several political speeches itself, though important and interesting, will not comprehensively cover the whole complexity of the issue of propaganda in the conflict. Though intertextuality was incorporated, the scope of the thesis does not allow for more comprehensive analysis of various genres. The analysis of sound elements and non-verbal aspects, as well as more careful examination of the dissemination of the speeches and included messages that would exceed the official resources is

not included for similar reasons. The author is aware of these limitations and encourages other scholars to explore the issue further.

1. Theoretical framework

The first chapter intends to put the problem under investigation into a theoretical framework.

1.1. Definition of terms

First of all, the selected terms relevant to propaganda will be defined which will prove helpful for their understanding further on. “Propaganda” could, according to Jowett and O’Donnell, be understood as *“the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist”* (JOWETT, O’DONNELL 2012, p. 7). “Public relations” (PR), a term which is often interchanged with propaganda, are described as *“professional communication activity with the aim of the creation and preservation of the positive relationship between the submitter and the audience (public), of course with a great emphasis on communication with the transmitter of such a relationship, the media”* (KŘEČEK 2013, p. 110)⁴. If to define “public diplomacy”, another term similar to propaganda, we could use the dictionary definition of this term in regards with the US policy: *“Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad”* (The Free Dictionary 2015). Nevertheless, I will provide other definitions of propaganda as well as the differences among these closely related terms in the next chapter.

Another widely used term worth defining is “persuasion” which can be depicted as *“a communicative process to influence others”* while *“a persuasive message has a point of view or desired behavior for the recipient to adopt in a voluntary fashion”* (JOWETT, O’DONNELL 2012, p. 32). Closely connected to both propaganda and persuasion are beliefs, values and attitudes as they vary according to a receiver of a message and have very much to do with how the message will be accepted and interpreted. The first of them, a “belief” *“expresses the relationship between two things (...) or a thing and a characteristic of that thing”* (Ibid, p. 35). Already existing beliefs have to be taken into account when

⁴ The translation of the original version was done by the author of the thesis.

a propagandist aims to alter or dismantle them or if he or she attempts to create new ones. A “value” can be portrayed as a kind of belief that is probable to endure long-term and is very hard to be altered. It is believed to serve as a sort of guideline and standard for someone’s behaviour. Values basically decide what a person conceives as right or wrong, favourable or unfavourable. Personal values are drawn on cultural values that are common for a bigger group of people, most typically when citizens of a certain nation share a similar national vision. These “national” or more broadly speaking “cultural” values more or less differ among civilizations, nations, or smaller groups within nations. The national values of people in the United States of America are, in general, different from those of Russians or Latin Americans. And since the values, whether personal, national or any other, make a strong anchor for propaganda, they are usually taken into account by a propagandist when he or she formulates his or her propagandistic message (Ibid, pp. 35 – 36). An “attitude” is defined by Jowett and O’Donnell as “*a readiness to respond to an idea, an object, or a course of action*”, as “*an internal state of feeling toward, or an evaluative response to, and idea, person, or object*” (JOWETT, O’DONNELL 2012, p. 36). Attitudes usually go hand in hand with the forming of beliefs. When a person forms a belief toward something, he or she automatically acquires an attitude toward it at the same moment. A belief is a sort of association with an object whereas an attitude tends to be rather an attributive evaluation of it. However, it also tends to be quite durable and thus anchored for propaganda purposes (Ibid, p. 36). “Behaviours“ or behavioural patterns are manifest expression of being and provide for considerable forecasts of future steps. Reminding the target audience about their past behaviours and achieved satisfaction or, conversely, disappointment, models of behaviours provide for quite a frequent technique in persuasion or propaganda. As we were talking about national or cultural values as values common to certain group of people, these can be more broadly defined as group norms. As the two scholars point out, “*‘group norms’ are beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors derived from membership in groups*” (Ibid, p. 37). This is also closely related to the concept of identity. There is not yet one definition of identity agreed by everybody. However, we could understand it to be a result of a social process. Thus, in line with constructivism, not as something that is given and cannot be changed. With regard to international relations, the focus is usually on collective or national identity (KRATOCHVÍL, DRULÁK 2009, pp. 97 – 99). It has very much to do as well with “collective memory” and “collective symbols” and a context and way of understanding which is common, and typically different from others, for a certain social group, for example nation. The last term which it is useful to define at the beginning

of the thesis, though I will go back to it more precisely later, is “discourse”. It is related to the use of language and its conditionality to historical, geographic or ideological environment, just to list some. Norman Fairclough understands discourse as “*a way of signifying a particular domain of social practise from a particular perspective*” (FAIRCLOUGH 1995, p. 14. In: WODAK, Ruth 2001, p. 66).

1.2. Seeking a definition of propaganda

The term “propaganda” comes from Latin, from the phrase “to be propagated” (ONIŞORU 2011, p. 39) and in its most neutral sense it can be understood as to disseminate or promote certain visions or ideas (JOWETT, O’DONNELL 2012, p. 2). It first officially appeared, though used even before, in the 17th century and it was connected to the activity of the Church. The Pope Gregory XV founded an official body translated as “Congregation for propagating the faith” in 1622 whose main goal was spreading Christianity and had very much in common with Catholic missionary work. The term was eventually extended to include also various sorts of promotion of political ideologies and, as Bittman adds, it became connected with a rather negative and pejorative meaning (BITTMAN 2000, p. 80). But what does propaganda mean today? What are its characteristics, goals and techniques? Authors who dedicate themselves to the study of propaganda, and I mostly focus on propaganda in international relations within my thesis, offer various definitions of the term. However, one common definition which everybody would agree upon does not exist yet. The viewpoint of a beholder is usually the factor that influences in the end the particular understanding of it (VINCENT 2006, p. 237). Here, I will present several definitions by prominent academics which I find most accurate based on a review of extensive literature on the topic. The Oxford Dictionary sees propaganda as “*information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view*” (Oxford Dictionary 2015), the Cambridge Dictionary as “*information, ideas, opinions, or images, often only giving one part of an argument, that are broadcast, published, or in some other way spread with the intention of influencing people's opinions*” (Cambridge English Dictionary 2015). Vincent’s understanding of propaganda links these together: “*Propaganda has to do with the use of communication channels, through known persuasive or manipulative techniques, in an attempt to shape or alter public opinion*” (VINCENT 2006, p. 233). He then concludes in the simplest possible way that “*propaganda is a long-established communication technique employed for public opinion manipulation*”

(Ibid, p. 264). Jacques Ellul viewed propaganda rather as a technique itself, a social phenomenon that might not be intentional and he implied that all the somehow biased accounts were propagandistic in their nature (ELLUL 1965. In: JOWETT, O'DONNELL 2012). "Bias" could be understood as some level of alternation of reality (SHOEMAKER, REESE 1991. In: MCQUAIL 1999, p. 287). Contrary to that, McQuail and Street's division of the types of bias according to the level of intentionality and overtness presupposes that not every bias is, nevertheless, propagandistic. They differed among four types of non-objective or biased messages: partisanship, propagandistic, unwittingly biased and ideological (MCQUAIL 1992. In: KŘEČEK 2013, pp. 31 – 32). Linebarger wrote about propaganda in 1948 that it *"(...) consists of the planned use of any form of public, or mass-produced communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific purpose, whether military economic or political"* (LINEBARGER 1948, p. 39; VINCENT 2006, p. 235). What is the aim of applying of propaganda? According to Vincent, it is *"to persuade and convert by using intentionally selective and biased information"* or *"to support public policies, nurture feelings of patriotism, or just convince us that certain activities, situations or products will serve our best interests (...)"* (VINCENT 2006, p. 233). However, the most accurate definition is in my opinion to be found in a frequently cited book *Propaganda and Persuasion* by Jowett and O'Donnell: *"Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist"* (JOWETT, O'DONNELL 2012, p. 7). They then go into a careful explanation of all the terms used within the definition. "Deliberate" and "systematic" are used to point out that propaganda is not something unintentional but rather a strategy that is thought through long before it is applied. "Attempt" refers to the active advance to achieve a certain goal. The desired state of a propagandist might be of three main types: perceptual, cognitive or behavioural, eventually all three together. These are embodied in *"to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour"*. The last part of the definition *"to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist"* is a key to understanding what propaganda means (Ibid, pp. 7 – 17). As Jowett and O'Donnell stress, *"the one who benefits from the audience's response, if the response is the desired one, is the propagandist and not necessarily the members of the audience"* (Ibid, p. 13). The recognition and identification of propaganda is, however, very difficult, though highly important. Vincent notes that propaganda is sometimes not immediately identified as doing damage (VINCENT 2006, p. 235). Bittman warns that the level of effectiveness of the techniques of modern

propaganda is so high that it is very hard for the general public to realise they became victims of its application (BITTMAN 2000, p. 81) and Jowett and O'Donnell add to this: *“Propaganda includes the reinforcement of cultural myths and stereotypes that are so deeply embedded in a culture that recognizing a message as propaganda is often difficult”* (JOWETT, O'DONNELL 2012, p. 289).

According to Vincent, all nations participate in conducting propaganda, both internationally and domestically. Propaganda is mostly used in three ways. First, it can be applied by political leaders in order to form the desired viewpoints of the local population on global matters. Second, political leaders might wish to influence the opinions of people from abroad. Finally, not only government leaders are engaging in propagandistic activities. Non-governmental organizations, civil society and other actors can use propagandistic messages with a view to influencing the public or have an impact on politicians and their relevant decisions (VINCENT 2006, p. 233). Onişoru and others⁵ divide propaganda into black, white and grey. Information in what is called “white propaganda” overtly refers to reliable sources that are easily accessible for checking (ONIŞORU 2011, p. 40). According to Bittman, a good example of white propaganda is the radio broadcast for a foreign audience. This type of propaganda is (was) used for instance by the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle, Radio Israel, Radio Moscow or the BBC (BITTMAN 2000, pp. 82 – 83). Contrary to that, “black propaganda” tends to identify the message with reliable sources but in reality the level of unreliability of those sources is rather high (ONIŞORU 2011, p. 40). Bittman defines the main difference between white and black propaganda by saying, that *“black propaganda (...) has an aim of not just to influence but to deceive the general public”* (BITTMAN 2000, p. 83). Activities by the racist regime in South Africa or a presidential campaign in the United States in 1972 stand for an example of such practice. According to Bittman, the Republicans in the campaign mentioned used numerous disinformation messages in order to create a conflict inside the Democratic Party (Ibid, pp. 83 – 85). “Grey propaganda” stands somewhere in the middle with elements of both black and white propaganda. In this case the source is not known, thus it is impossible for the audience to prove the information right (ONIŞORU 2011, p. 40). Szanto offers another typology and divides propaganda into two forms, agitative and integrative. “Agitative propaganda” aims to alarm the target audience and result in substantive change eventually.

⁵ See for example (BITTMAN 2000, pp. 82 – 87) or (CUNNINGHAM 2002, pp. 65 – 76).

“Integrative propaganda”, on the other hand, follows the goal of making the people lethargic, apathetic and neutral, thus in effect limiting possible interest in the matter in question (SZANTO 1978, p. 10. In: JOWETT, O’DONNELL 2012, p. 17). Cunningham, apart from the black, white and grey classification, offers other categories and types of propaganda as well. These are for example counterpropaganda, hate propaganda, propaganda of the deed or agitation, integration, disinformation and bureaucratic propaganda (CUNNINGHAM 2002, pp. 65 – 76).

Another way to define propaganda is to understand it in relation to other terms. Therefore, I will try to frame the understanding of propaganda more by seeking a definition for terms that are sometimes interchanged with each other and with propaganda in the media or in general discourse. As Vincent shows in an example of the United States, the term propaganda gained a sort of unpopularity and negative connotations. Therefore, instead of this, people use terms such as “*PR, publicity, promotion, marketing, public affairs, and advertising. These are often no more than modern-day synonyms*” (VINCENT 2006, p. 236). I will now focus on defining the terms “public relations” and “public diplomacy” with regard to propaganda. “Public relations” in general can be understood as “*professional communication activity with the aim of creation and preservation of the positive relationship between the submitter and the audience (public), of course with a great emphasis on communication with the transmitter of such relationship, the media*” (KŘEČEK 2013, p. 110)⁶. Though public relations usually refer rather to commercial and business activities, the principle of their philosophical foundations as they were defined by the so-called father of public relations, Bernays, and of political propaganda are very similar: “*If we understand the mechanism and motives of the group mind, it is now possible to control and regiment the masses according to our will without their knowing it*” (BERNAYS 1923, p. 83. In: VINCENT 2006, p. 236). The Free Dictionary definition of “public diplomacy” in regards with the US policy is: “*Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad*” (The Free Dictionary 2015). I view overtness and trueness of information as one of high importance when trying to differentiate between

⁶ The translation of the original version was done by the author of the thesis.

public diplomacy and propaganda. Similarly, Vincent understands public diplomacy as “*closely related to propaganda*” and “*more acceptable*” (VINCENT 2006, p. 237) and adds: “*While the term propaganda does not address the truthfulness of a matter or position being espoused, public diplomacy, at least in principle, does*” (Ibid, p. 238).

Is then propaganda right or wrong? Nancy Snow concludes on the ethical question of propaganda the following: “*Propaganda is source-based, cause-oriented, emotion-laden content that utilizes mass persuasion made to cultivate the mass mind in service to the source’s goal. Its utilization is not good or bad (...). The ethical question associated with propaganda involves its means/ends agreement or lack thereof and its asymmetrical exchange of information that always favors the sponsor of propaganda. At its best, propaganda involves pro-social causes that do not stray too far from the truth. At its worst, propaganda serves strictly a pro-source function that uses whatever means necessary to fulfil its goals*” (SNOW 2012, p. 1). Vincent argues that the ethics of the question is up to the submitter of the information to evaluate: “*Whether labelled truthful propaganda, public diplomacy, or something else, the legitimacy of such messages rests in the eye of the beholder or, in this case, message sender*” (VINCENT 2006, p. 255). As I mentioned earlier in the introduction, the intention of the thesis is not, however, to evaluate but rather to identify the presence of propaganda in selected fragments and try to understand and depict the more or less latent meanings and motives behind its particular use.

1.3. How propaganda works

How does the process of propaganda dissemination work? Modern propaganda is disseminated through various means of mass communication such as radio, television, printed media (newspapers, magazines...), movies, literature, posters, advertisements, photographic pictures, press releases and other journalistic or printed forms (BITTMAN 2000, p. 81). A propagandistic message can, however, also be incorporated into public speeches, lectures, military parades (ONIŞORU 2011) or any other public event for that matter. The use of the internet and social media and the related “power of rumour” gained popularity and influence in recent decades as well (JOWETT, O’DONNELL 2012, pp. 158 – 164).

Jowett and O’Donnell offer a descriptive model of the process of propaganda which is to be found in Figure 1. The institution in the model stands for the usual initiator of the propaganda.

Propaganda agents are understood as the people who disseminate or produce the message directly through a medium of communication. They might be prominent and charismatic figures⁷ or public officers, bureaucrats or lower-positioned people. The public is the target audience of the propagandistic message, the general public or a certain selected segment of it. Between the propaganda agent and the target audience, there are means through which the message is disseminated, identified as media methods in the model. Social networks, for example, consist mainly of opinion leaders and people who disseminate rumours (Ibid, pp. 363 – 366). What is important to note and is also incorporated into the analysis below is the social-historical context. *“Propaganda as a process is socially determined. The social-historical context provides a heritage that gives a propagandist motivation and even a “style” of communication. To understand how propaganda works, we must consider how the existing social-historical context allows it to work,”* Jowett and O’Donnell stress (Ibid, p. 360). Culture contains the social-historical context and as such it is illustrated in the model *“as a rim surrounding the flow of propaganda, with canals leading to and from the process and the cultural rim”* (Ibid, p. 362). The whole process of propaganda’s creation, dissemination and reception depends on the specifics of the relevant culture. Elements of the culture such as ideology, societal myths, government, economy, social practice or events have a great influence on propaganda (Ibid, p. 362).

⁷ Such as for example President Putin or President Obama who stand for the propaganda agents of the discourse fragments in the analysis of the thesis.




Figure 1: Model of the Process of Propaganda (JOWETT, O'DONNELL 2012, p. 17).

1.4. Propaganda in history and research

Jowett and O'Donnel characterize propaganda as “*an integral part of human history*” (JOWETT, O'DONNELL 2012, p. 51). They date its origin back to the past, to Ancient Greece. Propaganda was applied by Alexander the Great as well as Imperial Rome. It has been used for religious purposes too, whether we go back in history to the rise of Christianity and efforts of messianism, crusades, reformation and counter-reformation or we examine the role of propaganda in Islamic fundamentalism that has had come under the spotlight more since 9/11. We could see the emergence of propaganda in the 18th century together

with increasing political agitation and progress in technology (especially in printing and transport technologies). Propaganda use is to be identified when analysing the circumstances of American and French Revolution at the end of the century. Later on, the 19th and 20th centuries saw the institutionalization of propaganda connected most importantly with the development of modern mass communication methods (Ibid, pp. 51 – 98).

Onişoru puts forward three models which illustrate well the rise of propaganda in the 20th century - the Nazi model, the Communist model and the Cold War. The first one was developed in the period of 1933-1945 and was heavily used in connection with World War II (ONIŞORU 2011, p. 41). Lasswell summarizes the general aims of wartime propaganda as follows: “(to) (1) *mobilize hatred of enemy*; (2) *preserve friendship of allies*; (3) *procure the cooperation of neutral nations, if possible*; and (4) *demoralize the enemy*” (LASSWELL 1927. In: VINCENT 2006, p. 241). The Nazi model, according to Onişoru, disseminated propagandistic messages through various means including the press, radio, large public meetings or military parades. It pushed forward German values such as the greatness of the country, its culture and science. The presented idea was that Germany was striving to protect Western civilization and its immanent values and identity against the Bolshevik invasion. It also aimed to alter reality by presenting the Hebrew people as traitors who betrayed Germany at the end of World War I. The collective symbols applied were most notably the “swastika” and the Hail salute (ONIŞORU 2011, p. 41). The communist propaganda included in the Communist model saw its rise in the Soviet Union at times of proletarian revolution and after. The means of dissemination were very wide, from movies, radio and television to literature, theatre and opera. The constructed idea was that the communist system and set of values are superior to “decadent” Western capitalism. Central features included the leader personality cult or the image of “Mother Russia” in need of protection from the Nazis that only her sons can provide her with (Ibid, pp. 41 – 42).

I will now examine in a bit more in detail Cold War propaganda since research on the propagandistic methods used by the two ideological blocks with the lead of the USA and the Soviet Union might prove helpful for conducting the analysis below. Jowett and O'Donnell point out that the period after the World War II “*generated increased demands for more extensive propaganda activities, particularly as the two great world powers, Russia*

and the United States, sought to establish their political and cultural hegemony in the rest of the world (JOWETT, O'DONNELL 2012, p. 280). Igor Golomshtok adds to that: *“Never before had empires felt so compelling the need to prove their virtue, to demonstrate their spiritual superiority, to claim the high ground of “progress”, to win public support and admiration by gaining ascendancy in each and every event of what might be styled the Cultural Olympics”* (GOLOMSHTOK 1990, p. 107. In: CAUTE 2003, p. 3). The main topics in the propaganda of the period were connected for example to the space race, the atomic bomb, the Cuban Missile Crisis or Berlin. The effectiveness, in case of the USA as much as in the Soviet Union, was achieved by producing rather simple messages that tended to foster emotions in the audience. In the United States, propaganda was disseminated mostly through Hollywood movies, literature, posters and other forms. The intelligence and psychological war was heavily engaged in the process. All that helped in the creation of a phenomenon in the USA called McCarthyism, after the Senator, McCarthy. It very much resembled medieval witch-hunts and as Onişoru points out, its impact was the exploitation of anti-Soviet sentiments in the American society (ONIŞORU 2011, pp. 42 – 43). We may find another example of propaganda in one of the points of strategy against the Soviet Union created in 1982 by the Reagan administration. This was to launch offensive propaganda through Radio Free Europe, Radio Freedom and the Voice of America in order to inform the public in Eastern Europe about what was going on in their region and abroad (TERZIAN 1995. In: BITTMAN 2000, p. 202). The Soviet Union is believed to have used means similar to the United States when it came to propaganda during the Cold War period. The Americans were portrayed as imperialistic and presented as opposition to Soviet striving for peace. Negative presentation of the enemy is, indeed, a common method used in political propaganda (ONIŞORU 2011, p. 43). Bittman summarizes four main goals of Soviet propaganda from that time: 1. to depict the USA as an imperialistic and aggressive power and blame them for the emerging crises in the world; 2. to isolate America from their allies and discredit those who collaborate with them; 3. construct barriers between the USA and third world countries, presenting their interests as incompatible; and 4. to make Soviet politics and foreign actions popular among the public and thus create favourable conditions for interventions abroad (BITTMAN 2000, p. 131). Examples of Soviet propaganda are the methods employed in regard to the Korean War. The Soviets disseminated various messages about the American use of bacteriological weapons, and fake photographs of insects

that the Americans allegedly threw down from planes were spread through the Soviet press (BITTMAN 2000, p. 132).

Propaganda has not disappeared since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is just that with modern technologies the governments are not able to control effectively the flow of information. “*With a push of just a single button on a computer or a cell phone, pictures and text can be sent to millions of receivers throughout the world,*” explain Jowett and O’Donnell (JOWETT, O’DONNELL 2012, p. 213). Nevertheless, the “old” forms of propaganda have not yet disappeared. The Russian leadership, according to some international institutions⁸, still has quite a substantive control over civil society and the media and applies censorship (Ibid, p. 213). Another noteworthy form of propaganda that has been widely discussed lately includes terrorism. According to Bittman, it is a form of political violence aimed at frightening and influencing the public (BITTMAN 2000, p. 89). The topic of terrorism might, nevertheless, be used by governments for their own interests too. As Vincent notes, governments still are the major users of propaganda (VINCENT 2006, p. 255). Vincent mentions for example the Chechen War and Russian attempts to depict all Chechens as Islamic terrorists and thus justify the government measures used against the Chechen resistance (Ibid, p. 260).

Modern research on propaganda dates back to the end of World War I. It is believed to be the first research which focused on mass media and communications. The early theories used to be rather social scientific studies of the phenomenon. The “father of public relations” Edward Bernays was among the first when in 1928 his paper Propaganda was publicized. At that time, he understood propaganda as something rather positive, even necessary in order to prevent chaos and conflict in society (BERNAYS 1928. In: ONIŞORU 2011, pp. 43 – 44). After the end of World War II, the term propaganda stopped being so prominently used, and in its stead academicians referred rather to “persuasion” as part of communication and social psychology studies. Later and recent studies have included the concept of conditionality of impact of propaganda. They have taken into account the historical, cultural and social context in which specific beliefs, values, attitudes, group norms and behavioural patterns are constructed, individual differences and other variables (VINCENT 2006, pp. 238 – 239; JOWETT, O’DONNELL 2012, pp. 165 – 169). Several

⁸ For example, recently (in August 2015) Human Rights Watch has criticised Russia in its submission to the World Bank’s 2016 World Development Report on Internet for Development (Human Rights Watch 2014).

prominent propaganda theories are worth mentioning. One of the most known is Burlo's Hypodermic needle theory, later referred to as the Silver Bullet Model or, more generally, bullet theories. This theory encompasses the notion that "*the mass media are so powerful that they can inject messages into an audience who then fall down as if hit by a bullet*" (ONIŞORU 2011, p. 239). In other words, that people are not able to fight against mass manipulation due to its immanent appeal. It is very much connected to the simple stimulus-response concept of media influence. Another popular theory is called "agenda setting" and the relevant function of the media who are believed to have the power to decide which issues of the day will be deemed as significant (JOWETT, O'DONNELL 2012, p. 189). Social context was incorporated into the research in the beginning of the 60's thanks to Klapper. He initiated the model of so-called limited effects. He argues that social relationships are more influential than any direct psychological message. The subjects then tend to re-interpret the received information according to their attitudes and past experience. At the end of the decade George Gerbner started the research on the impact of the media. He focused in his work on the influence of television violence and developed the so-called "mean world syndrome". The government was therefore not viewed anymore as the only possible propagandist; media and the larger industry structure were accused of manipulation with a view to bigger profit. In 1988, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman came up with the propaganda model theory in which they argue that the media, as any other company, have to deal with a lot of pressure and thus conduct propaganda on behalf of entities, whether individuals, businesses or governments, who are providing them with the necessary resources (VINCENT 2006, pp. 238 – 241).

1.5. Common strategies and techniques

There are many strategies and commonly used techniques in propaganda defined over time by research. One of the most influential set of strategies of propaganda campaigning comes from *The Fine Art of Propaganda* which was compiled by Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee (LEE, LEE 1939. In: VINCENT 2006, p. 243). Though it was publicized back in 1939, it is still taught at universities and included in books on communication. They put together seven common devices used by propagandists into so-called "ABCs of propaganda analyses".

These include:

- name calling,
- glittering generality,
- image transfer,
- testimonial,
- plain folks,
- card staking,
- bandwagon approach.

