

UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE

FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

MASTER'S THESIS

2016

Pétraud Jean-Félix

-Page intentionally left blank-

UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, PRAGUE

FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



International and Diplomatic Studies

**THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WITH THE MIDDLE EAST:
From the earliest days to the Obama's mandate**

Author: Pétraud Jean-Félix

Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Jan Eichler, Csc

Declaration:

Herewith I declared that I have written the Master's Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.

Prague, 7 December 2016

.....

Author's Signature

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to Mgr. Nicolas Maslowski, DEA, Ph.D. who was my first supervisor for my Master Thesis, together with doc. PhDr. Jan Eichler, Csc. I would like also to thanks PhD student and former IDS student A. Hlavsova for her precious help, advises and book recommendations.

Secondly, I would like to thank deeply my family and friends for their tremendous support during the all Master period. Living and studying in Prague has been a fantastic and rich adventure but they were always present for me when it was necessary. No words can express my thanks for my parents who have been closer to me than ever in the past 2 years.

Lastly, I would like to dedicate this Master Thesis to my beloved Grand Parents, who both passed away when I was abroad. Their unconditional and inexhaustible love has shaped the young man I am. I would never have been able to pass my exams without them watching me from where they are.

To Cecile and Georges Bobin.

ABSTRACT

The following dissertation is an attempt of analysis and understanding of the foreign policy of the United States in the Middle East region and its evolution through time. Considering the fact that the Middle East region is or at least used to be a vital region for the United States national interests, the dissertation presents an exhaustive list of major events that have been major shifts in the US foreign policy in the region. The more or less chronological timeline allows the reader to have a better understanding of the evolution of the US foreign policy. The result of the dissertation is the identification of different patterns of foreign policy and to put the spot on the reasons of the changes of these patterns. Nevertheless, the history of the Middle East region and the incredible number of major events through the 20th century and the early 21st century make impossible to deal with all of them. Moreover, analysis and comments are based on academic research, but the dissertation remains subjective and may lead to discussions and debates.

Keywords:

Foreign policy, Realism, Isolationism, Containment, Cold War, Internationalism

Table of contents

List of Maps

Introduction

- 1. The theoretical framework, an attempt of realism**
 - 1.1. Realism, an internal theory of international relations**
 - 1. 1. 1. Defensive and Offensive realism, external theories of realism**
 - 1. 2. Connecting the theories and the foreign policy**
 - 1. 3. A spectrum of foreign policy making, historical background and perspectives**
 - 1. 4 Realism in foreign policy**
 - 1. 5. The American exceptionalism and the Manifest Destiny**
 - 1. 6. The balance of power**
 - 1. 7. The Status Quo**
 - 1. 8. Buzan model: superpowers, great powers and regional powers**
- 2. From the first contacts to the end of the 1970s**
 - 2. 1. The King Crane Commission**
 - 2. 2. Iran, Turkey and the Truman Doctrine**
 - 2. 3. The formation of Israel and its consequences on US foreign policy**
 - 2. 4 The Suez Crisis**
 - 2. 5. The Eisenhower doctrine**
 - 2. 6. The Iranian Revolution and the Hostage crisis**
- 3. From the 1980s to the early 21st century**
 - 3. 1. The Iran-Iraq War: beginning of a change**
 - 3. 2. The Gulf War I, from containment to interventionism**
 - 3. 3. The War of Iraq: the US foreign policy in trouble in a new world order**

List of Maps

Map 1: The traditional Middle East

Map 2: The UN proposal for the partition of Palestine

Map 3: The Suez Crisis evolution

Map 4: Iraq and Iran in the 1980s

Map 5: The Persian Gulf War, 1991

Introduction

From the moment I have watched the fantastic 1962 movie *Lawrence of Arabia* directed by David Lean with Peter O'Toole and other great actors when I was a kid, I have always been attracted and fascinated by the Middle East region. As a young man born in the end of the twentieth century, I have always known a Middle East region in a stage of war, upheaval and chaos. The second permanent characteristic was the very intense presence of the United States of America in the region. This is why the present dissertation is an attempt of understanding the foreign policy of the United States upon the Middle East region, from the earliest days of the country till the president Obama's mandate, not included. First of all, it has always been important to have a look backward in the past in order to have a better understanding of the present, to be able to have a look forward, and to try to forecast the future. Moreover, historical background and relative good contextualisation are relevant tools to improve the comprehension of a complex topic such as the US foreign policy in the Middle East. Thereafter, in an era of uncertainty over the future of the Middle East and after a last decade of war, massacres, coup, terrorism and other atrocities; trying to deal with this topic was the least that could be done to provide more light on the region complexity and on its connections with the foreign policy of the first global superpower, namely the United States of America.

Besides, even just defining the Middle East may be a complex task. Indeed, there are several definitions of the Middle East that are sensibly different from each other. For instance, the US Department of State does not use the term Middle East to refer to the region but the term Near East instead. Moreover, the US Department of State definition

of the Middle East encompasses nineteen countries plus the Palestinian Territories¹. Further the same definition of representation of the region can also change through time. For example, the 1944 US Department of State definition of Middle East, or Near East is different than the same definition of 1992. The CIA's representation of the Middle East is also composed by nineteen states but instead of encompassing the countries of Maghreb, as it is the case for the US Department of State, it includes countries of the Caucasus region such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan². According to the website Encyclopaedia Britannica, Near East correspond to the region nearest Europe, extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. Then the Middle East would be the region from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia, meaning countries such as India or Pakistan³.

For the purpose of this Master's Thesis, the Middle East will be defined as the so-called traditional Middle East. This territorial definition is composed by fourteen states. The States of the Arab Peninsula: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. Then the countries of the Levant: Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinian Territories. The states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Egypt must be added to complete the definition.

¹ Near Eastern Affairs: Countries and Other Areas. (n.d.). Retrieved May 19, 2016, from <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/>

² The World Factbook - Middle East. (n.d.). Retrieved May 19, 2016, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_mde.html

³ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. (2014, October 20). Middle East. Retrieved May 19, 2016, from <http://www.britannica.com/place/Middle-East>

⁴ World Development Indicators| World DataBank. (n.d.). Retrieved May 19, 2016, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_mde.html

² The World Factbook - Middle East. (n.d.). Retrieved May 19, 2016, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_mde.html

³ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. (2014, October 20). Middle East. Retrieved May 19, 2016, from <http://www.britannica.com/place/Middle-East>

Map 1: The traditional Middle East



Source: *CIA Factbook*

According to the World Bank, the total population of the region was for 2014 equivalent to 367 737 998 inhabitants whereas the total population of the United States a little bit lower with 318 857 056 inhabitants⁴. The regional powers of the region have different amount of inhabitants. In a descending order and for the year 2014, Egypt had 89 579 670 inhabitants, Iran: 78 143 644 inhabitants, Turkey: 75 932 348 inhabitants. Then it decrease considerably with Saudi Arabi and its 30 886 545 inhabitants. And it decrease even more with the state of Israel that count 8 215 700 inhabitants⁵. It is important to show that even just by their territories and populations, countries of the Middle East do not posses the same characteristics of power.

Furthermore, as already discussed in the abstract, the very high frequency of events of an importance and major shifts in the region makes hard the task to deal with all the Middle east issues, and all the foreign policy interventions of the United States with the major countries of the region. In order to be as relevant as I could, I have used different kind of sources. I have mostly used secondary sources such as academic books from experts on the fields of the Middle East History and/or on the American foreign policy. Then, I also used online articles from specialised magazines and broad list of different websites. In addition I have also used one primary source, which is the original speech of the president Dwight Eisenhower over the Congress in 1957. Further, I tried to provide as many definitions as I could to optimise the comprehension of the reader. And also a short set of maps in order to illustrate the territoriality of the region and different conflicts that happened through time.

