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Reflection of “otherness” in international relations

(Master’s Thesis)

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Author's Declaration

Herewith I declare that I have written the Master's Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.

Prague, 29 April 2016

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Author's Signature

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Abstract

The current migration crisis has put significant strain on the European Union and its member states. Immigration has always been a contentious issue in societies, most often facing significant opposition. By drawing on postmodern theories of international relations and Discourse Theory, this paper analyses how immigration is being increasingly securitized by the European Union and its member states along with what makes securitization the hegemonic discourse. This is done primarily with reference to identity construction through the framing of the Other – in this case the migrant – as an unwanted and externalized element. Furthermore, the paper details how the framing of the migrant as a threat to the internal security of a country strenghtend identity politics across Europe. Finally, using the Brexit campaign in the UK, the paper analyzes how the rise in identity politics in turn raises the possibility of a successful fusion of the anti-immigration discourse with the anti-EU discourse through the exploiting of societal unease.

Keywords

Identity, otherness, international relations, discourse, discourse analysis, migration crisis, European Union, identity politics, collective identity, other, self, identity construction, postmodernism, poststructuralism, migration, immigrant, securitization

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Introduction

The study of identity within international relations has steadily gained on importance ever since the initial steps were taken by early constructivists in the late 1980s. Such advances were only possible thanks to the successful challenge of post-positivist approaches to the hegemony of positivist, empiricist paradigms. The aftermath allowed for the examination of the socially constructed nature of international relations and opened the door to qualitative, interpretative analysis of the phenomena of world politics. This involved the study of identity formation, which in turn has profound effects on the behaviour of units within the system on all possible levels. An essential characteristic of identity creation is the formulation of 'otherness'. Through the articulation of an Other, the identity of the Self is delineated on the basis of excluding that which is undesirable. Thus identity cannot be understood without a reference to its binary opposition – the Other. Analysis incorporating the dichotomy between the self and the other has become more common in the academic sphere since the 1990s and has allowed for a deeper understanding of the dynamics in both international relations and human sciences in general. Naturally, identity and otherness studies play a prominent role in the analysis of identity politics, such as nationalist ideologies or racism. Strengthening collective identities in for instance nationalistic identities is accompanied by a clear articulation of the 'outsider', or in other words of those who do not fit into the clear cut articulation of a specific collective identity. In this respect, the Other is traditionally securitized and formulated as a threat to internal security or to the collective identity. Consequently, migrants represent the archetypal 'other' against which securitization occurs.

Migration has always occurred throughout human history, yet in today's interconnected world with over 7 billion people, it faces less obstacles to migration and occurs on a significantly larger scale. Dynamics such as globalization threaten specific entrenched identities through the dissolution of borders that secure them, barring the inside to the outside world in the process. Migration works on a similar principle, in that it represents the outside reaching the inside. Large migration flows always put strain on the receiving societies or countries and generate sentiments aimed at securing the border, or outright hostile narratives. As a response, governments often enact restrictive policies against immigrants in order to reduce their numbers, comfort their citizens and preserve the status quo with regards to who wields power. In framing the 'other' as a threat however, the anti-immigration discourse tends to centre around a specific identity that the Other threatens. The migration crisis that has gradually unfolded over the past couple of years has caught the European Union unprepared, and has put significant strain on individual countries and the Union. In spite of increasing securitization and improving border controls, the societal unease resulting from the crisis has helped bring about the probable exit of the United Kingdom from the EU. This paper will analyse how an anti-immigration discourse gains on momentum in the European Union and its potential consequences for government and EU level policy. In addition, it will argue that the rise in identity politics associated with the securitization of migration may prove problematic for the future of the EU.

The first part is dedicated to setting the theoretical basis and contextual framework for the remainder of the study. To begin with, the dynamics within the study of international relations that led to the acceptance of post-positivist studies in the field will be examined. It will set the ontological and epistemological positions that the study adopts and examine

their specific characteristics. This refers to predominantly the nature of post-positivist studies, into which the topic of the paper falls, and their relevance in the academic field of international relation. Following from this, the paper will provide a thorough analysis of identity and otherness concepts, with a focus on international relations in general and migration more specifically. The importance of the construction of the Other in relation to identity construction will be demonstrated along with the principal dynamics of the framing of the Other. Finally, a section will be dedicated to analysing discourse. Discourse is a fundamental part of the study of the construction of us/them dichotomy as discourse is the medium through which meanings are assigned and roles constructed. The second part of the paper deals with the application of theoretical insights from the first part. To begin with, the paper will demonstrate how the securitization of migration became the dominant discourse within the European Union, on both the national and supranational levels. Special emphasis will be placed on media as it is the principal means of channelling and strengthening societal sentiments. Following this, the paper will analyse how the societal unease resulting from the increased influx of refugees fuels a discourse that portrays migrants as a threat, strengthening identity politics in the process. Consequently, the main opposing discourse will be analysed, namely the humanitarian migration discourse, which is however not as well suited to addressing channelled societal fears and thus cannot become hegemonic. Finally, the last two sections will be dedicated to how securitization occurs in the context of the migration crisis on the state level, and subsequently on the European level. The paper will argue that securitization has indeed increased throughout the migration crisis and moreover, it has bolstered identity politics that can be turned against the European Union.

1. Theoretical Framework

1.1. Research Methods

The first part of the paper deals with setting the theoretical and conceptual framework and as such relies on secondary qualitative sources, mostly academic works. The core of the paper's methodology in the second part is centred around discourse analysis, which is also inherently of qualitative nature. As a result, the paper will predominantly employ it to specific key texts and actions that represent the discourse in question. The study will employ *Discourse Theory* for its analysis, which holds that nothing exists outside of discourse, thereby allowing for significant freedom in what the focus of analysis will be. Through analysing the specifics of a discourse, the paper will analyse the web of meanings it creates, and consequently the characteristics of the Self and the Other. In the second part, the majority of sources will be composed of media articles, speeches, press releases and official policy documents onto which Discourse Theory will be applied. For instance, in the parts detailing the articulation of migration as a threat or alternatively as a humanitarian concern, the analysis will be conducted on media articles. Media articles are the principal medium through which public sentiments are channelled and a discourse is articulated. In the following parts that focus in greater detail on specific policy, media articles, press releases and policy details will be analysed. Furthermore, specific policy action will be analysed as well, as the translation of a discourse into policy action is an important aspect of discourse analysis. The paper will not rely on qualitative analysis as it does not correspond to the focus of the paper.

1.2. Post-positivism and postmodernism in International Relations

The study of international relations is in the context of social sciences a relatively new field of enquiry. Although the study of 'peace and war', and aspects associated with it is in all probability as old as the objects of said study, the distinction of international relations from history, philosophy, or the study of warfare, and its constitution as an independent academic field dates to early 20th century. The very first university faculty of international relations opened at the University of Aberystwyth in 1919. In spite, and perhaps also as a result of its relatively short existence, the field has undergone deep divisions relating to not only methodological differences among theories, but also to ontological and epistemological questions. These schisms within the field are traditionally referred to as the 'great debates' of which there have so far been four (Kurki and Wight 2013, p.16). The topic of this paper is related in great part to the developments of the last iteration of these debates in that they facilitated the proliferation of research of this kind. Thus a brief outline of the historical narrative and the developments it gave rise to is necessary for a thorough conceptualization and contextualization.

The very first debate took place between the idealists and the realists. Beginning in the inter-war period, it carried through the Second World War and ended in its immediate aftermath. The idealists, motivated by the horrors of the First World War, sought to ameliorate the human condition with the aim of preventing future wars in the international system. For them, the primary cause of conflict was a lack of understanding in the international arena, which could be alleviated through international institutions, norms and practices. The realists accused the idealists of a value-driven approach that was excessively normative, making the mistake of focusing on how the world ought to be

instead of being grounded in the true nature of reality. The Second World War bolstered the realist argument and ended the debate. The second debate originated in the 1960s between the traditionalists and 'scientific' modernizers. More acutely, between traditional realists who advocated a historical, interpretive methodology and neorealists who stressed an empirical, systemic approach. The modernizers drew from the behaviourist revolution in social sciences and adopted a positivist approach, which claims that scientific knowledge is possible only through extensive collection of observable data that leads to the identification of certain patterns from which specific laws can be formulated. On the other hand, the traditionalists retorted that a substantial part of international relations is not susceptible to an empiricist, scientific approach. Gradually, a commitment to positivism was adopted, although in the United Kingdom traditionalist approaches still held sway. The third debate, alternatively termed the inter-paradigm debate, moved away from methodology and focused on which theoretical paradigm should assume primacy. Not rejecting positivism per se, the debate drew on Thomas Kuhn's (1962) study of the history of science, which claimed that the accumulation of knowledge progresses only once one theoretical strand becomes generally accepted and sets the rules for the majority of research. In this respect, realism, Marxism, and pluralism all strove to become the dominant paradigm. The fourth debate arose in the 1980s, its principal focus is the role of science in the study of international relations and among its core contentions being a schism between positivism and post-positivism.

As was mentioned above, positivism stresses systematic observation under rigorous methodological rules. Continued accumulation of empirical knowledge will reveal regularities from which further general laws can be extrapolated. What is important to

note is that what cannot be observed, cannot be included. Consequently, an absolute reliance on empiricism is inherent to positivist scientific approaches. The positivist motto is *esse est percipi* (to be is to be perceived) and thus existence is dependent on perception (Kurki and Wight 2013, p.22). In other words, as David Campbell (2013, pp.227-228) clearly summarised, positivism rests on three principal foundations. First is the adherence to epistemic realism, which states that there exists an external world independent of anything we, as observers, do. Secondly, this external world can be objectively described through language, independently of subject's interference. Lastly, that the reality of this outside world can be captured accurately in statements that correspond to its observed facts. As such, unobservable realities are not assigned ontological importance and are discounted from theoretical endeavours. In opposition to positivism there formed a number of post-positivist approaches and theoretical strands. More often than not, all they shared in common was the rejection of the positivist vision of science and its application in international relations.