Name calling strategy encompasses the use of labels in order to present the idea positively or negatively, depending on the goal of a propagandist. It hopes that an audience will not look into details and will not examine further the message but settle with the picture presented. It tends to create an emotional reaction to the message and stereotyping is very often incorporated for example in order to present an enemy in negative way. As Vincent ads, the strategy is *“often used as a one-sided attempt to dismiss the opposition on the basis of emotionally laden but logically unsound arguments”* (VINCENT 2006, 245). Glittering generality has something to do with the use of noble, virtuous and vague terms, mostly as the presentation of a high level of morality. These are connected to the message that the propagandist tries “to sell” to the audience. The hidden motivation for doing this is quite similar as in the case of name calling. The propaganda agent attempts to minimize the discussion and discourage people from looking further into the detail of the issue. Image transfer can be identified when *“one takes the power, respect, or good reputation bestowed on an existing entity or concept, and then attempts to share these positive qualities through association with a product, individual/group, or position/program, the perpetrator is hoping to benefit through the phenomenon known as image transfer”* (Ibid, p. 247). In the case where a prominent figure popular to the public, either in a negative or positive way, is chosen to present the message, the propagandist aims to disseminate in order to connect his or her popularity with the message and thus present it in a positive or negative way, this can be viewed as a strategy of testimonial. The strategy of plain folks or in other words regular-guy approach is quite popular among politicians when they try to convince the public that they are just the same ordinary people as them and through that present their ideas as good and valid. The card staking device is probably the hardest to identify. The distortions and selection of facts, confusion, logical and illogical statements,

selective omissions and stereotypes are the most typical techniques. There is a certain level of deceit as well as the agent stacks cards against the truth. Emotions are also incorporated in order to limit reasonable discussion. The bandwagon approach involves an appeal to “just join the crowd” since this is what “everybody else is doing”. Nationalism and loyalty are some of the feelings that the propagandist aims to play at (Ibid, pp. 243 – 253).

Onișoru lists another nineteen most commonly used techniques, some of them corresponding more or less to the previously mentioned ABC’s of propaganda analyses. These are:

- attacking your opponent,
- appeal to authority (incorporation of citation of a prominent person that supports the message),
- appeal to fear,
- appeal to moral wrong (“a reasonable person must know/agree/realize”),
- tedious repetition technique,
- bandwagon⁹,
- contrast black and white (presentation of only two opinions - “you are with me or against me”),
- man of common sense (“my suggestions are the most rational and logical ones”),
- demonify the enemy,
- euphoria based on the use of an event (encouraging sentiments of happiness),
- falsification of information,
- appeal to patriotic sentiments,
- use of generality (vague terms without any substantive information)¹⁰,
- techniques that seek disapproval of an idea of an opponent,
- super-simplification,
- quoting out of context,
- reasoning,
- Red Herring (when you present data which you know are false and thus claim victory for your own information and theories),
- slogan as a short phrase with huge impact (ONIȘORU 2011, p. 40).

⁹ It corresponds with the bandwagon approach defined earlier.

¹⁰ It corresponds more or less with the previously mentioned strategy of glittering generality.

2. Methodology

In order to achieve the previously established objective and answer the research questions, a qualitative research approach will be applied for the analysis. A qualitative analysis of any content puts particular emphasis on latent or hidden meanings that cannot be understood merely from numerical data. It is not just the frequency of elements within the text which is important and is the main focus of qualitative research but also the relations between the elements, how they are tied together, what is given as a fact or on the other hand, what is missing. The identification and understanding of a specific discourse present in the text is crucial for qualitative analysis (MCQUAIL 1999, pp. 309 – 310). According to McQuail, the future of analysis lies in the incorporation of the broader meaning structures prevalent in a society in the attempt to understand any content. He points out two approaches, discourse analysis within which one focuses also on other systems of meanings in a particular culture and reception analysis that takes into account that it is also the audience who co-create the meanings of any text (Ibid, p. 312). For my analysis, after an extensive review of the literature, I chose the critical discourse approach, most specifically the discourse-historical approach defined by a prominent scholar Ruth Wodak as I believe it contains both requirements made by McQuail and it is most relevant for the researched topic and exposure of propaganda. I will now introduce and explain the defining characteristics of the selected methodology. I will start with the introduction to what makes a critical theory, then I will move to the discourse analysis and its elements and, finally, I will define the critical discourse analysis and briefly summarize its main aspects. Wodak's discourse-historical approach will be presented later on in more detail.

Critical theory has evolved since the 1980s as a prominent approach in the studies of international relations. It criticizes the contemporary organization of society as well as traditional positivist theories such as realism or liberalism. Contrary to the traditional theories, it overtly acknowledges the normativity that is believed to be immanently embedded in any theory. The historical and social context in which any theory is created is believed to be crucial and thus complete objectivity is unachievable; a theory is socially conditioned. The aim of scholars of critical theory is to transform the unfavourable organizational structure of society and thus achieve the emancipation and freedom of an individual (KRATOCHVÍL, DRULÁK 2009, pp. 131 – 132). Discourse analysis and its variations examine language in its social context, the way in which people understand

the world around them through language. According to Norman Fairclough, *“discourses are diverse representations of social life which are inherently positioned - differently positioned social actors see and represent social life in different ways, different discourses”* (FAIRCLOUGH 2001, p. 123). Thus, *“a discourse is a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective”* (FAIRCLOUGH 1995, p. 14. In: WODAK, Ruth 2001, p. 66). Meyer adds to the historical conditionality of discourses: *“All discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context”* (MEYER 2001, p. 15). The identification and understanding of the prevalent discourse and its inner order will help a researcher to comprehend the motives and processes behind people’s thoughts and expressions, thus also the hidden motives behind propagandistic message. It was back in the beginning of the 20th century when the social sciences started to pay attention to the role of language. A prominent figure in the post-structuralist discourse approach later on was Michael Foucault who shifted his focus from linguistic research rather to analysis of the meaning system (KRATOCHVÍL, DRULÁK 2009, pp. 51 – 52).

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is more problem-oriented research than particularly defined methodology (FAIRCLOUGH, MULDERRIG, WODAK 2010, p. 357). As its title suggests, it derives its essence from critical theories and discourse analysis approach. “Discourse” embedded in it refers to the previously mentioned relationship between language and society. It can be understood as an “array of meaning-making resources”, social practice or ideology. In the word “critical”, an approach to methodology is encompassed. *“CDA sees itself not as a dispassionate and objective social science, but as engaged and committed; a form of intervention in social practice and social relationships”* (Ibid, p. 358). As such, it takes into account the social and historical context. It has come to be applied in a more consistent manner since the 1990’s and there are several variations of it. Among the most prominent figures who each defined a specific approach to CDA, we could mention Fairclough who was the first one to define CDA itself, Ruth Wodak, Teun A. van Dijk, Ron Scollon or Siegfried Jäger, although there are many more. However, apart from what was said earlier, there are several basic elements that are common to all CDA theories. They are all problem oriented, and include linguistic examination, focused on social processes and phenomena such as power, hierarchy, exclusion, and inequalities in society. They try to be helpful in the understanding of broader social problems, and context is crucial for an analysis. All scholars agree that objectivity is impossible. There is no superior theoretical viewpoint that would be used in a consistent

manner and the collection of data as well as concrete methodology are not defined as they differ according to the object of investigation. An interdisciplinary approach is needed (MEYER 2001, pp. 15 – 18, 23, 30 – 31).

Since I will apply Wodak's discourse-historical approach to CDA in the analysis below, I will now describe it in more detail. The approach tends to focus on both written and spoken language as it understands both of them as a form of social practice (WODAK 2001, pp. 65 – 66). There are several most important characteristics of the method. The first one is its inter-disciplinary approach. As Wodak points out in the field of politics and relationships between the media, politics and general public when defining the discourse-historical approach, *"politicians (...) are best seen both as shapers of specific public opinions and interests and as seismographs, that reflect and react to the atmospheric anticipation of changes in public opinion and to the articulation of changing interests of specific social groups and affected parties. The relationships between media, politics (all genres) and 'people' are very complex. Up to now, we have not been able to provide clear answers about who influences who and how these influences are directed. Only interdisciplinary research will be able to make such complex relationships more transparent"* (Ibid, p. 64). Since I will analyse political speeches later on, the interdisciplinary approach is of particular importance. This interdisciplinarity is to be applied at various levels, in theory, practice, work itself and in teams. The approach is, contrary to others, not concerned so much with specific linguistic expertise and figures, rather it is problem oriented. There is not one specified theory or methodology, they are instead incorporated and applied on the basis of their relevance to the object of investigation and its explanation. Fieldwork and ethnography should also be part of the analysis. A continual consideration of both theory and empirical data is necessary. Multiple genres, public spaces, intertextual and interdiscursive relationships should be examined within the analysis. The historical context and its incorporation is of the utmost importance for the approach. Wodak emphasizes that the *"distinguishing feature of the discourse-historical approach is its endeavour to work with different approaches, multi-methodically and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information"* (Ibid, p. 65). Such background information contains *"the knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which the discursive events are embedded"* (Ibid, p. 65). The categories and tools are, apart from the previously mentioned steps, to be applied according to the object of analysis.

Other grand and middle range theories should be taken into account. The results should also be shared with experts in the field with the aim of changing certain discursive and social practices (Ibid, pp. 69 – 70). I will share the conclusions of my thesis with, among others, the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the UN, OSCE and Other International Organizations in Vienna where I was working as an intern while compiling my thesis. I believe the conclusions of the thesis and identification of propagandist messages can be useful for them as they are dealing with the conflict in and around Ukraine in their day-to-day work. If propaganda in more general terms is revealed and explained, it could contribute to its decline as it would not further achieve its hidden goals and therefore lose its point. The discourse-historical approach, as it is true to the family of critical theories, contains at least three interconnected aspects of social critics:

- 1) text or discourse immanent critique which tends to look into inconsistencies, (self-) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas inside the text under analysis,
- 2) socio-diagnostic critique goes further than this when applying background and contextual knowledge in order to expose manifest or latent meanings,
- 3) prognostic critique serves as a means to improve the criticized practice and communication (Ibid, pp. 64 – 65).

Socio-diagnostic critique seeks to examine and deconstruct overt and latent meanings embedded in social practice (written or spoken) which possibly have a persuasive, propagandist, populist or manipulative character (REISIGL, WODAK 2001, p. 32). This brings me to the main reasons behind the selection of this approach in order to analyse and depict propagandistic practise in my analysis.

There are four levels on which the analysis should be applied based on a concept of context:

- 1) immediate, language or text internal co-text,
- 2) intertextual and interdiscursive relationship,
- 3) extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and frames (middle-range theories),
- 4) broader socio-political and historical context (grand theories) (WODAK 2001, p. 67).

Wodak concludes with the basic and most important steps of procedure to be taken when analysing (Ibid, p. 93). First, it is necessary to understand the context and background of the investigated problem. Therefore, I reviewed an extensive literature on propaganda in theory and practice, Ukrainian history and identity, Russian and American identity and sets of values as well as many articles on the ongoing conflict with special attention to the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. In order to establish interdiscursivity and intertextuality, which is advised by Wodak as a second point of procedure, I sampled and examined other texts on the topic (as for example many other speeches by Putin and Obama). I also largely drew from my personal experience as an intern at the Czech delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe as I was present at many meetings in which the conflict in and around Ukraine was discussed and during which I could hear the rhetoric and various arguments that Russian and American ambassadors, as well as others, presented in this regard. Thus, it gave me a good picture and overview about the topic and relevant positions as well as possible hidden motives these two countries have in connection with the object of the analysis. Wodak adds to the importance of intertextuality: *“The intertextual analysis comparing the two texts makes some of the vagueness and many possible reading of a few textual clauses distinctive and clear. It offers important evidence for some of the interpretations”* (Ibid, p. 90). The third proposed step contains formulation of precise research questions. The research questions are to be operationalized into linguistic categories after that. While working on these two steps I got inspiration from Wodak’s case study analysis as mentioned and developed more below. The fifth step is to apply these categories to the selected text and to interpret the meanings in an attempt to answer the defined research questions. I applied the detailed analysis on three transcripts of Putin’s and three of Obama’s speeches as I mentioned earlier in the introduction. The last two points are concerned with overall context and extensive interpretation in considering the research questions and the investigated problem. I will apply these at the very end of the thesis, in the conclusion section. I will analyse the main texts sequentially, clause by clause, while continually applying all the methods and techniques. I will be as explicit and transparent as possible and I will make sure all the arguments and conclusions are overtly justified. As Wodak advises, I will base my analysis on the original data, not on the translation, though only translated transcripts are included in the thesis as a reference for a reader.

For my analysis, I got inspiration from case studies conducted by Wodak on nations and national identities in Austrian political and discriminatory discourses. As she concluded, a method of description and analysis that exceeded the specific Austrian context was developed at the end (Ibid, p. 71). After reading through the speeches of Putin and Obama and related background, I realized the issue of nations and national identity were amongst the most prominent and possibly quite frequently propagandized in the fragments. The concepts of national identity, national pride, nationalism and patriotism, in reference to the chapter on the theory of propaganda, are in general among the sentiments often exploited by a propagandist in order to achieve certain ends. Wodak, on basis of that, constructs a more concrete plan of analysis together with the strategies to look for in the application of discourses of sameness (identity) and difference (Ibid, p. 72). She sums up the five most prevalent discourse strategies in the positive self- and negative other presentation as she views “*the discursive construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as the basic fundamentals*” of such discourses (Ibid, p. 73). The construction of division between “us” and “them” is at first sight also present in the speeches of the two presidents with regard to the conflict in Ukraine. Thus, while adapting the approach according to the problem under my investigation, I drew heavily on this method and related procedure described by Wodak. While establishing my own research questions I partly drew on the selected questions posed at the beginning of Wodak’s analysis by which she attempted to orient herself in order to select the discursive strategies that might have been present and identified in the texts under analysis.¹¹ I attempt to identify discursive strategies defined by Wodak in the selected transcripts of speeches under the analysis.

We can understand such strategy as “*systematic way of using language*” or “*a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practise (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim,*” explain the scholar (Ibid, p. 73). She divides the strategies into five: 1. referential and nomination, 2. predication, 3. argumentation, 4. perspectivation, framing or discourse representation and 5. intensification and mitigation strategies. The referential/nomination strategies include naming persons or groups of persons in a derogatory manner and thus discrediting them and excluding them in the eyes of the target audience. An example of such practice is to refer to immigrants as “aliens”

¹¹ The original questions posed by Wodak are to be found in (WODAK 2001, pp. 72 – 73).

or “guest workers” and by that emphasize their otherness and suggest that since they are guests they will and should not stay in the country long-term (REISIGL, WODAK 2001, pp. 45 – 54). Predication contains assigning qualities, either positive or negative, to persons, objects, events, actions or any social phenomenon for that matter. As Wodak and Reisigl note, “*reference can already bear the feature of predication, which is the second essential aspect of self- and other-presentation*” (Ibid, p. 54). Such practice can be more or less evaluative, overt or latent, concrete or vague. They are mostly applied by use of reference, attributes, predicative nouns/pronouns/adjectives, collocations, comparisons, metaphors, rhetorical figures, allusions or implications. The application of these, painting “us” or in other words an “in-group” in a positive light and “them”/“an out-group” in a negative one often ends up with black and white polarisation of the groups within society or between two nations (Ibid, pp. 54 – 65). Argumentation strategies have very much in common with persuasion. Persuasion, according to Wodak and Reisigl, is defined as “*the means of intentionally influencing a person so that she or he adopts, fixes or changes her or his ways of perception, attitudes to and views on persons, objects and ideas, and dispositions to behave or act in a specific way*” (Ibid, pp. 69 – 70). There are, however, differences between argumentation as part of rational negotiation and manipulative attempts to persuade an audience, and that is manipulative intentionality. The violation of rules of rational argumentation can be referred to as fallacious arguments. “*Here, forms of non-argumentative compulsion (emotionalisation, suggestion, demagoguery, propaganda, brainwashing, threatening and so on) force or compel to assent and approval by repressing the ability of rational and logical judgement and conclusion,*” conclude the authors (Ibid 2001, p. 70). It corresponds with what was written in the first theoretical chapter on propaganda as it was stated above that it was on the submitter of a message and his or her true intentions to define decisively if the message was manipulative and thus propagandistic or not. What is worth noting within the analysis of argumentation strategies are the “topoi”. They are understood as “*the content-related warrants or ‘conclusion’ rules that connect the argument with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion*” (KIENPOINTNER 1992, p. 194; In: REISIGL, WODAK 2001, pp. 74 – 75). The various types of topoi include topoi of usefulness and advantage, uselessness and disadvantage, definition and name-interpretation, danger and threat, humanitarianism, justice, responsibility,

burdening and weighting, finances, reality, numbers, law and right, history, culture and abuse (REISIGL, WODAK 2001, pp. 74 – 80)¹². With the application of perspectivation, framing and discourse representation strategies, submitters of messages tend to express their personal involvement and position in the discourse. They can be referred to as involvement and detachment strategies too. They are often connected to the intensification and mitigation strategies that are aiming at modification of persuasive impact on the audience as well as the submitter's expressiveness (Ibid, pp. 81 – 85). A three-dimensional approach to this specific analysis is proposed: 1. establish the specific contents and topics of a specific discourse, 2. examine the discursive strategies, 3. investigate linguistic means and the particular linguistic realizations of the stereotypes that depend on the context and are embedded in the texts under analysis (WODAK 2001, p. 72).

To achieve the objective and answer the research questions, I will apply Wodak's discourse-historical approach to CDA, more specifically her proposed step-by-step method and identification of related discourse strategies with regard to the construction of "us" and "them" in the selected political speeches given by President Putin and President Obama. In order to adapt the concrete tools according to the problem under investigation (as it is one of the common characteristics of CDA), I will attempt to identify, where relevant, also the commonly used techniques in propaganda listed and depicted by Onişoru and the methods included in the "ABC's of propaganda analysis".¹³ I believe that by compiling those approaches, a coherent picture will be achieved that would de-construct the propaganda assumedly used in selected fragments. Thus, more light will be shed on the role of propaganda in the conflict under investigation.

¹² Broader descriptions and explanations of the types of topoi are described in the book but I did not include them in the thesis for the sake of reasonable length. The topoi will be explained upon identification within the analysis itself. All the definitions of topoi are to be found in (REISIGL, WODAK 2001, pp. 74 – 80).

¹³ For the reference, both of these were listed and defined more in details above in the theoretical chapter on propaganda, its research and analysis.

3. Propaganda in Russian-Ukrainian conflict

The third chapter of the thesis forms its empirical part and is dedicated to a case study on propaganda in Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The chosen methodology will be applied on relevant political speeches by President Putin and President Obama. First, a historical context to the modalities of the conflict will be provided in order to expose and explain possibly propagandistic messages within the speeches later on.

3.1. Historical context

Although historical literature abounds with references to events that occurred on the territory of today's Ukraine, there is one characteristic aspect worth mentioning. Since Ukraine spent most of its history under the rule of foreign powers, its history used to be found as part of history of others¹⁴ rather than being treated by the historians as an entity itself. If one accepts this line of argument, the history of Ukraine starts in the 19th century together with the rise of Ukrainian nationalism (MAGOCSI 1996, p. 12). This is also one of the reasons why various perceptions of Ukrainian history have existed until today. An author of an exceptional book on Ukraine and its history and professor of History and Political Science at the University of Toronto, Paul Robert Magocsi, classifies them as follows: the Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, and Soviet viewpoints (Ibid, p. 12). The author of the thesis agrees with him on the importance of knowing and understanding these sometimes contradictory perceptions. The interpretation of history in a way that suits the interests of the presenter forms one of the prominent features of propaganda, both in general and more specifically in case of the conflict in and around Ukraine. Recently, numerous articles and papers on different historical narratives relevant to the conflict have been produced¹⁵. Although I am aware of the fact that engaging in history in fact means choosing one of its possible interpretations¹⁶, I will briefly summarize from my point of view which is based on an extensive literature review the main formative events of Ukraine's history. I believe that for an understanding of the modalities of the current conflict the broader historical context is necessary. I will then explore the complicated and divided identity of Ukraine and I will finish the section of the historical introduction

¹⁴ Most notably of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.

¹⁵ See for example: (BUSH 2015), (EMMERSON 2014), (MCLAUGHLIN 2014), (SPUTNIK NEWS 2015).

¹⁶ As it is for example extensively argued in the Chapter I. of The Cambridge History of Russia (SUNY 2006).

to the analysis with the context and development of the current crisis in and around Ukraine with particular focus on the Crimean peninsula, its history and its annexation by Russia in March 2014.

The history of Ukraine in its broader sense starts as early as the second half of 9th century when Kiev was a centre of Kievan Rus'. There are still disputes over whether the Rus' was rather Russian or Ukrainian. Because of the premise that the first Russian state was based in Kiev, many Russians still see Ukraine as integral part of their country, as "their cultural and spiritual homeland" (SCHLESINGER 2014). In the first half of the 13th century, the political entity of Kievan Rus' was invaded by the Mongols who named the region the Golden Horde. It was not until a century later that Ukrainian lands got out of the control of the nomadic tribe. Throughout the 14th century, they were divided among the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Poland and Moldavia. At the end of the 16th century, the territory became part of the Lithuanian and Polish Union of Lublin. It was shortly after that when the world saw the rise of the Cossacks with their desire for freedom. Eventually, they gave themselves up under the protection of the Russian tsar. At the end of the Russo-Polish War, Poland gave up the territory to the east of the Dnieper river known as "Left Bank" Ukraine to Russian control (CONANT 2014). As we can see, the historical division between the eastern and western parts of Ukraine has its roots early in history. The tsar's title was changed to Tsar of All Great and Little Rus' with Little Rus' referring to the "Left Bank" territory (MAGOCSI 1996, p. 227). Calling Ukraine Little Russia or Small Russia (Malorossiia) has persisted until today (KHRUSHCHEVA 2014)¹⁷. It is prevalent mostly in Russophone regions and it further demonstrates and endorses the idea of Ukraine as part of the bigger Russian world. In the 18th century, under the First and Second Partitions of Poland, the "Right Bank" part of Ukrainian lands was also incorporated into Russia while the south-western region, what came to be known as Galicia, became part of Habsburg Austria. In Galicia the Ukrainian national awakening came to force at the beginning of the 19th century as was mentioned earlier. In 1917, after Russia's first revolution, a Central Rada (Council) was established in Kyiv and a year later Ukraine declared its independence. However, it was thrown into a civil war, and in 1921 the Russian Red Army conquered most of the territory and established the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The remaining western part of the land was included into Poland. During World War II Ukraine suffered

¹⁷ See further on "Little Russia" and "Little Russians" vision in (BILENKY 2012, pp. 89 – 100).

greatly from Nazi occupation and related atrocities. There were also active movements fighting for Ukrainian independence, mostly against Polish and Soviet hegemony. One of their well-known and rather controversial figures whose name tends to serve as a fuel to public debate until today is for example Stepan Bandera. After the war, the Soviet Union's annexation of the western part of Ukraine was completed and recognized. The perception of this event differs substantively, some seeing it as the re-unification of Ukraine under the Soviets, others as the beginning of a fifty-year occupation by the Russians (EMMERSON 2014). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine gained its independence in 1991. Since then, the country has been struggling to find its direction and position in the world. Presidents and prime ministers once leaning towards Russia and at other times more to the West were rotating in the leadership of an independent state. In 2004 the Orange Revolution took place when a presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko launched protests and demonstrations disputing the election process and results which ascribed victory to his opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, who was presented as oriented towards the East, most notably Russia. Yushchenko won after the annulment of the poll results by the Supreme Court. However, in 2010, Yanukovych was once again declared as the winner of the next presidential elections and later as the new president of Ukraine (MAGOCSI 1996) (BBC News 2015a) (SERHY 2006) (Ukrajinská Iniciativa - ukrajinská diaspora v ČR 2014).

Ukrainian national identity is similarly as complicated and full of conflict as is its history. Leonid Peisakhin whose major area of interest is research on political identities in Ukraine concludes: *"Insofar as there is a common historical theme that defines the Ukrainian experience, it is one of division: between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia in 1569-1795, Austrian and Russian empires in 1795-1917, and Greek Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy from 1596 until the present"* (PEISAKHIN 2013). The division is apparent when taking into account the ethnic and linguistic aspects, historical experience and connections to different part of the world, socioeconomic developments, religion or different geographic conditions of the Ukrainian regions. And a deep division is to be found especially when it comes to the language and ethnic distribution within the Ukrainian territory as well as the people's visions of the position of their country in the world and the foreign policy direction it should take. According to the Razumkov Center, who conducted a survey for the period of 2002 - 2015, Ukrainians have been substantively divided on whether their country should move its foreign policy direction to the European

Union countries or lean rather towards Russia. As we can see from the graph below, 40.8 % of the respondents were in favour of engaging in integration with the European Union in November 2012, while 35.3 % would have preferred Ukraine tying its relations closer to Russia. Polls conducted later are showing an increase in the favourability of policy direction to the EU and a substantive decrease in prioritizing Russia. In March 2015 it was 47.7 % for the EU and only 10 % for Russia. However, as the Sociological Service of the Centre informs us, the sample of 2015 poll did not include the respondents from Crimea and areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions under the control of separatists.




Figure 2: Sociological poll: Which foreign policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine? (recurrent, 2002-2015) (RAZUMKOV CENTRE 2015).

Another article from The Washington Post offers an interesting set of maps that demonstrate the division of the country which was already present before the conflict started with the Euromaidan demonstrations at the end of 2013. Interestingly, the division illustrated by the maps corresponds more or less with the division related to the conflict and its development. The top left map shows the Ukraine's language divide with blue colour illustrating the percentage of the population that identified Russian as their native language in the national census conducted in 2001. The one in the top right corner portrays the ethno-linguistic division of the country. Red colour stands for ethnic

Ukrainians and mostly Ukrainian-speaking and yellow and white for mostly Russian-speaking and predominantly Russian-speaking. Worth noting is the brown colour which represents the ethnic Russian majority and dominates the Crimean peninsula, an object of annexation by Russia from March 2014 which I will go into in more detail later on. Yellow with brown lines portrays the areas where a significant ethnic Russian majority lives. The bottom pictures focus on the election results from 2004 and 2010. If we allow some simplifications, Yanukovych was presented as a rather pro-Russian candidate, whereas Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were advocates of strengthening the ties with the European Union. As we can conclude, the ethnic, linguistic and historically rooted division is quite apparent when it comes to the different visions of Ukrainian citizens in the West and in the East about their preferred country's foreign policy direction. There is, therefore, a particular pattern in which people vote in Ukrainian elections, different for each of the regions. As David Marples from the University of Alberta calls it, regional voting is the most characteristic feature of Ukrainian elections (MARPLES 2015, p. 10). Leonid Peisakhin notes that *"it (Ukraine) has never been and is not yet a coherent national unit with a common narrative or a set of more or less commonly shared political aspirations"* (PEISAKHIN, The Washington Post 2013).