To continue, the first part of this Master's Thesis is devoted to the theoretical framework. I have chose to use the prism of Realism because in my eyes it was the

⁴ World Development Indicators| World DataBank. (n.d.). Retrieved May 19, 2016, from <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2>

⁵ Ibid.

theory of international relations, which would match the most with the foreign policy of the United States. In this first part I present different kind of realism such as offensive and defensive realisms. In order to don't narrow too much the possibility of foreign policies from the United States, but still remaining within the Realism framework. One of the toughest tasks here was to connect somehow the international theory to the realm of foreign policy, Thereafter I try to present a large spectrum of foreign policy making explaining the build up of foreign policy, using some examples to illustrate my arguments. Then I explain one of the most important elements of the US foreign policy, which are the roots of the national identity of the American country with its exceptionalism and the so-called Manifest Destiny. And finally the three sub-parts are devoted to explain three major elements of the international and regional system in international relations in order once again to provide as maximum of elements of comprehension.

Furthermore, the second chapter of this Master's Thesis is devoted to the period of time from the first real important contacts between the United States in term of foreign policy, in the Middle East; to the end of the 1970s and its major shifts, whether we talk about shift for the Middle East region or for the American foreign policy over the region. The selection of events is exhaustive and subjective, but I have tried to deal with elements that could be developed enough to show different patterns of the US foreign policy in the Middle East region. Thus it goes from the King Crane Commission in the early 20th century to the Iranian revolution and the Hostage Crisis of 1979. I tried to identify two major Doctrines, which were in my eyes essential to understand the undertaken actions by the United States in the Middle East.

Finally, the third and last chapter is devoted to the period of time going from early 1980s to the early 21st century. This chapter presents the peculiarity of showing the

progressive but visible changes in the US foreign policy over the Middle East region. It was a period of switch from the containment policy towards interventionism or internationalism. The three studied periods are the Iran-Iraq War, the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War of 2003. Which is significant with this chapter is that the foreign policy of the United States got focused on a particular region of the Middle East, mostly because of its crude oil reserves, or its potential danger for the US national interests.

1 - The theoretical framework, an attempt of realism

The complexity of the Middle East region and of the Foreign Policy that have led the United States upon the region since the beginning of the twentieth century makes harder the task of finding an accurate theoretical framework. Nonetheless, I would like to stress that the Realist School of international relations will be the theoretical framework of this thesis diploma. Even though there are different categories of realism, it is through the prism of the classical realism this thesis will be written. Nevertheless, there are other subtleties that would be defined, such as the difference between offensive and defensive realism. Furthermore, for the sake of the thesis, and regarding the trend evolution of the US foreign policy, especially from the 1970s, it is possible that the thesis crosses the borders of the realism and derives with other form of theories of international relations.

1.1 Realism, an internal theory of international relations

Firstly, it is important to take into account that Realism had and still has a strong influence on the US foreign policy, especially in the post World War II era and for the Cold War⁶, with a peak when Henry Kissinger was Secretary of States. Moreover,

⁶ Cold War: it refers to the period between the end of the Second World War and the early 1990s, during which the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a battle for regional and global influence. This conflict was marked by economic, ideological and military competition, brinkmanship and proxy wars. Cold War considerations influenced many conflicts during this period including the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It also contributed to numerous other tensions in the Middle East as the two superpowers armed and supported states within their sphere

according to realism, states are the main actors within an anarchic international system, meaning without any superior authority (Pfaltzgraff & McClelland, 2016). Secondly, six principles define the framework of political realism (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p. 3-4). The first is that objective laws that have their roots in human nature govern politics. Moreover, the second and important principle is that interest, or national interest is defined in terms of power. The ultimate aim for any actor is survival, and states are seeking the maximisation of power in order to be able to provide security to its people and to defend its borders and territory integrity. Furthermore, the third principle is that interest defined as power, is an objective category, which is universally valid. However, the public interest can change. To continue, the fourth and tremendous principle is that survival of the state will always prevail on morality. The fifth principle according to Morgenthau is stressing the differences between the own values of each states and the moral laws that govern the universe, or more simply the universal values. And finally the last but not the least, is that political realism is different from the other schools of theories of international relations. Realism has a kind of special status and can be considered as one of the predominant theory among the entire scope of international relation theories and I would like to add that this is particularly the case for the United States.

Furthermore, in the Realist view of international relations, the power is transformed into influence but only if it is: “both masked and embedded in a generally accepted system of norms” (Ned Lebow, 2013, p. 59). For Realists such as Hans Morgenthau, the common bonds are fragile, and easily undermined by the endless thirst of power of the actors of the international area such as individuals, faction or states (Ned

of influence. The Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s and formally ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p.4).

Lebow, 2013). Richard Ned Lebow continues by precisising that when such situation happens, mechanisms such as the balance of power: “may not only fail to preserve the peace but may make domestic and international violence more likely” (Ned Lebow, 2013, p. 60). For instance, this can be applied to the Middle East region and its generation of frequent conflicts.

1.1.1 Defensive and Offensive Realism, external theories of realism

Defensive and offensive realism are two major theories arguing that the distribution of power in the international system creates external pressures that shape the US foreign policy (Nguyen, 2013). Both recognised the anarchic structure of the international system and the fact that states are not even among them. Further, they also accept that survival is the ultimate goal for states. Moreover, as it is the case for classical realism, these two theories assess that the lack of a Leviathan, of a superior authority in the international system, is the main driving force pushing the states for seeking a maximising power foreign policy (Nguyen, 2013). As Nguyen stresses, the US foreign policy is thus shaped by its relative amount of power (Nguyen, 2013).

For the offensive realists, the weaker states of the international system would have the tendency to bandwagon the stronger, or the most threatening power. It is a way “to be out of fear or to gain profit, rather than to balance against it” (Nguyen, 2013). For instance, even though the topic of this thesis diploma is the US foreign policy of the USA on the Middle East and not the Foreign policy of the states of the Middle East region with the United States, the offensive realist stance of weaker bandwagoning the stronger can be an illustration of the US foreign policy with some of the Middle East countries. Besides, offensive realism emphasizes that once a country have gain the status of

hegemon⁷ in the international system, it will do anything to defend and maintain its dominant position over the other states, by keeping as wide as possible the power gap between itself and potential challengers. For instance, such a policy has been one strong element of the US foreign policy in the Middle East during the Cold War era. Based on the work of Meirshimer (2001), Nguyen proposed that once the US became a regional hegemon (e.g. the hegemon in the Middle East region), the foreign policy of the United States was to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic state (either the Soviet Union, or a state of the Middle East region) in other regions in the world (for the purpose of this thesis, the Middle east) (Nguyen, 2013). The tool of foreign policy would be deterrence⁸, and in the case of the rivalry with the Soviet Union for controlling the Middle East, it would be deterrence in a containment⁹ goal.

On the other hand, defensive realism, rather than stressing the maximisation of power, emphasizes on the security maximisation, via the balance of power, the use of deterrence and multilateral arms control. Defensive realists, such as Waltz (1979) and Walt (1987), argue that power maximisation can be counterproductive and harm state security (Nguyen, 2013). Defensive realists have the belief that states must favour the status quo and that their primary goal is survival or/and security, rather the

⁷ Hegemon or hegemony: « in realist thought used to refer to an international system dominated by a hegemon that dominates the system through its military and economic might » (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2013, p.354)

⁸ Deterrence: « Persuading an opponent not to initiate a particular action because the perceived benefits are outweighed by the anticipated costs and risks » (Dunne, Kurki & Steeve, 2013, p. 352)

⁹ Containment: « the overwatching strategic framework for US foreign policy during the Cold War. In theory it was a multifaced program that entailed the use of economic, diplomatic, and military instruments of American foreign policy to hold Soviet expansionism in check, but in reality military instruments dominated. (...). There were two different broadly constructed strategic postures. They were symmetrical containment and asymmetrical containment » (Hastedt, 2004, p. 102)

maximisation of power (Nguyen, 2013). Depending of the nature of the foreign policy operated by the United States, both offensive and defensive realisms are relevant for the US foreign policy making, with a short major trend in favour of the offensive realism influence. Nguyen sustained this assumption: “US recent history shows that (...) the US has sought to sustain its primacy and hegemony in the world politics (and to some extent in the Middle East) by increasing its relative power to other states.”