The origins of post-positivism can be traced to the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy that understood language not as detached and independent of the world it described but as embedded in social practice and inseparable from what it sought to describe (Campbell 2013, p.228). As a result, a new conception of the relationship between the object and the subject gradually emerged, which instead of perceiving them as independent of each other, conceived them as mutually constitutive. Consequently, knowledge based on a clear distinction between the two is put into question. Similarly, the existence of foundations and universal rules in which knowledge can be grounded is put to the test. The onset of post-positivism runs parallel to the emergence of a number of strands in international

relations that conflate on a number of issues, yet possess important differences. For the sake of brevity, here the umbrella term postmodernism is employed holistically as encompassing those strands of IR theory that break with the modernist, rigid positivist approach of. Among these can be counted some strands within the constructivist theory, critical theories, post-colonial or feminist theories, and most importantly the poststructuralist accounts of international relations theory. Emerging in 1980s, these accounts were inspired by philosophers such as Foucault and Derrida, and were preoccupied with rejecting foundationalism and examining the “apparent” truths and assumptions on which all modern knowledge is built (Sajed 2010; Borenskoetter 2010). In this sense it forms a break with the tradition of modernity and to an extent enlightenment, which established the basis of positivist and rationalist thinking.

Later in the paper, the term poststructuralism will be employed as the difference in meaning between the term postmodernism and poststructuralism favours the latter for the purposes of this paper. Within the conceptual framework of this study, postmodernism refers to a number of theoretical and philosophical approaches that seek to primarily break and supersede the premises of modernity. As such, the scope of the term is unnecessarily broad. Poststructuralism in international relations is inspired by authors such as Derrida and Foucault. It is preoccupied primarily with deconstructing and exposing power hierarchies implicit in commonly used binaries such as inside/outside, and how these binary pairs affect the construction of social reality (Sajed 2010, p.2). This involves the analysis and taking apart of the creation and maintenance of dominant structures within social sciences. Consequently, the term poststructuralism corresponds better to the field of enquiry of this study.

Both Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault have greatly influenced the evolution of post-positivist approaches and their work has ironically served as the foundation for further inquiry. Derrida was preoccupied with *deconstructing* the binary nature of Western thought and pointed to the way our thinking is based on the centrality of presence, on foundations, on an original presence at the root of things. Derrida calls this *logocentrism* or the 'metaphysics of presence' (Derrida 1998, p.49).

Michel Foucault's work has influenced almost all areas of social sciences, from literature and philosophy to psychiatry and international relations. In international relations specifically, Foucault focused on the intersection of knowledge and power. The traditional approach to power in international relations is taken from the neorealist account, which considers power in military and economic terms and consequently as a quantifiable variable wielded by the units (states) of the system. These units in turn operate in an anarchic arena and are thus forced to act in a power-maximizing, rational manner. In other words, the more power a unit possesses, the freer to act it is (Waltz 1979). Foucault's analysis of the nature of power in social sciences disrupts this power model and instead looks at power networks with individuals as the principal focus. Instead of examining the coercive power of states, Foucault's analysis dealt with productive, disciplinary power which conditions individuals through the imprinting of specific knowledge that is deemed ideal (Foucault 1999). Furthermore, Foucault critiqued sovereignty for its hegemonic position and how existing discourses support its position. He strove to move towards a theory which would not have an inherent presupposition, such as sovereignty was in most IR theories, so that alternatives can actually be imagined

and the diversity of discourses is not reduced. Consequently, as change cannot be enacted without an understanding of how the current state is maintained, this led to the study of how power operates. Finally, Foucault can be in part credited with introducing discourse into social sciences (Neal 2009, p.166). It is not the aim of this study to enlighten all of Foucault's or Derrida's work, nor of the other notable thinkers, such as Irina Kristeva or Emmanuel Levinas, that influenced the post-positivist debate but rather demonstrate some of the sources of these endeavours. Many post-positivist scholars of international relations built on the foundations laid by Foucault and others, and will be revisited throughout this study.

In its early stages, poststructuralist approaches focused mostly on critiquing the established standards and paradigms. The edited volume by James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (1989) *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* and the special issue of *International Studies Quarterly* edited by Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker (1990) provide a thorough demonstration of how scholars diverged from the positivist framework and began to critique established concepts and norms in order to open up dialogue and offer alternative analytical outlooks. For instance, Ashley's 'Living on Border Lines' (1989) found in Shapiro's and Derian's edited volume examines the notion of sovereignty through a Derridean suspicion of its logocentric nature. Consequently, Ashley demonstrates that the historically constructed nature of sovereignty must be presented as universal and perpetual in order to assume legitimacy. Its success as an undisputable aspect of international relations stems from self-perpetuation through a series of practices designed to make it seem as ever-present.

Moreover, its legitimization of state violence and organization of the world politic into separate state-units ensures the distinction between internal and external realms.

This critical approach extended to a re-examination of core texts of international relations theory as well. Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, and especially the "Melian Dialogue", is in the realist tradition employed as a core text that affirms the ahistorical and absolute nature of hegemony or power relations. The postmodern reading of Thucydides stresses the importance of intersubjective conventions at the time and introduces historical contextuality into the interpretation (George 1994). As a result, previously immutable laws become dependent on the contemporary intersubjectivity.

These first collections provided a meta-theoretical critique of previous theories, most notably those of realism and neorealism, rather than an independent theory of its own. By examining how knowledge was constructed, poststructuralist scholars brought into question the principal concepts of international relations theory. Yet the absence of a coherent and uniform methodology that would allow for the adoption of a postmodern or poststructuralist theory facilitated external criticisms and gives landscape of the field a maze-like character. As such, poststructuralist accounts of international relations offer rather than anything else a more of a distinct critical approach to the examination of international relations. Later endeavours focused on specific political questions or events directly and thus the breadth of postmodernist analysis increased substantially, moving from abstract to more practical issues. For instance, David Campbell (1998) deconstructed U.S. foreign policy discourse to demonstrate how the American identity is constructed exclusion of unwanted or dangerous 'others'. Didier Bigo (2002) studied the

proliferation of unease, which according to him has its roots in the neoliberal logic that permeates contemporary global society. Within it, freedom cannot be effectively conceptualized without insecurity and danger at its border. These works will be contextualized and revisited in greater detail in the following chapter. Overall, it can be stated that the specific topics of postmodern research vary greatly, yet they all employ concepts of identity and otherness, which permeate the poststructuralist scholarly body and are essential to its understanding of international relations. When studying the reflection of otherness in international relations with a specific focus on immigration discourse, adopting poststructuralist approaches becomes necessary. Foundation based positivist approaches would not account for discourse oriented identity creation that is central to such a study. The following section will elaborate specifically on the concepts identity and otherness in international relations, and their relevance in poststructuralist examinations of immigration.

1.3. Identity and 'Otherness' in international relations

Identity as a term is practically ever-present in everyday life and academia both. It is invariably tied to the conception of the 'Self' on both the individual and collective levels. In an ontological sense, it describes and gives meaning to the self. Within the field of international relations it began to appear in the 1980s and 1990s through the works of constructivist scholars. It rode on the wave of postmodern rejection of positivism and was facilitated by the developments associated with the end of the Cold War. Although the concept entered social sciences as early as the 1950s in the field of psychology and began to spread to other areas during the 1960s, the study of international relations was at the

time carried out under the behaviouralist paradigm and was thus unreceptive to more abstract conceptualizations. In the context of international studies, identity is traditionally employed in describing the socially constructed nature of states, their interests, and interaction in the international arena (Borenskoetter 2010, p.1).

The traditional way to employ the concept in the study of international relations is characterised by the constructivist school, which focuses primarily on the possibility of change in international relations by rejecting the static view of the units and of the system in world politics. Through stressing the social dimension of politics, constructivists examine the role of norms, rules, and languages on the construction of social reality. Consequently, through the process of interaction, new political realities can come into being, making international politics 'a world of our making' (Onuf 2012). The importance of agency and interaction is clearly described in Alexander Wendt's (1992) seminal article "Anarchy Is What States Make of It". Wendt employs an analogy with Alter and Ego, two space aliens that meet for the first time. The relationship that develops between the two is based on their initial and continued interaction. As a result, there exists the potential for relationships based on animosity, mutual respect, or even those akin to friendship. In a similar way, the nature of the international system and relations between its units are not predetermined by a set of immutable laws, but rather are in part based on the actions of said units. In positivist theories of international relations, identities, much like

interests, are given and stable. Identity-based theories offer the possibility of changing identities and interest, thereby changing the nature of the system and its dynamics¹.

Identity, however, is significantly more profuse throughout social sciences and international relations. In fact, it cannot be tied to one theory or conceptualization, but rather, it entails the possibility of adopting new approaches that are centred on it. Thus systemic, unit-based, individual-focused, or event-based approaches in international relations and politics may examine how identities are formed and consequently how they influence the world we live in. An essential area of analysis is then identity construction. It is generally assumed in social sciences that constructing identities involves – if not outright requires – the creation of ‘others’ (Lebow 2008, p.474). The dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is well known and has a long tradition in both history and academia. Carl Schmitt (2008), a Nazi theoretician, infamously asserted that political identities are best formed during violent conflicts with adversaries. Samuel Huntington’s (1993) influential thesis is based on dichotomies between conflicting collective cultural identities that are mutually incompatible and eventually lead to conflict. Self/Other or us/them dichotomies form the basis of nationalistic ideologies, racism, religion, or contemporary political projects such as the ‘war on terror’, that separate the world into the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’.

Such duality has a long tradition in Western philosophy. Both Kant and Hegel, albeit with minor differences, asserted that societies and states formed through the willingness of

¹ Wendt himself focuses more on the influence of identities than on their construction. Yet still his work is highly influential in the context of identity-based theoretical approaches of international relations.

individuals to ensure collective security (Lebow 2008, p.475). The chaotic outside was a major constitutive factor in the formation of the secure inside. Friedrich Nietzsche claimed that as the Western conception of the Self is based on a differentiation from a negative and hostile other, ensuring the perceived existence of such a dangerous Other will become a necessary reality (Strong 1992). Similarly, establishing the idea of national sovereignty clearly delineated the outside and the inside and the subsequent emergence of nationalism allowed for a clearer and more emotional 'us/them' separation. One of Jacques Derrida's principal contribution to social sciences was through the conception of *deconstruction*. Derrida was concerned with how Western thought in general operates on the basis of binary oppositions that are mutually exclusive, such as inside/outside or presence/absence (Zehfuss 2009, pp.139-140). By reversing the original positions of these pairs, Derrida demonstrated how the exclusion of one term is necessary in constituting the other (Culler 1982). For instance, in conceptual terms, difference is necessary to constitute identity. Foucault's emphasis on the power/knowledge nexus described how power relations establish the limits of Derridean binary pairs, thus delineating what is considered to be outside and inside or what is good and bad. The aforementioned productive power is decentralised and pluralized, and it becomes increasingly difficult to identify where it is located. Foucault then takes it a step further with the concept of *biopower*, which relates to how power networks shape human life at the level of populations (Neal 2009, p.164). Biopower coincided with the emergence of what Foucault called *governmentality* – a form of governance that does not rely on coercion but rather exhibits control by strengthening socially prescriptive behaviour and habits of self-management (Sajed 2010, pp.7-8). Consequently, the individual, his identity,

and human nature altogether are historically produced factors – meaning they are not absolute or universal – and are susceptible to power manipulation.