Figure 3: A set of maps demonstrating the division of Ukraine (FISHER 2014a) (KARKKLIS 2014).

Lauren McLaughlin in her blog which is a part of the Harvard Summer School website considers three basic regions in Ukraine. First, the centre, including Kiev, whose two main aspects of identity are Christianity from the Byzantine Empire and the early Slavic alphabet and which was mainly influenced by the Cossacks, was part of Poland and Lithuania in the past and then gradually taken piecemeal by Russia at the end of 18th century. Second, the west, a rather small region which was part of Poland and later the Austrian Empire, thus has a history of Roman Catholicism and European connection. And finally, the southeast, occupied by the Asian nomads and Slavs, having very little connection to the West and attracting Russians earliest from the areas (MCLAUGHLIN 2014). David Marples divides Ukraine similarly, to the Western Ukraine which experienced a rise of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) with the previously mentioned prominent figure of Stepan Bandera, Eastern Ukraine (especially pro-Russian cities and regions of Donetsk and Luhansk) and the rest of Ukraine which “*has not exhibited particularly strong political directions*” (MARPLES 2015, pp. 11 – 13). However, he adds that other factors apart from simplified ethnic and linguistic division can play their part in voting (Ibid, p. 10). The name of the country itself, whether it is translated from old Slavonic as “on the border” (PEISAKHIN 2013) or as “to cut”, with the secondary meaning of “an edge” or “borderland” (MAGOCSI 1996, p. 189) suggests the possible division rather than a common history and identity. However, alternative narratives of the translation have appeared recently demonstrating once again the struggle for Ukrainian national identity. Some say, for example, though it is largely disputed elsewhere, that the translation means “homeland” rather than the “borderland” (SKLIARENKO V. 1991, p. 365). Denys Koryukhin from the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine describes three competing projects of Ukrainian national identity whose main aspect touches on the relations between Ukraine and Russia. The first one, according to him, falls under Pan-Slavic identity. It views Ukraine and Russia side by side as part of the common Slavic world. However, this idea has never been put into practice and it eventually gave rise to the other major identity projects: “Ukrainian proper” one in which Ukraine is portrayed as an opposition (as the other) to Russia and another one called “Little Russian” which sees Ukraine as part of an All-Russian World (KORYUKHIN 2015, pp. 60 – 61) .

The aspects of the conflict which is in the main focus of the thesis have much in common with the above described division of Ukraine. The current lines of conflict correspond

more or less to the ethno-linguistic division. However, it was hardly the only reason for the violent outbreak. Rather, I dare to say and I argue for it throughout my analysis that other factors, most remarkably interests and overt or more latent interventions by other bigger powers, played their part in fuelling the already existing division and contributing to the situation in which the expression of the differences became violent. The conflict started with the demonstrations after Ukrainian President Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in late November 2013. Later, he instead accepted an Ukrainian-Russian Action Plan and a financial loan to Ukraine offered by President Putin. The protesters who took part in what was called the Euromaidan demonstrations in Kiev raised their voice against these moves as they understood them as turning away from the integration process with the EU and falling back under Russian influence. Yanukovych was asked by the crowd to resign at the beginning of February 2014 and later that month, popular disobedience reached its peak after the parliament did not support the calls for the pre-2004 Constitution which would limit substantively the president's power in the country. Although agreement with the opposition witnessed by the third parties of several prominent figures of European countries' political representation was reached a few days later, demands for the resignation of Yanukovych did not stop and the Euromaidan protesters refused to step down. On 23rd February, Yanukovych fled the country and the government buildings were taken over by the demonstrators. Parliament voted to remove Yanukovych from the leadership of the country and new presidential elections were set for May that year. But with the situation beginning to calm down in the Central and Western Ukraine, demonstrations in the eastern part of the country broke out. People mostly in rather pro-Russian regions of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and Odessa started to protest against the change of the leadership and its commitment to strengthening ties with the West instead of Russia (BBC News 2015b) (BBC News 2015a) (FISHER 2014b).

And that brings us to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula that is, apart from related events, very much the focus of the analysis. Since the 14th century, Crimea was a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire called the Crimean Khanate. The name "Crimea" is probably derived from language of Crimean Tatars, the ethnic group from the period of the Khanate which persists until today and, of course by smaller numbers, still forms a part of the population of the peninsula. At the end of the 18th century it was incorporated and later recognized by Turkey into the Russian Empire (ŠVANKMAJER et al. 2008, p. 207) and the city of Sevastopol as the centre of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was built at that time.

Crimea suffered intensively from the crimes of World War II and the Crimean Tatars as a whole were later accused by Stalin as Nazi collaborators and were the objects of massive deportations and ethnic cleansing. Numerous Ukrainian and Russian families settled in the peninsula afterwards. In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev, then leader of the Soviet Union, gave Crimea over and made it part of Ukraine instead of Russia. After the dissolution of the USSR, Crimea became part of the newly formed state of Ukraine (MAGOCSI 1996, pp. 702 – 703, Chapter 14) (KATCHANOVSKI 2015) (TAYLOR 2014). At the end of February 2014 pro-Russian gunmen took over control of the key buildings in the Crimean capital. Later on, the Crimean autonomous parliament supported the idea of joining Russia. A local referendum was organized on 16th March with the results presented in overwhelming favour of the incorporation of the region into the Russian federation. Russia accepted the unification and publicly pronounced Crimea and Sevastopol as new regions of the Russian Federation retrospectively. This immediately became an object of large condemnation on the part of international actors, most overtly by Ukrainian, European and US political figures (BBC News 2015b) (BBC News 2014a) (BBC News 2014b). Ivan Katchanovski from University of Ottawa points out: *“Before its secession with direct Russian military support and its annexation by Russia in March 2014, Crimea already had a history of separatism in Ukraine. But this region avoided a violent conflict during the break-up of the Soviet Union, in contrast to Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Chechnya in Russia”* (KATCHANOVSKI 2015, p. 81). The crisis in and around Ukraine has been evolving since then. Presidential elections gave Ukraine a new president in Petro Poroshenko and parliamentary elections took place in the autumn. On 17th July 2014, a Malaysian airplane was shot down above the area of Eastern Ukraine with each side of the conflict accusing each other of whose fault it was. However, the conflict still endures. The eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk are in control of pro-Russian separatists, the annexation of Crimea by Russia is not recognized by most of the world (BBC News 2015b) and in spite of attempts to reconcile and minor success in negotiations about ceasefire and withdrawal of weapons (OSCE 2015b) (OSCE 2015c) (OSCE 2015d), the crisis is most probably not about to disappear any time soon. Taras Kuzio adds: *“As a result of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the armed conflict in Ukrainian Donbas, over 921,000 people (as of 23 January 2015) have registered as internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Ukraine, and over 524,000 have sought asylum or other legal status in the Russian Federation (PACE, 2015). Nevertheless, eighty percent of Ukrainians believe*

Ukraine is at war with Russia, according to a December poll. International organisations and human rights bodies have systematically reported widespread human rights abuses by separatist and Russian nationalist groups, while Ukrainian forces have been criticized for indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas (Amnesty International, 2014; Council of Europe, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2014; Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2014; United Nations, 2014)” (KUZIO 2015, p. 110)¹⁸.

3.2. Analysis of Putin’s Presidential Speeches

In order to prove the hypothesis that there is, indeed, propaganda applied in the conflict in and around Ukraine, Putin’s presidential speeches, interviews and press statements within the period around the annexation or incorporation of Crimea were put under analysis. Fourteen fragments that touched upon the topics related to the conflict in Ukraine and more particularly to Crimea were listed to be included into a broader analysis and for the purpose of intertextuality out of which three selected speeches were put under detailed analysis. The whole list of analysed fragments is the following: speech at the Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club from 19th September 2013, Meeting with President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych transcript from 17th December 2013, speech at a meeting of the Russian-Ukrainian Interstate Commission and Press statement following a meeting of Russian-Ukrainian Interstate Commission from the same date, transcript of Vladimir Putin’s answers to journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine on 4th March 2014, Address by President of the Russian Federation from 18th March 2014, transcript from Putin’s speech at the Meeting in support of Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation “We are together!” from the same date as the previous one, Response to a journalist’s question about the peace plan in Ukraine from 22nd June 2014, Statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin on 21st July 2014 calling for a full investigation into the crash of the Malaysia Airlines plane, Yalta Meeting with members of political parties represented in the State Duma from 14th August 2014, transcript from the speech at the Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club on 24th October 2014, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly on 4th December 2014, New Year Address to the Nation from 31st December 2014 and transcript from the speech at the Concert celebrating Crimea and Sevastopol’s reunification with Russia from 18th March 2015. Detailed analysis was

¹⁸ Apart from the mentioned resources, I have gained my knowledge and information on the context of the crisis in and around Ukraine from the meetings within the OSCE I was present at as part of my internship in Vienna in the period September 2015 - December 2015.

applied to three speeches: Address by President of the Russian Federation from 18th March 2014 (Crimea speech), speech at the Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club from 20th September 2013 (Valdai speech) and Yalta Meeting with members of political parties represented in the State Duma from 14th August 2014 (Yalta speech).

The Crimea speech was properly and comprehensively analysed in a sequential (clause by clause) way. Analyses of the other two speeches consist of the flow of the argument and interpretation when identifying the most salient features which are most likely to be relevant to the topic of the thesis and related as well more or less to the main themes of the Crimea speech. The Crimea speech was given right after President Putin signed a draft treaty on the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation and within the speech the treaty was introduced to the Federal Assembly for its ratification. The overt target groups were therefore the Federation Council members and State Duma deputies. The Valdai speech was given by the President of the Russian Federation in the final plenary meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club whose official “*goal is to promote dialogue between Russian and international intellectual elite, and to make an independent, unbiased scientific analysis of political, economic and social events in Russia and the rest of the world*” (VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB 2015) and which has been meeting regularly from 2004. The target group can be therefore depicted as international experts on Russia. The overt target group of the Yalta speech were members of political parties represented in the State Duma. However, as we will see below in the analysis, the overall target group of these speeches might be and most likely is much broader than the apparent and primary target groups presented above.

The three speeches were selected for several reasons. The reasons for the selection of the Crimea speech are clear as it is generally viewed as the most important speech given with regard to the incorporation in which Putin lays down the main arguments for such action. This is also why it is analysed first although it was given later than Valdai speech. The timing of the speeches apart from the link-up of the main topics was important for the selection of the other two of them. Since the Valdai speech preceded the Crimea speech by about six months and the Yalta speech followed the Crimea speech after five months, it is possible to explore the development, intensification or mitigation of the topics and their presentation over time. This might be interesting especially when taking into account the timeline of related events. The treaty on the incorporation of Crimea was

signed by the President and applied retrospectively on the day of the Crimea speech (SPUTNIK NEWS 2014a) (BBC News 2014a). The Valdai speech was given a few months before Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU and before the “Maidan demonstrations” started. The Yalta speech takes place several months after these turbulent events, after the presidential elections in Ukraine and before the parliamentary ones, in the situation when the armed clashes in the Donbass region are ongoing. Another argument for the selection is that all three discourse fragments are speeches so they can be easily compared and analysed in a unified manner. Other reasoning came to light in line with the CDA methodology after the overall analysis of all fragments was done. The three selected speeches are long enough and include themes and techniques worth analysing with regard to the topic of this thesis.

3.2.1. Detailed Analysis of the Crimea Speech

Throughout the whole speech we can see the speaker’s clear attempts to create a division between “us” and “them”, the creation of an in-group and an out-group. In the very first welcoming paragraph the in-group “us” is created to include also the people from Crimea and Sevastopol. *Representatives of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are here among us, citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol (2, 3).* Within this sentence, the unity of the group is expressed by being citizens of Russia. The idea behind that might be that no matter what region they come from they are the citizens of Russia, therefore part of the in-group. What is also interesting to point out is that only the draft treaty on incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation was signed by President Putin before the speech in question took place. A draft treaty has to be ratified by both of the houses of the Federal Assembly and approved by the Russian Constitutional Court. The treaty came into force on the day of ratification by the Federation Council¹⁹ three days after the speech was given and was applied retrospectively to the day it was signed (SPUTNIK NEWS 2014a) (BBC News 2014a). However, during the analysed speech Putin already calls the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol citizens of Russia. That illustrates that the construction of in-group identity was intentionally in the process before the legislation process was completed. One might guess that to reverse the adoption of the treaty after the common identity was

¹⁹ The Federation Council is the upper house of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. The lower house of the Assembly is the State Duma. (Official Russia)

created must have become very unattractive for the lawmakers as it would require stepping out of the in-group and opposing its members' shared identity.

The intensification of the idea of unity of such an in-group is expressed in the next paragraph: *Dear friends, we have gathered here today in connection with an issue that is of vital, historic significance to all of us* (4, 5). The unity of the in-group is further intensified by sharing an event (an issue) that is of importance to *all of us* clearly referring to the members of that group. Intensification is also illustrated by the use of a strongly emotionally tinged word such as “vital”. Lines 5 and 6 indicate that the referendum which was held in Crimea prior to the given speech was held *in full compliance with democratic procedures and international norms*. This stated as a fact right at the beginning of the speech leaves out any possible opposing views, therefore effectively curtailing the discussion about it before it could even start. However, the legality and legitimacy of the referendum was disputed immediately and heavily by the Western media and officials.²⁰ On the other side, to involve intertextuality into the analysis, the prominent Russian media website gives notably minor space to such allegations.²¹ On the results of the referendum Putin says: *More than 82 percent of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96 percent of them spoke out in favour of reuniting with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves* (7, 8). It is not, however, specified who exactly was included in the *electorate* (7). The use of a word *reuniting* is as well interesting to note. *Re* expresses that something is coming back to the state it was before. Latently and in the context of the rest of the speech, it creates the feeling that Crimea ever being part of another country than Russia was just an aberration from the “normal state” which is now being corrected. This claim appears several times in the speech. Another example might be found in lines 37 - 40 when the image of *Crimea as always an inseparable part of Russia* (37) persists *despite all the dramatic changes during the entire 20th century* (39).

Ending the argument by saying *These numbers speak for themselves*. might be denominated as “appeal to moral wrong” which is one of the commonly used techniques of generating propaganda given by Onişoru. It implies that only a non-reasonable person could disagree with the argument, thus discrediting the opponent (ONIŞORU 2011, p. 40).

²⁰ See for example BBC News, The Guardian, Forbes, CNN on that matter - (BBC News 2014b), (BIRRELL 2014), (GREGORY 2014), (COHEN 2014).

²¹ See for example Russia Today - (RT News 2014a), (RT News 2014b).

The same technique can be traced in lines 9 and 10: *To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other (9 - 10)*. The quote *enough to note* implies that anyone who would disagree with the argument (incorporation of Crimea into Russia) would do so only because his knowledge is limited. To rephrase: If you knew enough, you would understand (agree with) the argument. We can view this as a predication strategy which aims at labelling the social actors mentioned in the discourse fragment with either positive or negative attributions and is in line with the framework of sameness and difference and the above mentioned construction of in-groups and out-groups (REISIGL, WODAK 2001, p. 45). The opposition is latently presented as under-educated on the matter, thus wrong. The target audience might therefore be tempted to agree without further reflection on the matter as it desires to be part of “the informed and educated” group or to believe and accept the argument since it is what informed and educated people claim in opposition to those uninformed and under-educated.

A strong appeal to patriotic sentiments as another of Onişoru’s propagandistic techniques can be identified in the fifth paragraph (11 - 18). *Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour (11 - 18). Shared history and pride (11) and Orthodoxy (12) are used as other bonding features of the created in-group. The first sentence *Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride (11)* implies that there is nothing which would connect Crimea with anyone other but Russia. The appeal to patriotic sentiments is intensified by collective symbols such as the ancient city of Khersones where the baptism of Vladimir I, Grand Prince of Kiev and of all Russia, (who) was an outstanding political figure in ancient Russia took place in the times of Kievan Rus (LAPARENOK, Leonid, RT). Orthodox Christianity is used as a formation of a larger in-group which includes also Ukraine and Belarus. The orthodoxy stands at the centre of the modern geopolitical school of thought called Eurasianism which has*

orthodoxy at its ideological centre and is close to Putin. According to Eurasianism, Russia is the very centre of Eurasia, the cultural zone which amongst others might include Ukraine and Belarus as well. As was mentioned earlier, the Eurasian cultural zone defined by this school stood as an alternative both ideological and organic to the Western European cultural zone (Lehmannová et al. 2010, pp. 120–121). As Putin's aim is to restore Russia as a respected, strong and independent great power (VEBER 2008, p. 515) which might be substantially linked to the functioning and power of a Eurasian Economic Union in his eyes, the central identity-building value might be orthodoxy as it is common to the people in the Eurasian region. *Russian military glory and outstanding valour (18)* is expressed directly and through *The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea (14- 15)* which is a reference to the wars from the 19th and 20th centuries.

Use of specific collective symbols supports this claim. *Balaklava (16)* and *Malakhov Kurgan (17)* refer to the Crimean War in which Russia suffered huge losses of lives in the fifties (ŠVANKMAJER et al. 2008, p. 255). *Kerch* and *Sapun Ridge (17)*, on the other hand, refer to World War II. Sevastopol history is also referred to together with the mention of the Black Sea Fleet. As Russia has historically been under constant threat of invasion (Lehmannová et al. 2010, p. 123), military glory and valour is highly appreciated in the country and connected with strong emotions. The idea that the region which is connected in the people's collective memory with great battles and victories would be part of other country, especially if this country is presented as an enemy, is very emotional and therefore can be easily abused for propaganda purposes. The argument also implies that since Russian soldiers, thus Russian people and nation suffered so hard in order to have Crimea as part of its homeland, it is just and fair to let them have it. The appeal to national pride is intensified by emotionally tinged words and phrases such as *the graves of Russian soldiers (14)*, *legendary city (15)*, *outstanding history (15 - 16)*, *a fortress (16)*, *the birthplace of Russia's Black Sea Fleet (16)*, *dear to our hearts (17)*, *military glory (18)*, *outstanding valour (18)*.

On lines 23 - 26 the speaker talks about the composition of Crimean residents. He claims that out of 2.2 million people in total, *1.5 million are Russians (24)*. It is important in order to understand the latent meanings to analyse the speech in its original language. In Russian, there is a distinction between Russian (rossiyskiy - российский) when referring

to the citizens of Russia as a country, thus today the Russian Federation and Russian (russkiy - русский) which refers to the ethnic origin of a person. Accordingly, Russia as a country is connected to the first mentioned (Rossiya - Россия) and so is the official full name Russian Federation (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya - Российская Федерация). An English translation is not able to distinguish this nuance. On line 24, a word русских (russkiye) is used for Russians so as to point to ethnic origin rather than to citizenship. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a significant population with Russian ethnic origin remained in the newly created non-Russian republics. According to the Cambridge History of Russia, more than 25 million Russians were living in such states in 1989 (SMITH 2006, p. 517). Until today the “Russian diaspora” in the world is still substantial and connected with controversies and vivid discussions on the rights of minorities. Taking into account other related discourse fragments the existence and protection of Russian minorities in other countries, most notably in former Soviet republics, is one of the arguments for political decisions and Russia’s interventions in neighbouring countries. The protection of Russians in other close countries was one of the arguments behind the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 and it was one of the priorities of Russia’s National Security Strategy of 2009 (EICHLER, TICHÝ 2013, pp. 131, 193). This argument justifying the incorporation of Crimea into Russia is presented in the analysed speech as well. It is done more latently by pointing out the substantiality of the Russian ethnic minority in Crimea as is done above and more overtly later in the speech. It gives an impression that since the majority of the region is of Russian ethnic origin, their attitude towards incorporation into Russia is accordingly positive. Ethnic origin, however, can generally have little in common with the identity of a person.

Another bonding feature of a constructed in-group in the speech is language as we can see from this quote: *350,000 are Ukrainians who predominantly consider Russian their native language (24 - 25)*. The claim goes as follows: although these people are not of Russian ethnicity but Ukrainian, they consider Russian as their first language, therefore they are part of the constructed in-group (“us”), not the out-group (“them”). Crimean Tatars are presented as part of an in-group not on the basis of ethnicity or religion but on the basis of their own choice: *290,000–300,000 are Crimean Tatars, who, as the referendum has shown, also lean towards Russia (25 - 26)*. However, it is not mentioned how many of the Crimean Tatars actually participated in the referendum. Russian Sputnik News claims it was about 40 % of their total number (SPUTNIK NEWS 2014b). This is disputed, however,

elsewhere, most notably in Western media and by some prominent international organizations, by pointing out the Crimean Tatars' alleged boycott of the referendum and related controversies²². Together with allegations of vagueness on how the referendum was held and allegedly accompanied by the presence of Russian military forces, the real support for incorporation into Russia by Crimean Tatars is dubious. In the analysed speech, their support is, nonetheless, stated as a fact discouraging a target audience from looking for any other evidence or information on that matter. Another observation is the intentional omission of the last group containing about 50,000 – 60,000 people if we stick to the numbers given by the speaker. Who are these and why are they not mentioned? Is it because they do not form the in-group according to Putin?

The speaker's acknowledgment of the Crimean Tatars' misfortune in the past on lines 27 - 29 presents him as a compassionate leader and mitigates the hard line policy Russia applied in the region in relation to the conflict. Perspectivation and framing strategies can be traced here. He uses passive in the first sentence of the paragraph so as to express his detachment from the topic and refrains from naming the one who stands behind this misfortune. Obviously he refers to the violent deportation of Crimean Tatars when Stalin was in power. Nevertheless, instead of presenting this as a conflict between Russia(ns) and Crimean Tatars, he uses this opportunity to illustrate that the suffering was shared by Crimean Tatars and Russians, thus to use it as another common historical experience on the way to construct the in-group and common identity in which Russians and residents of Crimea and Sevastopol are together. In the second sentence, moreover, he uses *I*, most probably in order to differentiate himself from those responsible for the misfortune and referred to in the first sentence. The pronoun *I* is again used on line 30 as a personal involvement and promise that helps to create the image of a strong leader that can be trusted: *I believe we should make all the necessary political and legislative decisions to finalise the rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars, (etc.) (30 - 31).*

Line 37 goes as follows: *In people's hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. (37).* It is unclear who these people are. Russians? Crimeans? All

²² See for example Reuters, UN Human Rights Watch, The Guardian, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal on that matter. (REUTERS 2014), (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2014), (LUHN 2014), (SHEVEL 2014), (SHISHKIN, TROIANOVSKI 2014).

the people in the world? In any case this can possibly be decoded as bandwagon approach, one of the seven common devices in the ABCs of propaganda analyses which includes “*an appeal for individuals to join the groundsweell of public opinion and activity on the rationale that everybody else is joining*” (VINCENT 2006, pp. 252 – 253). According to Vincent, the bandwagon technique also aims at feelings of loyalty and nationalism in the audience (Ibid, p. 253). Here, it is magnified by an appeal to emotions too through the use of “*in people’s hearts*”. Paragraph 41 - 48 presents “mistakes” of the leaders in Bolshevik era and specifically Khrushchev by whose decree Crimea and Sevastopol became part of Ukraine in 1954. *This was the personal initiative of the Communist Party head Nikita Khrushchev. What stood behind this decision of his – a desire to win the support of the Ukrainian political establishment or to atone for the mass repressions of the 1930’s in Ukraine – is for historians to figure out* (46 - 48). Although Putin “leaves the evaluation of the decision to the historians”, his own negative judgement of Khrushchev’s act is quite clear. The original Russian translation of *win* is connected with an even more negative and cynical meaning close to “buy” the people’s support. Likewise, the original translation of *atone* gives the impression of “blind a trail of his guilt” on the repressions. Khrushchev is specifically referred to as the Communist Party head. That might illustrate use of another of the seven most common propagandistic techniques according to Vincent, image transfer. The Communist Party is rather connected with negative feelings nowadays in Russia. The speaker might attempt to share these connotations of the Party through association with Khrushchev and transfer the negative feelings to Khrushchev himself and thus also on his decision to incorporate the Crimean region into Ukraine. Furthermore, Putin offers only two reasons that could possibly stand behind the incorporation, both of them damnable and aimed at achieving Khrushchev’s personal goals. He offers, intentionally or not, no alternative that could still be valid in the reality of today and understood positively. Therefore, Crimea ending up as a part of a different country than Russia is presented as a mistake and an historical wrong which is consistent with the lines 49 - 64 too where the attributions such as violation of norms, totalitarian state, the decision made behind the scenes without the people’s involvement or the phrase *it (Russia) was not simply robbed, it was plundered* (63 - 64) pertain to the act. Furthermore, it is emphasized in the speech that back then it was just a formality since both Russia and Ukraine were parts of the Soviet Union, thus one country. It was just after the dissolution of the Union, when there was a realisation of Crimea becoming a part of “another country”. This is similar to the above mentioned argument of Crimea being part

of another country than Russia as an aberration from the “normal state”. On line 59 a phrase *many people (...) hoped that (...)* is used. It could be identified as fallacious topos since the “many” is not further specified, nor it is possible to find any evidence for it. However, it creates a possibly fake sentiment of broad agreement on the matter, and thus attempts to construct an internal consensus.