1.2 Connecting the theories and the foreign policy

First of all, one of the first tasks to accomplish while dealing with foreign policy concept is to define it. In the term foreign policy there is “foreign”, which push to make the distinction between foreign and domestic policy (Kaarbo, Lantis & Beasley, 2013). Foreign policy would be all policies toward outside of the state’s borders, and domestic policies will concerned the internal policies within the territory of the state. Nonetheless, phenomenon such as the globalization and new contemporary politics has made the border between *foreign* and *domestic* policies more porous (Kaarbo, Lantis & Beasley, 2013, p. 2). In other words, foreign policy has often been perceived as the pursuit of the national interest by the states through their external relations. But, one of the main issues is that there are not precise borders between what can be defined as domestic policy, and what can be defined as foreign affairs (Dobson, 2007, p.1). Moreover, there are always been non-states actors (i.e. European Union, OPEC, United Nations...) (Dobson, 2007, p. 1). Dobson stressed the idea that policies must be permanently recrafted to meet new challenges (e.g. terrorism) (Dobson, 2007, p.1).

In addition to this brief definition, I would like to underline and use the very relevant introduction of the *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy* by Glenn Hastedt

about what is foreign policy. The following attempt of explanation about what is the American foreign policy is most of his words and work. According to Hastedt: "American foreign policy is an evolving subject of inquiry" (...) and "historians and political scientists are constantly reevaluating the past in order to better understand the present and future" (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, vii). Furthermore, Hastedt stress that simultaneously of this constant evolution of the American foreign policy, it is possible to identify four consistent main points that underlie the conduct of American foreign policy over time (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, vii). The first point is that foreign policy: "is made with an eye to opportunities and challenges that lay beyond America's borders" (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, vii). Second, for Hastedt, foreign policy is about choices. He explains that countries have more choices of response than only military interventions abroad, economic sanctions or declarations of resolve. He underlines that policy makers have a broader pallet of choices, which, actually depend on the goals, and values that have been previously established. Thus, if the goals and values of the country at a precise moment of time change, the set of options of policy makers change as well.

To continue, the third and interesting one is that foreign policy is heavily influenced by domestic considerations (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, vii). So even though for the Realists only states are actors on the international system, and even though foreign policy may push to differentiate it from the domestic policy; the internal forces in action within a country such as the pull of personalities, institutions, civil society and societal forces have to be taken into account in the foreign policy making. Thus, the external environment of the United States is not the only component into the choices making for the foreign policy making. Furthermore, "American foreign policy is influences by the past" (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, vii). It is in my eyes one of the most important points that 'past taken decisions influence, sometimes strongly, the present

and the future. And if you ignore this absolute truth, it is like ignoring how Americans may view the world, and how others may respond to American foreign policy (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, vii).

1. 3. A spectrum of foreign policy making, with historical background and perspectives

First of all, this section is an attempt to explain and understand how foreign policy is made, with a presentation of a range of different options and different level of foreign policy analysis. And what could be the aims and goals of the American foreign policy. This is also based mainly on the Introduction of the *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, by Glenn Hastedt.

In addition of the survival of the state and the maximisation of its power, the American foreign policy aims to protect the core values and goals of the United States from threats. And to advanced them when there is the opportunity to do so (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, vii). These core values and goals are: “deeply embedded in the American historical experience and combine to constitute an American worldview and national style” (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, viii). The United States have a special position in the world that have been feed by different characteristics such as a sense of uniqueness or exceptionalism, a penchant for unilateral action¹⁰, and legalistic definitions of world problems and their solutions (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, viii). Moreover, foreign policy makers can view the world outside United States’s borders as

¹⁰ Unilateralism: When a state conducts its actions and reaches its foreign-policy decisions without consulting or cooperating with other international actors (Dunne & Kurki & Smith, 2013, p. 358)

threatening or supportive, stable or unstable. It can be added that this perception of the foreign policy makers can tremendously change the actions decided and taken by the United States on a country or a region such as the Middle East.

To continue, Hastedt explain that the selection of a grand strategy is one of the fundamental choices that the United States and even any country must do in order to orientate itself to the world. He keeps explaining that this is far more than: “just a statement of goals and values” (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, viii). I insist of this point because it is in my eyes one of the most important step in the foreign policy making and for the success of the foreign policy itself. As Hastedt underlines: “it provides policy makers with guidance on such challenging questions as defining core values, identifying what opportunities should be exploited and what situations are threatening, determining its relationship to the international community as a whole, and deciding how its power should be used” (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, viii). Besides, Hastedt provides a grateful help when attempting to define what have been the different grand strategies of the United States in its history. To him, Isolationism was the United States’s grand strategy from the earliest days of the country until the period leading up to World War II. Afterwards, Hastedt explains that for most of the second half of the twentieth century: “American foreign policy operated within the context of a single grand strategy (...): containment” (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, viii). In the Cold War context, the global challenge was the competition with the Soviet Union what was threatening the American society. Hastedt stresses that the American answer to the Soviet threat was mostly military counterpressure. And this competition with the Soviet Union was one of the main elements of the American foreign policy in the Middle East too.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States grand strategy became obsolete and was not relevant anymore. Policy makers

have been debating about what changes needed to be made for guiding the American foreign policy into the 21st century. And: “they included returning to isolationism¹¹, democratizing the world, and pursuing global hegemony” (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, ix). The 9/11 attacks in 2001 stopped the debate, and the new principal identified threat to the United States was evident. The new foreign policy was about to be constructed around the idea of war against terrorism. Then in 2002 the George W. Bush administration decided the new grand strategy: pre-emption (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, ix). President Bush and his administration identified Iraq as the main security threat to the United States and they took the decision to take military actions. This new grand strategy provoked passionate debates even within the civil society, with pro and cons. Besides, Hastedt emphasise that it was not the first time than there was a debate over the new grand strategy to adopt. He explains that there were debates between isolationism and internationalism in the very beginnings of the republic. And he illustrate as well by saying that: “Woodrow Wilson and Henry Cabot Lodge¹² clashed over American grand strategy at the end of World War I” (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, ix).

¹¹ Isolationism: national policy of avoiding political or economic entanglements with other countries. Isolationism has been a recurrent theme in U.S. history (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013). See also: « along with internationalism, isolationism is one of two reoccurring general orientations toward the international system found in American foreign policy. Frequently presented as polar opposites, internationalism and isolation draw their inspiration from similar historical, intellectual, and a sense of moral pragmatism, and legalism. Together these traits form the basis for the American national style of foreign policy » (Hastedt, 2004, p. 258).

¹² Henry Cabot Lodge (1850-1924): he served as a Republican U.S. senator from Massachusetts from 1893 to 1924. He sat more than 20 years in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Protégé of Teddy Roosevelt, partisan of a nationalistic and aggressive internationalism. Initially pro-neutrality during the World War I, he turned to a pro-British stand, against President Woodrow Wilson. He was against the establishment of the League of Nations and the concept of collective security. He feared that Germany would be able to rearm and once again threaten European peace (Hastedt, 2004, p. 296).

Furthermore, Hastedt stresses also another point quite important about the very used and appreciated bilateral foreign policy by the United States. It is a two-way flow of influence. As he says: “not only is the United States dealing with another state is trying to achieve its foreign-policy goals, but that state is trying to realize its own set of goals in dealing with the United States” (Hastedt, 2004, Introduction, ix). This case is very relevant with the bilateral agreements and relations that the United States has had with countries of the Middle East region from the second half of the 20th century.

1. 4. Realism in foreign policy

One of the difficulties of the present theoretical framework is to connect somehow the general realist theory of international relations with the realm of foreign policy, and further with the foreign policy of the United States. However, according to Smith (1966): “Theories of foreign policy are therefore intrinsic to theories of international relations, even for those who deny the centrality of the state as an actor in international relations” (p.13). Nonetheless, nuances must be provided to the general concept of realism on its application in foreign policy. For instance, Smith stressed that defining foreign policy through international relation theories is a pitfall (Smith, 1966, p. 24). He pretends that a general theory cannot be applied to foreign policy analysis, neither to explain it (Smith, 1966, p.24). This point of view may relativize the impact of Realism into the foreign policy realm.