Emmanuel Levinas states that ‘otherness’ is not something we can detach ourselves from because we are permanently connected to it. As there exist ‘others’ to our self, our self is always the ‘other’ to some other self, thus making the clear distinction impossible (Levinas in George 1994, p.210). William Connolly (2002), in his influential work *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* defines identity as relational and always dependent on converting difference into negative otherness. Drawing on Foucault and employing parallels with religion, Connolly states that to maintain an identity, power is required to propagate correct discourses of identity and prevent dissenting views to challenge the binary division into good and evil, on which religion also tends to rely. In general then, it is assumed that delineating the ‘other’ is a crucial component of realizing the self, since identity relies on determining that which is exogenous and foreign.

Within the study of international relations, the principal focus of identity-oriented analysis will invariably drift towards collective or large-group identities. In psychology, ingroup solidarity and outgroup hostility is a commonly accepted notion dating back to early 20th century William Graham Sumner’s² work. In a manner not dissimilar to Kant and Hegel, he stipulated that groups formed naturally in response to the scarcity of precious resources. Competition for these finite resources would result in antipathy

² For further information read Sumner, W., G., (1906). *Folkways*. New York: Ginn.

towards other groups seeking a portion of these assets (Lebow 2008, p.478). Psychiatrist Vamik Volkan defines large-group identity as “the subjective experience of thousands or millions of people who are linked by a persistent sense of sameness, even while also sharing some characteristics with people who belong to foreign large groups” (Volkan 2009, p.208). Once a large group feels threatened or is humiliated, it becomes obsessed with maintaining and securing their collective identity. Once perceived harm has been caused, people belonging to that identity easily use same or worse methods against the enemy other, often employing aggression in order to secure their own identity. According to Volkan, enemies can be both real in the sense that one is engaged in armed conflict, or imagined in the sense that the other is the reservoir of unwanted, externalised parts of the original group. In much the same way children externalise unwanted aspects of their lives, large groups of adults may regress and externalise the negatives. This process usually activates amplifiers in the form of old glories or traumas that members of a collective identity share, amplifying the strength of the identity. It becomes substantially easier for politicians to tap into these reservoirs and manipulate group identities once perceived enemies are singled out (Volkan 2009, p.210).

Since the 1980s, important research has been done into how otherness is externalized and employed to normalize potentially endangered identities. David Campbell, one of the most prominent scholars of poststructuralism analysed how the construction of American identity relied on the exclusion of unwanted and allegedly dangerous groups. Campbell’s work relies on the conceptualization of identity always in relation to difference. In a Foucauldian way, the state legitimizes its identity by setting the limits of what belongs and what is to be excluded, thereby establishing the limits of its identity. In *Writing*

Security, Campbell (1998) demonstrates how specific categories such as communists, blacks or Native Americans are portrayed as dangerous in foreign policy texts and thus are employed in defining what it means to be American through ostracizing what isn't 'American'. In other words, through various interpretations of danger, both internal and external, limits to the accepted identity are set.

In the period following the end of the Cold War, the absence of a clear cut bi-polarity translated into an emergence of 'Others' that were either underdeveloped or in need of protection from other 'Others'. Cynthia Weber examined how interventions were usually justified in ethical and moral terms as designed to help others who faced persecution (Weber 1995). Later poststructuralist analyses of the intervention in Iraq exemplified how inherently positive categories such as civilization or human rights were employed to identify the West as supremely good. The established identity of the West was then juxtaposed with the persecuted and powerless civilians and extremist or terrorist opposition (Hansen 2010, p.6). These studies demonstrated the identification of the interventionists with positively connoted universal, foundational values. The portrayal of the 'others' as victims or aggressors facilitated the acceptance of the intervention and justified it in moral terms as necessary. This notion can be pursued further by stating the mutually constitutive aspect of this dynamic. The interventionist's identification with universal, moral values compels him to act. The act of intervention, interpreted as morally just and ethically imperative reinforces the subjective identification with aforementioned values, making future acts more likely.

On the other hand, not all scholars would consider the creation of a negative 'other' as a necessary prerogative for identity construction. In spite of widespread agreement that each identity or culture is surrounded by a constitutive outside, various authors stress the potential of dialogue between conflicting parties in overcoming differences. The study of the effects of recognition or lack thereof constitutes one of the more prominent areas. Charles Taylor (1992) for instance stressed the potential negative consequences of misrepresentation or the complete failure to recognize others. Mutual recognition may bring forth the common humanity between individuals and collectives and in the process alleviate some of the tension between the Self and the Other. Richard Lebow (2008), drawing primarily on Homer's *Iliad* and experimental research makes the case that identities form prior to the construction of 'others', that stereotypes of otherness do not need to be negative, and that positive interaction with 'others' can act as the basis of identity construction and maintenance. Lebow points to the Maoris in New Zealand, who once constituted the excluded group but have since been incorporated into national identity. Conversely, the British in the U.S. have once constituted the core of national identity, yet have gradually been stereotyped. In the field of psychology, some research indicates that transcendent identities, such as the European Project, may mute feelings of animosity through the setting of a common denominator for a collective identity (Lebow 2008, p.479).

In the context of debating identity and difference, state sovereignty and state borders play a crucial role in delineating the boundaries of inside and outside. As was already mentioned, analysis of sovereignty marked the initial anti-foundational endeavours of poststructuralist scholars. Rather than being a universal aspect of international relations,

it is a socially constructed reality that serves to separate the good and homogenous on the inside from the chaotic and dangerous outside. It imprints the need to defend borders and normalizes acts of exclusion, marginalization and even violence (Walker 1993). From the perspective employing Foucault's concept of biopower, borders act as the instruments of managing the well-being and security of its subjects. Migrants, asylum seekers, and to an extent regular travellers threaten the homogeneity of the controlled sphere (Hansen 2010, p.). Didier Bigo ventures beyond analysing political propaganda, racism and various speech acts that convince the population of the dangers of immigration. Although these are contributing factors, Bigo focuses on the proliferation of 'unease' stemming from insecurity that is structurally inherent in the neoliberal logic, in which "freedom is always associated at its limits with danger and (in)security" (Bigo 2002, p.65). Thus securitization of immigration is a form of governmentality through which various institutions manage or create unease in order to posit themselves as necessary protectors and safeguards of security.

It is then possible to speak of a securitization of immigration, as it becomes increasingly associated with security studies and is perceived to constitute a security threat. Clearly, in today's Europe this notion is exacerbated by the surge in immigration from insecurity ridden societies in other parts of the world. Securitization of immigration however began as early as 1980s, when migration started to be increasingly associated with a danger to the domestic order. Associations of migrants with crime and terrorism run parallel to the invocations of collapsing welfare systems and degenerating national identities. Often, migrants and asylum-seekers are portrayed as the principal negative 'others' against which identities in Europe are constituted. A number of authors have extensively

explored the securitization of immigration in Europe. Ceyhan and Tsoukala connect it to the pressures arising out globalization dynamics. Increasing interconnectedness, volatile markets or increased migration flows and deterioration of state borders destabilize old assumptions about the nature of our world, creating widespread anxieties in the minds of many. Thus discourses aimed at safeguarding national identity and security from the tumultuous external chaos proliferate (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002). Roxanne Doty (1999), using France as her case study points to racism and the desire to retain French authenticity as the core reasons for separating the inside from the outside, and consequently, for the demonization of immigration. On the European level, Jef Huysmans analyses the consequences of establishing a borderless Schengen area on immigration securitization. Abolishing border controls integrated migration policy into the greater European security network and directly securitized immigration by transforming it into a European security issue. The construction of an internal security field is of course only one aspect that feeds into the negative politicization of immigrants as an illegitimate, dangerous presence, yet the negative representation at a European level bolsters national securitization of immigration and further demonization of foreign migrants (Huysman 2000). Finally, Alessandra Buonfino (2004) offers a comprehensive analysis of how the perception of immigration as a security concern became the dominant European immigration discourse on both the national and European level. Buonfino concludes that

“because of the fear and perceived risk that immigration arouses in receiving societies, securitization has gradually become the optimal national discourse type amongst many possible, coexisting discourses competing for hegemony. Securitization is the best possible discourse ... for the preservation of unity in a world of plurality because of its

perceived ability to preserve existing boundaries and keep identity strong and legitimate.” (Buonfino 2004, p.48)

It is clear that a vast amount of research on the topic of identity exists within social sciences. There is apparent a widely accepted notion that identity construction and maintenance hinges upon the creation of ‘others’ that facilitate establishing boundaries of the Self. Although some authors stipulate that the ‘other’ does not necessarily need to be negatively framed, migrants tend to fall into the category of potentially dangerous, unwanted others. Perhaps this is due to the fact that they constitute the Other that explicitly wishes to enter the internal realm, as opposed to for instance the framing of another country as the Other against which an identity forms. Having analysed the theoretical basis of identity and otherness in international relations, especially in the context of migration, it becomes necessary to examine discourses as they enable the construction and maintenance of ‘others’ and ‘selves’.

1.4. Analysing Discourse

Once the ontological and epistemological premises of postpositivist theories of international relations are accepted, namely that social reality is constructed and mutable, the relevance of discourse must be established. A definition of discourse is ephemeral, with scholars adopting definitions that vary to specific degrees. In simple terms, it refers to “the language and representations through which we describe and understand the world, and through which meanings, identities, and social relations are produced” (Dunne et al. 2010, p.325). A more Foucauldian definition would consider discourse as “ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and

power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them” (Weedon 1987, p.108). The principal distinction between the two is the latter’s inclusion of a power element, which is central to any Foucauldian analysis. Finally, for Laclau and Mouffe a discourse translates into the grounding of a web of meanings in a particular realm. Furthermore, the structuring of meanings inherently involves the exclusion of other meanings through the exercise of power (Rear 2013). In spite of a varying degree of definitions, the importance of discourse as the principal building block of social reality and consequently of identity is shared across the spectrum.

Discourse analysis within the Discourse Theory conceptual framework “refers to the analysis of empirical raw materials and information as discursive forms. This means that discourse analysts treat a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic data ... as ‘texts’ or ‘writing’” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, p.6). These raw materials then constitute the foundations of discourse and shape our perception and understanding of the world. The absence of a strict delineation with regards to the data to be employed allows for substantial flexibility in conducting research.