An internal consensus can be also constructed by using the pronoun “we” accordingly or the technique of appeal on moral wrong as mentioned above. Such specific topos is used several times during the speech. Examples of that might be *I know the local population supports this (34)*, *people wondered (51 - 52)*, *we all know it (53)*, *this is hard to disagree with (72)*, *the people could not reconcile to (75 - 76)*, *we all knew this in our hearts and minds (77)*. The argument of historical injustice goes up to line 80 with emotionally tinged phrases like *Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics (...)* (67 - 68), *they (people of Crimea and Sevastopol) were handed over like a sack of potatoes (71 - 72)*, *the people could not reconcile themselves to this outrageous historical injustice (74 - 75)*. On lines 72 - 75 an appeal to patriotic sentiments is expressed, though not overtly. If rephrased, the argument goes as follows: although people disagreed, Russia back then was too weak to protect their interest. “Back then” is laid down as an opposite to “now”, when Russia under Putin is strong and proud.

The main message expressed on lines 77 - 93 is that Russia gave up Crimea as a sacrifice for maintaining good relations with Ukraine. See for example: *Yes, we all knew this in our hearts and minds, but we had to proceed from the existing reality and build our good-neighbourly relations with independent Ukraine on a new basis. Meanwhile, our relations with Ukraine, with the fraternal Ukrainian people have always been and will remain of foremost importance for us (77 - 80)*. So far, the speech seemed to foremost target the local population of Russia, maybe also the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol. Here, for the first time, an appeal seems to shift to the Ukrainian citizens in an attempt to show them how important they are for Putin himself and to the people of Russia. It might have also been said with an attempt to point out and emphasize that the actions are not aimed against the Ukrainian people as they are “brothers” who Russia cares about. Use of predication strategy can be identified further in the speech. The social actor which is referred to on lines 93 - 97 is Ukraine. There are attributions of a behaviour which is

presented as “right” but not pursued lately by an actor - *good neighbour, friendly, democratic and civilised state that would protect their* (Russian citizens and speakers in Ukraine) *rights in line with the norms of international law. However, this is not how the situation developed* (95 - 96). Ukraine is therefore latently presented as a bad neighbour, unfriendly, undemocratic, uncivilised, abusing the rights of the Russian minority and infringing international law. The hidden meaning of such argument and another demonstrated justification of Russia’s actions might be that it was not Russia who started the dispute, but conversely, it was the “wrong” behaviour of Ukraine which left no other choice for Russia than to intervene.

Through nomination strategy, Putin aims to divide social actors in Ukraine into two groups. The first one includes the Ukrainian (ordinary) people who are generally unsatisfied with the situation in their country and its corrupt leaders. To them, understanding is expressed by the speaker. Guilt for their suffering is ascribed to the former leaders of Ukraine, and Russia is presented as a country which has been harboured the “victims” and offered help. *I understand why Ukrainian people wanted change. They have had enough of the authorities in power during the years of Ukraine’s independence* (101 - 102). *Last year alone almost 3 million people found such jobs in Russia* (107 - 108). *I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty* (110 - 111). The second group is presented as *those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine* (113). They are put in opposition to the first group: (they) *had a different agenda* (than the first group) (113 - 114). They are portrayed in a very negative way as cynical, violent, dangerous and eager for power: (...) *they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day* (114 - 117). A strong and clear appeal to fear can be found here. Russia has a history of violent wars and turning points and change is connected with chaos, instability and violence in people’s collective memory. This is where Russian patriotic sentiments and devotion to the leader in a struggle against the enemy most possibly comes from. (Lehmannová et al. 2010, pp. 124 – 125) This is for example what Michael McFaul writes in The Cambridge History of Russia about Putin handling the Chechen war: “*Opinion polls conducted in the autumn of 1999 demonstrated that people were grateful to Putin for accepting responsibility for the security of the Russian people. He looked like a leader*

who had taken charge during an uncertain, insecure time and had delivered on his promise to provide stability and security“ (MCFAUL 2006, p. 378). Furthermore, an image transfer technique can be identified. Russian people suffered hugely during World War II. Through an image transfer technique a speaker aims to connect the suffering and atrocities committed by Nazis on Russian people during WWII with the actions of the current authorities of Ukraine and prominent figures of the “Euromaidan demonstrations”, thus transferring to them metaphorically attributions people have connected with Nazis. Another example of that can be found further in the speech when they are referred to as: *we can all clearly see the intentions these ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II (124 - 125)*. Bandera is a controversial figure in Ukrainian history, in the minds of Russian people connected with the nationalistic movements in Ukraine which stood in opposition to Russians in the past. The speaker once again attempts to create an internal consensus by using the “we can all clearly see” bandwagon approach. An insinuation of Nazi ideology can be also found in *attempts to build a purely Ukrainian state (121 - 122)*. All these connections might be viewed as a fallacious argument as there is no clear evidence of connection of the authorities in Ukraine and Nazi ideology and it is largely disputed elsewhere. However, by incorporating fear, the debate is getting irrational and led by emotions rather than critical thinking.

An appeal to fear and a striking lack of evidence is visible in this phrase as well: *The draft law was set aside, but clearly reserved for the future (122)* when referring to the proposal of the law which was later abandoned in the Ukrainian parliament. The targeted picture is that the second group of social actors took advantage of the frustration of the first group and abused it for cynical personal goals. The speaker positions himself as a “friend” and “protector” of the first group and on the other hand as an “opposer” to the second one. The conflict is not presented as Russia against Ukraine but as Russia and Ukraine (in terms of Ukrainian people) against the oppressors of Ukrainian people. Events that followed after the Euromaidan protests are presented as an *execution of a coup (116)* and as such refer to unlawful and violent action. Accordingly, the figures that came into power after the Euromaidan protests are denominated as *so-called authorities (18)* as it was only them who consider themselves as leaders and in reality have no general support which impugns their legitimacy in the eyes of the target audience. Apart from being presented in connection with Nazis

as we see above, they are portrayed as being controlled by someone else: *they were*

immediately 'disciplined' by the foreign sponsors (119 - 120), the mentors of these current authorities (120 - 121). It is not overtly expressed who are those “in control”, nevertheless they appear to be a third group of social actors allegedly participating in the conflict. We can guess it refers to someone who is not Ukrainian (foreign) and taking into account the context of the text to the Western authorities, most specifically to the United States of America. This might also be a more or less latent appeal to fear as it might evoke a feeling that there is some foreign (Western in that sense) conspiracy aimed against Russia. This sounds strikingly similar to the dictionary used during the Cold War when the two major superpowers and their allies were driven against each other by propagandistic claims. Putin then comes back to disputing the legitimacy of the current leadership by saying that *many government agencies have been taken over by the imposters (...and) are controlled by radicals (127 - 129).* Again, there is no ground evidence offered on that matter, however, it creates a feeling of chaos, fear and danger in the audience.

The fourth group of social actors is identified on line 131 as those who opposed the coup. It is not clear again who exactly is involved this group. It is, however, said that they were immediately threatened with repression, thus presented as a group in need of help. Who is certainly included in this group according to the speaker is Crimea. Its distinction from the rest of Ukraine and similarity to Russia is once again emphasized on the basis of the language: *the Russian speaking Crimea (132).* The justification of Russia's actions is based on the argument that Russia had no other choice but to perform the actions in order to protect them from their alleged suppressors: *In view of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives (132 - 133). Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part (135 - 136).* The attention is then switched to another actor which is frequently referred to during the speech - *our colleagues in Western Europe and North America (139). They say we are violating norms of international law (139 - 140).* That is an attempt to construct the in-group and out-group in its clearest form - us versus them. It is presented as the objections coming from Western Europe and North America being targeted against the all-encompassing we in which in the context of the rest of the speech Russian people and Crimea and Sevastopol residents are included. The speaker thus extends the responsibility for the decisions and steps taken by Russia from himself to all the citizens of Russian Federation and put them in opposition against Western Europe and North America. What is

also interesting is the use of the Western Europe term. Though unclear from the speech which countries this term encompasses, it makes more sense when laid aside with Eastern Europe, thus once again creating a sentiment of division, the “us and them” framing. Behind the inexplicit Eastern Europe the countries like Ukraine, Belarus or other may be found putting them in one group with Russia against “them”. The division of the world into West and East is also a technique used within the Cold War rhetoric. *These western colleagues (155)* are presented as those who did violate the international norms before, and therefore have no legitimacy and right to scold Russia or Crimea: *Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least remember that there exists such a thing as international law – better late than never (140 - 141)*. There is also a hidden appeal to nationalistic pride when they are described as wishing “to boss Russia around” on the basis of their own goals at the very moment: *Kosovo Albanians (and we have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed. Again, one wonders why (169 - 171). One should not try so crudely to make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black tomorrow (176 - 177)*. There is also clearly fallacious and illogical argument depicting “them” as very cynical and non-respectful to human lives made in the lines 177 - 178: *According to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human losses*. The original objections against the Russian leadership’s Crimea situation likening to the Kosovo case were based on the argument that in the Kosovo case there were huge losses of life and human suffering, therefore gaining independence for Kosovo was seen as the only solution in order to stop it and calm down the situation. Putin, however, makes it look like exactly the other way around. As if those who are making such objections wish for more deaths in Crimea.

From line 190 the speaker continues in his appeal to fear, this time applied to the world in general. The world is portrayed as chaotic, where international institutions are weak and the United States of America are forcing their will. An intensification of the topic can be traced here. As violation of international norms by the “West” was indicated more latently as was observed earlier, here it is stated “loud and clear”: *Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun (192 - 194). They force the necessary resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall (198 - 200)*. They are painted

as aggressive - *this aggression (198) they use force against sovereign states (196 - 197)* and vain - *They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right (195 - 196)*. Who are those *foreign sponsors (120)* becomes clearer further in the speech. After defining “them” and ascribing to them the above mentioned attributions, as seen in line 207 Putin is talking about *controlled “coloured” revolutions*. A passive is used to describe what was done, however, since it closely follows the definition of “them” as *western partners, led by the United States of America (193)* and ascribes to them all the attributions mentioned above, it is highly probable that it is “them” as well standing behind these controlled revolutions.

This argument is further applied to the Ukrainian case and the “orange revolution” of 2004. The description Putin applies to these coloured revolutions is quite similar to the one he made on the current Ukrainian situation. People were unsatisfied with the situation in the countries - *(people) were sick of tyranny and poverty, of their lack of prospects (208)* is similar to *they have had enough of the authorities in power (101 - 102), these feelings were taken advantage of cynically (208 - 209)* corresponds with *however, those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda (113 - 114)* and *as a result, instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks in violence and a series of upheavals (210 - 211)* with *They resorted to terror, murder and riot (115)*. Put together with the sentence *We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. (217 - 218)*, an appeal to fear of some sort of foreign conspiracy against Ukraine, Russia and the Eurasian region is spotted again more overtly presented. After “they” are presented as conspiring against Russia and deceitful for example by *they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact (222 - 223)*, a current threat aimed at all of “us” is identified by the speaker: *Today, we are being threatened with sanctions, but we already experience many limitations, ones that are quite significant for us, our economy and our nation (229 - 230)*. The claim hidden in the phrase is that the discrimination of “us” by “them” is long-term which is consistent with the conspiracy warnings. A threat of sanctions is not presented as a punishment for Russia’s behaviour but as something that is a part of a long-term strategy with the possible aim to “get rid of Russia for good”, as something that would come no matter what Russia would have done. Incorporation of Crimea is then perceived as only an excuse

for such actions. Putin goes on with the recovery of Cold War rhetoric when he reminds the audience of a containment policy claiming it is still being applied by “West”: (...), *we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today* (235 - 236). This is consistent with the constructed division of “us” and “them” framing. It is especially fallacious since in the very next paragraph he calls for *refut(ing) the rhetoric of the Cold War* (245).

A presentation of strong position is expressed at the end of this argument: *Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected* (246 - 247). An appeal on moral wrong is used again in lines 248 - 250: *we are grateful to the people of China, whose leaders have always considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea taking into account the full historical and political context*. Similarly to before, anyone who views the situation in Ukraine and Crime differently from the speaker is presented as “not taking into account the full historical and political context”.

From line 248 further the target audience seems to shift to China, India, to the people of the United States of America, Europeans and more specifically Germans. The arguments included, however, can be applied to the local population of Russia, too, as they correspond to what was said earlier in the speech. The conflict in Ukraine is presented as *civil standoff* (257) latently denying any role by Russia in its outbreak. The special relationship of Russia with Ukraine and the constructed in-group where Russia and Ukraine are together in latent opposition to the out-group is emphasized again: *we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other* (293 - 294). Another group might be targeted within the speech, judging by the paragraph 295 - 299: *Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure that these people’s rights and interests are fully protected*. It could be understood as a hidden threat to the Ukrainian current authorities. To rephrase: if you don’t treat the Russians and Russian-speaking people the way Russia (or Putin himself?) expects, we will stand up for them. If the target audience is in reality rather citizens of Russia, this might be perceived as Putin making a strong position or to have a standby argument that would justify in the eyes of local population a possible future Russian intervention.

From line 309 on there is a strong appeal to patriotic sentiments: *The Russian people showed this maturity and strength through their united support for their compatriots. Russia's foreign policy position on this matter drew its firmness from the will of millions of our people, our national unity and the support of our country's main political and public forces. I want to thank everyone for this patriotic spirit, everyone without exception (309 - 313).* Uniformity of opinions of Russian people is given as a fact discouraging anyone who could view things differently and putting him into minority, *against the will of millions (311).* People are given only two alternatives, to agree with Putin and the decisions Russia is taking or to retreat and forever give in to the enemy: *Are we ready to consistently defend our national interests, or will we forever give in, retreat to who knows where (316 - 317)?* The West is once again portrayed as an aggressor wishing for Russia finding itself in difficulties. As allies to the aggressor, thus aggressors themselves, latently those standing up to the leadership of Russia are called the *fifth column (319)* and *national traitors (320)*: *Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions but also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I would like to know what it is they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column, this disparate bunch of 'national traitors', or are they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic situation so as to provoke public discontent (317 - 321)?*

When speaking about the questions raised by the Crimean referendum between lines 326 - 336, Putin implies there was no other way to put such questions. Any other possible alternative for Crimea residents is refused by an appeal to fear of possible chaos and topos of specificity of culture and history which by itself leave no other option. A topos of numbers is used by presenting the results of opinion polls conducted in Russia: (...) *95 percent of people think that Russia should protect the interests of Russians and members of other ethnic groups living in Crimea – 95 percent of our citizens. More than 83 percent think that Russia should do this even if it will complicate our relations with some other countries. A total of 86 percent of our people see Crimea as still being Russian territory and part of our country's lands. And one particularly important figure, which corresponds exactly with the result in Crimea's referendum: almost 92 percent of our people support Crimea's reunification with Russia (341 - 347).* In the speech this is evidence of people's general support of Russia's decisions related to the situation in Crimea: *but I want to make the point that the absolute majority of our people clearly do support*

what is happening (339 - 340). But what exactly are the interests of Russians and ethnic groups living in Crimea and who will decide what they are? What ways of protecting their interests are supported? Only diplomatic or also violent? One is to support the reunification of Crimea with Russia, another might be to support the referendum to be accompanied by Russian troops. However, it seems as if Putin relates this support to all the decisions which were taken regarding the Crimean situation and presents himself as a democratic leader: *the people is the ultimate source of all authority (352).*

3.2.2. Detailed Analysis of the Valdai Speech

In the speech which was presented by Putin at the final plenary meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club and which preceded the Crimea speech by approximately five months, there is one prevalent topic - Russian identity. The first quarter of Putin's speech is focused on an urgent need to strengthen national identity. It is presented as fundamental for Russia in order to survive and succeed. We can see this illustrated on several occasions: *today we need new strategies to preserve our identity (18), it is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural and national self-determination (29), the question of finding and strengthening national identity really is fundamental for Russia (39 - 40).* The responsibility for recovering and strengthening such common identity is up to each and every person of the constructed in-group. Failure to do so would make one guilty of Russia's failure, as latently expressed in the speech: *They (economic growth, prosperity and geopolitical influence of a country, in this particular sense of Russia) depend on whether the citizens of a given country consider themselves a nation, to what extent they identify with their own history, values and traditions, and whether they are united by common goals and responsibilities (37 - 39).* Putin, though not overtly, takes charge of the role of consolidator of a nation as he is taking the lead in unifying the diverse ideologies presented within, as we might derive from the line 69 - 70: *All of us – so-called Neo-Slavophiles and Neo-Westernisers, statists and so-called liberals – all of society must work together to create common development goals.*

An appeal to strengthen nationalism and patriotism is further intensified by creating the feeling of the numerous dangers Russia is facing which can be identified as an appeal to fear. These might be challenges from inside Russia: *lack of a national idea stemming from a national identity profited the quasi-colonial element of the elite – those determined*

to steal and remove capital, and who did not link their future to that of the country (51 - 53). A clear effort to discredit any opposition if it suits the speaker can be derived from quotes such as *Too often in our nation's history, instead of opposition to the government we have been faced with opponents of Russia itself (83 - 84)* or *A true civil society and a true, nationally-focused political elite, including the opposition with its own ideology, values and standards for good and evil – their own, rather than those dictated by the media or from abroad (191 - 193).* It then becomes very easy to accuse any views opposing those of the speaker as being corrupted and controlled from outside when the feeling of some sort of conspiracy against Russia is created as was similarly done in the Crimea Speech. As another challenge, outside competition is mentioned: *Without this we will not be able to withstand internal and external challenges, nor we will succeed in global competition. And today we see a new round of such competition (30 - 31).* To make things look worse, there is also a reminder of the perils which are stemming from the generally more dangerous and unstable world of today around Russia: *Military-political problems and general conditions are worsening (32).*

After establishing the urgent need to strengthen Russian identity, the speaker moves on to what elements such identity is constructed of. We can once again see the attempts to create an in-group and out-group which are in opposition to each other. The out-group in this regard is the West and it is, by the application of predication strategies, presented as demoralized, wicked and aggressive towards Russia: *(...) many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with the belief in Satan (98 - 102), talking about registering political parties whose aim is to promote paedophilia (103 -104), people in many European countries are embarrassed or afraid to talk about their religious affiliations (104 - 105), aggressively trying to export this model all over the world (106 - 107), attempts to somehow revive a standardised model of a unipolar world and to blur the institutions of international law and national sovereignty (115 - 116).* Švankmajer points out that there is strong feeling of messianistic vision in Russia, that Russia is pre-destined to save the rest of the morally deceived world (ŠVANKMAJER et al. 2008, p. 528). Ted Hopf acknowledges three major discourses on Russian identity in the 1990s in part of his chapter in *The Cambridge History of Russia*

called “Between Europe and the United States, 1992-2000”. These are liberal, conservative and centrist. Each of them viewed Russia in relation to internal, external and historical “Others” which had impacts on the country’s interests and foreign policy (HOPF 2006, pp. 700 – 704). It is clear that Putin now attempts to construct, strengthen and stabilise the Russian national identity exactly on the same basis, on the division between “us” and “them”. After the out-group (though possibly artificially fabricated within the speech) is described with such a negative predication, the in-group becomes automatically and without greater debate much more attractive to the audience. The latently expressed basis of the identity the speaker is attempting to construct is therefore the internal and external challenges and opposition to the manufactured out-group.

Putin then turns to promoting the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional approach as something immanent to Russia’s identity: *Over the past centuries in Russia, (...) not even the smallest ethnic group has disappeared (140 - 141), This multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity lives in our historical consciousness, in our spirit and in our historical make-up (147 - 148)* in opposition to Western failure to cope with the phenomenon of multiculturalism: *European politicians and public figures are increasingly talking about the failures of multiculturalism, and that they are not able to integrate foreign languages or foreign cultural elements into their societies (137 - 139)*. As components of Russian national identity the speaker presents *the Russian people, Russian language, Russian culture, Russian Orthodox Church and the country’s other traditional religions (151 - 152)* and *shared values, a patriotic consciousness, civic responsibility and solidarity, respect for the law, and a sense of responsibility for their homeland’s fate, without losing touch with their ethnic or religious roots (161 - 163)*. What is interesting is that these components and the need to strengthen national identity is further intensified within the Crimea Speech in which the main elements constituting the in-group are shared history and pride, orthodoxy (or choice with regard to the Crimean Tatars), language (but not necessarily ethnicity), opposition to the out-group (the West, in particular the USA) and external threats. Since the Valdai speech preceded the incorporation/annexation of Crimea into Russia and related actions by several months we can debate whether there was an intention to create a strong feeling of belonging to an in-group by manufacturing a common identity in order to gain popular support for Putin’s later controversial decisions.

3.2.3. Detailed Analysis of the Yalta Speech

The main topics of Putin's initial speech in Yalta to the political parties represented in the State Duma four months after the Crimea speech were supporting the idea that Crimea's incorporation into Russia was a right choice, further strengthening Russian national identity. Similar techniques which can be deemed as propagandistic as in the other two speeches (in particular the Crimea speech) are applied to the Yalta speech. The bandwagon technique can be traced in the first paragraph when the speaker demonstrates general support for his actions with regard to Crimea and Sevastopol as illustrated by *I want to start by thanking you all (...) for the consolidation, unity and solidarity that all parties in the State Duma and indeed all of our country's political forces (...) (2 - 5)*. To make no mistake, Crimea and Sevastopol being part of Russia is mentioned twice by describing them as *our two new regions* in the very first four paragraphs in lines 3 and 18 - 19. In order to strengthen the idea of incorporation of these two regions into Russia as a right choice, several arguments are presented, though latently. The first one is most likely an argument that the Ukrainian authorities have not paid enough attention to the well-being of the citizens of these two regions. Although Ukraine and its leaders of the past are not directly mentioned in lines 36 - 39, it is likely they who are the *previous authorities (who) pumped a lot out of it and gave little or nearly nothing back (38)*. Moreover, we can trace what is called super-simplification, one of the Onişoru propaganda techniques, in this argument as it suggests that all the problems Crimea and Sevastopol faced in the past are the results of intentional abuse of these two regions to the advantage of the Ukrainian leaders. This, however, taking into account the complicated and challenging economic environment of the whole world over the last decades, is rather improbable.

What can be depicted as fallacious argument is the following statement in lines 38 - 39: *My sincere discussions with certain leaders speak to this directly. Indeed, they do not even try to hide it*. Putin uses his popularity and respect to strengthen the argument by presenting his personal experience and findings, however, omitting (most likely intentionally) the fundamental details. Who was the conversation with? Was he reliable? Did his opinion represent the attitudes of all the Ukrainian leaders of the past? What exactly did he say and under what circumstances? After establishing Ukraine as a harmful nation to be under, he goes on to present Russia as the "saviour of the day" by saying *we are taking the most pressing, priority measures to remedy the situation (43 - 44)*. The main body

of the speech focuses on Russia's plan to "rehabilitate" Crimea and Sevastopol - in energy supply, infrastructure, the social and healthcare sectors, the education system, pensions and salaries. It is presented as a wholly "black and white story" in which everything in Ukraine was wrong and Russia will put it into order. There are also allegations hidden in the speech such as *it is important to fully rehabilitate the repressed peoples (91 - 92)* which suggests certain people were repressed when the two regions were part of Ukraine, thus depicting Ukrainian leaders as repressors. Nevertheless, no proof or details are presented to support the claim.

Arguments present in the rest of the speech are quite similar to those in the Crimea and Valdai speeches. They might serve as further reasoning for the incorporation of Crimea and Sevastopol into Russia or they are likely to be put forward in order to strengthen the national identity Putin seeks to create. An appeal to patriotic sentiments and an interpretation of history as common for Russia and Crimea can be identified from line 95 on as is the use of collective symbols. Isthmus of *Perekov (97)* serves as a reminder of the Russian Civil War and a warning against fratricidal killing, which might, in line with the speeches under analysis, be interpreted as a need to unite under common identity in order to prevent such tragedy in the future. This argument is more overtly illustrated as well by mention of *the poet Maximilian Voloshin, who called for reconciliation during the years of the Civil War and provided shelter in his home to people from both sides of the conflict (100 - 101)*. Crimea and its incorporation into Russia are presented as a symbol of the unity of Russia itself within the speech: *I feel that Crimea can serve as a unique benchmark even today; it can play a unique, unifying role for Russia, becoming its own sort of historical, spiritual source, another way of reconciliation, to finally cure the wound inflicted upon our people as a result of the dramatic split of the 20th century, to restore the link of times and eras, the unity of Russia's historical path, our national consciousness, conduct our own kind of cultural and historical therapy (107 - 111)*.

What is interesting to note at this point of the analysis is the development of the creation and strengthening of a common Russian identity over all three speeches under analysis. While the Valdai speech established the need for a common identity and suggested the components which it might consist of, the Crimea speech goes on into details and further argues for these components, and the Yalta speech tends to confirm their relevance and use Crimea's incorporation as proof and a collective symbol in order to strengthen and stabilise

the established identity and unity. It is questionable whether this was already the intention at the time of the Valdai speech, however, the developmental path appears to be quite clear and well thought out. The division into in-group and out-group (us and them) mostly by predication strategy is used once again as another latent argument both in order to strengthen the common identity as well as defend the incorporation of Crimea. Ukraine is presented as destabilized and dangerous as illustrated by *we see how fraught the national and civil divide, radicalism and intolerance is in Ukraine (113 - 114), bloody chaos and a fratricidal conflict (114 - 115), large-scale humanitarian crisis (115), thousands of people have already been killed and hundreds of thousands have become refugees (115 - 116), great tragedy (117)*. The west is described as wicked: *western countries where these values are deteriorating in the current political environment (132 - 133)*. Russia, in contrast to that, is presented as the saviour of the day fighting for justice, an advocate for the weak, defending common values and caring for their citizens: *we will do everything we can in order for this conflict to end (119 - 120), the most important thing for us right now, as always, are our internal affairs, our goals, concerns and objectives that are set before us by the people of Russia, the citizens of Russia (126 - 128), we must strengthen traditional values (131)*.