Furthermore, the traditional state-centric view as the main unit of the international system must be relativized a little bit. It can't be denied that non-states actors are in the decision making process (Smith, 1966). However, Dubson (2007) identified what he called: “arteries, which feed into the heart of US foreign policy” (p.2).

And the two main identified “arteries” are Idealism¹³, and further and foremost, Realism. To continue, the self-interested nature of human beings being in confrontation with the anarchical structure of the international system pushes, according to the realists the states to maximise their power (Smith, 1966, p.15). The crucial power factor, aggregated with the concept of national interest is at the core of the realist view on what should be the foreign policy. And according to Smith, Morgenthau identified several main types of foreign policies such as seeking the status quo, having an imperialist foreign policy or seeking prestige through the foreign policy (Smith, 1966, p.15). Smith goes further when he explains that due to the position of the states in the international system, they must use foreign policy mechanisms of balance of power, even though it might be a bit in contradiction with the realist stance. Nonetheless, the balance of power is an element at the core of the foreign policy for realists, Morgenthau considering it as the only foreign policy for states.

Moreover, as it has been presented, realists’ assessment of the will by the states to maximise their power through their foreign policy lead to different ways to reach that aim. According to Dobson (2007), force, diplomacy, duplicity, balancing power and conduct contrary to democratic principles are all options to be used in pursuing national

¹³ Idealism: liberal theory of international relations that emerged on the aftermath of the First World War. One of its main ideas is to improve the world. Idealists, such as Norman Angell believe that war is irrational and does not pay off (Angell, 1910). In this theory of international relations, human beings are considered as good, and the human nature can change, with the idea of progress. Further, because wars are caused by governmental or institutional failures, idealists have the belief that humans can learn from their mistakes, and ultimately reach universal peace. Idealists focus on collective security in order to transform the international relations through different tools such as international institutions (e.g. the League of Nations and later the United Nations). Moreover, for the idealists, normativity is a way to achieve their aims, rather than the use of force and coercive measures. In the United States, Idealism is traditionally related to two Presidents of the United States, and their doctrines i.e. James Monroe (President from 1817 to 1825) and foremost Woodrow Wilson (President from 1913 to 1921) (Pajon, Sawicki & Vaisse, 2004).

security (p.3). Furthermore, for the realists, the world is imperfect and human beings are basically evil to each other. This raises the issue of morality. Indeed, following Realists stance, morality has no place in the foreign policy that a state must follow, and that can be an issue for the United States regarding their core values from the founding fathers and the American exceptionalism.

To continue, in the table contents of his book, Hastedt (2000) identified several different tools of foreign policy. The first tool is diplomacy, the second is covert action, and the third is economic instruments of foreign policy. Among the economic instruments of foreign policy is the foreign aid, subdivided into three sub-fields: humanitarian, economic development aid and security assistance. For instance, the two last elements of foreign aid are usual foreign policy tool used by the USA with the states of the Middle East regions. To finish, the two last identified tools of foreign policy are the use of military power (e.g. Gulf War One, Iraqi War) and the arms control and missile defence (e.g. Turkey and the NATO membership). Even though some of these tools of foreign policy can be considered as liberal, such as the economic instruments of foreign policy, it must be assessed that sometimes even liberal tools can served more realist, or pragmatic foreign policy objectives, such as the security assistance with the Truman Doctrine for instance.

1. 5. The American exceptionalism and the Manifest Destiny

Writing about the United States foreign policy is not an easy task and that for several reasons. The first among all is that the US foreign policy is very flexible and can suddenly, even abruptly know a change of direction (Hastedt, 2000). The world has changed considerably from the early beginnings of the United States in 1776 and the

today's reality of 2016. Major events such as two World Wars, the Cold War and the post Cold War era characterized by the emergence of modern terrorism, have shaped, transformed and influenced the evolution and adaptation of the US foreign policy. And this is also true when talking about the US foreign policy on the region of the Middle East. Moreover, the region, especially after the Second World War has known a sequel of several events, perhaps more than anywhere else on the planet that have shaped, or that have been shaped by the US foreign policy upon the region.

Furthermore, free from any considerations based on a theory of international relations or on theories of foreign policy, the United States have from the very beginnings of the state a strong self-made identity that influence the foreign policy of the country, even though if realists have the tendency to reject such statement. The united States have been created by the so-called Founding Fathers, with a specific mission, which provide to the country the idea of exceptionalism (Dobson, 2007, p.4). According to Hastedt (2000), the sources of the American style of foreign policy have: "to be found in the conditions of the earlier first generations of American policy makers operated, and the ideas that guided their thinking" (p.33-34). Then it resulted in the perception of something unique and superior (Dobson, 2007, p.4), and the belief in this uniqueness of the American experience led to the belief of the existence of an American mission (Hastedt, 2000, p.34). Thus, from the late eighteenth, early nineteenth centuries, American policy makers believe in their exceptionalism, "missionism" and messianism.

Moreover, the United States developed a belief in their degree of perfection, which has led them to conceive the idea of a Manifest Destiny, i.e. a civilizing mission of spreading their model and values on the continent and beyond (messianic expansionism) (Pajon, Sawicki & Vaisse, 2004). The idea of a civilizing mission of the United States, justified by their infallible development model based on liberal democracy

and the Christian faith, was formed in 1845 by the publicist John O'Sullivan, who used the formula Manifest Destinies for the first time (Pajon, Sawicki & Vaisse, 2004). According to Yves Lacoste, the Manifest Destiny is: "the fate, the role that God would clearly told America to develop the values of freedom, justice and progress, in the greatest possible extension and defend those values against tyranny (Lacoste in Pajon, Sawicki & Vaisse, 2013).

In conclusion, even though the realists reject morality, when it come to practise, the foreign policy of the United States while being realistic, has always been influenced by the core values of the country, and by both the self-perception of an American exceptionalism and the Manifest Destiny. To illustrate those points, Presidents' rhetoric, from Eisenhower, Reagan or again Bush Jr., were influenced, if not based, on this legacy from the past. For example, for Thomas Jefferson, America was: "an empire for liberty" with "obligations not confined to the limits of our own society" and the mission of "acting for all mankind" and the belief that "circumstances have imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self government" (Kissinger, 2014, p. 236).

1. 6. The balance of power

In the classical realism, and as it is stressed and explained by Morgenthau (Morgenthau & Thompson, p. 187:237,1985), the concept of balance of power is essential. Keeping in mind that the survival of the state is the only and ultimate aim, realists reject any other form of foreign policy in international relations. "According to Morgenthau (1985), the balance of power is the aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aims

at preserving it" (p.187). The concept of equilibrium is essential into the balance of power system because it means stability within a system composed of a number of autonomous forces (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p.182). Further, if there is disruption of this equilibrium, two scenarios are possible. First: the re-establishment of the former equilibrium or the post-disruption equilibrium. Second: a new equilibrium (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985). To continue, Morgenthau (1985) distinguishes different methods of balance of power (p.204), which could be translated as different tools of foreign policy. One of these tools is armament, a tool often used by the United States, especially from the Truman doctrine and during the Cold War, namely when Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State.

A second identified tool is contracting alliances, with a distinction between ideological alliances and distribution of benefits alliances (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p.204). For the former, it is stressed that the best alliance is concluded between to parties equals in power and sharing the same interests. This is interesting because whatever the regional power the USA could contract an alliance with in the Middle East, the USA would always be superior in power than the other. Moreover, "according to Morgenthau (1985), the aim of alliance is the preservation of the territorial and political integrity of the receiving party" (p.204). That could be for instance the case of the alliance between the United States and Israel. In addition, Morgenthau (1985) stresses as well that weak nation should not make alliances with strong nations, but by necessity. "A weak nation may well possess an asset which is of such great value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable" (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p.205). Such an example of alliance could be applied to the nature of the alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

To go further, considering that when the foreign policy led by the United States can be defined as the balance of power, the USA is always stronger than any other regional power of the Middle East with whom the USA is dealing. Therefore, the United States can be considered as the holder or the balancer (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p.213). Then “according to Morgenthau (1985) paraphrasing Palmerston: While the holder of the balance has no permanent friends, it has no permanent enemies either; it has only the permanent interest of maintaining the balance of power” (p.214). The inherent instability of the Middle East region and the constant challenge to the equilibrium among the regional powers fostered the United States trying to maintain as much as it can the balance of power, on its own national interests. To continue, the holder, here the United States is in a splendid isolation position ((Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p.214). This specific position means basically that by supporting or at the contrary by a lack of support, the balancer is decisive in the struggle for power. “The holder of the balance waits in the middle in watchful detachment to see which scale is likely to sink” (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p.214). Such a foreign policy could be applied for the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988.