The importance of discourse in postmodern theory means that its analysis has become an essential field within social sciences. Even within the study of international relations there exists a number of different theories for discourse analysis. Drawing directly on Foucault, the historical Foucauldian discourse analysis tracks the historical development of a discourse, establishes its principal constituents and analyses the power structures that reinforce particular discourses and its dissolution into the society. A strong focus is placed power, that is, on elements that are excluded by a specific discourse and on challenges to

its dominance (Drulak 2008, pp.105-108). Campbell's (1992) aforementioned study of U.S. foreign policy and identity construction can be said to be an example of Foucauldian discourse analysis. Another highly influential theory is critical discourse analysis (CDA). Pioneered by Norman Fairclough, in simple terms CDA focuses on the effect of discourse on the world around us and vice versa. In a sense, CDA accepts a division between discursive and non-discursive worlds which have a mutually constitutive relationship. A discourse as an action both constructs the world and is constructed by a set of social practices (Rear 2013). Fairclough devised a three-dimensional framework for textual analysis - which forms the core of CDA - comprising of the levels of text itself, discursive practice, and social practice. Such a systematic approach was to allow for connecting micro aspects of language use to broader social practices (Drulak 2008). CDA offers a stronger methodology than Foucauldian discourse analysis and is more preoccupied with linguistics, devoting substantial focus to language itself. The work of Ruth Wodak et al. (1999) on the discursive construction of Austrian national identity is a prime example of CDA. Wodak through thorough textual analysis identifies various macro strategies employed in the construction of the Austrian national identity, and sheds light on general aspects of national identity creation. The theory employed in this paper, however, is referred to as simply Discourse Theory and was pioneered by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in the 1980s.

Discourse Theory was initiated with the publication of Laclau and Mouffe's *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985), which drew on post-Marxist, poststructuralist, and psychoanalytic strands of thought. Challenging Marxist materialist determinism, Discourse Theory rejected the notion that identity results from one's position in economic

hierarchies (class). Laclau and Mouffe stressed the primacy of the political, meaning that identities, subject positions, and social practices themselves are constructed through competing political discourses (Horner 2014, p.5). Discourse Theory goes a step further than CDA in claiming that the discursive and non-discursive or material and non-material worlds cannot be separated. It is not to say that reality independent of us does not exist but rather that our perception of it, the meanings it possesses are all articulated by discourse and thus nothing can be said to exist outside it. Following from this is the notion that since all phenomena are determined by discourse, no meaning can be permanently fixed. As there always exists a number of competing discourses, meanings are continuously being altered based on the current dominant discourse. It can then be said that the *raison d'être* of Discourse Analysis is not the discovery of the 'truth' about the world but to uncover the discursive struggles that constitute reality (Horner 2014, p.6).

By their definition, Laclau and Mouffe's conception of discourse involves the attempts to fix meaning in a specific domain. This is achieved by positioning specific *signifiers* around *nodal points*, which tie these together much like reference points in a manner that rearticulates their meanings relative to other discourses. For instance in a discourse of communist ideology, the signifier 'communism' is a signifier, acting as a nodal point that secures together other signifiers such as 'democracy' or 'equality', infusing them with different meanings than if the nodal point was 'liberalism'. Consequently, the meaning a nodal point acquires is dependent on its relative position to other signifiers (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, p.11). The process of establishing specific meanings through relative positioning of signifiers is called *articulation*. As Laclau and Mouffe state, articulation is "any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified

as a result of articulatory practice”, meaning that a discourse is “the structured totality resulting from this articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p.105). In other words, articulation allows for the delineation or alternatively the questioning of subject positions and identities through linking signifiers and nodal points in *chains of equivalence*. Through articulation a respite from the fluctuations of meanings is achieved within a particular discourse. The fixation of meaning is however always temporary. Finally, a *floating signifier* refers to a nodal point over which competing discourses struggle to fix a set of meanings (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p.110).

Discourse Theory conceptualizes identity in Lacan’s psychoanalytic terms, while borrowing Althusser’s concept of interpellation. Interpellation refers to individuals being placed into certain subject positions by ideology and its institutions, rather than being fully self-conscious and free. Lacan on the other hand conceives of individuals as intrinsically fragmented and perpetually striving to become whole, to establish a stable identity. Within Discourse Theory, an individual may have a number of different *subject positions*, resulting from the multitude of identifications in a discourse structure, such as ‘black’, ‘Christian’, and ‘teenager’. Consequently, when a discourse structure fails, a *dislocation* occurs that facilitates an identity crisis and forces the subject adopt a new discourse (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, p.20).

As there is no a priori permanent meaning, all meanings are essentially the product of competing discourses. Discourses that articulate new meanings have the potential to bring forth new political projects, ideologies and shape the common identity of a society. For a discourse to achieve this, it needs to overcome other contending discourses in a

struggle for dominance. Therefore, the difference in the articulation of various discourses mirrors the power struggles among groups within societies. Finding inspiration in the work of Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe thus developed the concept of a *hegemonic discourse* (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Hegemonic discourse relates to the dynamic of the dominant ideology or political force establishing a dominant discourse within a society, which also acts to reproduce the power relations designed to preserve its hegemonic status (Buonfino 2004, p.25). If a discourse becomes hegemonic, it may become naturalised and assume the status of a taken-for-granted assumption (Horner 2014, p.5). Thus the social practices resulting from hegemonic discourses can come to appear so natural that individuals forget their origins and they appear as common sense. What is taken as a natural order, along with institutions and factors that accompany it is the result of hegemonic practices (Mouffe 2008, p.4). However, no hegemonic discourse is immune to being challenged by antagonistic discourses that attempt to install a different form of hegemony. Antagonism is inherent to Discourse Theory as it points to the boundary of a social order where identity is no longer fixed, but is challenged by a competing narrative. Social antagonisms are established when competing social agents cannot fully achieve the interests of their identities (Horwath and Stavrakakis 2000, p.14). In the words of Laclau and Mouffe, they occur when “the presence of [an] "Other" prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p.125). However, when discourses collide, the ensuing antagonisms can be resolved through *hegemonic intervention*. Hegemonic intervention refers to a forceful reconstitution of unambiguity by suppressing one identity or discourse in favour of another (Jorgensen and Philips 2002, p.48).

In the formation of group identities, myth formation plays a crucial role. A myth is a type of floating signifier that seeks to portray society as a totality with a stable uniform identity. It can then be applied to signifiers such as 'the nation' or 'the country' that possess the characteristic of a unified, total whole. By definition then, it is an attempt at a hegemonic practice. Once a myth becomes the hegemonic vision of social order, moving from the product of one particular interest group onto universality, it reaches the status of a *social imaginary*. What constitutes a social imaginary is the *logic of equivalence*, which seeks to mute different discourses or movements within a society by creating a core with which all identify. The overcoming of boundaries among groups is achieved by "relating them to a common project and by establishing a frontier to define the forces to be opposed, the 'enemy'" (Mouffe 1993, p.50). In contrast stands the *logic of difference* which "consists in the expansion of a given system of differences by dissolving existing chains of equivalence and incorporating those disarticulated elements into an expanding order" (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, pp.16-17). These two dynamics are not mutually exclusive however. Rather, they often overlap and occur at the same time along each other.

Discourse Theory is best suited to examining the topic of this paper as it gives significant freedom in conducting research, in that it is not limited to for instance speech acts, but encompasses both linguistic and non-linguistic acts. Furthermore, its projects are often problem-driven, in that they examine how a specific issue is articulated – in this context the so-called migration crisis - and the wider contextual dynamics between various conflicting articulations.

2. Practical Application

2.1. Hegemonic Nature of the Securitization of Migration

Before the examination of current discourse dynamics relating to the European Union in the context of the migration crisis, it is important to historicize the evolution of the securitization as the dominant – or hegemonic – discourse on migration. This part does not seek to analyse or to conduct a historical discourse analysis pertaining to securitization of migration in the European Union as this is vastly outside the scope of this paper and has been done previously. Rather it sets the basis for the latter analysis of the migration crisis, without which the examination of recent developments would be context-less.

In the post-war decades, mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, migrants were in general considered a necessary boost to the European workforce. By the 1970s, immigration was increasingly perceived as destabilizing to the domestic public order. This related mainly to changes in European labour markets and the desire to protect the welfare and rights of the domestic workforce (Doty 2006). The issue of migration was however not incorporated into the institutional framework of the European Community at the time. The beginnings of the dichotomization of space between European and outsider can be connected to Council Resolution 1612/68, which made the distinction between the movement of nationals of member states and those of external countries. The resolution argued that free movement of persons would be extended to citizens of member countries. This is considered the foundation for “fortress of Europe” attitude in the area of immigration (Ugur 1995, p.977). Since the mid-1980s, contextualization of migration

changed from social and economic rights related to the construction of the internal market towards a politicization through the conflation of immigration and asylum-seeking. For instance, in the work programme of the 1998 Austrian Presidency, in the section of Eurodac – a database of asylum seeker fingerprints – it is stated that “In recent years the steep rise in the number of illegal immigrants (and therefore potential asylum-seekers) caught has revealed the increasing need to include their fingerprints in the system” (Statewatch 1998, p.6.). The conflation of the two terms in fact rearticulates the term asylum-seeker in a structure relating it to illegal, criminal activity, firmly cementing it within a security discourse.

Gradually, the issue of migration began to be incorporated into the institutional security framework of the EU as integration progressed. With the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the EU gained limited competence in the field of ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, which incorporates migration, asylum and external borders issues alongside traditional security factors such as fraud and drugs (Peers 2000, p.16). With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the field of Justice and Home Affairs became one of the core areas of EU’s policy. The following amended Treaty of the European Union states that it is the aim of the EU to “maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum [and] immigration” (Article 2). Moreover, since 1999, the EU has been working to create a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). In line with the securitization discourse, in 2004, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Members States of the European Union (FRONTEX) was established in order to improve the management of external

borders. The community policy in the field of EU external borders aims at “... uniform and high level of control and surveillance, which is a necessary corollary to the free movement of persons within the European Union” (Council of the European Union 2004, p.2). With increasing integration and expansion of EU membership, the securitization of borders tended to increase correspondingly. The necessity to separate the harmonious inside from the chaotic and dangerous outside is apparent. An area of ‘freedom, security and justice’ can only be achieved within a specific space and in relation to space that lacks these characteristics.