All this is ended by a strong appeal to patriotic sentiments by expressing the strength of Russia which will not “lie down” to anyone: *we must (...) build our nation, not fencing it off from the outer world, not breaking ties with partners, but also not allowing them to treat us with disparagement or boss us around (137 - 139)*, which will proudly aspire to peace and greatness: *we must consolidate and mobilise. But not for wars or conflicts, not for countering anyone – rather, for hard work in the name of Russia and for Russia (140 - 141)* and which will stand united against anything that might come: *it is very important to strengthen the unity of Russian society (142)*.

3.3. Analysis of Obama's Presidential Speeches

Altogether 18 discourse fragments given by Obama - statements, remarks and addresses - related more or less to the conflict in and around Ukraine and to the annexation of Crimea were put under broader analysis. The fragments cover the period of roughly one year, from January 2014 to January 2015. The period under analysis is rather shorter than in case of the analysis of President Putin's speeches. However, this is due to the relative absence of the topic in Obama's statements before the beginning of year 2014 and of any direct response to the Putin speech at the concert celebrating the Crimea incorporation in March 2015. The list of included speeches is as follows: President Barack Obama's State of the Union Address from 28th January 2014, Statement by the President on Ukraine from February 28th 2014, Statement on Ukraine from 6th March 2014, Remarks by President Obama and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatsenyuk after the Bilateral Meeting of March 12th 2014, Statement by the President on Ukraine from 17th March 2014, Statement by the President on Ukraine from March 20th 2014, Statement by the President on Elections in Ukraine from May 25th 2014, Statement by the President on Ukraine from 18th July 2014, Statement by the President on the Situation in Ukraine and Gaza from 21st July 2014, Statement by the President on Ukraine from July 29th 2014, Statement by the President from 28th August 2014, Remarks by President Obama at the NATO Summit Press Conference from 5th September 2014, Remarks by President Obama and President Poroshenko of Ukraine after the Bilateral Meeting of September 18th 2014, Remarks by President Obama in his Address to the United Nations General Assembly from September 24th 2014, Weekly Address: America is Leading the World from September 27th 2014, Statement by the President on Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine from 27th October 2014, Statement by the President on the Ukraine Freedom Support Act from December 18th 2014 and Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address of 20th of January 2015. Three of these speeches were identified for a detailed analysis: the Statement by the President on Ukraine from March 20th 2014, extract from President Barack Obama's State of the Union Address of 28th January 2014 and the relevant fragment of the Remarks by President Obama in his Address to the United Nations General Assembly of September 24th 2014.

The identification process was done in a similar manner to the selection of Putin's speeches for detailed analysis, so was the reasoning for it. The Statement on Ukraine from 20th March

2014 is the first public speech given by Obama after the famous Crimea speech was presented by Putin. Thus, it can be understood as a reaction to Putin and annexation of the peninsula. This speech is identified as the main one for detailed analysis and is analysed comprehensively, clause by clause. The other two fragments of speeches include the interpretation and argument in relation to the main speech and topic of the thesis. The Extract of the State of the Union Address from the end of January 2014 with regard to foreign policy issues was selected because it constructs and illustrates American identity in foreign relations at the time when demonstrations at Maidan square were already taking place. Together with the other two speeches under detailed analysis, it demonstrates well the intensification of the topic of conflict in and around Ukraine in Obama's public appearances and it can offer an interesting comparison with the analysis of Putin's Valdai speech which was similarly centred on the topic of Russian national identity and its construction. A fragment of the Address to the United Nations General Assembly from September 2014 took place approximately half a year after the annexation of Crimea, similar to Putin's Yalta speech analysed earlier in the thesis. The overt target group of the March Statement on Ukraine is quite unclear, however most probably the American public could be identified. The American public is also the primary target group of the State of the Union Address. The most overtly expressed target group of the Address to the United Nations General Assembly are world leaders, politicians and their representatives.

3.3.1. Detailed Analysis of the Statement on Ukraine

What is stated in the very beginning of Obama's speech and what is repeated several times later is the notion that the steps United States is taking are part of the reaction to the situation in Ukraine and Russia's actions. Apart from line 2 which ends with *the situation in Ukraine and the steps that the United States is taking in response*, the same message can be found later within the speech. Line 8 includes the quote *because of these choices (that the Russian government has made), the United States is today moving*, line 10 as follows: *in response to Russia's initial intervention in Ukraine*. The word *initial* alone bears the notion that Russia was the first to intervene by any means. Another example can be found in line 15: *as part of our response to what Russia has already done*. Since the argument is repeated four times within a relatively short statement (51 lines in total), it can be viewed as a repetition technique (with reference to the commonly used propaganda techniques defined by Onişoru). We might guess why it is so obviously important for President Obama to emphasize it was not the USA

which was at the beginning of the conflict. One reason could be to argue against President Putin's allegations implying that the USA was behind the Euromaidan demonstration. Another (not necessarily negating the previous one) might be an effort to show the international community as well as the local American population that the United States are not an imperialistic and interventionist country as their critics tend to describe them. Last but not least, it can also be perceived as an indirect attempt to blame Russia for the destabilized situation and present the USA as the one who is trying to fix things - which would fall under the use of discourse predication strategies defined by Wodak. To put it in other words, according to the discourse presented by Obama, Russia is the one who initiated and escalated the whole situation in Ukraine leaving the USA no other option than to react. Interestingly, this line very much resembles one of Putin's, although, in Putin's eyes, the situation is rather vice versa - Russia being forced to react to the situation which emerged in Ukraine thanks to considerable involvement by the West and particularly the USA.

The initial welcoming phrase *Good morning, everybody (1)* seems to be very friendly and informal creating a feeling of a friendly discussion among the gathered ones rather than a statement which would appeal to authority or strength. The overt target group is very broad, however, it remains unclear if it encompasses everybody in the room, everybody who is watching the speech, everybody who would listen or read the statement later or everybody in the world. Clearly, the most probable would include the first three groups, nevertheless. It starts to be worth analysing in detail when taking into account the phrase *we've continued to be deeply concerned by events in Ukraine (3)*. It is, similarly, unclear who is included in *we*. Does the speaker automatically presuppose that all those who listen to or read his speech are concerned about the situation in Ukraine? One of the seven common devices of the ABC's of propaganda analyses could be depicted here, the bandwagon approach. The attempted construction of an in-group can be identified as well. By saying "we all are concerned about the situation in Ukraine", a speaker encourages the target group to subconsciously join the crowd/the in-group on the basis of the argument that "everybody else is doing it and you do not want to remain alone". A possible result could be that even those who, in reality, had not yet been concerned about the situation in Ukraine automatically start to be and, in concurrence, become appreciative of someone addressing these concerns, thus the speaker himself. It might be

a well-thought-out tactic to seek public approval for US actions related to the situation in Ukraine.

Lines 3 - 6 go as follows: *We've seen an illegal referendum in Crimea; an illegitimate move by the Russians to annex Crimea; and dangerous risks of escalation, including threats to Ukrainian personnel in Crimea and threats to southern and eastern Ukraine as well.*

In the quote *we've seen* another of Onișoru's propaganda techniques can be traced, an appeal to moral wrong. Anybody who would see the referendum in Crimea as a legal move by the Russians in relation to Crimea as legitimate (etc.) proves himself as unreasonable, as "we all have seen it is not like that". No further arguments, proof or any alternative views are provided, the matter is stated as a pure fact, thus effectively limiting any possible critical thinking process by the listener. Detachment strategy could also be applied since, by saying this, a speaker prevents the idea being presented as his opinion, since it is a fact no one disputes. Using the words *illegal* and *illegitimate* can have a very strong impact in particular in the American environment and on the American people. The rule of law and legality are important values in American culture. Rooted in their colonial past and thanks to their liberal tradition and protestant faith, Americans put great emphasis on individual freedom and freedom of expression and are antagonistic towards authoritative and undemocratic leaderships (FOLEY 2007, pp. 97 – 117) (Lehmannová et al. 2010, p. 92). Obama himself stresses the importance of individual freedom, deeply rooted in the essence of common American belief (OBAMA 2010, p. 54). A collocation *to annex Crimea*, thus referring to the act as an "annexation of Crimea" can be depicted as nomination strategy. By applying the nomination strategy, according to Wodak, naming something or someone in such a particular manner will automatically prescribe them certain characteristics. In the case of "annexation of Crimea", one immediately imagines it as an illegal and morally wrong action, thus tending to condemn it without further consideration. Since condemnation of imperialism is rooted in American culture too (Lehmannová et al. 2010, p. 94), the impact on the local population further multiplies.

Lines 5 and 6 include a strong appeal to fear. Since the three events (the referendum in Crimea, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the danger of escalation and to human lives) are put next to each other, it creates a feeling that they are interconnected. It is presented as if the first two events were the reasons for an escalation of the conflict and risk to people in Ukraine. Taking into account intertextuality, the US leadership is blaming Russia

for involvement in both, the referendum and the annexation. Thus, Russia is presented here as the one responsible for the escalation of the conflict. An appeal to emotions when incorporating a danger to human lives will further intensify this allegation. The next sentence serves to prove the argument above. *These are all choices that the Russian government has made* (6) blames the Russian government not only for the referendum and annexation but more or less overtly also for the escalation of the situation. What is worth noting is the naming of the Russian government. It is not Russia in general or the Russian people who are presented as the aggressor in this sentence, it is the Russian leadership. This rhetorical choice might have the effect of leaving out the Russian people from the allegations and giving them the possibility to stand up to the Russian leaders (at least in their minds) and become a part of an in-group Obama tends to construct. Using the word *choices* is most probably not coincidental neither. "To choose something" refers to an active action taken by a subject. The phrase is therefore latently suggesting that without the Russian government's active interference, the situation would not have been in such a bad state as it is now. Thus, it contradicts what Putin is insisting on, that the steps the Russian government has taken were provoked by previous events and foreign interventions, not anything Russia would choose to do independently.

The sentence continues as follows: *choices that have been rejected by the international community, as well as the government of Ukraine* (7 - 8). Who is, however, the international community? It is true that United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that calls on states not to recognize the change in status in the Crimean region. However, 11 states voted against and 58 countries abstained from the vote (United Nations 2014), including China and India (SENGUPTA 2014). Is it legitimate, therefore, to say that the international community rejected the Russian choices? This could possibly be described as glittering generality, propaganda technique for which the use of vague terms and omitting details in order to camouflage ideas and distorting the facts behind is characteristic. Obama surely is aware of the fact that the world is not so united on the issue as he presents it. An ordinary listener without a deeper knowledge of the issue can simply take the notion that whole world, not just the USA and some other countries, stands up to Russia. It also creates a division between two groups - Russia or more particularly the Russian government as it was suggested earlier in a constructed out-group (them) and literally everybody else in the in-group (us). A bigger group brings bigger assurance and security, therefore the attraction of joining the in-group is further intensified. Naming Ukrainian active leaders as *the government*

of Ukraine bears significant meaning too, when considering the environment. Contrary to Putin's naming of the Ukrainian leadership, it gives it the hallmark of legality and legitimacy.

Obama then moves to the introduction of additional sanctions imposed on the Russian officials which is actually the core of his speech: *And because of these choices, the United States is today moving, as we said we would, to impose additional costs on Russia* (8 - 9). Intentionally or not, Obama (and with him the USA since he is representing the country) takes up the role of "wise parent (USA/Obama) punishing a naughty child (Russian leadership)". A parent is not happy about having to punish its child - *This is not our preferred outcome* (21 - 22). Moreover, a parent is aware that it will bring additional grief to all - parent, child and others whom the parent cares about - *These sanctions would not only have a significant impact on the Russian economy, but could also be disruptive to the global economy* (22 - 23). But unfortunately, the child leaves him no other option if he is about to be a good parent and the child is to learn from his mistakes - *However, Russia must know (...) (23)*. Some suggest that the USA are acting superior, having a strong feeling of exceptionalism over others, taking American values for universal ones and therefore understanding American interventions abroad as just and legitimate (EICHLER, TICHÝ 2013, p. 115). Michael Foley adds to this: *"American identity has become closely associated with a settlement of principle that has allowed the United States to establish a self-image of exceptionalism. While other societies and cultures have been afflicted with deep ideological conflict to, it can be claimed that America's historical and social unity has displaced the need for advanced critical thought"* (FOLEY 2007, p. 3). This feeling of exceptionalism was called "manifest destiny" at the end of 19th century and as Associate Professor of History at Knox College in Galesburg Catherine Denial puts it, *"in simple terms, Manifest Destiny was the idea that Americans were destined, by God, to govern the North American continent"* (DENIAL 2010). In modern times, this term gained some negative connotations as it became connected to criticism of American expansionism in the world. As Eichler and Tichý note, for example, the third set mission of the American strategic document "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense"²³ from 2012 includes controversial aspects that are sometimes hard for everybody to understand. It is an American feeling of exceptionalism, the universal effectiveness of American values and the legitimacy of US

²³ See (U.S. Department of Defense 2012).

intervention around the world (EICHLER, TICHÝ 2013, p. 115). If we are to believe the existence of the feeling of exceptionalism, the American public might be appreciative of Obama's decision to impose sanctions as well as previously described in the stance of a wise parent. In line with this "parent-child" model, the introduction of sanctions is accompanied by quite an overt threat of increasing the cost if Russia does not obey: (...) *we've been working closely with our European partners to develop more severe actions that could be taken if Russia continues to escalate the situation (17 - 19)*. Later on, a threat of isolation is also used by Obama suggesting that if Russia does not comply it would be left alone without any friend, as we could understand from lines 23 - 24: *However, Russia must know that further escalation will only isolate it further from the international community*. Once again, the alleged unity of the world in its stand against Russia's actions is rather a dubious claim.

Involvement tactic as part of perspectivation and framing discourse strategies defined by Wodak is applied on lines 10-11: *Based on the executive order that I signed in response to Russia's initial intervention in Ukraine, we're imposing sanctions (...)*. Firstly, the personal involvement of the speaker is suggested by using the pronoun *I* and connecting it with a decisive action. Afterwards, *we* is utilized for the next steps taken, connecting the speaker (*I*) with the rest of the in-group (*we*). Use of *we* in this particular sentence could have an additional effect, creating internal consensus on the rightfulness of the decision. Since it is *we* who are taking the action, possible criticism of such action is rather unappealing for the target audience. A similarly problematic and possibly fallacious argument emerges when "international community" is used on line 16: *the world is watching with grave concern as Russia has (...)*. Most probably the desired effect of such vague terminology is to bring about a feeling in the target group that the concern is universal and the introduction of sanctions by the USA is thus based on overall support. It is possibly important for Obama to present himself as a multilateral leader and position himself in opposition to his predecessor President Bush and those with similar attitudes. Another reason could be that Obama is not indifferent to the critical notions of American unilateralism or even imperialism raised by Putin among others and tries to convince the rest of the world as well as the American public that these concerns are wrong. An example of the importance Obama is putting on multilateralism can be found also in line 18: *we've been working closely with our European partners*. An appeal to fear is applied in the phrase (...) *that could lead*

to further incursions (...) (17). *Incursion* also seems to be quite a strong word, thus intensifying the appeal.

Elements of “moralistic or value rhetoric” could be found on lines 24 - 28: *The basic principles that govern relations between nations in Europe and around the world must be upheld in the 21st century. That includes respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity - the notion that nations do not simply redraw borders, or make decisions at the expense of their neighbors simply because they are larger or more powerful.* Moralism in the American value system is connected with the above-mentioned feeling of exceptionalism and it causes the need to explain political moves by moral reasons (Lehmannová et al. 2010, p. 93). The speaker presents the ideal state of things - the one in which basic principles like sovereignty and territorial integrity are upheld. Since this is given as reasoning for the introduction of sanctions against Russia, Obama indirectly suggests that Russia is not pursuing such an ideal state. The principles Russia is allegedly violating are presented as principles which define the modern world (*principles that (...) must be upheld in the 21st century*). Thus, Obama might intend to portray Russia, and in particular the Russian leadership, as an out-of-date country living in the past and threatening the modern world and its set of values. Americans are rather oriented to the future and have no serious interest in the past (Lehmannová et al. 2010, pp. 88 – 89). Thanks to this, it might prove to be a particularly strong argument against Russia. The use of metaphor *nations do not simply redraw borders* (26 - 27) to describe Russia’s action is detected. Its rather strongly tinged metaphor most probably aims at creating a feeling of the absurdity of such action, thus discrediting the opponent.

An appeal to another value deeply rooted in the American system of values - equality, is applied at the end of the paragraph: (nations do not simply) *make decisions at the expense of their neighbors simply because they are larger or more powerful* (27 - 28). Russia is portrayed as a “big bad bully” and Ukraine as its victim. In opposition to that, the USA is portrayed as a good guy who, together with the Ukrainian government, beyond any of their other interests, does care about the wellbeing of the ordinary citizens of Ukraine: *One of our other top priorities continues to be providing assistance to the government of Ukraine so it can stabilize its economy and meet the basic needs of the Ukrainian people* (29 - 30). The paragraph (29 - 34) thus further intensifies the division of in-group and out-group, us and them. What is also worth noting is that the Ukrainian

leadership is portrayed as described above - as an equal partner to the USA and as a functional and responsible government who has its people's needs as their utmost priority. All NATO members are included in the constructed in-group judging from paragraph 35 - 40. The uniting elements of such an in- group are presented as legally based - *We're bound together by our profound Article 5 commitment to defend one another, (...) (36 - 37)* as well as by an appeal to emotion and pride - (...), *and by a set of shared values that so many generations sacrificed for (37 - 38)*. To stress the point or possibly to make it hard to oppose it, it is indirectly suggested that if a member of the audience does not conform his identity to the constructed line, he or she betrays the memory of those who sacrificed in the past for values which are presented as fundamental but not further specified. The element of glittering generality could thus be found here too.

It is difficult to say if lines 41 - 43 and 44 - 50 show a genuine desire to offer a compromise, an attempt to present the USA and Obama as a constructive leader or if it follows the end of passing all responsibility for whatever will happen in the future (when expecting rather something negative) to Russia, thus giving up any responsibility on the part of the USA. Obama offers only one solution for Russia that he deems as the right one: *We've emphasized that Russia still has a different path available - one that de-escalates the situation, and one that involves Russia pursuing a diplomatic solution with the government in Kyiv, with the support of the international community (42 - 44)*. He does not go into details of such steps but it is more than obvious that what he means is that if Russia does not behave the way Obama expects it and wants it to, a further deterioration in the situation is without doubt and that it would be Russia's and only Russia's fault. Russia is presented as attempting to deprive Ukrainians of their freedom of choice, a fundamental value for Americans: *We want the Ukrainian people to determine their own destiny (46) (...) and that can only happen if Russia also recognized the rights of all the Ukrainian people to determine their future as free individuals, and as a sovereign nation (47 - 49)*. Moreover, Obama indirectly suggests that this is the universally acknowledged position when putting Russia into isolation against everybody else's opinion once again on lines 49 - 50: (...) *rights that people and nations around the world understand and support*. We can find an especially interesting choice of words in lines 44 - 45: *The Russian people need to know, and Mr. Putin needs to understand that (...)*. It creates a division between the Russian people and the leadership of Russia. By naming Putin it further suggests that the leadership is not plural but rather represented by one man, Mr. Putin. As was mentioned earlier, in America there is a strong denial of authority and undemocratic

governments and pluralism is most important. The sensitive difference between the phrase *need to know* and *need to understand* is also worth noting. It is as if Obama tells it (the truth) to the Russian people, as they might have never heard it before and thus have not really had a chance to try to understand it. But on the other hand, he blames Putin for refusing or failing to understand even though he knows the truth. By this means, the speaker portrays Putin negatively but lets the window open for the Russian people if they decide to “understand now that they know”.

There are most probably several target groups the speech is directed to. That includes the American people, the Russian people, the Russian leadership/President Putin, American policy makers (Congress), the Baltic States and Poland as those most overtly expressed.

3.3.2. Detailed Analysis of the State of the Union Address

The main topic of the extract of the State of the Union Address given by President Obama on 28th January 2014 is American identity as perceived abroad. According to Michael Foley, there are nine main elements that form American identity: freedom, the individual, wealth, democracy, the rule of law, equality, morality, progress and order (FOLEY 2007, pp. 19 – 212). Some of them become apparent when analysing Obama’s speeches. In the substantively larger earlier part of the speech Obama focuses rather on domestic issues. That suggests their relatively higher importance in comparison with foreign policy topics. According to numerous prominent authors, an interesting characteristic of American foreign policy and visions of America’s position in the world is a seeming conflict between isolationism and expansionism or in other words internationalism (KISSINGER, Henry 1999, p. 12) (Lehmannová et al. 2010, pp. 94 – 95). As Henry Kissinger notes, there are two ideas of America - as a “lighthouse” for the rest of the world which gets inspiration from America’s internal system of values and democracy and tries to imitate it; or as a “crusader” whose obligation is to advocate and enforce its values throughout the world. America’s behaviour has oscillated between these two visions in the past. However, according to Kissinger, since World War II, they have become mutually dependent and applied to some extent at the same time (KISSINGER, Henry 1999, p. 12). The fact Obama dedicates the larger and earlier part of his State of the Union speech to domestic issues might suggest the dominance of isolationist tendencies. Foreign policy issues are, nevertheless, extensively present as well,

thus confirming Kissinger's judgement. Obama opens the foreign policy issues with the situation in Afghanistan, the threat of terrorism, Israeli-Palestinian talks, the conflict in Syria and the deal on chemical weapons and Iran. Stress is given to the importance of soft measures and diplomacy. He then moves to the part of the speech under analysis in which there is a focus on American identity with regard to abroad and in which Obama directly mentions Ukraine too.

The style of the speech and its rhetoric can be defined by several characteristics: short sentences and rather easy language; friendly - frequent use of *we*, *us* or *my fellow Americans* (20); moving and with an appeal to human emotions, pride and patriotic sentiments by application of an image transfer and use of specific exemplary stories to prove the point - *our Marines and civilians rushed to aid those battered by a typhoon, and were greeted with words like, "We will never forget your kindness" and "God bless America!"* (13 - 14), *when Team USA marches the red, white, and blue into the Olympic Stadium – and brings home the gold* (18 - 19) or most overtly by the story of an Army Ranger named Cory Remsburg (30 - 46); use of emotionally linked and rather strong words - *enormous opportunities* (2), *new generation of heroes* (24); use of slogans, vague terms, glittering generality - *opportunities to do good* (2), *(our alliance with Europe remains) the strongest the world has ever known* (5), *willing to do the hard work of building democracy* (6), *shape a future of greater security and prosperity* (11 - 12) and basically a whole paragraph at the end (46 - 56); and an appeal to morality in the American context - *to free people from fear and want* (3), *we do them* (interventions around the globe) *because we believe in the inherent dignity and equality of every human being, regardless of race or religion, creed or sexual orientation* (15 - 17). There is once again a feeling of exceptionalism and related faith and the burden America must carry - *our leadership* (1), *no one is better positioned to take advantage of those opportunities than America* (3 - 4), *no other country in the world does what we do* (20), *on every issue, the world turns to us, not simply because of the size of our economy or our military might – but because of the ideals we stand for, and the burdens we bear to advance them* (20 - 22). As the overt target group of the State of the Union speech is the American public, it could be argued that these techniques and morality rhetoric serve as a justification for the expansionism of the USA while the hidden motives of the American leadership could be behind it in reality. On the other hand, Obama's efforts to stress the importance of multilateralism, soft measures and diplomacy over hard policy line can be traced in the discourse fragment. The possible

reasons for these are given earlier within the analysis of the speech from March. Obama directly mentions Ukraine on lines 6 - 8: *In Ukraine, we stand for the principle that all people have the right to express themselves freely and peacefully, and have a say in their country's future.* This sentence sounds neutral but when we put it into the context of the situation in Ukraine where the Euromaidan demonstrations had already been taking place for around two months, we come to the conclusion that this must be latent support for the protesters. The concepts of progress and change have positive connotations in American discourse such as vitality, purpose or direction (FOLEY 2007, p. 175). Revolutions are thus taken as something that will possibly move the country in a better direction as it did in the case of gaining US independence from the United Kingdom back in 18th century in the minds of the American public. Contrary to Russian discourse in which revolution is connected rather with chaos and violence, in the United States, taking the side of the protesters is likely to gain popular support. Still, the statement is not as strong as can be seen in the later speeches. It leaves the window open for some sort of reconciliation between the Ukrainian leadership and the “crowd”, as long as those protesters are given the rights required by Obama. An intensification of the US position with regard to Ukraine can be depicted from the following statements by Obama.

3.3.3. Detailed Analysis of the Address to the UN General Assembly

The September speech from which a fragment related to the conflict in and around Ukraine was chosen for detailed analysis tends to intensify the topic and Obama's position towards the topic. Condemnation of Russia's aggression is mentioned as the first politico-military issue after the broader introduction. The speech is primarily addressed to the world leaders of the General Assembly of the United Nations and secondarily to the American and world public. Therefore, the focus on foreign policy and global issues in comparison with the analysed State of the Union speech is understandable. However, it is mentioned and covered in more detail before the topics of ISIL and terrorism or Iran had their turn. Russia's actions in Ukraine are described as “aggression” which can also be identified as an intensification of the issue.