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to consider the balance of power as monolithic, something that does not evolve and adapt. The balance of power evolved considerably in four hundred years, especially during the twentieth century. In the post Second World war era, the balance of power shifted in the hands of the two actors considered as superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union; then only remaining in the hands of the United States after the end of the cold war. However there are structural changes in the balance of power (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p.218). Then post WWII tendency was a change on to the detriment of the autonomy of the local systems (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p.220) e.g. the Middle East system.

1. 7. Status quo

The status quo is often presented as an aim for countries' foreign policy. But actually status quo can be either the aim of a policy, or considered as a policy itself. "According to Morgenthau (1985), the status quo derived from *status quo ante bellum*, a diplomatic term referring to the usual clauses in peace treaties which provide for the evacuation of territory by enemy troops and its restoration to the prewar sovereignty" (p.53). A maybe more simple definition is provided by Dunne & Kurki & Smith (2013), when status quo states are: "states satisfied enough with the balance of power that they have no interest in using military force to shift it in their favour. Status quo powers are sometimes referred to as security seekers" (p.358). Indeed, a major motivation in the US foreign policy on the Middle East region is seeking stability by maintaining the balance of power on its favour in order to maximise the defence of its national interests. In his chapter four, the Struggle for Power: Policy of the Status Quo, Morgenthau (1985) put the spotlight on the idea that there are three typical patterns of politics, and to each of these politics correspond an international policy (p.53). "According to Morgenthau (1985), a political policy seeks either to keep power, increase its power or to demonstrate its power" (p.52). The Dunne's definition of status quo confirm what Morgenthau had already written, which is that a nation keeping power that is not motivated by a change in the distribution of power would lead a foreign policy seeking the status quo. And as an overall, this is the foreign policy of the United States on the Middle East, but because of the permanent tenuousness of the stability in the region and the tendency of disruption of the balance of power, the United States also had to adapt its foreign policy so that to seek something more than the status quo.

1. 8. Buzan model: superpowers, great powers and regional powers

Even though Barry Buzan cannot be considered as a pure classical realist, his works on the polarity of the international system and the definitions of the different categories of actors within the international arena, especially considering the game of balance of power are a tremendous input into the realist conception of the interactions between states and into their foreign policy. Further, it is quite relevant to use his definitions for the purpose of this thesis diploma regarding the diversity of the different actors when we talk about the foreign policy of the United States upon a region with different regional powers.

In an attempt to define how are divided the actors of the world system of international relations, Barry Buzan classified the actors in three different categories: superpowers, great powers and regional powers (Buzan, 2004). In his argumentation, he explains that the United States became a superpower after the First World War, alongside with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, which characterized the international system as multipolar. Further, for the post World War II the superpowers were the Soviet Union and the USA, which characterized the international system as bipolar. And to finish, the United States were, and still are the sole superpower since the end of the Cold War, making the country what Buzan called an hyperpower, meaning that it is the sole superpower, which characterized the international system as unipolar (Buzan, 2004, p. 69). According to Buzan, you need a wide range of capabilities to be defined as a superpower (2004):

Superpowers must possess first-class military-political capabilities (...) and the economies to support such capabilities. They must be capable of, and also exercise global military and political reach. (...) Superpowers must be active players in processes

of securitization and desecuritization in all (...) the regions in the system, whether as threats, guarantors, allies or interveners. (...) Their legitimacy as superpowers will depend substantially on their success in establishing the legitimacy of such values (universal values). (p. 69)

Continuing in his demonstration, Great powers are as similar as the superpowers with the difference that they do not have the necessary need to have high capacities in military, economic and securitization sectors in the international system (Buzan, 2004). The difference between great powers and regional powers is that they still possess a worldwide influence and they could become superpowers in the future regarding their capacities. Thus there could be the path of rising in the hierarchy of international power (Buzan, 2004, p. 70), or the opposite path meaning that some current great powers are declining former superpowers (Buzan, 2004).

In addition, according to Barry Buzan, there are no great powers in the Middle East region, but only regional powers. "Regional powers define the polarity of any given regional security complex" (Buzan, 2004, p. 71). According to Buzan (2004), Even though the regional powers are excluded from the game of power at the higher level (superpowers, great powers), nevertheless, they are the security policy makers within the region and the determinants of the interactions between the region and the global powers (Buzan, 2004, p. 72). Moreover, regional powers can be embedded in spite of themselves into global power rivalries, as it has been the case for the Middle Eastern regional powers during the Cold War (Buzan, 2004, p. 72), and even in the post Cold War era to some extent with the Bush War on Terror of the 2000s. To conclude, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel are considered as the regional powers of the Middle East region. Buzan includes Iraq, which can be partially true from the 1980s to the early

2000s, so even though if Iraq matters for the region, it would not be considered as a regional power for the purpose of this thesis diploma.

It is important to define the polarity of the different layers of the world system of international relations in order to understand the nature of the relations, and the connections among the different actors of the international arena and the polarity of the different systems matters in the understanding. So here are the definitions of three different levels of polarity of the system. A bipolar system, or bipolarity, is a system in which there are only two great powers (or superpowers according to Buzan) (Dunne & Kurki & Smith, 2013, p. 351). It was the case during the Cold War with the United States and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers. A multipolar system, or Multipolarity, is a system in which there are three or more great powers (or superpowers according to Buzan)(Dunne & Kurki & Smith, 2013, p. 354). The world was multipolar in the post Second World War era. And to finish, a unipolar system is a system in which there is only one great power (or superpower according to Buzan). Global hegemony is synonymous with Unipolarity (Dunne & Kurki & Smith, 2013, p. 358).

Thus, or the prospect of this thesis diploma, it is important to always keep in mind that for the inter war period, the United States were a great power whereas the complexity and the reality of the Middle East region make impossible to classify the countries of the region according to the Buzan model. Then, on the aftermath of the Second World War and for the Cold War era, the United States was one of the two superpowers with the Soviet Union. On the global level, the international system was bipolar. However, the five countries already mentioned previously were or became rapidly regional powers, characterizing the Middle East as a multipolar sub-system of the international arena. And to finish, the end of the Cold War did not change the

characteristics of the Middle East region, but the difference was that the United States were standing alone as being the unique superpower (or hyperpower according to Buzan), transforming the international system into an unipolar system.

2. From the first contacts to the end of the 1970s: US Foreign policy in the Middle East

In the early 20th century the United States was not a major player in the Middle Eastern politics due to the dominance of the isolationist tendency in the foreign policy of the United States. And in the direct aftermath of the First World War, the historical background of the United States (i.e. the anti-colonial war and its revolution for independence) made the country a natural friend for many nationalists of the Middle East region (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p.5). Thus, at the direct end of the first worldwide conflict, the United States were perceived as a potential champion of Arab self-determination.

2. 1. The King Crane Commission

First of all, it has to be acknowledged that the King-Crane Commission is often perceived and described as the first real intervention of the foreign policy of the United States in the Middle East region (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008). Apart some exceptions such as the Barbary Wars with pirates at the early nineteenth century, it was the really first contacts with the Middle East region¹⁴. One of the main reasons is simply that the Middle East was at the time the “playground” of great power such as France and Great Britain foremost. On the aftermath of the First World War there were tensions between the Arabs and the colonial powers. And it is under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson

¹⁴ For more details on the pre-contacts of the United States with the Middle East, I suggest to read the chronology of the book of Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy. America in the Middle East 1776 to the present*, 2011 (3rd edition).