The identity that the European Union is creating for itself relies on an adherence to moral superiority in values such as human rights. Through the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU attained the right to sanction members that act in violation of these core values and principles. As such the immigration discourse of the EU, albeit of a securitising nature, will be articulated with some such signifiers attached. The Lampedusa incident in 2013, during which over 360 migrants lost their lives, sparked continent-wide discussion on the topic of migration. With at least 1,200 migrants having died crossing the Mediterranean in the previous year, Cecilia Malmstrom, the then European Commissioner for Home Affairs issued a statement in response.

“We have to become better at identifying and rescuing vessels at risk. We also need to intensify our efforts to fight criminal networks exploiting human despair so that they cannot continue to put people's lives at risk in small, overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels.

The European Commission has developed a new tool, EUROSUR, which ... will help Member States to better track, identify and rescue small vessels at sea thanks to better

coordination between national authorities, appropriate channels of communication and improved surveillance technology.” (Malmstrom 2013)

Although the articulation of migration within a discursive field of human rights is to an extent present in the stated need to avoid placing people’s lives at risk, the discourse type of securitization of migration is still dominant. The overwhelming reaction was to increase and toughen security measures aimed at preventing migrants from entering the territory of the EU, articulated as a means to improving migrants’ safety.

The discourse pertaining to immigration is more radical when the focus is shifted to individual countries. As such, immigration in nation states tends to be linked to various socio-economic and political problems, ranging from economic depression and unemployment to cultural threats, social unrest and the disintegration of public order. The range of possible negative articulations is substantial. The discourse portraying immigration as a danger to the stability of the inside and thus firmly rooted it in the realm of security is portrayed well in the remarks made by the then Conservative leader Michael Howard in the run-up to the 2005 general election in the UK. He declared that

“[we] face a real terrorist threat in Britain today – a threat to our safety, to our way of life, and our liberties. But we have absolutely no idea who is coming into or leaving our country. There are a quarter of a million failed asylum seekers living in our country today. No one knows who they are or where they are. To defeat the terrorist threat we need action not talk – action to secure our borders.” (Transcript of a speech by Howard 2005)

Howard's remarks explicitly connect the asylum seeker and terrorist signifiers, thus rearticulating their meaning through their relative closeness. Furthermore, the asylum seeker/terrorist nexus is a perceived danger to not only safety of British citizens, but their liberties and way of life. The securitization of migration and demonization of the Other, in this case epitomised by the asylum seeker, feeds of the fears from the spread of terrorism. Drawing upon fears is the fundamental tool with which an element can be politicised and consequently externalised. Oftentimes, the source of this unease does not originally rest within the ruling class, albeit it is possible. The decision-makers will be placed under pressure by various media that draw upon societal fears. Alessandra Buonfino affords the media a key role in discourse generation as "media messages no only reflect these fears, they *channel* and *strengthen* them and transform them into a powerful message/discourse for authorities" (Buonfino 2004, p.30, emphasis in original). Thus with the case of migration, the two principal fears being employed are economic and social insecurity. Consequently, the hegemonic discourse will be the one better able to respond and act upon the formulation of society's fears. It will seek to strengthen national identity through containing the external threat in a confined space – outside of national borders – and prevent the contamination and destabilization of the inside. In this manner it also serves to preserve the status quo in terms of existing power structures, as the hegemonic discourse legitimizes its dominance through the appeasement of articulated fears. It is important to note that migration is a politicized phenomenon, being a threat for what it signifies, rather than what it is. It is the constitutive outside to the strengthening of the internal identity (Buonfino 2004, p28).

Throughout the securitization of migration within the EU and its member states there have of course existed, and continue to exist, discourses that compete with the dominant strand. Discourses promoting the economic benefits of migration or the need for solidarity based on values and morality in the case of those fleeing warzones or persecution constantly challenge the discourse of securitization. In the academic sphere however, the idea that migration issues have been securitized in the EU, both domestically and at the institutional level, has become ubiquitous (Huysmans 2000; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Buonfino 2004; Bigo 2002). There develops an interesting paradox over time, when the global rhetoric spells out increasing globalization and interconnectedness, freedom in capital movements and other dynamics that seek to tear down borders, while immigration policy has over the years been expanded and toughened. It is perhaps exactly these dynamisms that take apart old structures, threaten homogeneity and security, and bring overwhelming changes that have facilitated the securitization of migration. The disintegration of traditional identities required the articulation of an external threat – the Other – against which identity could be restored. Certainly, discourses that securitize the phenomenon of migration have become hegemonic in the EU and its member states already before the current migratory boom. In order to examine discursive evolution in the context of said boom, the establishment of the benchmark hegemonic discourse was necessary. As will be examined below, securitization of migration has in the context of the migration crisis intensified, with the rising levels of societal unease opening doors to more radical discourses that challenge established power structures. Thus, having determined the discursive context, more recent developments can now be analysed.

2.2. Articulating Migration as a Threat

Increases in crime, threats to national security, economic threats or the disruption of social order are fears shared by almost everyone. The articulation of migration in the context of these fears has played a major part in the securitization of migratory discourse, which has begun long before the numbers of asylum applications from non-member states began to rise sharply. The effect the recent spike in the influx of migrants has had on the discourse of the EU and its members is profound. In 2012, the number of asylum seekers stood at 431 thousand, while the following year the number increased by almost 50 percent to 627 thousand. The numbers from 2014 were close to the previously recorded peak of 1992, when there were 672 thousand recorded asylum applications to the EU. Previous year however saw an unprecedented 1.3 million asylum applications, almost double the number recorded in 1992 (Eurostat 2016). Furthermore, the numbers are likely higher in reality as many migrants have not been documented. The migration crisis has inflamed anti-immigration discourse across Europe and the EU has struggled to adapt and contain the situation. It is not a new discourse to connect the issue of migration with rising insecurity, and the recent boom in the influx of migrants to Europe has given momentum to such discourses, which often tend to be narrated by various media. For instance, David Barret writing for *The Telegraph* stated that

“Britain is facing a new *threat to its border* after France announced the construction of a ‘Sangatte’-style *refugee camp* less than 50 miles from Dover, prompting *fears it will intensify the migrant crisis*... British MPs said it risked acting as a magnet for larger numbers of migrants who want to reach this country rather than settle in France.”

(Emphasis added, Barrett 2015)

Here the articulation connects together the threat to the British border with the refugee camps and the migration crisis. The article does not refer to specific threats that migrants pose to Britain or its borders but rather the mere presence of a refugee camp near British borders constitutes a threat. The threat arises out of the potential increase in migrants seeking to cross UK borders, thus invading the internal sphere. The article already presupposes that an increase in immigration means a threat to Britain and the Other becomes dangerous because of its very identity of Otherness, not for what he does but for what he represents. Within this discourse, the migrant has already been fixed in the consciousness of people as danger or a threat through the continued hegemonic status of the securitization of the migration discourse and the articulatory processes that create its webs of meaning. Ivar Arpi, in an article titled “It’s not only Germany that covers *up mass sex attacks by migrant men*... Sweden’s record is shameful” (Emphasis added) for *The Spectator* articulates migrant men around nodal point of crime, particularly sexual assault. The author then exacerbates Swedish national identity politics as being the polar opposite to the identity of migrant men:

“Sweden prides itself on its sexual equality and has even pioneered a feminist foreign policy. When hundreds of women were reported to have been molested and abused in Cologne — at the hands of an organised mob — the reaction from Swedish politicians and pundits ought to have been one of outrage.” (Emphasis added, Arpi 2016)

The discourse of the author is a prime example of an attempt to protect a specific national identity, or identity politics, against the destabilizing danger of the Other. In this context,

the signifier “migrant men” represents the constitutive Other to the Swedish Self. Through the articulation of a threat, the discourse creates a Self and an Other in a process in which the definition of the Self is dependent on the definition of the Other. In other words, the definition of migrant men as perpetrators of sexual assaults polarizes their identity as incompatible and dangerous to Swedish identity characterised by “sexual equality” and “feminist foreign policy”. An influx of migrants poses a threat not only to Swedish women but to the collective identity shared among Swedes. By articulating the threat, the author in turn strengthens the national identity by clearly stating what it should exclude.

Alternatively, within the UK, anti-immigration discourse is often targeted at various aspects of the welfare system, such as the NHS. An example of how media tap into societal fears in order to articulate both an economic and health related threat can be found in the *Daily Mail* article “Immigrants, HIV and the true cost to the NHS: Should the ‘International Health Service’ be treating patients who come here with the killer disease”:

“In Britain doctors report increasing numbers of *legal migrants and asylum seekers, particularly from Africa, who have HIV and other serious diseases*. No one know exactly what health tourists cost the taxpayer each year. Professor Meirion Thomas, an eminent consultant who has worked for the NHS for 44 years and who has researched the issue thoroughly, believes the cost to the taxpayer to be billions of pounds annually...His words have been echoed by Professor Thomas, who says *Health tourists* come to the UK with pre-existing illnesses with the sole purpose of accessing free NHS care, and that our *health service is being ‘bled dry’* by people suffering serious diseases such as HIV that require lengthy and expensive treatment.” (Emphasis added, Reid 2014)

Reid's article dramatically communicates how as a result of asylum seekers and legal migrants, the NHS is being "bled dry" while at the same time deadly diseases are entering the country. If the institution is being "bled dry", it logically follows that there is insufficient funding for treatment of British people, resulting in lower levels of health. Moreover, migrants and asylum seekers are rearticulated as "health tourists" coming to the UK just to get free treatment at the expense of the taxpayer. Thus the article draws on fears of worsening healthcare because money is being spent on "health tourists", who may at the same time infect the natives. Migrants then create conditions for the need to increase the protection of Britain from the outside threat. Notably for the UK, articulating threats to the NHS evokes amplified reactions as for many Brits, the free healthcare institution is part of the British identity, thus making it a threat to one's very identity. Immigration becomes a politicised phenomenon and an excuse for a change in the system:

"This is the result of a *decision by the Coalition in 2012* to make HIV treatment free to all non-British visitors after *lobbying by Left-leaning politicians and campaign groups* ...

Earlier this year, 20 Tory backbenchers unsuccessfully tried to amend the Government's Immigration Bill." (Emphasis added, Reid 2014)

The author includes the causes of this vulnerability – "Left-leaning politicians and campaign groups" – while also offering the alternative that attempted to change exploitation of the British healthcare system – "20 Tory backbenchers". This is indicative of the subtle way that the media can feed into society's fears and exert pressure on policy-makers.