A black and white technique or in other words “you are either with me or with my enemy” is applied several times throughout the speech. In lines 13 - 16 Obama offers two options in each sentence for the world leaders to choose from, one which is presented as good

and one which clearly represents its opposite, the wrong one: *We can renew the international system that has enabled so much progress, or we can allow ourselves to be pulled back by an undertow of instability. We can reaffirm our collective responsibility to confront global problems, or be swamped by more and more outbreaks of instability.* It is not hard to conclude, taking into account the flow of the text and intertextuality, that the “good option” corresponds with the American position and the “wrong one” refers to Russia’s actions. The construction of or strengthening of an already constructed in-group and out-group can be identified too.

The introduction of the paragraph 32 - 38 with a quote *here are the facts* (2) complies with the conclusion above and it might be depicted as an appeal to moral wrong. It might be misleading to say *the people of Ukraine mobilized popular protests and calls for reform* (32 - 33) since the visions of people living in Ukraine on the position of their country in the world were and still are substantively divided. Similarly dubious, at least for some, might have been the legality, legitimacy and popular recognition of the then active government in Kiev. President Obama presenting lines 32 - 38 as pure facts can therefore be depicted as possibly fallacious and with the aim of creating a black and white picture. Wodak’s predication strategy can be identified. Russia is latently described as a bully who violates international norms: *First, all of us - big nations and small - must meet our responsibility to observe and enforce international norms* (25 - 26). It is depicted as living in the uncivilized and inhuman past when suggesting that behind the fact that *civilized people are not allowed to recover the remains of their loved ones* (40 - 41) is Russia’s attempt to hide the truth. Furthermore, an appeal to fear is incorporated into the warning that it is about to push for more expansion against independent nations: *Russian aggression in Europe recalls the days when large nations trampled small ones in pursuit of territorial ambition* (4 - 5). The USA represents the opposition to that - *America stands for something different* (41), the alternative and good version of the behaviour of a strong and big country which instead works multilaterally - *American strength to working with all nations* (63 - 64); defends universal human rights and freedoms - *We believe that right makes might - that bigger nations should not be able to bully smaller ones, and that people should be able to choose their own future* (41 - 43); is constructive and willing to cooperate with Russia - *And that’s the kind of cooperation we are prepared to pursue again - if Russia changes course* (58 - 59). Nomination strategy is also applied when calling the separatist active authorities in Eastern Ukraine *proxies* (36), thus suggesting they are not independent

but rather they follow Russia's instructions and are under its control. Obama once again uses several metaphors in order to intensify his arguments: *Russia poured arms into eastern Ukraine (34 - 35), might makes right (39)/ right makes might (42), nation's borders can be redrawn by another (39 - 40), at the barrel of a gun (48).*

One could find an appeal to human emotion for example in line 35 when blaming Russia for fuelling the conflict: *a conflict that has killed thousands*. The parent-child model identified in the speech given in March is also present: *If Russia takes that path - a path that for stretches of the post-Cold War period resulted in prosperity for the Russian people - then we will lift our sanctions and welcome Russia's role in addressing common challenges (53 - 55)*. Finally, "we" is used many times, more often than passive, which illustrates both efforts to present America as multilateral country as well as to create an in-group as big as possible and put Russia into isolation. Involvement strategy when using "I" is applied only once in the analysed fragment when Obama presents himself as a determined and credible leader in line 63: *And I stand before you today committed to investing American strength to working with all nations (...)* (63 - 64).

Conclusion

In the introduction, several research questions formed in line with the methodology were given: 1) Are there features included in the speeches researched that can be denominated as propagandistic? 2) What are the characteristics of discourse which prevail in speeches? What discursive strategies are used and how are they applied? 3) What are the main themes addressed? 4) What kind of understanding of these themes and related actions underlies the speeches? 5) By means of what arguments and argumentation strategies is the annexation of Crimea justified and legitimized? 6) Alternatively, by means of what arguments and argumentation strategies is the annexation of Crimea condemned? 7) How are the people or groups of people named referred to in the speeches? 8) What characteristics are attributed to them? 9) Are such characteristics and discourse presented overtly? 10) Are they developed over time? Are they being intensified or mitigated? 11) Who is the target group? Whom are the speeches addressed to? 12) What are the main differences between Putin's and Obama's speeches relevant to the research of the thesis?

I will now answer research questions 1 - 11 together, not one by one, based on the analysis of transcripts of statements given by President Putin, and accordingly in the case of speeches by President Obama. Afterwards, I will answer research question number 12 which aims at a comparison of the two. I will conclude with the confirmation or, alternatively, negation of the hypothesis and I will assess if the objective of the thesis was achieved.

Firstly, I will summarize the main themes and their understanding which are present in the fourteen analysed Putin fragments and which are believed by the author of the thesis to describe the political discourse represented by President Putin over an analysed period in relation, more or less, to the situation in and around Ukraine, in particular Crimea and Sevastopol and, more broadly, with Russian identity and Russia's place in the world. The key element presented more or less overtly in all of the fragments is Russian common identity and the need for its strengthening. The topics of history, justice and appeal to pride and nationalism are emphasized in order to support such identity. Together with that, the question of Russian and other minorities abroad and the protection of their rights is mentioned several times. The special relationship between Russia and Crimea and Sevastopol is intensified over time from the shared history of two independent nations to Crimea as "ever part of Russia" and its "homecoming". Crimea ending up as part of Ukraine is

perceived as historical injustice, violation of norms, opposed by everybody and something yet to be resolved. Russia is presented as strong and independent, “saviour of the day” and protector of the repressed, engaging multilaterally, protecting the right of each and every person/nation to choose for themselves, multi-ethnic but united, bullied unfairly by the West (in particular by the USA) and acting not out of choice but out of a necessity to react. Putin’s/Russia’s actions are presented as based upon an overwhelming support by the people. The United States of America, on the other hand, are depicted as morally wrong, bullying Russia and being afraid of Russia’s rising power and conducting propaganda. The characteristics applied to them are more or less overtly intensified from “occasionally acting unilaterally” to “unilateral dictatorship imposing the destinies of the world” and “foreign sponsors conducting experiments (for example colour revolutions)”. Ukraine is being described from denominations such as “our friends” and “having historically exceptional and special relations with Russia” to “brotherly country”, “fraternal country” to “once one country”. Similarly, the ordinary people of Ukraine are referred to as poor, being right about disagreeing with past authorities of Ukraine, being cheated and being those who Russia understands and wants to help to. Contrary to that, the Ukrainian active authorities are portrayed as illegitimate, controlled by “foreign sponsors”, weak and without actual power, following their own political goals and often controlled by radicals. In line with that, governmental change in February 2014 is presented as an unlawful governmental takeover, coup, armed seized power, resulting in chaos and bloodshed and controlled by “someone from behind”. Nazis, nationalists, neo-fascists, Russophobic and other dangerous groups are presented to be behind the Euromaidan demonstrations and related events, in power till today (related then latently to the characteristics of the Ukrainian authorities of today), spreading chaos and terror and all of that believed to be the result of chaos as a consequence of the takeover. The West in general is delineated variously, from partners and friends who have strayed from the path, being in trouble, treating immigrants and minorities unfairly, having their traditional values withering away and replacing them with dangerous and wicked habits with the consequence of chaos and constantly lying and betraying Russia. Europe itself, however, is presented in milder terms as being “vital for Russia as Russia is vital for Europe” and being abused by the USA in order to follow their political goals. Other important topics Putin comes back to very often are norms and laws, both internal constitutional and international. He speaks about their significance and of the chaos and conflict which are the results of their violation,

their compliance by Russia and subsequently Crimea and constant violation by the West, those behind Maidan and the active Ukrainian authorities. The current world is described as more dangerous and insecure. The sanctions imposed by the West are also mentioned several times. Within the fragments, though not as frequently as previous topics, more or less overt threats are expressed – the threat to use power, to withdraw from the nuclear arms agreement or modernisation of the Russian army.

With regard to the three discourse fragments presented one way or another by the President of the Russian Federation and selected for detailed analysis, the analysis proved that there was, indeed, propaganda applied to the conflict in and around Ukraine as various propaganda techniques could be identified within the fragments. Throughout all the selected speeches we can see attempts to create a division between “us” and “them”, the creation of in-group and out-group. While applying nomination, predication strategies, perspectivation and framing strategies, Putin seeks to construct a common identity of an in-group and put it into opposition to the out-group. In a more narrow sense, the constructed in-group probably encompasses all the Russians. In his understanding, as concluded from the analysed speeches, one can become Russian on the basis of ethnic origin, residency, language or choice. To this group of “us”, all the Russian minorities all over the world are believed to belong, as well as citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol. In a broader sense, an in-group is most likely consist of the countries that are part of the Eurasian cultural zone which, judging from the speaker’s statements, might apart from Russia be Ukraine and Belarus too. The West and in particular the United States of America, the illegitimate authorities of Ukraine and “those behind Maidan” are latently presented as an out-group and are depicted as opposition.

Appeals to patriotic sentiments and appeals to fear are the most frequent propaganda techniques applied within the speeches. What can also be identified is an appeal to moral wrong and emotion in general and super-simplification. Techniques defined by Vincent as the bandwagon approach and image transfer are used several times. Collective symbols, emotionally tinged words and phrases and fallacious topoi are present as well. In the analysis, intensification and mitigation discourse strategies and latent meanings were identified as well as examples of intentional omissions of information.

Arguments which are used to justify the incorporation of the two regions into Russia can be summarized as following: 1. Common history and shared values; 2. Correction of historical wrong as Crimea ending up as a part of a country other than Russia is presented as a mistake, historical wrong and aberration from the “normal state”; 3. Actions based on “everybody’s belief”, free choice of the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol and overall support from the Russian people; 4. The protection of Russians (Russian minorities) in other countries nearby; 5. Responsibility to protect the Ukrainian and the Russian people from the oppressors (nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, anti-Semites, foreign sponsors, most likely the United States of America); 6. Fight for justice and defend common values and Russian interests. Crimea and its incorporation into Russia are then presented as a symbol of the unity of Russia, or in other words of a constructed in-group.

Target groups of the selected speeches identified at first glance are the Federation Council members and State Duma deputies in the case of the Crimea speech, international experts on Russia in the case of the Valdai speech, and members of political parties represented in the State Duma when it comes to the Yalta speech. However, as was pointed out in the analysis, there are most likely more target groups which are aimed at. First and foremost, based on the analysis, is the local population of Russia and Russians abroad together with the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol. Other target groups might possibly be deduced: Ukrainian citizens, the Ukrainian current authorities, China, India, the people of the USA, Europeans and more specifically Germans, while it is not clear if it is the leaders of these countries, their citizens or both.

In order to identify the present discourses of President Obama’s speeches, I will list the main themes and their understanding depicted by Obama in the 18 fragments under broader analysis. The main feature of understanding of the identity of the USA included could be described as American exceptionalism. This exceptionalism covers all sectors, from economy, military to the ideals that are central to it. These ideals are understood as universals and America is predestined and obliged to protect them at home and over the globe. The USA is described as upholding international laws, united with allies and partners, protector of global security, protector of universal human rights and free expression and protector of the Ukrainian people’s future. The idea behind this is that they are struggling to stabilize Ukraine, helping its people to achieve universal rights and security, prosperity and dignity, and leading efforts to de-escalate the situation and to rally the world against Russian

aggression in Ukraine. They are committed to the security and democracy of their allies. However, they are also offering compromises and a “different path available” for Russia, and thus are depicted as a constructive leader. Another topic included in the speeches is Obama’s recognition of historical ties between Russia and Ukraine. However, international law, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and their violation by Russia is stressed numerous times. As part of international law, the importance of universal human rights is emphasized. Issues such as inherent dignity and equality of every human being, freedom of expression and the right of the nations and people to determine their own destiny are included while stressing that Russia has no right to interfere in those. Contrary to the USA, Russia is portrayed as violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is latently suggested in the speech from February 2014, recognized as intervention in Obama’s appearances in March and intensified to calling it aggression in September that year. It is also suggested that Russia is bullying Ukraine and abusing its status as a big and powerful country. It is presented as an out- of-date country living in the past and threatening the modern world and its set of values and it is suggested that Russia is excluded from the international community and is receiving global condemnation for its actions. Russia, according to Obama, is the one behind the dangerous risk of escalation and threats people are facing and is responsible for (later intensified to “encouraging”) the violence in Eastern Ukraine. Obama suggests that Russia has the capacity to put an end to the fighting but refuse to take the concrete steps necessary to de-escalate the situation and furthermore undermines the critical reform efforts by the Ukrainian government. Ukraine is presented as a sovereign state. Ordinary Ukrainian people are portrayed as being the only ones who have a say in their country’s future and our friends that we are ready to help to achieve what they deserve. It is worth noting that the people and government of Ukraine are presented as one in-group. The active authorities are identified as the legitimate government of Ukraine, the government in Kiev or, for example, the Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatsenyuk. This gives them legality and legitimacy in the eyes of the target audience. They are described as a legitimate, legal partner, who is constructive and firm but nonviolent and who is putting forward a process to stabilize the country. A strong alliance and unity with Europe is emphasized in the speeches numerous times. Europe is described with predications such as our allies or our European partners. When talking about the governmental change of February 2014 and the Euromaidan demonstrations, Obama refers to the ordinary Ukrainian people from all parts of the country standing up on behalf of democracy and with the desire to be able to determine

their own destiny. The referendum on the future of Crimea is, on the other hand, condemned as illegal, a clear violation of the Ukrainian constitution and international law and not recognized by the international community. Similarly, the situation around Crimea and Sevastopol is described as an illegitimate move by the Russians to annex Crimea or Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea which will never be recognized. Last but not least, the issue of threats and imposed costs on Russia by the USA (and its partners) and the danger they pose to the Russian economy is included in the speeches.

Several propaganda techniques were identified in Obama's speeches due to the conduct of a detailed analysis of the three selected fragments. Efforts to construct a division between us and them, in-group and out-group, were depicted. Russia forms the constructed out-group (them) and literally everybody else is part of the in-group (us – the USA, allies, the international community). What is interesting is the attempt to create another division, between the Russian leadership and Russian people, and turn the ordinary citizens of Russia against the authorities, more specifically against President Putin. In line with the in-group/ out-group construction, there are nomination and referential and predication strategies involved. Perspectivation and framing strategy is also applied, however, detachment strategy is rather rare.

Black and white technique is applied, as well as the bandwagon approach. An appeal to pride and patriotic sentiments, to fear and to moral wrong is included as well, though not so frequently. Obama uses the glittering generality technique quite often. It is accompanied by the use of vague terms, strong appeal to human emotions, emotionally linked words, exemplary stories, image transfers, catchy metaphors and short slogans. An intensification of the presentation of issues related to Ukraine can be depicted over the analysed period due to its rising frequency, prior position in the speeches and intensification of the rhetoric.

There are several arguments given for the condemnation of the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation: 1 Violations of the basic principles of the modern world and an attempt to go back to the past; 2. Violation of the basic universal values and rights of the people; 3. Illegality of the referendum in Crimea; 4. Illegitimacy of the move by the Russians to annex the two regions; 5. Risk of escalation and danger to human lives;

6. Rejection by the international community. Based on such reasoning and the American exceptional position, an obligation for the USA to interfere and impose costs on Russia is concluded.

The target group of the March Statement on Ukraine is most probably very broad with the American people, the Russian people, the Russian leadership/President Putin, American policy makers (Congress), the Baltic States and Poland as the most overtly expressed ones. The American public is the primary target group of the State of the Union Address and the secondary one together with the world public of the Address to the United Nations General Assembly in which the world leaders are the most overtly expressed targets.

I will now answer research question number 12. When it comes to comparison between President Putin and President Obama, the frequency of the speeches relevant to the topic in the period under investigation is quite similar. To give an example, I found five rather short statements to the events in Ukraine given by Obama between the end of February and the end of March 2014. This can be compared to three (but much longer) speeches given by Putin during March that year. As we could see, propagandistic techniques are to be found in the speeches of Putin as well as of Obama. The common and frequently used is the construction of the division between “us” and “them”, between in-group and out-group, as was expected. Discursive strategies defined by Wodak as referential and nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivation and framing strategies were present. We could also observe the intensification strategy, though mitigation was much more seldom. Putin’s speeches contained more appeals to patriotic sentiments or to fear and various fallacious arguments. Contrary to that, use of glittering generality, appeal to emotions (most frequently compassion), black and white contrast, vague terms, slogans and metaphors were more present in Obama’s speeches. An appeal to patriotic sentiments was, nevertheless, incorporated by both of them. The difference was that Putin tended to relate the appeal to history and its re-interpretation, whereas Obama connected the appeal to pride, more with current American values, ideals and future possibilities. As I explained earlier in the thesis, this is one of the examples in which group values different for the American and Russian public can be anchored with a view of achieving a propagandistic aim. Accordingly, while Putin uses a lot of historical collective symbols, Obama intensifies his messages with emotional, sometimes personal, stories from the present or recent past. When our focus is shifted to the language, we can observe that Obama uses simpler

and shorter sentences (as well as statements in general) and he incorporates use of the pronoun “we” much more frequently. Obama’s style of communication is rather friendlier than Putin’s. For example, Obama often addresses his speeches to “everybody” whereas Putin tends to be more concrete and formal in his welcoming sentences. When comparing the argumentation with regard to the annexation, Putin stresses that Russia is the one reacting to the events in Ukraine and American interventions. Obama, interestingly, claims the same but vice versa and argues that the United States had no other option than to take action after what Russia did with the Crimean peninsula. They also blame each other for not being willing to engage in discussion and compromise and they accuse each other using Cold War rhetoric.

The introduction offered a hypothesis to be confirmed or negated: There are propagandistic strategies present in the speeches of both leaders. The objective of the thesis was stated as follows: to identify and further examine the role of propaganda in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. More particularly, I aimed to analyse relevant President Putin’s and President Obama’s speeches during the period around the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and identify and provide a comprehensive assessment of the propagandistic techniques and strategies included in them. The findings of the analysis prove the use of propagandistic techniques within the speeches, and the role of propaganda, its hidden meanings and possible motives were further examined. The use of propaganda within the speeches relevant to the conflict given by President Putin and President Obama further illustrate that various players including the political leaders of the Russian Federation and the USA are playing their part in the conflict through dissemination of propagandistic messages. For all this, we can conclude, that the hypothesis is confirmed and the objective of the work successfully achieved.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 - Transcript of Putin's Crimea Speech

1 **President of Russia Vladimir Putin:** Federation Council members, State Duma deputies, good
2 afternoon. Representatives of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are here among us, citizens
3 of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol!

4 Dear friends, we have gathered here today in connection with an issue that is of vital, historic
5 significance to all of us. A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance with
6 democratic procedures and international norms.

7 More than 82 percent of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96 percent of them spoke out
8 in favour of reuniting with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves.

9 To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what
10 Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other.

11 Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient
12 Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy
13 predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples
14 of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into
15 the Russian empire are also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding
16 history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia's Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava
17 and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts,
18 symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour.

19 Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples' cultures and traditions. This makes it similar to Russia
20 as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has been lost over the centuries. Russians
21 and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and people of other ethnic groups have lived side by side in Crimea,
22 retaining their own identity, traditions, languages and faith.

23 Incidentally, the total population of the Crimean Peninsula today is 2.2 million people, of whom
24 almost 1.5 million are Russians, 350,000 are Ukrainians who predominantly consider Russian their
25 native language, and about 290,000–300,000 are Crimean Tatars, who, as the referendum has
26 shown, also lean towards Russia.

27 True, there was a time when Crimean Tatars were treated unfairly, just as a number of other peoples
28 in the USSR. There is only one thing I can say here: millions of people of various ethnicities suffered
29 during those repressions, and primarily Russians.

30 Crimean Tatars returned to their homeland. I believe we should make all the necessary political
31 and legislative decisions to finalise the rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars, restore them in their rights
32 and clear their good name.

33 We have great respect for people of all the ethnic groups living in Crimea. This is their common
34 home, their motherland, and it would be right – I know the local population supports this –
35 for Crimea to have three equal national languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar.

36 Colleagues,

37 In people's hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This firm
38 conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to generation, over time,
39 under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our country went through during
40 the entire 20th century.

41 After the revolution, the Bolsheviks, for a number of reasons – may God judge them – added large
42 sections of the historical South of Russia to the Republic of Ukraine. This was done with no
43 consideration for the ethnic make-up of the population, and today these areas form the southeast
44 of Ukraine. Then, in 1954, a decision was made to transfer Crimean Region to Ukraine, along with
45 Sevastopol, despite the fact that it was a federal city. This was the personal initiative
46 of the Communist Party head Nikita Khrushchev. What stood behind this decision of his – a desire
47 to win the support of the Ukrainian political establishment or to atone for the mass repressions
48 of the 1930's in Ukraine – is for historians to figure out.

49 What matters now is that this decision was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that
50 were in place even then. The decision was made behind the scenes. Naturally, in a totalitarian state
51 nobody bothered to ask the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol. They were faced with the fact.
52 People, of course, wondered why all of a sudden Crimea became part of Ukraine. But on the whole –
53 and we must state this clearly, we all know it – this decision was treated as a formality of sorts
54 because the territory was transferred within the boundaries of a single state. Back then, it was
55 impossible to imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become two separate states.
56 However, this has happened.

57 Unfortunately, what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart. Things developed so
58 swiftly that few people realised how truly dramatic those events and their consequences would be.
59 Many people both in Russia and in Ukraine, as well as in other republics hoped that
60 the Commonwealth of Independent States that was created at the time would become the new
61 common form of statehood. They were told that there would be a single currency, a single economic
62 space, joint armed forces; however, all this remained empty promises, while the big country was
63 gone. It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realised that it was
64 not simply robbed, it was plundered.

65 At the same time, we have to admit that by launching the sovereignty parade Russia itself aided
66 in the collapse of the Soviet Union. And as this collapse was legalised, everyone forgot about Crimea
67 and Sevastopol – the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. Millions of people went to bed in one country
68 and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while
69 the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be
70 divided by borders.

71 Now, many years later, I heard residents of Crimea say that back in 1991 they were handed over like
72 a sack of potatoes. This is hard to disagree with. And what about the Russian state? What about
73 Russia? It humbly accepted the situation. This country was going through such hard times then that
74 realistically it was incapable of protecting its interests. However, the people could not reconcile
75 themselves to this outrageous historical injustice. All these years, citizens and many public figures
76 came back to this issue, saying that Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian
77 city. Yes, we all knew this in our hearts and minds, but we had to proceed from the existing reality
78 and build our good-neighbourly relations with independent Ukraine on a new basis. Meanwhile, our
79 relations with Ukraine, with the fraternal Ukrainian people have always been and will remain
80 of foremost importance for us.

81 Today we can speak about it openly, and I would like to share with you some details
82 of the negotiations that took place in the early 2000s. The then President of Ukraine Mr Kuchma
83 asked me to expedite the process of delimiting the Russian-Ukrainian border. At that time,
84 the process was practically at a standstill. Russia seemed to have recognised Crimea as part
85 of Ukraine, but there were no negotiations on delimiting the borders. Despite the complexity

86 of the situation, I immediately issued instructions to Russian government agencies to speed up their
87 work to document the borders, so that everyone had a clear understanding that by agreeing
88 to delimit the border we admitted de facto and de jure that Crimea was Ukrainian territory, thereby
89 closing the issue.

90 We accommodated Ukraine not only regarding Crimea, but also on such a complicated matter
91 as the maritime boundary in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. What we proceeded from back
92 then was that good relations with Ukraine matter most for us and they should not fall hostage
93 to deadlock territorial disputes. However, we expected Ukraine to remain our good neighbour, we
94 hoped that Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially its southeast and Crimea,
95 would live in a friendly, democratic and civilised state that would protect their rights in line with
96 the norms of international law.

97 However, this is not how the situation developed. Time and time again attempts were made
98 to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced
99 assimilation. Moreover, Russians, just as other citizens of Ukraine are suffering from the constant
100 political and state crisis that has been rocking the country for over 20 years.

101 I understand why Ukrainian people wanted change. They have had enough of the authorities
102 in power during the years of Ukraine's independence. Presidents, prime ministers
103 and parliamentarians changed, but their attitude to the country and its people remained the same.
104 They milked the country, fought among themselves for power, assets and cash flows and did not care
105 much about the ordinary people. They did not wonder why it was that millions of Ukrainian citizens
106 saw no prospects at home and went to other countries to work as day labourers. I would like
107 to stress this: it was not some Silicon Valley they fled to, but to become day labourers. Last year
108 alone almost 3 million people found such jobs in Russia. According to some sources, in 2013 their
109 earnings in Russia totalled over \$20 billion, which is about 12% of Ukraine's GDP.

110 I would like to reiterate that I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans
111 against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest,
112 democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do
113 not satisfy the people. However, those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different
114 agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power
115 and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis,
116 Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this
117 day.

118 The new so-called authorities began by introducing a draft law to revise the language policy, which
119 was a direct infringement on the rights of ethnic minorities. However, they were immediately
120 'disciplined' by the foreign sponsors of these so-called politicians. One has to admit that the mentors
121 of these current authorities are smart and know well what such attempts to build a purely Ukrainian
122 state may lead to. The draft law was set aside, but clearly reserved for the future. Hardly any
123 mention is made of this attempt now, probably on the presumption that people have a short
124 memory. Nevertheless, we can all clearly see the intentions of these ideological heirs of Bandera,
125 Hitler's accomplice during World War II.

126 It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to.
127 Many government agencies have been taken over by the impostors, but they do not have any control
128 in the country, while they themselves – and I would like to stress this – are often controlled
129 by radicals. In some cases, you need a special permit from the militants on Maidan to meet with
130 certain ministers of the current government. This is not a joke – this is reality.

131 Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first
132 in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. In view of this, the residents of Crimea
133 and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events
134 that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities.
135 Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents
136 in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part.