(1913 – 1921)¹⁵ that the United States decided to propose a fact-finding commission with the aim of investigating *in-situ* the will of the local population (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008). President Woodrow Wilson proposed the formation of an interallied commission on Syria over the future disposition of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013). He made this suggestion to the Council of Four entente powers (France, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy) in Paris, for deciding the peace terms (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013). However, this investigation was supposed to be a tripartite initiative, with the United States alongside France and Great Britain. But the rising tensions between the two European powers prevented the formation of such a commission and even though they had both agreed to this commission idea, they did not send any delegates to participate to its activities. Thus, the only two American delegates have been the members of the commission: Henry Churchill King and the democrat Charles R. Crane (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013). They travelled through the Middle East, to Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Anatolia, during the summer 1919 in order to meet the local representatives and the local population (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013).

Officially, the United States had no interests for the region, “the American people having no political ambitions in Europe or the Near East...” (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 18). One of the main topics of the commissioners during their journey in the Middle East was the self-determination of the visited countries populations’. Besides, post-war self-determination was one of the tremendous engagement and inner conviction of president Woodrow Wilson: “the liberation of peoples and postwar self-determination were sine qua nons for US participation in the war” (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas,

¹⁵ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/woodrowwilson>

2013). It was at the core of Wilson's Fourteen Points¹⁶. Besides, according to Baxter and Akbarzadeh: "the entry of the United States into the World War One marked the entry of the USA into the politics of the Middle East" (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p.16). As a result, the King-Crane Commission found out that the Arab people of the visited countries were against the article 22 of the League of Nations¹⁷, in favour of an independent state and in favour of a strict and immediate end of the Zionist settlement (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p.18). Moreover, the Commission report that was delivered on 28 of August 1919 was also against a separation of Lebanon and Syria, thus endorsing the Hashemite position for a Great Syria state (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p.18). I would like to stress the fact that for many Arab nationalists, the mandates of the League of Nations and the acceptance of "guidance from advanced nations" (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013) was perceived as a "veiled colonialism" (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013). But why present the King Crane Commission? Because it shows the ambiguity of the foreign policy of the United States in the first half of the twentieth century. At that time, according to the model of Barry Buzan, the United States just became a superpower, alongside Great Britain and the Soviet Union, when France was "only" a great power. However France was far more involved in the Middle East region than the United States. By neglecting the King Crane Commission, because this is what happened, and by supporting its European allies, the foreign policy of the United States

¹⁶ The Fourteen Points by President Woodrow Wilson in his address to the joint session of the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1914. It was an outline of his vision of what a postwar peace settlement should be. He added new points to its original proposal on February 11, July 4, and September 27 of 1918 (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013)

¹⁷ The article 22 of the League of Nations was about placing the territories and their population of former states that were under the Ottoman governance, under the « tutelage (...) to advanced nations who by reason of their resources (...) can best undertake this responsibility (...) this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League » (The Covenant of the League of Nations, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22)

in the Middle East region proved to be ambiguous and quite unclear and weak in the first quarter of the twentieth century. This contradiction can be stressed by the fact that in spite of knowing the will of the people of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine for self-determination, President Wilson was also supporting the mandates of the League of Nations (in favour of Great Britain and France) and he was foremost supporting the Balfour Declaration¹⁸ (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013). It is very paradoxical because according to Baxter and Akbarzadeh, the King Crane Commission gained attention because its report was against the principle of establishing a “national home” for the Jewish people in Arab Palestine, mainly because at that time, 9/10 of the people in Palestine were Arabs (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p.18).

In conclusion, the King Crane Commission has been a failure, because of the foreign policy of the great powers of the time (namely the United States, France and Great Britain), because of the unwillingness of these powers to listen to the voices of the Middle East populations (King and Crane have met: “thirty four mayors and municipal councils, fifteen administrative councils, sixty-five councils of village chiefs, thirty Arab sheikhs, seventeen professional and trade organisations” ((James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013)). Woodrow Wilson by its ambiguous foreign policy did not act as he was saying, but much more in the defence of national interest by preserving and improving the relations with the European powers. We can see here a conflict between the idealism of President Wilson and his endorsement of self-determination principle, with a pragmatic realistic foreign policy. At the end, after discussion with the United States, the

¹⁸ The Balfour Declaration was a letter from the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour issued on November 2, 1917 addressed to Lord Walter Rothschild, a British leader of the Zionist movement. It was a promise of support for the creation of « a national home for the Jewish people » in Palestine. It was perceived as a boost for the Zionist movement and it provided a legal framework for continuing the Jewish immigration to Palestine alongside with the purchase of lands in Palestine, « the twin pillar of the Zionists’ policy to make Palestine their national home (James Gelvin in Lesch & Haas, 2013).

League of Nations confirmed the Mandates that entered into force in September 1923 (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p.20). Further, the Balfour Declaration was incorporated into the British Mandate in Palestine (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 22).

2. 2. Iran, Turkey and the Truman Doctrine (1945-1947)

On the aftermath of the Second World War, the states of Iran and Turkey were under the threat of the Soviet Union. Indeed, in early 1945, Moscow expressed claims upon part of the Turkish territory in Eastern Anatolia but foremost on demanding a greater share in governing and policing the Turkish straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). However, the government of Turkey following the stance of the President Inonu rejected the proposition of the Soviet Union. A reject supported by the United Kingdom, and the United States. But the United States understood that the situation was critical, and feared that Turkey could fall under the Soviet influence. They needed to react. But primarily, it was the situation in Iran that pushed the United States in a shift of its foreign policy.

First of all, the United States had little interests in Iran before the World War II. The USA was enjoying a very positive image in the country thanks to a little amount of American teachers, missionaries and archaeologists who were present in the Persian country (Gasiorowski in Lesch & Haas, 2014). Even though if the USA had opened diplomatic relations with Iran in 1865, they sent a ranked ambassador only in 1944. During the Second World War, the Great Britain and the Soviet Union have invaded the country, in September 1941, and forced Reza Shah to abdicate, in favour of his young son Muhammad Reza Shah (21 years old) because Reza Shah was considered as too close with Germany (Gasiorowski in Lesch & Haas, 2014). Iran was strategic for the

supply route to the Soviet Army in the war effort. The United States sent troops as well in the supply-operation and in early 1944, there were about 30 000 US soldiers in Iran (Gasiorowski in Lesch & Haas, 2014). Moreover, the United States started a military training mission in order to help Iran to organize and improve its army and its gendarmerie (Mark Gasiorowski in Lesch & Haas, 2014). And the US gave as well \$8, 5 million in lend-lease to Iran, without interfering into the Iranian domestic affairs, at the contrary of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the three Great Powers: United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom, or Big Three had signed the Tripartite Agreement on January 1952 which, specified that all troops of the three states should be fully withdrawn in a maximum of six months once the end is over. However, instead of that, the Soviet Union have been backing strongly separatist rebels, namely communists from the Tudeh party in the northwestern regions of Iran (Takeyh & Simon, 2016). So in December 1945 and January 1946, the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009) declared their autonomy from Tehran. Already in 1945, Iran asked to the US to put pressure upon the Soviet Union for withdrawing its troops and letting Iranian soldiers going North to take back the two northwest provinces. Then with a very strong US support, Iran appeal to the newly created United Nations¹⁹ on January 30, 1946 (Takeyh & Simon, 2016). The US officials publicly protested against the Soviet government and they backed strongly the Iranian claims at the United Nations and the same day the UN Security Council passed the Resolution 2 fostering Iran and the Soviet Union to find a diplomatic end to this affair. Finally the

¹⁹ The United Nations (UN) was established on October 24, 1945 after that the UN Charter signed previously the 26th of June 1945 was ratified. Lynch, C. M. (n.d.). United Nations (UN). Retrieved May 23, 2016, from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations>

Iranian PM Qavam met Stalin in Moscow and even though the Soviet Union did not initially wanted to cooperate, it did withdrew its troops from Iran and the Northwestern provinces in Spring 1946 (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). As Lesch and Bunton stressed in their book, the US department of State and other US agencies reviewed completely their interests in Iran. Further, US officials came to the conclusion that Iran was “of vital strategic interest” (Gasiorowski in Lesch & Haas, 2014). The US administration did not decide to provide a large amount of financial assistance to Iran; however, the military training was extended in the years 1947 and 1948. Then the staff of the US embassy in Tehran was tremendously increased, and to finish, the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) decided to open a station in Tehran in early 1947 in order to enable covert operations (Gasiorowski in Lesch & Haas, 2014).