Since September 11th 2001, immigration has increasingly been connected to terrorism. This has been exacerbated by the developments in the Middle East over the past few years and the resurgence of international terrorism at the hands of the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda and a number of other terror groups. Recent terror attacks in Europe have further increased feelings of unease and insecurity among citizens, which can be tapped into in order to bolster securitization discourses. Media articles with titles such as “REVEALED: The quiet ports where illegal immigrants and terrorists are slipping into the UK” (Culberston 2016), “ISIS terrorists are arriving in Europe hidden among migrants crossing the Mediterranean on boats, warns EU’s top prosecutor” (Newton 2015) or “Dozens of terrorism suspects among refugees who entered Germany” (Reuters 2016) tap into societal fears for one’s safety. Signifiers like ‘refugee’ or ‘migrant’ are in the process tied to the nodal point ‘terrorism’, firmly securitizing the phenomenon of migration. By articulating the signifier “migrant” or “refugee” around the nodal point “terrorism”, the meaning of the two signifiers is radically altered. Traditionally, a refugee would be someone considered to be fleeing severe insecurity – such as terrorism. The rearticulating necessitates similar security measures employed against terrorists to be employed against migrants. What makes the entrance of terrorists into Europe possible is the porous, insecure border of not only Europe but of individual countries within it. Thus it also includes implicit or explicit pressure to change relevant policy and securitize borders further.

There are a number of existing discourses employed in the media that create various dichotomies between ‘us’ and ‘them’. With regards to articulating immigration as a threat,

a successful discourse will seek to tap into a specific identity discourse. As a result, articulations may differ between countries according to the characteristics of specific identity politics. In the UK, fears arising out of threats to welfare or economic related fears may find stronger support than gender related articulations, while in Sweden the opposite may be true. The common feature such discourses share is the articulation of the outsider as a threat to the stability of the inside. In defining the characteristics of the Other, the discourse creates or supports a specific identity creation, which rests on the exclusion of its unwanted parts. Therefore, migration discourse that formulates the phenomenon as a danger creates exclusionary discourses aimed at strengthening the desired national or collective identity. By drawing on societal fears, such discourse can amplify the feeling of unease in society with regards to migration and consequently create an imperative for the government to contain the threat, comforting the society in the process. Should the pressure be strong enough, current elites will adopt the discourse of the public sphere in order to preserve existing power structures as otherwise they risk losing their hold on power. Taking securitization as the benchmark hegemonic discourse, strengthening discourses that articulate immigration as a threat seek further exclusion of the Other. In the UK for instance, the Ipsos MORI's Issues Index poll conducted each month by The Economist found that in June 2016, just ahead of the referendum in the UK's membership in the EU, almost 50% of respondents saw immigration as the most important facing Britain today (Ipsos MORI 2016). This is a clear sign that further securitization is the dominant discourse in the UK as it is able to channel and strengthen societal fears.

An important dynamic that strengthens the discourse of increasing securitization is the current historical context, which has been touched upon in this section already. General

levels of insecurity were already high when the number of migrants began to rise sharply. The financial crisis that hit the United States and consequently Europe as well has not yet dissipated, its effects still being felt by the majority of European countries. Lacklustre growth is endemic in EU markets, while in the past few years, terror groups began to successfully target Western countries. Discourses that articulate migration as a threat are able to propagate policy measures that are in their focus on internal security able to address these societal fears.

2.3. Immigration as a Humanitarian Concern

In light of the recent migration crisis, the social construction of migration as a threat is being contested by articulations that emphasize humanitarian concerns, multiculturalism, and values such as solidarity. For the purpose of this paper, such discourse will be called 'humanitarian' as it tends to articulate migrants as Others in need of aid and solidarity. A direct attempt to 'humanise' the situation of migrants coming to Europe is to in fact not refer to them as migrants. David Marsh in *The Guardian* writes:

"The language we hear in what passes for a national conversation on migration has become as debased as most of the arguments, until *the very word "migrants" is toxic, used to frighten us* by conjuring up images of a 'swarm' (as David Cameron put it) massing at our borders, threatening our way of life *something similar happened to the word 'immigrant', when it became increasingly used by racists* to mean something like 'a black person in Britain who should go back home' *This is a story about humanity*. Reporting it should be humane as well as accurate. Sadly, most of what we hear and read about "migrants" is neither." (Emphasis added, Marsh 2015)

The author is pointing to the way dominant discourses articulate migration as a threat or a danger to the society in an attempt to disrupt the chains of equivalence established by the hegemonic discourse. The social construction of migrants under the hegemonic discourse has succeeded by its prevalence through time to naturalize the association of migration with an externalised threat or danger, dehumanising the term in the process. The author provides the social antagonism to the dominant discourse in that he challenges the chain of equivalence that has enveloped the term migrant in a web of meaning that conveys alarm and unease. Stating that the term “immigrant” has achieved a racist connotation and consequently alluding to the similarity between how both migrant and immigrant are employed portrays the anti-migration discourse as racist. Finally, the author seeks to articulate the term migrant around the nodal point “humanity” or “human” thus seeking to bridge the ‘us/them’ dichotomy on the basis of a shared identity between the Other and the Self. In a similar fashion, the Al-Jazeera media outlet has decided to refrain from using the term migrant, instead opting for refugee. In the words of Barry Malone, “The umbrella term migrant is no longer fit for purpose when it comes to describing the horror unfolding in the Mediterranean.”(Malone 2015)

A significant way the ‘humanitarian’ discourse portrays migration is in terms of victimhood. This refers to the framing of the Other not as an externalised threat but as in need of protection from another ‘Other’. This line of reasoning is reminiscent of Cynthia Weber’s (1995) aforementioned analysis of the justification of Western interventions on the basis of moral necessity aimed at helping those being persecuted. This is epitomized by an open letter organized by *The Guardian*, which states:

“The refugee crisis is escalating in what has been described as the biggest humanitarian crisis since the second world war ... Governments across Europe are failing to accept responsibility as thousands are drowning in the Mediterranean, fleeing desperate situations at great risk to seek sanctuary. Instead of addressing the issues, fences and detention centres are being built and as a result of the EU-Turkey deal people are being deported to war zones where their homes and lives have been destroyed.” (Emphasis added, The Guardian 2016)

The author connects the current “refugee crisis” to the tragedy of the Second World War, framing refugees and migrants as victims in need of help. The migrants are in this case themselves threatened by ‘other Others’, from whom they are desperately fleeing. This changes the dichotomous separation of the Self and the Other towards a relationship not based on hostility but on likeness and consequently compassion. Identity construction of the discourse is not based on the exclusion of the Other – in this case the migrant or refugee – as the unwanted, undesired externality, but rather on the moral necessity of offering aid to those who are threatened. The migrant is not articulated as the threat, the policies of European governments in fact represent the threat to the safety and well-being of migrants. The discourse articulates the need for solidarity based on moral values. Finally, the articulation of the author places pressure on decision-makers by contrasting the plight of the refugee with unhelpful, and to an extent cruel, government policies. The rationale is to promote policy change in an attempt to disrupt the hegemonic securitization discourse.

Such articulation is prevalent in the humanitarian discourse as it narrates the issues of migration in terms of the dangers and difficulties the refugees – or migrants – undergo. An article in the *Independent* titled “Refugee children in France being sexually exploited and forced into crime by traffickers, says Unicef” (Samuels 2016) portrays refugees as victims of traffickers:

“Refugee children are being sexually exploited and forced to work tirelessly by traffickers in northern France, an extensive report by Unicef is to reveal.

Young people from Syria and Libya told the charity they suffer a range of abuses at camps in Dunkirk and Calais, including being coerced into performing sex acts on traffickers and forced to commit crimes.” (Emphasis added, Samuels 2016)

The author creates a chain of equivalence between “refugee children”, “sexual exploitation” and “traffickers”. As opposed to the discourse that demonizes migrants, the article seeks to articulate traffickers as the constitutive externality to identity formation. In other words, policy action should not be aimed at containing the ability of migrants and refugees to enter Europe but rather at persecuting smugglers.

Aside from traditional media outlets, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the most active propagators of the humanitarian discourse. As they predominantly focus on human security, NGOs frame events in the context of human suffering or hardship. This makes them inherently inclined to focus on the humanitarian factors in migration, rather than on security concerns. Furthermore, being international organizations that focus on crises across the world, they operate on the basis of certain values rather than being tied to specific identity politics – such as a specific national identity. NGOs often take a hard

stance against securitizing policies, as is well illustrated in the statement of *Medecins Sans Frontieres* that it will no longer take funds from EU institutions or its member states as a result of their policies in the current migration crisis. Jerome Oberreit, the International Secretary General of MSF stated that:

“For months MSF has spoken out about a *shameful European response focused on deterrence rather than providing people with the assistance and protection they need*. The EU-Turkey deal goes one step further and has placed the very concept of 'refugee' and the protection it offers in danger.” (Emphasis added, Medecins Sans Frontieres 2016)

The NGO directly challenges the securitization discourse and its policies of “deterrence”. It attempts to discredit policy response of European governments, attacking a specific policy measure that it perceives as threatening to the very meaning of the term “refugee”. Here the pressure to enact policy change is clear as in protest, the charity will no longer accept funds from specific donors. The weight behind the discourse it propagates is in general respect that people have for Medecins Sans Frontier and thus it possesses leverage. Humanitarian discourse is the principal antagonistic force against the hegemonic securitization discourse. With the intensification of the latter, the former has also gained in force. Its inherent weakness is however the fact that it does not address or feed of societal fears. With unease and insecurity on the rise among citizens of European countries, discourses that are better able to access, address and channel these sentiments will dominate the discursive field.

2.4. State Level Securitization in the Context of the Crisis

A discourse can be considered hegemonic when it begins to influence policy-making of governments and institutions. The hegemonic nature of the securitization discourse is thus apparent upon the analysis of political groups and government policy in the context of the migration crisis. The influence of the migration discourse can be clearly observed in the recent political events within the UK. The campaign to leave the European Union – Brexit – cited immigration control as one of the core reasons for striving to leave the European Union. The eventual success of the Leave campaign is a testimony to the power of the anti-immigration discourse, and to the increasing unease that general populations feel. Consequently, the overwhelming insecurity felt by many is channelled and strengthened through various media outlets, and addressed by various political groups. The government policy of the UK government throughout the migration crisis has responded to the pressures exerted by the strengthened securitization discourse. In a press release on July 29th 2015, UK Home Office stated that:

“The UK Government has announced a new range of programmes to address the root causes of the migrant crisis. This includes aid initiatives totalling £217 million in Africa, to help approximately 2.5 million refugees and vulnerable people in the countries that the majority of migrants are travelling from or through. An additional £100 million in aid will help those displaced as a result of the Syria crisis.