137 First, we had to help create conditions so that the residents of Crimea for the first time in history
138 were able to peacefully express their free will regarding their own future. However, what do we hear
139 from our colleagues in Western Europe and North America? They say we are violating norms
140 of international law. Firstly, it's a good thing that they at least remember that there exists such
141 a thing as international law – better late than never.

142 Secondly, and most importantly – what exactly are we violating? True, the President of the Russian
143 Federation received permission from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed Forces
144 in Ukraine. However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet. Russia's Armed
145 Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line with an international agreement. True,
146 we did enhance our forces there; however – this is something I would like everyone to hear
147 and know – we did not exceed the personnel limit of our Armed Forces in Crimea, which is set
148 at 25,000, because there was no need to do so.

149 Next. As it declared independence and decided to hold a referendum, the Supreme Council of Crimea
150 referred to the United Nations Charter, which speaks of the right of nations to self-determination.
151 Incidentally, I would like to remind you that when Ukraine seceded from the USSR it did exactly
152 the same thing, almost word for word. Ukraine used this right, yet the residents of Crimea are denied
153 it. Why is that?

154 Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent our
155 western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that
156 the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate
157 and did not require any permission from the country's central authorities. Pursuant to Article 2,
158 Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN International Court agreed with this approach
159 and made the following comment in its ruling of July 22, 2010, and I quote: "No general prohibition
160 may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations
161 of independence," and "General international law contains no prohibition on declarations
162 of independence." Crystal clear, as they say.

163 I do not like to resort to quotes, but in this case, I cannot help it. Here is a quote from another official
164 document: the Written Statement of the United States America of April 17, 2009, submitted
165 to the same UN International Court in connection with the hearings on Kosovo. Again, I quote:
166 "Declarations of independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does
167 not make them violations of international law." End of quote. They wrote this, disseminated it all
168 over the world, had everyone agree and now they are outraged. Over what? The actions of Crimean
169 people completely fit in with these instructions, as it were. For some reason, things that Kosovo
170 Albanians (and we have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians, Ukrainians
171 and Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed. Again, one wonders why.

172 We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special case. What
173 makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is the fact that the conflict
174 in Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties. Is this a legal argument? The ruling
175 of the International Court says nothing about this. This is not even double standards; this is amazing,

primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human losses.

I will state clearly — if the Crimean local self-defence units had not taken the situation under control, there could have been casualties as well. Fortunately this did not happen. There was not a single armed confrontation in Crimea and no casualties. Why do you think this was so? The answer is simple: because it is very difficult, practically impossible to fight against the will of the people. Here I would like to thank the Ukrainian military – and this is 22,000 fully armed servicemen. I would like to thank those Ukrainian service members who refrained from bloodshed and did not smear their uniforms in blood.

Other thoughts come to mind in this connection. They keep talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, some sort of aggression. This is strange to hear. I cannot recall a single case in history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and with no human casualties.

Colleagues,

Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what has been happening in the world over the past several decades. After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. Key international institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they are sadly degrading. Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle “If you are not with us, you are against us.” To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall.

This happened in Yugoslavia; we remember 1999 very well. It was hard to believe, even seeing it with my own eyes, that at the end of the 20th century, one of Europe’s capitals, Belgrade, was under missile attack for several weeks, and then came the real intervention. Was there a UN Security Council resolution on this matter, allowing for these actions? Nothing of the sort. And then, they hit Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too.

There was a whole series of controlled “colour” revolutions. Clearly, the people in those nations, where these events took place, were sick of tyranny and poverty, of their lack of prospects; but these feelings were taken advantage of cynically. Standards were imposed on these nations that did not in any way correspond to their way of life, traditions, or these peoples’ cultures. As a result, instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks in violence and a series of upheavals.

The Arab Spring turned into the Arab Winter.

A similar situation unfolded in Ukraine. In 2004, to push the necessary candidate through at the presidential elections, they thought up some sort of third round that was not stipulated by the law. It was absurd and a mockery of the constitution. And now, they have thrown in an organised and well-equipped army of militants.

We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want

220 to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open and fair. But we saw no
221 reciprocal steps.

222 On the contrary, they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before
223 an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO's expansion to the East, as well as the deployment
224 of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: "Well, this does not
225 concern you." That's easy to say.

226 It happened with the deployment of a missile defence system. In spite of all our apprehensions,
227 the project is working and moving forward. It happened with the endless foot-dragging in the talks
228 on visa issues, promises of fair competition and free access to global markets.

229 Today, we are being threatened with sanctions, but we already experience many limitations, ones
230 that are quite significant for us, our economy and our nation. For example, still during the times
231 of the Cold War, the US and subsequently other nations restricted a large list of technologies
232 and equipment from being sold to the USSR, creating the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
233 Export Controls list. Today, they have formally been eliminated, but only formally; and in reality,
234 many limitations are still in effect.

235 In short, we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th,
236 19th and 20th centuries, continues today. They are constantly trying to sweep us into
237 a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we call
238 things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything. And with
239 Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly
240 and unprofessionally.

241 After all, they were fully aware that there are millions of Russians living in Ukraine and in Crimea.
242 They must have really lacked political instinct and common sense not to foresee all the consequences
243 of their actions. Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring
244 all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You must always remember this.

245 Today, it is imperative to end this hysteria, to refute the rhetoric of the cold war and to accept
246 the obvious fact: Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other
247 countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected.

248 At the same time, we are grateful to all those who understood our actions in Crimea; we are grateful
249 to the people of China, whose leaders have always considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea
250 taking into account the full historical and political context, and greatly appreciate India's reserve
251 and objectivity.

252 Today, I would like to address the people of the United States of America, the people who, since
253 the foundation of their nation and adoption of the Declaration of Independence, have been proud
254 to hold freedom above all else. Isn't the desire of Crimea's residents to freely choose their fate such
255 a value? Please understand us.

256 I believe that the Europeans, first and foremost, the Germans, will also understand me. Let me
257 remind you that in the course of political consultations on the unification of East and West Germany,
258 at the expert, though very high level, some nations that were then and are now Germany's allies did
259 not support the idea of unification. Our nation, however, unequivocally supported the sincere,
260 unstoppable desire of the Germans for national unity. I am confident that you have not forgotten
261 this, and I expect that the citizens of Germany will also support the aspiration of the Russians,
262 of historical Russia, to restore unity.

263 I also want to address the people of Ukraine. I sincerely want you to understand us: we do not want
264 to harm you in any way, or to hurt your national feelings. We have always respected the territorial

265 integrity of the Ukrainian state, incidentally, unlike those who sacrificed Ukraine's unity for their
266 political ambitions. They flaunt slogans about Ukraine's greatness, but they are the ones who did
267 everything to divide the nation. Today's civil standoff is entirely on their conscience. I want you
268 to hear me, my dear friends. Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia, shouting that other
269 regions will follow Crimea. We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that. As for Crimea, it
270 was and remains a Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean-Tatar land.

271 I repeat, just as it has been for centuries, it will be a home to all the peoples living there. What it will
272 never be and do is follow in Bandera's footsteps!

273 Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this
274 strategic territory should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian.
275 Otherwise, dear friends (I am addressing both Ukraine and Russia), you and we – the Russians
276 and the Ukrainians – could lose Crimea completely, and that could happen in the near historical
277 perspective. Please think about it.

278 Let me note too that we have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining
279 NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant
280 that NATO's navy would be right there in this city of Russia's military glory, and this would create not
281 an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia. These are things that could
282 have become reality were it not for the choice the Crimean people made, and I want to say thank
283 you to them for this.

284 But let me say too that we are not opposed to cooperation with NATO, for this is certainly not
285 the case. For all the internal processes within the organisation, NATO remains a military alliance,
286 and we are against having a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our
287 historic territory. I simply cannot imagine that we would travel to Sevastopol to visit NATO sailors.
288 Of course, most of them are wonderful guys, but it would be better to have them come and visit us,
289 be our guests, rather than the other way round.

290 Let me say quite frankly that it pains our hearts to see what is happening in Ukraine at the moment,
291 see the people's suffering and their uncertainty about how to get through today and what awaits
292 them tomorrow. Our concerns are understandable because we are not simply close neighbours but,
293 as I have said many times already, we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient
294 Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other.

295 Let me say one other thing too. Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine
296 and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic
297 and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine's own interest to ensure that these people's
298 rights and interests are fully protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine's state stability and territorial
299 integrity.

300 We want to be friends with Ukraine and we want Ukraine to be a strong, sovereign and self-sufficient
301 country. Ukraine is one of our biggest partners after all. We have many joint projects and I believe
302 in their success no matter what the current difficulties. Most importantly, we want peace
303 and harmony to reign in Ukraine, and we are ready to work together with other countries to do
304 everything possible to facilitate and support this. But as I said, only Ukraine's own people can put
305 their own house in order.

306 Residents of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the whole of Russia admired your courage, dignity
307 and bravery. It was you who decided Crimea's future. We were closer than ever over these days,
308 supporting each other. These were sincere feelings of solidarity. It is at historic turning points such

309 as these that a nation demonstrates its maturity and strength of spirit. The Russian people showed
310 this maturity and strength through their united support for their compatriots.

311 Russia's foreign policy position on this matter drew its firmness from the will of millions of our
312 people, our national unity and the support of our country's main political and public forces. I want
313 to thank everyone for this patriotic spirit, everyone without exception. Now, we need to continue
314 and maintain this kind of consolidation so as to resolve the tasks our country faces on its road ahead.
315 Obviously, we will encounter external opposition, but this is a decision that we need to make
316 for ourselves. Are we ready to consistently defend our national interests, or will we forever give in,
317 retreat to who knows where? Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just
318 sanctions but also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I would like
319 to know what it is they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column, this disparate bunch
320 of 'national traitors', or are they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic situation so
321 as to provoke public discontent? We consider such statements irresponsible and clearly aggressive
322 in tone, and we will respond to them accordingly. At the same time, we will never seek confrontation
323 with our partners, whether in the East or the West, but on the contrary, will do everything we can
324 to build civilised and good-neighbourly relations as one is supposed to in the modern world.

325 Colleagues,

326 I understand the people of Crimea, who put the question in the clearest possible terms
327 in the referendum: should Crimea be with Ukraine or with Russia? We can be sure in saying that
328 the authorities in Crimea and Sevastopol, the legislative authorities, when they formulated
329 the question, set aside group and political interests and made the people's fundamental interests
330 alone the cornerstone of their work. The particular historic, population, political and economic
331 circumstances of Crimea would have made any other proposed option — however tempting it could
332 be at the first glance — only temporary and fragile and would have inevitably led to further
333 worsening of the situation there, which would have had disastrous effects on people's lives.

334 The people of Crimea thus decided to put the question in firm and uncompromising form, with no
335 grey areas. The referendum was fair and transparent, and the people of Crimea clearly
336 and convincingly expressed their will and stated that they want to be with Russia.

337 Russia will also have to make a difficult decision now, taking into account the various domestic
338 and external considerations. What do people here in Russia think? Here, like in any democratic
339 country, people have different points of view, but I want to make the point that the absolute
340 majority of our people clearly do support what is happening.

341 The most recent public opinion surveys conducted here in Russia show that 95 percent of people
342 think that Russia should protect the interests of Russians and members of other ethnic groups living
343 in Crimea – 95 percent of our citizens. More than 83 percent think that Russia should do this even if
344 it will complicate our relations with some other countries. A total of 86 percent of our people see
345 Crimea as still being Russian territory and part of our country's lands. And one particularly important
346 figure, which corresponds exactly with the result in Crimea's referendum: almost 92 percent of our
347 people support Crimea's reunification with Russia.

348 Thus we see that the overwhelming majority of people in Crimea and the absolute majority
349 of the Russian Federation's people support the reunification of the Republic of Crimea and the city
350 of Sevastopol with Russia.

351 Now this is a matter for Russia's own political decision, and any decision here can be based only
352 on the people's will, because the people is the ultimate source of all authority.

353 Members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, citizens of Russia, residents
354 of Crimea and Sevastopol, today, in accordance with the people's will, I submit to the Federal
355 Assembly a request to consider a Constitutional Law on the creation of two new constituent entities
356 within the Russian Federation: the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and to ratify
357 the treaty on admitting to the Russian Federation Crimea and Sevastopol, which is already ready
358 for signing. I stand assured of your support.

Appendix 2 - Transcript of Putin's Valdai Speech

1 President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, friends, ladies and gentlemen,
2 I hope that the place for your discussions, for our meetings is well chosen and that the timing is good. We are
3 in the centre of Russia – not a geographical centre, but a spiritual one. [Novgorod Region] is a cradle of Russian
4 statehood. Our outstanding historians believe and have analysed how the elements of Russian statehood came
5 together right here. This is in the light of the fact that two great rivers – the Volkhov and Neva – acted
6 as natural means of communication, providing a natural linkage at the time. And it was here that Russian
7 statehood gradually began to emerge.
8 As has already been pointed out, this year the [Valdai] club has brought together an unprecedented list
9 of participants: more than 200 Russian and foreign politicians, public and spiritual leaders, philosophers
10 and cultural figures, people with very different, original and sometimes opposing views.
11 You have already been conferring here for a few days now, and I'll try not to bore you unduly. But nevertheless,
12 I will allow myself to state my views on subjects that you have touched on during these discussions in one way
13 or another. I am not only thinking about analysing Russian historical, cultural, and governance experiences.
14 First and foremost, I am thinking of general debates, conversations about the future, strategies, and values,
15 about the values underpinning our country's development, how global processes will affect our national
16 identity, what kind of twenty-first-century world we want to see, and what Russia, our country, can contribute
17 to this world together with its partners.
18 Today we need new strategies to preserve our identity in a rapidly changing world, a world that has become
19 more open, transparent and interdependent. This fact confronts virtually all countries and all peoples in one
20 form or another: Russian, European, Chinese and American – the societies of virtually all countries.
21 And naturally, including here in Valdai, we strive to better understand how our partners are attempting
22 to meet this challenge, because we are meeting here with experts on Russia. But we proceed from the fact that
23 our guests will state their views on the interaction and relationship between Russia and the countries that you
24 represent.
25 For us (and I am talking about Russians and Russia), questions about who we are and who we want to be are
26 increasingly prominent in our society. We have left behind Soviet ideology, and there will be no return.
27 Proponents of fundamental conservatism who idealise pre-1917 Russia seem to be similarly far from reality,
28 as are supporters of an extreme, western-style liberalism.
29 It is evident that it is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural and national self-determination.
30 Without this we will not be able to withstand internal and external challenges, nor we will succeed in global

31 competitions. And today we see a new round of such competitions. Today their main focuses are economic-
32 technological and ideological-informational. Military-political problems and general conditions are worsening.
33 The world is becoming more rigid, and sometimes forgoes not merely international law, but also basic decency.
34 [Every country] has to have military, technological and economic strength, but nevertheless the main thing that
35 will determine success is the quality of citizens, the quality of society: their intellectual, spiritual and moral
36 strength. After all, in the end economic growth, prosperity and geopolitical influence are all derived from
37 societal conditions. They depend on whether the citizens of a given country consider themselves a nation,
38 to what extent they identify with their own history, values and traditions, and whether they are united
39 by common goals and responsibilities. In this sense, the question of finding and strengthening national identity
40 really is fundamental for Russia.

41 Meanwhile, today Russia's national identity is experiencing not only objective pressures stemming from
42 globalisation, but also the consequences of the national catastrophes of the twentieth century, when we
43 experienced the collapse of our state two different times. The result was a devastating blow to our nation's
44 cultural and spiritual codes; we were faced with the disruption of traditions and the consonance of history,
45 with the demoralisation of society, with a deficit of trust and responsibility. These are the root causes of many
46 pressing problems we face. After all, the question of responsibility for oneself, before society and the law, is
47 something fundamental for both legal and everyday life.

48 After 1991 there was the illusion that a new national ideology, a development ideology, would simply appear
49 by itself. The state, authorities, intellectual and political classes virtually rejected engaging in this work, all
50 the more so since previous, semi-official ideology was hard to swallow. And in fact they were all simply afraid
51 to even broach the subject. In addition, the lack of a national idea stemming from a national identity profited
52 the quasi-colonial element of the elite – those determined to steal and remove capital, and who did not link
53 their future to that of the country, the place where they earned their money.

54 Practice has shown that a new national idea does not simply appear, nor does it develop according to market
55 rules. A spontaneously constructed state and society does not work, and neither does mechanically copying
56 other countries' experiences. Such primitive borrowing and attempts to civilize Russia from abroad were not
57 accepted by an absolute majority of our people. This is because the desire for independence and sovereignty
58 in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres is an integral part of our national character. Incidentally, such
59 approaches have often failed in other nations too. The time when ready-made lifestyle models could be
60 installed in foreign states like computer programmes has passed.

61 We also understand that identity and a national idea cannot be imposed from above, cannot be established
62 on an ideological monopoly. Such a construction is very unstable and vulnerable; we know this from personal
63 experience. It has no future in the modern world. We need historical creativity, a synthesis of the best national
64 practices and ideas, an understanding of our cultural, spiritual and political traditions from different points
65 of view, and to understand that [national identity] is not a rigid thing that will last forever, but rather a living
66 organism. Only then will our identity be based on a solid foundation, be directed towards the future and not
67 the past. This is the main argument demonstrating that a development ideology must be discussed by people
68 who hold different views, and have different opinions about how and what to do to solve given problems.

69 All of us – so-called Neo-Slavophiles and Neo-Westernisers, statist and so-called liberals – all of society must
70 work together to create common development goals. We need to break the habit of only listening to like-
71 minded people, angrily – and even with hatred – rejecting any other point of view from the outset. You can't
72 flip or even kick the country's future like a football, plunging into unbridled nihilism, consumerism, criticism
73 of anything and everything, or gloomy pessimism.

74 This means that liberals have to learn to talk with representatives of the left-wing and, conversely, that
75 nationalists must remember that Russia was formed specifically as a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional
76 country from its very inception. Nationalists must remember that by calling into question our multi-ethnic
77 character, and exploiting the issue of Russian, Tatar, Caucasian, Siberian or any other nationalism
78 or separatism, means that we are starting to destroy our genetic code. In effect, we will begin to destroy
79 ourselves.

80 Russia's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are unconditional. These are red lines no one is
81 allowed to cross. For all the differences in our views, debates about identity and about our national future are
82 impossible unless their participants are patriotic. Of course I mean patriotism in the purest sense of the word.

83 Too often in our nation's history, instead of opposition to the government we have been faced with opponents
84 of Russia itself. I have already mentioned this; Pushkin also talked about it. And we know how it ended, with
85 the demolition of the [Russian] state as such. There is virtually no Russian family that completely escaped
86 the troubles of the past century. Questions about how to assess certain historical events still divide our country
87 and society.

88 We need to heal these wounds, and repair the tissues of our historic fabric. We can no longer engage in self-
89 deception, striking out unsightly or ideologically uncomfortable pages of our history, breaking links between
90 generations, rushing to extremes, creating or debunking idols. It's time to stop only taking note of the bad
91 in our history, and berating ourselves more than even our opponents would do. [Self-]criticism is necessary, but
92 without a sense of self-worth, or love for our Fatherland, such criticism becomes humiliating
93 and counterproductive.

94 We must be proud of our history, and we have things to be proud of. Our entire, uncensored history must be
95 a part of Russian identity. Without recognising this it is impossible to establish mutual trust and allow society
96 to move forward.

97 Another serious challenge to Russia's identity is linked to events taking place in the world. Here there are both
98 foreign policy and moral aspects. We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting
99 their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are denying
100 moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and even sexual. They are
101 implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with the belief
102 in Satan.

103 The excesses of political correctness have reached the point where people are seriously talking about
104 registering political parties whose aim is to promote paedophilia. People in many European countries are
105 embarrassed or afraid to talk about their religious affiliations. Holidays are abolished or even called something
106 different; their essence is hidden away, as is their moral foundation. And people are aggressively trying

to export this model all over the world. I am convinced that this opens a direct path to degradation and primitivism, resulting in a profound demographic and moral crisis.

What else but the loss of the ability to self-reproduce could act as the greatest testimony of the moral crisis facing a human society? Today almost all developed nations are no longer able to reproduce themselves, even with the help of migration. Without the values embedded in Christianity and other world religions, without the standards of morality that have taken shape over millennia, people will inevitably lose their human dignity. We consider it natural and right to defend these values. One must respect every minority's right to be different, but the rights of the majority must not be put into question.

At the same time we see attempts to somehow revive a standardised model of a unipolar world and to blur the institutions of international law and national sovereignty. Such a unipolar, standardised world does not require sovereign states; it requires vassals. In a historical sense this amounts to a rejection of one's own identity, of the God-given diversity of the world.

Russia agrees with those who believe that key decisions should be worked out on a collective basis, rather than at the discretion of and in the interests of certain countries or groups of countries. Russia believes that international law, not the right of the strong, must apply. And we believe that every country, every nation is not exceptional, but unique, original and benefits from equal rights, including the right to independently choose their own development path.

This is our conceptual outlook, and it follows from our own historical destiny and Russia's role in global politics. Our present position has deep historical roots. Russia itself has evolved on the basis of diversity, harmony and balance, and brings such a balance to the international stage.

I want to remind you that the Congress of Vienna of 1815 and the agreements made at Yalta in 1945, taken with Russia's very active participation, secured a lasting peace. Russia's strength, the strength of a winning nation at those critical junctures, manifested itself as generosity and justice. And let us remember [the Treaty of] Versailles, concluded without Russia's participation. Many experts, and I absolutely agree with them, believe that Versailles laid the foundation for the Second World War because the Treaty of Versailles was unfair to the German people: it imposed restrictions with which they could not cope, and the course of the next century became clear.

There is one more fundamental aspect to which I want to draw your attention. In Europe and some other countries so-called multiculturalism is in many respects a transplanted, artificial model that is now being questioned, for understandable reasons. This is because it is based on paying for the colonial past. It is no accident that today European politicians and public figures are increasingly talking about the failures of multiculturalism, and that they are not able to integrate foreign languages or foreign cultural elements into their societies.

Over the past centuries in Russia, which some have tried to label as the "prison of nations", not even the smallest ethnic group has disappeared. And they have retained not only their internal autonomy and cultural identity, but also their historical space. You know, I was interested to learn (I did not even know this) that in Soviet times [authorities] paid such careful attention to this that virtually every small ethnic group

144 had its own print publication, support for its language, and for its national literature. We should bring back
145 and take on board much of what has been done in this respect.

146 Along with this the different cultures in Russia have the unique experience of mutual influence, mutual
147 enrichment and mutual respect. This multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity lives in our historical consciousness,
148 in our spirit and in our historical makeup. Our state was built in the course of a millennium on this organic
149 model.

150 Russia – as philosopher Konstantin Leontyev vividly put it – has always evolved in “blossoming complexity”
151 as a state-civilisation, reinforced by the Russian people, Russian language, Russian culture, Russian Orthodox
152 Church and the country’s other traditional religions. It is precisely the state-civilisation model that has shaped
153 our state polity. It has always sought to flexibly accommodate the ethnic and religious specificity of particular
154 territories, ensuring diversity in unity.

155 Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions are an integral part of Russia’s identity, its historical
156 heritage and the present-day lives of its citizens. The main task of the state, as enshrined in the Constitution, is
157 to ensure equal rights for members of traditional religions and atheists, and the right to freedom of conscience
158 for all citizens.

159 However, it is clearly impossible to identify oneself only through one’s ethnicity or religion in such a large
160 nation with a multi-ethnic population. In order to maintain the nation’s unity, people must develop a civic
161 identity on the basis of shared values, a patriotic consciousness, civic responsibility and solidarity, respect
162 for the law, and a sense of responsibility for their homeland’s fate, without losing touch with their ethnic
163 or religious roots.

164 There are broad discussions on how the ideology of national development will be structured politically
165 and conceptually – including with your participation, colleagues. But I deeply believe that individuals’ personal,
166 moral, intellectual and physical development must remain at the heart of our philosophy. Back at the start
167 of the 1990s, Solzhenitsyn stated that the nation’s main goal should be to preserve the population after a very
168 difficult 20th century. Today, we must admit that we have not yet fully overcome the negative demographic
169 trends, although we have veered away from a dangerous decline in the national potential.

170 Unfortunately, throughout our nation’s history, little value was given at times to individual human lives. Too
171 often, people were seen simply as a means, rather than a goal and a mission for development. We no longer
172 have that right and we cannot throw millions of human lives into the fire for the sake of development. We
173 must treasure every individual. Russia’s main strength in this and future centuries will lie in its educated,
174 creative, physically and spiritually healthy people, rather than natural resources.

175 The role of education is all the more important because in order to educate an individual, a patriot, we must
176 restore the role of great Russian culture and literature. They must serve as the foundation for people’s
177 personal identity, the source of their uniqueness and their basis for understanding the national idea. Here,
178 a great deal depends on the teaching community, which has been and remains a highly important guardian
179 of nationwide values, ideas and philosophies. This community speaks the same language – the language
180 of science, knowledge and education, despite the fact that it is spread out over an enormous territory, from
181 Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. In this way, the community of teachers, the educational community overall,

182 in the broad sense of the word, binds the nation together. Supporting this community is one of the most
183 important steps on the path toward a strong, flourishing Russia.

184 I want to stress again that without focussing our efforts on people's education and health, creating mutual
185 responsibility between the authorities and each individual, and establishing trust within society, we will be
186 losers in the competition of history. Russia's citizens must feel that they are the responsible owners of their
187 country, region, hometown, property, belongings and their lives. A citizen is someone who is capable
188 of independently managing his or her own affairs, freely cooperating with equals.