Among all the doctrines from American Presidents that have shaped the foreign policy of the United States, the Truman Doctrine is the most consequential of all (Lindsay, Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2012). In the firstfruits of the period known as the Cold War, the President Harry S. Truman (President from April 1945 to January 1953) initiated a policy that would last for up to fifty years. On February 21, 1947, Lord Inverchapel who was the British Ambassador to the United States at the time delivered two official statements, two notes to the US State Department. First of all, the British were signalling to the United States that due to severe economic issues, they had decided to stop all aid to Greece and Turkey. The second information was that the end of providing aid would be effective from March 31, 1947 (Lindsay, Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2012).

As Lindsay has written, Dean Acheson, the Undersecretary of State understood that this situation could turn into a political disaster. Indeed, a civil war was raging in Greece,

with communists rebels, strongly backed by the Soviet Union. If Greece was to fall under the influence of the Soviet Union, the neighbouring countries would follow.

Turkey always had a tremendous geostrategic importance by its control of the two straits. They are the gates of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean sea, and Russia has been seeking its control for centuries. Moreover, in this post Second World War context, the president Truman sought the USA to replace the United Kingdom as the major power of the eastern Mediterranean region (Lindsay, Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2012). However, because of its isolationist stance in the past, the United States did not have a tradition of providing economic assistance to other countries (Lindsay, Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2012). Aware of the domestic considerations that a political involvement of the United States would rise, President Truman met the Senator Arthur Vandenberg who was chair of the Senate Foreign Committee, and as Lindsay point out, a former isolationist (Lindsay, Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2012). Vandenberg told to the president that he will have to: “scare the hell out of the American people” if he wanted to convince his people of the importance of this affair.

Thus, on March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman addressed a speech to a joint session of the Congress. Truman presented his plan of the future of the American foreign policy that the country must lead, in the interests of the United States, and in the interest of the world: “It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”²⁰. The President Truman was here asking to the Americans to break with the tradition of isolationism and the reluctance to get involve into the European Affairs. Lindsay stressed that Truman was asking his people to assume the responsibility of global leadership (Lindsay, Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2012).

²⁰ Avalon Project - Truman Doctrine. (2008). Retrieved May 20, 2016, from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp

Furthermore, Truman insist in some points which are interesting concerning the Middle East: "Turkey now needs our support", "That integrity (of Turkey) is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East"²¹. By saying so the President Truman targeted directly Turkey as a country to protect. He stressed for instance that if Greece would fall under "the control of an armed minority", explicitly the communist rebels of the Greek civil war, Turkey would follow. Then the American president continues saying that if such thing happens: "Confusion and disorder might spread throughout the entire Middle East". The Truman Doctrine was a reaction to the Soviet pressures on Turkey and Greece, an "early formulation of the domino theory" (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p. 276). The domino theory as it has already explicitly been explained is the theory that if one country fall under the influence of Communism, the surrounding countries would, by domino effect, falls as well under this influence.

William L. Cleveland emphasized as well the idea that the Soviet Union was perceived (by the USA) as an aggressive expansionist power with only one single mission that was spreading Communism worldwide. President Truman answered to this threat by his Doctrine composed by a major element that is a tremendous shift of the US foreign policy at the time: committing its resources to countries under Soviet threat in order to contain any Communism spread and to some extent, the containment of the Soviet influence. Truman in his speech stressed these new tools of foreign policy: "I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes"²². He goes further expressing concretely the American foreign policy aims: "One of the primary objectives

²¹ Avalon Project - Truman Doctrine. (2008). Retrieved May 20, 2016, from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp

²² Ibid.

of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion”.

Concretely, Harry Truman asked to the Congress assistance to Greece and Turkey of an amount of \$400 million for a period ending on June 30, 1948. He also asked the right to send military and civilian advisors for: “supervising the use of such financial aid and material assistance”²³. On May 22, 1947, both the House of Representatives and the Senate voted in favour of the Truman’s request, for what was called the Greek-Turkish Aid Act (Lindsay, Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2012). The Greek-Turkish Aid Act granted \$100 million in military aid to Turkey and \$300 million for Greece equally divided between military and economic assistance (Lindsay, Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2012). The United States kept providing financial and military assistance from years to years, and between 1947 and 1960, the USA has provided \$3 billion to Turkey, in order to enable the country to maintain an army of 500 000 men (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p. 277), as a means of containment.

2. 3. The formation of Israel and its consequences on US Foreign policy

First of all, the formation of the state of Israel was the result of the actions of several different forces, through time and by nature, which at then end contributed to the establishment of the state of Israel (i.e. Zionist²⁴ movement, worldwide spread anti-Semitism, Jewish lobbying, political endorsement, the Holocaust etc.). What we can say is that these movements started to enter into actions in the second part of the 19th century, and it needed almost a hundred years to finally reach its aims by the creation of

²³ Avalon Project - Truman Doctrine. (2008). Retrieved May 20, 2016, from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp

²⁴ Zionism:

a state on the Palestinian soil. Secondly, it is in my eyes important to acknowledge that the United States was not the major player behind the establishment of Israel (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008). The major force in the Zionist movement and the creation of Israel was the United Kingdom. In the first part of the 20th century, the creation of a Jewish state was definitely not a foreign policy priority. Further: “the limited US role in the pre-state period reflects the balance of power of the first decades of the 20th century in international relations” (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 46). At the time, the United States had a little voice in the international arena. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that the Jewish US lobbying played a very active if not crucial role into this establishment. The Biltmore Program²⁵ of 1942 and its endorsement by president Truman have played a significant role in favour of the creation of Israel. According to Cleveland and Bunton, Truman’s role and influence was consequent because at the wake of the Second World War the United States emerged as a global superpower “capable of exerting immense pressure on its allies” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 261).

To continue, Palestine was under a British mandate; and on February 1947, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin recognized that Britain had lost the control of the situation in Palestine and asked help to the United Nations (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 262). A United Nations committee was formed with the mission to find a viable

²⁵ Biltmore Program: The Biltmore Program refers to the outcomes of an international Zionism conference held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City on 9-11 May 1942. Nearly 600 local and international delegates, including leading Zionist figures such as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben Gurion, attended the conference. The conference adopted eight key resolutions that were ratified by the Zionist General Council in Palestine. These included a call for the immediate implementation of the “original purpose” of the Balfour Declaration, a complete rejection of the British White Paper of 1939, and increased and unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine. Despite some internal dissent, often based on support for a binational resolution with the Palestinian Arabs, the Biltmore Program quickly gained acceptance as the platform of the Zionist movement (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008).

solution. President Truman started a lobbying effort on behalf of the majority report in favour of a two-states solution, against the advises of his Departments of States and Defence, which were stressing the much worthy foreign policy of maintaining cordial relations with the new independent Arab States of the Middle East region (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 264). On November 29, 1947, the United Nations passed the Resolution 181, which was in favour of the partition of Palestine into two separate states (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008).

Map 2: The UN proposal for the partition of Palestine



Source: *A History of the Modern Middle East*, p. 265.

However, the Arab Higher Committee created by the Arab League and representing the Palestinians rejected the UN Resolution. Further, in May 14, 1948, the last British High Commissioner, General Alan Cunningham left Palestine without transferring any power to any authority (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 266). The same day, only few hours later, the Jewish leader David Ben Gurion proclaimed the independence of the state of Israel, which was immediately recognized by the United States, and the Soviet Union as well.