As the Home Secretary described in the UK Parliament on 14 July, it was also confirmed yesterday that the UK has agreed to additional funding of up to £7 million towards increasing security at the Channel Tunnel railhead at Coquelles.” (Home Office 2015)

The following month, on the 25th of August 2015, the UK Home office issued a release titled “New action to make Britain a harder place for illegal migrants”. In referring to a new Immigration Bill, Immigration Minister James Brokenshire said:

“As a one nation government we will continue to crack down on abuse and build an immigration system that works in the best interests of the British people and those who play by the rules.”

Finally, in May 2016, further strengthening of the borders through an expansion of maritime border enforcement powers was announced by the Home Office:

“From 31 May, new maritime enforcement powers will come into force, which will allow Border Force officers to stop, board, divert and detain vessels and arrest anyone they suspect has broken immigration law. The stronger maritime powers, which form one part of the wide-ranging Immigration Act, are intended to combat 3 immigration offences in the territorial waters of the UK:

- assisting unlawful immigration
- assisting an asylum seeker to arrive in the UK
- assisting entry to the UK in breach of a deportation or exclusion order”

The policy response of the UK government is in accordance with the enhanced securitization discourse, in that policy measures introduced throughout the migration crisis are aimed at strengthening the borders of the country against potential intrusions by migrants. The securitization discourse is still dominant with the occasional articulation in terms of humanitarian concerns, as can be observed in the first press release cited. Although increase in humanitarian assistance was announced, the

corresponding increase in security measures aimed at preventing illegal migrants from reaching UK mainland is indicative of the prevalence of the securitization discourse. Addressing the “root causes” of the migration crisis is then aimed at reducing the number of individuals compelled to take the journey to Europe or the UK. The statement of the Immigration Minister demonstrates the dynamic of conceptualising immigration as a threat. The construction of the Other is constitutive in the formation of the identity of the Self, with the intensification of the threat resulting in stronger, more homogenous identity formation. In this case the statement alludes to “one nation” and an immigration policy that is best for “British people”. Nationalistic discourse that promotes identity politics forms in contrast to an exclusion of specific characteristics with which the Other is associated. The immigrant invades and pollutes the homogenous, national inside. Similarly, the strengthening of maritime borders against an intrusion of illegal immigrants seeks to increase security through preventing the arrival of illegal migrants but also asylum seekers. The policy measure articulates asylum seekers, unlawful migrants and deported individuals in one chain of equivalence, assigning them the same meaning of a threat to the internal security of Britain. The introduction of new security measure against migrants is a response of the government to the dominance of the discourse that portrays immigrants as threat. In order to preserve current power structures, the power-wielding individuals seek to comfort the societal fears and prevent a challenge to their dominant position. In spite of government action aimed at strengthening the border, the Brexit campaign was able to adopt the anti-immigration discourse and channel it against the European Union.

The way the immigration discourse was articulated within the Brexit campaign not only challenged the government policy to contain immigration, but also challenged the

discourse, and subsequently the power structures, of the European Union. The statement of Boris Johnson, one of the leading Conservatives of the Brexit campaign, demonstrates the articulation of the immigration problem as a cause of EU membership:

"The Government has failed because of the simple reality that inside the EU we cannot control immigration - it is literally impossible because we have no choice but to accept the principle of free movement and the European Court has ultimate control over our immigration policy ... If you vote IN on 23 June, you are kissing goodbye permanently to control of immigration. You are voting for the current situation not only to continue but to get worse. You are voting for the European Court to be in charge of immigration and asylum policy permanently. You are giving away any chance of democratic legitimacy for immigration policy." (Emphasis added, Johnson 2016)

Johnson's articulation connects remaining in the European Union with never again having control over immigration policy, increasing immigration, loss of sovereignty and lack of democracy. It employs a logic of equivalence to mute a number of different discourses and unite them in one anti-EU discourse. Thus it is not so much a challenge to domestic power structures as it is to the legitimacy of the European Union. The government is not responsible for not managing the threat that the anti-immigration discourse articulates, it is the European Union that prevents achieving security. This speaks of the failure of both European and Government policies to address the societal fears, which could then be channelled in opposition to the prevailing political order. It is difficult to ascertain whether any EU policy could address societal fears to an extent that would prevent Brexit from happening. The important thing is that an anti-EU discourse was capable of successfully incorporating the anti-immigration discourse and reshaping

the identity of both the EU and Britain in the process. The discourse successfully articulated the EU institutions as the Other, against which it articulated British national identity. The victory of the Brexit campaign demonstrates that it was successful in dislocating the identification of a significant part of the population with the nodal point 'European'. The dislocation was filled with a stronger identification with the myth of British national identity.

Similarly, Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK Independence Party and also a leading figure in the Brexit campaign uses the same articulation as Johnson, with the notable difference that he challenged not only EU's discourse and policies, but the dominant political groups in the UK:

"We have long been witness in Britain to the failed policy of the EU's open borders, supported by the establishment politicians to the detriment of our nation. When the referendum comes, the British people will finally have their chance to reject these open borders by saying No to the European Union." (Emphasis added, Farage 2015)

Being a member of a minority opposition party in the UK, Farage places blame on both the EU and the Establishment parties that supported the "failed policy of the EU's open borders". In Farage's discourse, the myth of the nation plays a crucial role, framing the actions of the EU and the main parties as detrimental to the British Nation. Thus the referendum represented not only a disconnect between Britain and Europe but challenges the hegemony of the two main traditional parties in the British political system. The immigration discourse was successfully employed through a logic of equivalence to unify the plurality of discourses, such as those of the Conservative Party and UKIP in challenging the long-standing, established power structures of Europe. The discourse

succeeded in dislocating the existing identity structures in spite of government policies aimed at strengthening the border. Furthermore, the societal unease is fuelling identity politics based on socially constructed myths, principally nationalism. These developments are however not limited to the UK. Across the EU, intensified securitization discourse with regards to migration is producing government policies that strengthen national borders in an attempt to comfort national sentiments. Identity politics are on the rise in several EU countries along with discourses that articulate migrants as a threat to the internal order.

Perhaps the most vocal securitization discourse in the EU comes from Hungary and its political elites. In June 2015, in response to increasing the increased influx of immigrants Hungary began the construction of a barrier along its 175 kilometres long border with Serbia, consisting of a four meter high fence with razor wire along. In October, it completed another stretch of razor wire fence along its 348 kilometres long border with Croatia. Borders were consequently secured with Slovenia and Romania as well. Hungarian immigration policy is the result of its government immigration discourse that articulates migrants as the dangerous Other. Viktor Orban, Hungarian Prime Minister has stated that

“Europe is not being pressured by a ‘refugee problem’ or a ‘refugee situation. Rather, *the continent is under threat of an ever-growing modern exodus ...* We shouldn’t forget that the people who are coming here grew up in a different religion and represent a completely different culture. *Most are not Christian, but Muslim.* Or is it not worrying that Europe’s Christian culture is already barely able to maintain its own set of Christian values?” (Emphasis added, Karnitschnig 2015)

In a separate interview with the Hungarian Prime Minister, he stated that:

“Of course it’s not accepted, but the factual point is that all the terrorists are basically migrants ... All of them present a security threat because we don’t know who they are ... We would like to save Schengen. We would like to save the liberties ... including the free movement inside the European Union.” (Emphasis added, Kaminski 2015)

Orban is framing a specific Hungarian, and more importantly European, identity centred around the medieval myth – perhaps for some the social imaginary – of a ‘Christian’ Europe. Orban rearticulates refugees as ‘Muslims’ conducting an ‘Exodus’ to ‘Christian’ Europe thus constructing migrants as a cultural threat to Europe’s very identity. The discourse is in line with Samuel Huntington’s influential thesis *The Clash of Civilisations*, which predicts increasing conflicts of ‘civilizations’ due to their incompatible cultural identities. The discourse frames the collective identity of Europe as fundamentally incompatible with that of the migrants’, thus stating that allowing the entry of the Other pollutes the homogenous inside and destroys Europe’s cultural purity. In addition to the cultural threat that migrants embody, the connection of ‘the migrant’ and ‘terrorist’ is made explicitly. The migrant threatens Europe’s cultural identity, the safety of its citizens, and the institutional freedoms of the EU. Securing the border against migrants is thus essential to saving Europe and its identity, and is a hegemonic practice arising out of a hegemonic discourse.

Hungarian policy is by many viewed as excessively radical but increasing securitization can be observed elsewhere across the European Union. The rise in the securitization of borders is most apparent in the context of the Schengen area. Schengen Europe grew from an experiment between the Benelux countries, Germany, and France into a free-travel

zone encompassing 26 different countries of Europe. It is one of the symbolic pillars of the European Union, an inscription on the wall of a Schengen museum in Luxembourg reads that “The suppression of internal borders of the European Union is recognition that all the citizens of the states concerned belong to the same space, that they share a common identity” (Traynor 2016). In spite of its importance in economic and both symbolic terms, several countries have now introduced border checks as security measures in the context of the migration crisis.

Already, border checks were introduced in Norway, France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden. The Danish Prime Minister remarked upon announcing new initiatives aimed at reducing the number of migrants entering the country that “Far too many immigrants are coming to Europe and to Denmark. It is increasing day by day. Denmark cannot remain open for everyone” (Cremer 2015). Upon the reintroduction of border controls by Sweden in early 2016, the government issued a statement that “the government now considers that the current situation, with a large number of people entering the country in a relatively short time, poses a serious threat to public order and national security” (Crouch 2016). Following talks by EU Interior Minister in early 2016 in Amsterdam, the Austrian Interior Minister Johanna Mikl-Leitner said “Schengen is on the brink of collapse” (Trainor and Smith 2016). As the societal unease increases in countries affected by the migration crisis, the governments will respond by attempting to limit migrant flows in order to secure existing power structures and comfort the society. The alternative is to risk losing power to political groups whose discourse better addresses the widespread anxiety. In this sense the rise and success of the securitization discourse in the context of the migration crisis necessitates government policy that increases border security. This results in the strengthening of national identity as the interests of national

citizens are explicitly prioritized. The strengthening of national identities can only be done at the expense of a more collective European identity, the precise characteristics of which are not in this case relevant, rather the focus becomes the potential dynamic witnessed in the United Kingdom, whereby strengthened identity politics and anti-immigration discourse played a major role in the UK's exit from the EU by referendum.