189 Local governments and self-regulated citizens' organisations serve as the best school for civic consciousness.
190 Of course, I'm referring to non-profits. Incidentally, one of the best Russian political traditions, the country
191 council tradition, was also built on the principles of local government. A true civil society and a true, nationally-
192 focused political elite, including the opposition with its own ideology, values and standards for good and evil –
193 their own, rather than those dictated by the media or from abroad – can only grow through effective self-
194 governing mechanisms. The government is prepared to trust self-regulating and self-governing associations,
195 but we must know whom we are trusting. This is absolutely normal global practice, which is precisely why we
196 have passed new legislation to increase the transparency of nongovernmental organisations.

197 Speaking of any kind of reforms, it is important to bear in mind that there is more to our nation than just
198 Moscow and St Petersburg. In developing Russian federalism, we must rely on our own historical experience,
199 using flexible and diverse models. The Russian model of federalism has a great deal of potential built into it. It
200 is imperative that we learn to use it competently, not forgetting its most important aspect: the development
201 of the regions and their independence should create equal opportunities for all of our nation's citizens,
202 regardless of where they live, to eliminate inequalities in the economic and social development of Russia's
203 territory, thereby strengthening the nation's unity. Ultimately, this is a huge challenge because these
204 territories' development has been very unbalanced over the course of decades and even centuries.

205 I would like to touch on another topic. The 21st century promises to become the century of major changes,
206 the era of the formation of major geopolitical zones, as well as financial and economic, cultural, civilisational,
207 and military and political areas. That is why integrating with our neighbours is our absolute priority. The future
208 Eurasian Economic Union, which we have declared and which we have discussed extensively as of late, is not
209 just a collection of mutually beneficial agreements. The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the identity
210 of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world. Eurasian integration is a chance
211 for the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent centre for global development, rather than
212 remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia.

213 I want to stress that Eurasian integration will also be built on the principle of diversity. This is a union where
214 everyone maintains their identity, their distinctive character and their political independence. Together with
215 our partners, we will gradually implement this project, step by step. We expect that it will become our common
216 input into maintaining diversity and stable global development.

217 Colleagues, the years after 1991 are often referred to as the post-Soviet era. We have lived through
218 and overcome that turbulent, dramatic period. Russia has passed through these trials and tribulations and is
219 returning to itself, to its own history, just as it did at other points in its history. After consolidating our national

220 identity, strengthening our roots, and remaining open and receptive to the best ideas and practices of the East
221 and the West, we must and will move forward.
222 Thank you very much for your attention.

Appendix 3 - Transcript of Putin's Yalta Speech

1 President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, colleagues, friends,
2 We are meeting today in Crimea. It was a conscious choice to meet with you here. I want to start by thanking
3 you all for the ceaseless attention you have been paying to developing our two new regions, and of course
4 for the consolidation, unity and solidarity that all parties in the State Duma and indeed all of our country's
5 political forces showed during those days that were of such decisive importance for the fate of Crimea
6 and Sevastopol and for our entire country.
7 Let me take this opportunity to note the productive and substantial work the State Duma accomplished during
8 the spring session. You approved amendments to our country's Constitution and passed important laws
9 concerning the economy and social sector. In just a short timeframe you examined the so-called 'Crimean
10 package' of laws, which were passed in order to regulate key areas of life in Crimea and Sevastopol during
11 the transition period. This was extremely important and concerns the operation of the banking and financial
12 systems and pension payments. You took a number of important decisions that directly concern people's
13 interests. I remind you that 12 federal constitutional laws and 283 federal laws were passed in all.
14 Finally, during the spring session, you began work on improving the local self-government system and took
15 a decision that significantly increases the role and responsibilities of municipalities and regions. Overall, you
16 have accomplished a lot, done a lot of hard work, and we all deserve to meet now in Crimea at this time.
17 Looking at the decisions taken to develop municipal and regional government, we see that they are based
18 on a flexible approach, and this kind of flexible approach and logic is especially important for our two new
19 regions, Crimea and Sevastopol, where so much has to be done from scratch.
20 Regional and local elections will take place here in September, as in many other Russian regions. It is important
21 that regional and local government work be organised effectively and that powers and responsibilities be
22 clearly delineated.
23 But I say again, we must at the same time take into account the regions' particular circumstances and traditions
24 and best practice in local and regional government. First and foremost of course are the interests of the people
25 living in these regions.
26 I know that many deputies arrived in Crimea on the eve of our meeting – probably not only to enjoy
27 the summer sun and the southern coast, but because I know you also met with people, and this is extremely
28 important. Indeed, it is important and highly useful. After all, State Duma deputies are constantly doing this
29 work in other territories. It is very important, of course, to visit this place as well and talk to local people.
30 A serious expert discussion also occurred within the framework of the special seminars on economic issues that
31 were held yesterday, as well as on the history of Crimea. I hope that today, we will discuss many
32 of the suggestions made within the framework of the seminars. I generally suggest that we not only conduct
33 today's meeting as an evening or day of questions and answers, but count on us to exchange ideas

34 and suggestions. It will be a pleasure for me and Mr Medvedev to hear the suggestions you may have
35 for developing these territories.

36 We have a great deal to do here. We have accumulated an enormous heap of problems that have essentially
37 been unresolved for decades. Sometimes, one gets the sense that Crimea lived like a poor relation.

38 The previous authorities pumped a lot out of it and gave little or nearly nothing back. My sincere discussions
39 with certain leaders speak to this directly. Indeed, they do not even try to hide it.

40 Yes, there were many problems, and now there are even more in that nation. And, of course, they should have
41 supported other territories. They took a lot from Crimea and gave little back. That is the cause for the neglect
42 of infrastructure, the economy, the social sector, and the low incomes of the majority of citizens. Now, within
43 the framework of the transition period, we are taking the most pressing, priority measures to remedy
44 the situation.

45 First of all, we are working to improve the reliability of Crimea's energy supply. Reserve capacities have been
46 created for key social facilities.

47 The next step is integrating Crimea's energy systems with all of southern Russia, which will allow us to solve
48 the energy deficit problem. A great deal of work is also underway to set up water supplies and create new
49 communication and telecommunication systems.

50 Second is infrastructure and removing transport limitations. Despite the increased amount of flights and ferries
51 in the Kerch Strait, we still have problems. And here, we will need the Cabinet and the regional authorities
52 to do some extra work. Corresponding instructions have already been set forth and issued.

53 I want to point out that this year we allocated over 5.6 billion rubles [about \$156 million] from the federal
54 budget on fixing roads and railways in Crimea. We are about to set off on a project to build the Kerch Bridge.
55 Works on the site will begin in the next few weeks. The bridge must be opened by the end of 2018.

56 We just discussed this issue yesterday and came to the conclusion that even if it is not effectively used up to its
57 maximum capacity at first, we still need to complete this project with a certain potential, in the sense that it
58 will certainly reach its full capacity, because we will need to develop the port infrastructure as well.

59 Third is the social sector. I have already said that it has been neglected. This concerns both healthcare
60 and education. This year, we will direct about two billion rubles from the federal budget alone for modernising
61 hospitals and clinics in Crimea and Sevastopol. People who need high-tech medical assistance can get it
62 at leading clinics in Russia. We have already allocated the funds for this – half a billion rubles for Crimea
63 and Sevastopol for 2014.

64 In the future, healthcare sector in Crimea and Sevastopol will operate within Russia's compulsory medical
65 insurance system. We will renovate and reequip the entire network of medical facilities.

66 We will also bring the educational system in order, from universities to preschools and children's vacation
67 facilities. This is a lot of work and it is impossible or very difficult to do it all overnight, but we will certainly
68 work consistently in this direction and do everything over time.

69 Yesterday, I met with regional leaders in Sevastopol; there is a natural population decline. It is surprising.

70 The birth rate is lower than Russia's average. And where do we see it? In Crimea, on the Black Sea coast. It
71 seems unbelievable! So we will have to do a great deal.

72 I will note that children's health camps in Crimea were at 100% capacity during the first session of this summer.
73 And right now, the Taurida international youth forum is currently underway here in Crimea.
74 The potential for organising children's and youth recreation in Crimea is great, enormous, and naturally, it is
75 not fully realised, but should be. In this regard, of course, I support the suggestion by leader of the Communist
76 Party faction in the State Duma Mr Zyuganov to create a presidential international children's centre
77 on the basis of the legendary Artek.
78 Moreover, we need to prioritise resolving the issue of increasing pensions and salaries for public employees.
79 They were significantly lower than in Russia. We gradually increased pensions and salaries. Thus, the pensions
80 in Crimea have already grown nearly two-fold, nearing the average Russian indicator. From January 1, 2015,
81 public employees' pensions and salaries will be paid in full accordance with Russian legislation.
82 Colleagues, friends, right now, the long-term economic and social development challenges in Crimea
83 and Sevastopol have particular significance. A corresponding federal programme has been drafted. The Cabinet
84 and Prime Minister Medvedev are giving this a great deal of attention. The total amount of funds
85 for the programme through 2020 is over 700 billion rubles.
86 Its main goal is to ensure dynamic growth in Crimea and Sevastopol, to make them economically self-sufficient
87 and successful, to create new jobs, upgrade the infrastructure, industry, agro-industrial complex, social sector
88 and tourist sector. I count on the State Duma deputies and the regions you represent to get actively involved
89 in implementing these objectives and providing support to Crimea and Sevastopol.
90 The most important condition for success is maintaining stability, interethnic and interfaith harmony
91 in the region. I already spoke about this yesterday at the Security Council meeting in Sevastopol. It is important
92 to fully rehabilitate the repressed peoples and, what I feel is extremely important, to ensure real equality
93 for three languages: Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar. Preserving and developing ethnic cultures
94 and traditions of all peoples living here is an extremely important challenge.
95 Looking at history, I want to note the following. Crimea truly does hold a special place in the history of our
96 nation, our Fatherland. The Crimean land also remembers our triumphs and our victories, but it also recalls
97 the tragedy of the fratricidal Civil War and other woes. Here in Perekop, Russians killed other Russians while
98 blinded by mutual hate, and over 150,000 compatriots were forced to leave their Fatherland at the end
99 of 1920.
100 But Crimea's legacy also includes the poet Maximilian Voloshin, who called for reconciliation during the years
101 of the Civil War and provided shelter in his home to people from both sides of the conflict. In the last several
102 months, I have received many letters from the descendants of those who left Russia after the revolution
103 and the Civil War. They now live all around the world – in the US, Europe and Australia. They are everywhere!
104 But I must note – and I say this with respect and love for these people – their letters include words of support,
105 belief in Russia, concern for the future of our nation and, of course, Crimea and Sevastopol. And these people
106 have carried their love for the Fatherland over generations. This certainly calls for respect.
107 I feel that Crimea can serve as a unique bench mark even today; it can play a unique, unifying role for Russia,
108 becoming its own sort of historical, spiritual source, another way of reconciliation, to finally cure the wound
109 inflicted upon our people as a result of the dramatic split of the 20th century, to restore the link of times

110 and eras, the unity of Russia's historical path, our national consciousness, conduct our own kind of cultural
111 and historical therapy. And let's think about how to meet this objective together with participation by deputies,
112 representatives of political party, public and religious organisations and cultural workers.

113 Colleagues, unfortunately, today we see how fraught the national and civil divide, radicalism and intolerance is
114 in Ukraine. The situation becomes more dramatic with each passing day; the nation has plunged into bloody
115 chaos and a fratricidal conflict. The southeast is suffering from a large-scale humanitarian crisis; thousands
116 of people have already been killed and hundreds of thousands have become refugees, literally losing
117 everything. It is a great tragedy.

118 We are carefully monitoring what is happening there, putting these questions before Ukraine's leadership
119 and the international community, as well as key international organisations, and we will do everything we can
120 in order for this conflict to end as quickly as possible, so that the bloodshed in Ukraine comes to an end.

121 As you know, the Government of Russia has made the decision to limit imports from many nations that
122 imposed entirely unfounded and unlawful sanctions on Russia. But I want to note that this is not just
123 a retaliatory measure. This is, first and foremost, a measure for supporting Russian manufacturers as well
124 as opening our markets to the nations and manufacturers that want to cooperate with Russia and are prepared
125 for that kind of cooperation.

126 At the same time, regardless of the external political and economic situation, the most important thing for us
127 right now, as always, are our internal affairs, our goals, concerns and objectives that are set before us
128 by the people of Russia, the citizens of Russia. We must focus on resolving our national problems
129 and challenges. Our future is only in your hands. We must ensure high-quality governance and work by political
130 and civil institutions. And most importantly, we must provide high living standards for Russian citizens.

131 We must strengthen traditional values. Incidentally, many people support Russia in this choice – not only
132 citizens of our nation, but many other nations around the world as well, including western countries where
133 these values are deteriorating in the current political environment.

134 We must ensure the successful development of our nation, using our wealth of internal reserves. We must
135 create additional incentives for industrial and agricultural development, conditions for developing the creative
136 potential of Russian producers, entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers and workers.

137 This is what builds Russia's competitiveness and its appeal. I repeat: we must calmly, commendably
138 and effectively build our nation, not fencing it off from the outer world, not breaking ties with partners, but
139 also not allowing them to treat us with disparagement or boss us around.

140 We must consolidate and mobilise. But not for wars or conflicts, not for countering anyone – rather, for hard
141 work in the name of Russia and for Russia.

142 It is very important to strengthen the unity of Russian society. A great deal depends on you, colleagues,
143 on the deputies, politicians and public leaders. It depends on how persuasive we are in conversations with our
144 voters, our citizens, how decisive and insistent we are in implementing initiatives and projects that we
145 announce. The citizens' trust in public authorities is the key, the most important and most critical factor in our
146 movement forward.

147 I want to thank you for our joint work during the previous period and wish you success. Thank you very much.
148

Appendix 4 - Transcript of Obama's Statement on Ukraine

1 THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, everybody. I wanted to provide an update on the situation in
2 Ukraine and the steps that the United States is taking in response.

3 Over the last several days, we've continued to be deeply concerned by events in Ukraine. We've
4 seen an illegal referendum in Crimea; an illegitimate move by the Russians to annex Crimea; and
5 dangerous risks of escalation, including threats to Ukrainian personnel in Crimea and threats to
6 southern and eastern Ukraine as well. These are all choices that the Russian government has made --
7 choices that have been rejected by the international community, as well as the government of
8 Ukraine. And because of these choices, the United States is today moving, as we said we would, to
9 impose additional costs on Russia.

10 Based on the executive order that I signed in response to Russia's initial intervention in Ukraine,
11 we're imposing sanctions on more senior officials of the Russian government. In addition, we are
12 today sanctioning a number of other individuals with substantial resources and influence who
13 provide material support to the Russian leadership, as well as a bank that provides material support
14 to these individuals.

15 Now, we're taking these steps as part of our response to what Russia has already done in Crimea. At
16 the same time, the world is watching with grave concern as Russia has positioned its military in a way
17 that could lead to further incursions into southern and eastern Ukraine. For this reason, we've been
18 working closely with our European partners to develop more severe actions that could be taken if
19 Russia continues to escalate the situation.

20 As part of that process, I signed a new executive order today that gives us the authority to impose
21 sanctions not just on individuals but on key sectors of the Russian economy. This is not our preferred
22 outcome. These sanctions would not only have a significant impact on the Russian economy, but
23 could also be disruptive to the global economy. However, Russia must know that further escalation
24 will only isolate it further from the international community. The basic principles that govern
25 relations between nations in Europe and around the world must be upheld in the 21st century. That
26 includes respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity -- the notion that nations do not simply
27 redraw borders, or make decisions at the expense of their neighbors simply because they are larger
28 or more powerful.

29 One of our other top priorities continues to be providing assistance to the government of Ukraine so
30 it can stabilize its economy and meet the basic needs of the Ukrainian people. As I travel to Europe
31 next week to meet with the G7 and other European and Asian allies, I once again urge Congress to
32 pass legislation that is necessary to provide this assistance -- and do it right away. Expressions of

33 support are not enough. We need action. I also hope that the IMF moves swiftly to provide a
34 significant package of support for Ukrainians as they pursue reforms.

35 In Europe, I'll also be reinforcing a message that Vice President Biden carried to Poland and the Baltic
36 states this week: America's support for our NATO allies is unwavering. We're bound together by our
37 profound Article 5 commitment to defend one another, and by a set of shared values that so many
38 generations sacrificed for. We've already increased our support for our Eastern European allies, and
39 we will continue to strengthen NATO's collective defense, and we will step up our cooperation with
40 Europe on economic and energy issues as well.

41 Let me close by making a final point. Diplomacy between the United States and Russia continues.
42 We've emphasized that Russia still has a different path available -- one that de-escalates the
43 situation, and one that involves Russia pursuing a diplomatic solution with the government in Kyiv,
44 with the support of the international community. The Russian people need to know, and Mr. Putin
45 needs to understand that the Ukrainians shouldn't have to choose between the West and Russia.
46 We want the Ukrainian people to determine their own destiny, and to have good relations with the
47 United States, with Russia, with Europe, with anyone that they choose. And that can only happen if
48 Russia also recognized the rights of all the Ukrainian people to determine their future as free
49 individuals, and as a sovereign nation -- rights that people and nations around the world understand
50 and support.

51 Thank you very much, everybody.

Appendix 5 - Transcript of extract of Obama's State of the Union Address

1 Finally, let's remember that our leadership is defined not just by our defense against threats, but by
2 the enormous opportunities to do good and promote understanding around the globe -- to forge
3 greater cooperation, to expand new markets, to free people from fear and want. And no one is
4 better positioned to take advantage of those opportunities than America.

5 Our alliance with Europe remains the strongest the world has ever known. From Tunisia to Burma,
6 we're supporting those who are willing to do the hard work of building democracy. In Ukraine, we
7 stand for the principle that all people have the right to express themselves freely and peacefully, and
8 have a say in their country's future. Across Africa, we're bringing together businesses and
9 governments to double access to electricity and help end extreme poverty. In the Americas, we are
10 building new ties of commerce, but we're also expanding cultural and educational exchanges among
11 young people. And we will continue to focus on the Asia-Pacific, where we support our allies, shape
12 a future of greater security and prosperity, and extend a hand to those devastated by disaster -- as
13 we did in the Philippines, when our Marines and civilians rushed to aid those battered by a typhoon,
14 and were greeted with words like, "We will never forget your kindness" and "God bless America!"

15 We do these things because they help promote our long-term security. And we do them because we
16 believe in the inherent dignity and equality of every human being, regardless of race or religion,
17 creed or sexual orientation. And next week, the world will see one expression of that commitment –
18 when Team USA marches the red, white, and blue into the Olympic Stadium – and brings home the
19 gold.

20 My fellow Americans, no other country in the world does what we do. On every issue, the world
21 turns to us, not simply because of the size of our economy or our military might – but because of the
22 ideals we stand for, and the burdens we bear to advance them.

23 No one knows this better than those who serve in uniform. As this time of war draws to a close, a
24 new generation of heroes returns to civilian life. We'll keep slashing that backlog so our veterans
25 receive the benefits they've earned, and our wounded warriors receive the health care – including
26 the mental health care – that they need. We'll keep working to help all our veterans translate their
27 skills and leadership into jobs here at home. And we all continue to join forces to honor and support
28 our remarkable military families.

29 Let me tell you about one of those families I've come to know.

30 I first met Cory Remsburg, a proud Army Ranger, at Omaha Beach on the 65th anniversary of D-Day.
31 Along with some of his fellow Rangers, he walked me through the program – a strong, impressive
32 young man, with an easy manner, sharp as a tack. We joked around, and took pictures, and I told
33 him to stay in touch.

34 A few months later, on his tenth deployment, Cory was nearly killed by a massive roadside bomb in
35 Afghanistan. His comrades found him in a canal, face down, underwater, shrapnel in his brain.

36 For months, he lay in a coma. The next time I met him, in the hospital, he couldn't speak; he could
37 barely move. Over the years, he's endured dozens of surgeries and procedures, and hours of
38 grueling rehab every day.

39 Even now, Cory is still blind in one eye. He still struggles on his left side. But slowly, steadily, with
40 the support of caregivers like his dad Craig, and the community around him, Cory has grown
41 stronger. Day by day, he's learned to speak again and stand again and walk again – and he's working
42 toward the day when he can serve his country again.

43 "My recovery has not been easy," he says. "Nothing in life that's worth anything is easy."

44 Cory is here tonight. And like the Army he loves, like the America he serves, Sergeant First Class Cory
45 Remsburg never gives up, and he does not quit.

46 My fellow Americans, men and women like Cory remind us that America has never come easy. Our
47 freedom, our democracy, has never been easy. Sometimes we stumble; we make mistakes; we get
48 frustrated or discouraged. But for more than two hundred years, we have put those things aside and
49 placed our collective shoulder to the wheel of progress – to create and build and expand the

50 possibilities of individual achievement; to free other nations from tyranny and fear; to promote
51 justice, and fairness, and equality under the law, so that the words set to paper by our founders are
52 made real for every citizen. The America we want for our kids – a rising America where honest work
53 is plentiful and communities are strong; where prosperity is widely shared and opportunity for all lets
54 us go as far as our dreams and toil will take us – none of it is easy. But if we work together; if we
55 summon what is best in us, with our feet planted firmly in today but our eyes cast towards tomorrow
56 – I know it's within our reach.
57 Believe it.
58 God bless you, and God bless the United States of America.

Appendix 6 - Transcript of extract of Obama's Address to the UN GA

1 And yet there is a pervasive unease in our world -- a sense that the very forces that have brought us
2 together have created new dangers and made it difficult for any single nation to insulate itself from
3 global forces. As we gather here, an outbreak of Ebola overwhelms public health systems in West
4 Africa and threatens to move rapidly across borders. Russian aggression in Europe recalls the days
5 when large nations trampled small ones in pursuit of territorial ambition. The brutality of terrorists
6 in Syria and Iraq forces us to look into the heart of darkness.
7 Each of these problems demands urgent attention. But they are also symptoms of a broader
8 problem -- the failure of our international system to keep pace with an interconnected world. We,
9 collectively, have not invested adequately in the public health capacity of developing countries. Too
10 often, we have failed to enforce international norms when it's inconvenient to do so. And we have
11 not confronted forcefully enough the intolerance, sectarianism, and hopelessness that feeds violent
12 extremism in too many parts of the globe.
13 Fellow delegates, we come together as united nations with a choice to make. We can renew the
14 international system that has enabled so much progress, or we can allow ourselves to be pulled back
15 by an undertow of instability. We can reaffirm our collective responsibility to confront global
16 problems, or be swamped by more and more outbreaks of instability. And for America, the choice is
17 clear: We choose hope over fear. We see the future not as something out of our control, but as
18 something we can shape for the better through concerted and collective effort. We reject fatalism or
19 cynicism when it comes to human affairs. We choose to work for the world as it should be, as our
20 children deserve it to be.
21 There is much that must be done to meet the test of this moment. But today I'd like to focus on two
22 defining questions at the root of so many of our challenges -- whether the nations here today will be
23 able to renew the purpose of the UN's founding; and whether we will come together to reject the
24 cancer of violent extremism.

25 First, all of us -- big nations and small -- must meet our responsibility to observe and enforce
26 international norms. We are here because others realized that we gain more from cooperation than
27 conquest. One hundred years ago, a World War claimed the lives of many millions, proving that with
28 the terrible power of modern weaponry, the cause of empire ultimately leads to the graveyard. It
29 would take another World War to roll back the forces of fascism, the notions of racial supremacy,
30 and form this United Nations to ensure that no nation can subjugate its neighbors and claim their
31 territory.

32 Recently, Russia's actions in Ukraine challenge this post-war order. Here are the facts. After the
33 people of Ukraine mobilized popular protests and calls for reform, their corrupt president fled.
34 Against the will of the government in Kyiv, Crimea was annexed. Russia poured arms into eastern
35 Ukraine, fueling violent separatists and a conflict that has killed thousands. When a civilian airliner
36 was shot down from areas that these proxies controlled, they refused to allow access to the crash for
37 days. When Ukraine started to reassert control over its territory, Russia gave up the pretense of
38 merely supporting the separatists, and moved troops across the border.

39 This is a vision of the world in which might makes right -- a world in which one nation's borders can
40 be redrawn by another, and civilized people are not allowed to recover the remains of their loved
41 ones because of the truth that might be revealed. America stands for something different. We
42 believe that right makes might -- that bigger nations should not be able to bully smaller ones, and
43 that people should be able to choose their own future.

44 And these are simple truths, but they must be defended. America and our allies will support the
45 people of Ukraine as they develop their democracy and economy. We will reinforce our NATO Allies
46 and uphold our commitment to collective self-defense. We will impose a cost on Russia for
47 aggression, and we will counter falsehoods with the truth. And we call upon others to join us on the
48 right side of history -- for while small gains can be won at the barrel of a gun, they will ultimately be
49 turned back if enough voices support the freedom of nations and peoples to make their own
50 decisions.

51 Moreover, a different path is available -- the path of diplomacy and peace, and the ideals this
52 institution is designed to uphold. The recent cease-fire agreement in Ukraine offers an opening to
53 achieve those objectives. If Russia takes that path -- a path that for stretches of the post-Cold War
54 period resulted in prosperity for the Russian people -- then we will lift our sanctions and welcome
55 Russia's role in addressing common challenges. After all, that's what the United States and Russia
56 have been able to do in past years -- from reducing our nuclear stockpiles to meeting our obligations
57 under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to cooperating to remove and destroy Syria's declared
58 chemical weapons. And that's the kind of cooperation we are prepared to pursue again -- if Russia
59 changes course.

60 This speaks to a central question of our global age -- whether we will solve our problems together, in
61 a spirit of mutual interest and mutual respect, or whether we descend into the destructive rivalries of
62 the past. When nations find common ground, not simply based on power, but on principle, then we
63 can make enormous progress. And I stand before you today committed to investing American
64 strength to working with all nations to address the problems we face in the 21st century.