The Ipsos Brexit poll conducted in May 2016 showed that in Italy and France, over 50 percent of people think that a referendum on EU membership should be held, with those who would vote 'Out' standing at over 40 percent (Ipsos Brexit poll 2016). Simultaneously, nationalist parties, such as the Austrian Freedom Party whose candidate nearly won the Presidential elections in April or Le Front National which won 6.8 million votes in regional elections in 2015, are gaining support across Europe (BBC 2016). For instance, Marine Le Pen, the leader of Le Front National and a Presidential hopeful is strongly for France leaving the EU and has stated that should she win the elections, she will organize a referendum about remaining in the Union (Chrisafis 2016). The migration crisis has strengthened the securitization of the migration discourse, which has in turn opened up new avenues for parties that promote identity politics.

Identity politics that are on the rise on Europe are a response to the articulation of immigration as a threat by the dominant immigration discourse. The potential consequences of the dominance of such discourse is that it refocuses narrative from the examination of the Self to the Other in the search for causes of articulated threats or problems. Framing the Other as a threat against which the discourse creates a homogenous identity centred on a particular myth or social imaginary facilitates the ascription of any societal issue onto the externalized Other. With an increase in discourses

that articulate the immigrant as a threat, the collective identity is strengthened correspondingly, which facilitates the ascription of negative characteristics to any Other that does not fit into the category of the collective, national identity. As was shown by the victory of the Brexit campaign, articulating the migration crisis as stemming from membership within the EU is in today's climate achievable. In response, the EU will have to address these societal sentiments and the discourses that articulate them and prevent them gaining hegemony by itself adopting the increasing securitization discourse. These developments have to an extent taken place at the EU's level, although certain dangers to its hegemony remain.

2.5. European Union Discourse and Policy

As was underlined in previous sections, the securitization discourse with regards to migration has developed along with intensified integration of EU members states. The creation of a borderless area of freedom, security and justice involves the necessity to delineate this in space through the establishment of borders. This is accompanied by the inclusion of those who are entitled to benefiting from such institutional privileges, and those who do not – namely members of the Union. Already, the Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement connected immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control, placing the regulation of migration in the institutional framework that deals with ensuring internal security. Moreover, it created two types of migrants. Those who are members of EU member states and can thus move freely, and those who are not and need to undergo extensive controls. Policies of exclusion and inclusion are essential to the creation of any common identity among the European

countries. The migration crisis has placed increased pressure on the European Union's capability to ensure the security of this internal sphere. The reorganization of the European Commission in late 2014 resulted in the transformation of the Home Affairs portfolio into the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, while the new Juncker-led Commission articulated the need for a New Policy on Migration as one of its priorities (Collet 2015). The invigoration of the migration narrative acts as assurance to members of the European Union that the securitization will be strengthened, with consequent initiatives being in line with the securitization discourse.

The EU draws its legitimacy from the participation of the member states and in order for it to continue existing, it must retain not only the faith of individual governments but of the citizens of these governments. The UK referendum only demonstrates the difficulties an anti-immigration discourse that articulates EU institutions as one of the principal causes of societal unease can cause. As such, the EU is forced to respond to the securitization discourse that is channelled and strengthened at national levels and fed into its institutional framework through elected governments. Policy-makers in countries where societal unease is high are at risk of being side-lined by power groups that exploit the discourse that portrays immigrants as a threat. This forces them to promote securitization of migration at both the national and the supranational level in order to protect the status quo. The pressure is not placed solely on national elites but on the EU officials as well. Should the European Union fail to be seen as proactive in securitizing borders and bringing migration under control, it risks losing the confidence of citizens to such a degree that anti-EU discourses emanating from disillusioned societies bring to power groups that seek to withdraw from the Union. If the Brexit campaign succeeded in

dislocating the identification of millions of people with the European idea, it may be done elsewhere as well.

The event that marked increased commitment to the issue of migration was the capsizing of a migrant boat near the Italian coast in April 2015. The death of over 800 people ignited a debate aimed at improving EU's migration policy. As a result, a special meeting of the European Council was scheduled on April 23rd, 2015. Within the resulting statement, the Council stated:

“The situation in the Mediterranean is a tragedy... We have therefore decided to strengthen our presence at sea, to fight traffickers, to prevent illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility.” (European Council 2015)

The statement does articulate the capsizing of the boat as a tragedy, addressing its humanitarian aspects. The response to the “tragedy” is however the securitization of EU's border area. The policy to “fight traffickers” and “prevent illegal migration flows” are aimed at strengthening the inside from the influence of the outside. “Internal solidarity and responsibility” is not external solidarity. Rather it refers to solidarity among members of the Union, not of the inside towards the exogenous Other.

In further securitization, the European Council has enacted a deal with Turkey aimed at reducing the number of refugees – or more generally migrants – that reach Greece (EU territory).

“All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey... Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said directive will be returned to Turkey.

Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect.” (European Council 2016)

The EU-Turkey deal has as its principal objective to limit the number of migrants reaching the territory of the Union. By preventing the Other from reaching the internal area of the Union, the responsibility has been shifted elsewhere. With decreasing numbers of migrants arriving into the Union, societal unease should decrease and the probability of a challenge to national and continental hegemonic power structures should decrease. By explicitly redirecting the migrants from reaching the EU, the identity of the Other has been fixed as unwanted, requiring externalization. In spite of the widespread criticism by humanitarian agencies – such as the Medecins Sans Frontieres – that were mentioned above, the EU finalized the deal. This confirms the commitment to the securitization discourse over the humanitarian discourse, in spite of EU’s professed adherence to humanitarian values. Alongside responding to the pressures arising out of the immigration securitization discourse, the EU is obliged to reaffirm its commitment – in discourse and policy – to solidarity and unity among its members.

The policy of the EU will logically seek to involve the strengthening of ties among its members and favour collective action over unilateral. Considering the prevalence of the securitization discourse and increasing levels of unease, collective strengthening of external borders is an ideal policy course. Thus preventing further increases in migration is in accordance with the hegemonic discourse on migration, the issues arise when solidarity and collective responsibility is invoked. The EU-Turkey deal involves the resettling one Syrian from Turkey to the EU for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands with a limit of 62,000 in total (European Council 2016). The deal does not cover the migrants that arrived in Greece before March 2016, meaning those who already made the journey need to be processed somehow. Similarly, Italy is under heavy strain to cope with the large influx of refugees. As a response, temporary emergency relocation scheme was established in two Council decisions in September 2015 in which member states committed to relocate 160,000 people from Greece and Italy by September 2017 (European Council 2016). Initially, relocation was meant to be conducted on a voluntary basis but after opposition from a number of countries and a general lack of progress, changes were made to make it compulsory. The Council decisions were however not unanimous, with several countries being outvoted after opposing the relocation measures. Already during the initial proposal in 2015, Spain and the Visegrad countries were in opposition, with Poland willing to accept only Christian migrants (EurActiv 2015). Slovakia later also stipulated it would only accept Christian migrants, citing incompatible cultural identities as the primary concern (BBC 2015). Overall, the relocation scheme has so far failed to deliver, with only 1500 relocated asylum applicants by mid-May 2016, leading to frustration in the Commission (European Commission 2016). As a result, the Commission introduced a proposal for enforcing the relocation of migrants by giving

250,000 Euro per-head fines to countries for failing to implement the relocation scheme (Winneker 2016).

This may prove dangerous for the long-term stability of the Union. With the securitization discourse intensifying on both domestic and EU levels, policies enforcing solidarity and collective responsibility may cause national sentiments to turn against the EU. The articulation of the migrant as the Other that represents a threat to inside results in a policy that securitizes the inside and externalizes the Other. As was examined in previous sections, anti-immigration discourse strengthens national identities around specific myths. Forcefully attempting to relocate migrants to countries where identity politics are on the rise will not alleviate societal concerns, rather it will result in a perceived threat to the constructed identity. It represents an attempt at a hegemonic intervention that seeks to mute the multitude of discourses pertaining to immigration and restore one hegemonic discourse, from which a single hegemonic policy can stem. Such a hegemonic discourse however does not address the societal unease that is formulated and strengthened through various media and power groups and is thus prone to failure. As the case of the UK demonstrated, it is possible to articulate the EU as complicit in sustaining the threat to the domestic order, channelling societal insecurity that stems from immigration into anti-EU sentiments. These in turn challenge the hegemonic discourse and its power structures. Similarly, should the increased immigration influx continue, the EU will be articulated as unable to deal with the current crisis, making the dislocation of identification the European ideal easier for challenging nationalistic discourses.

Conclusion

To conclude, the analysis of the European immigration discourse in the context of the current migration crisis has revealed several important issues. The securitization of the immigration discourse is still hegemonic and is undergoing an intensification. This is the result of the societal unease that is strengthened and channelled by various media. This in turn places governing elites under pressure to securitize the phenomenon in order to protect the 'inside' and appease its citizens. Should they not address the public discourse, the elites are prone to being challenged by another power group that articulates a discourse that better addresses said unease and insecurity. Furthermore, the framing of the migrant as a threat is a crucial aspect of the securitization discourse. It strengthens a desired collective identity around a specific myth that seeks to portray the society as one unified whole. The result of this is an increase in identity politics across the European Union. Through increasing identity politics, or in other words, through the strengthening of a specific national or collective identity, the framing of an Other as a threat becomes more frequent and easier. This dynamic along with the increasing anti-immigration discourse has the potential to stimulate anti-EU discourse by linking it with the societal unease arising out of increased migration. Increased migration is portrayed as a threat to the national identity while the EU is portrayed as the cause or as a spoiler in addressing the issue. This is what happened in the UK, where the Brexit campaign successfully merged the anti-immigration discourse with the anti-EU discourse in a logic of equivalence and ensured the referendum ended in a majority voting to leave the Union. The immigration discourse of the EU has also undergone increasing securitization as it also needs to address the unease being filtered upwards to the institution through national governments. Should it not adopt the securitization discourse as hegemonic it risks another 'Brexit'.

Polls indicate that the amount of people in favour of a similar referendum is rising which puts pressure on the EU to act. On the other hand, in this specific area, the EU is hampered by its commitment to collective responsibility and internal solidarity. By forcing the relocation of migrants on individual member states that strongly oppose it, it feeds anti-EU discourses that are able to tap into the prevalent societal insecurity. The overall tense situation will likely not improve. Migrants will keep being securitized and the EU will tread on shaky ground for the foreseeable future.

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