Nevertheless, as Hastedt emphasises: “no official treaty or alliance exists between the United States and Israel, yet the depth of the relationship between the two is normally considered among the strongest that the United States has with any state” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 259). Moreover, Truman commitment to the establishment of Israel could also be explained by his concerns over the possibility of Israel to turn to the Soviet Union, which would have resulted in having a pro-Soviet state in the Middle East whereas the grand strategy of the US expressed in the Truman Doctrine was the containment of the Soviet Union. These concerns were also founded on the fact that socialism was popular within the Zionist movement (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008). Before the Six Day War of 1967, the relations between the United States and Israel were “cool and distant” (Hastedt, 2004). Later, President Eisenhower showed his opposition to Israel in the Suez Crisis.

The relations between the United States and Israel really started with the Six Day War of 1967. But, the major shift was during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 with the shuttle diplomacy led by the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It led to a major shift in the alliances system of the region with Egypt and Syria turning their backs to the Soviet Union and initiating strong alliances with the United States.

2. 4. The Suez Crisis

The year 1956 is traditionally described as one of the major turning points for the history of the Middle East and for the role of the United States in the region and its foreign policy. This war: “signalled the change in power-brokers and their influence in the region” (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 47). At the time, France and Great Britain were still playing a heavy role in the Middle East region, because of historical background and colonialist past, defence of their national interest and economic interest via the control of strategic areas of the region, such as the Suez Canal in Egypt. As Dobson explained, the United States’s foreign policy was at the time justified by ideology and: “driven by considerations that were not necessarily Cold War related” (Dobson & Marsh, 2007, p. 118). Nevertheless, the situation in the Middle East was already in a bad situation as Dobson acknowledged in his book: “when Truman left office in January 1953, UD Middle Eastern policy was already in deep trouble” (Dobson & Marsh, 2007, p. 120). The British were facing difficulties and nationalist attacks in Iran and Egypt because of oil in Iran and due to the military presence of British troops near the very geostrategic Suez Canal. The Eisenhower administration did not want to get too involved in the region and was still hoping to rely on its western allies (France and Great Britain). But the failure of the Baghdad Pact²⁶ and events in Egypt made a deeper

²⁶ Baghdad Pact: “Mutual security organization dating from 1955 to 1979 and composed of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. Until March 1959 the organisation was known as the Middle East Treaty Organisation, included Iraq, and had its headquarters in Baghdad. It was formed at the urging of Britain and the United States. The Central Treaty Organisation was intended to counter the threat of Soviet expansion into vital Middle East oil-producing regions. It was never very effective. Iraq withdrew from the alliance in 1959. The United States never joined the Organisation” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1998).

involvement of the United States inevitable, always in a Cold War context, and with the containment of the Soviet Union influence in the Middle East as the grand foreign strategy. The situation was sum up at: "American policy makers did not want to hear this but the US must fill the power vacuum" (Dobson & Marsh, 2007, p. 120).

First of all, some context in the former British colony of Egypt is important to acknowledge. Gamal Abdul Nasser became president of Egypt in 1953 (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013) after having led a successful revolt against the pro-British King Farouk (Hastedt, 2004, p. 462). Among his objectives was the industrialisation of the country, and his major project was the Aswan dam, in the south of Egypt on the Nil River, historical source of life of Egypt. However, Nasser needing money, asked to the United Kingdom and the United States for funding. The United States gave him the assurance of a US \$250 millions loan (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013, p. 47). But as the opening overture was getting closer, Nasser got involved in an anti-Israel alliance, proclaimed Egyptian neutrality in the Cold War and purchased weapons from Czechoslovakia, a Soviet ally. As a consequence, the United States decided to step back, and the 19th of July 1956, Washington formally withdrew its offer of funding the Aswan dam project (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013, p. 47). And the World Bank cancelled its credit in parallel the 23rd of July, four days after the United States.


Then President Nasser took the decision to nationalise the Suez Canal, looking for more income, and he took control of the Canal. However, this Egyptian nationalisation meant massive losses of profits for France and the United Kingdom (the Suez Canal being under French and English consortium), and also no waterway access for Israel (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013). Indeed, the Suez Canal was vital for the European powers, because about 800 000 barrels of crude oil a day were passing through it for European consumption and needs. As a result, the three countries decided to lead a secret

tripartite military operation, code name Operation Musketeer, and the Israeli forces started the attack on October 29, 1956 (Hastedt, 2004, p. 463). It was a military success, but a political disaster for the three attackers (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013). President Eisenhower condemned what he considered as an aggression against Egypt, and he called for: “collective military, economic and financial sanction” against Israel if it does not withdraw its troops during a session of the United Nations Security Council (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013, p. 48). But the French and the English used their veto to stop the UN resolution, and they joined the conflict on October 31 (Hastedt, 2004, p. 463).

Besides, we can see here the ambiguous foreign policy of the United States on this “affair”. Indeed, the United States were condemning Israel, even though the new Middle Eastern country was already benefiting of a special relation with the United States. But The United States couldn’t keep that stance against France and the United Kingdom, its two best allies in the region and elsewhere, in a Cold War context and a containment struggle against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Eisenhower was trapped in the sense that this conflict was happening on the eve of American elections and the President was running for a second mandate “on a peace ticket” (Dobson & Marsh, 2007, p. 121). Moreover, the Cold War context was tense due to the severe repression of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising by the Soviet Union in Europe. And when Moscow started to threaten France and the United Kingdom of retaliation on London and Paris if they did not stop their attack upon Egypt, the United States could not step back. Eisenhower could not give the Soviets any pretext for intervention (Dobson & Marsh, 2007). Thereafter, the United States decided to put pressure on London. The US administration threatened London to withhold its vital support for the British currency (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013, p. 48). The allies were constrained to withdraw their troops, and even the British Prime Minister resigned. Finally: “a cease fire was called on November

6, and in December, the United Nations peacekeepers took up positions in the Suez and returned the canal to Egypt” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 463). The conflict ended definitely in March 1957, with the cost of 2500 to 3500 dead, mostly Egyptians (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013, p. 48).

Map 3: The Suez Crisis evolution



Source: BBC

The Suez Crisis put the United States in a delicate position, and the Eisenhower administration had to take into account the international context of Cold War, its containment policy and the fear that this crisis would open the Middle East to the Soviet influence, and also the American domestic policy because of the upcoming presidential elections. Hastedt underline that: “a war in the Middle East would have complicated the Eisenhower administration’s reelection efforts, and U.S. diplomats worked through September and October to forestall military action by Washington’s allies” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 463). However, the crisis had other consequences in the international and regional system, as for the American foreign policy in the Middle East region. First, the United States became *de facto* the superpower involved in the Middle East. Second, Egyptian president Nasser turned to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets started providing: “significant funding and military hardware” to Egypt (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013, p. 49). Egypt was then perceived as a Soviet client in spite of its rhetoric of non-alignment (see Bandung conference) in American eyes, and the US dichotomy being simple with the policy of “us VS them”, it turned even more the United States towards Israel, and paradoxically Saudi Arabia, which was then the main rival of Egypt for the Arab leadership in the region. Another regional consequence was the later formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) between Egypt and Syria, from 1958 to 1961 (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2013).

2. 5. The Eisenhower Doctrine: the US commitment to the Middle East

First of all, the Eisenhower Doctrine followed the steps of the Truman Doctrine. It was a Doctrine in favour of the pursuit of the containment as main foreign policy by the United States, against the Soviet Union. It is in the immediate aftermath of the Suez

Crisis that Republican President Dwight Eisenhower made his speech to the American Congress on January 5, 1957 (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). The Middle East context has been pretty intense since the beginning of the 1950s. Indeed, the United States via the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had overthrown the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq with a successful coup, which, bring back the Shah into power (Hastedt, 2004, p. 144). Then the United States helped the creation of the Baghdad Pact, even though it proved to be a failure later, in order to encircle the Soviet Union. And prevent any Soviet influence in the region. At last, the American administration proposed to aid President Nasser in Egypt for the Aswan Dam, and afterwards, the US helped to spark the Suez Crisis as previously presented (Hastedt, 2004, p. 144).

President Eisenhower divided his speech into nine major articles plus the introduction in which he put the spot on the peculiar and urgent situation of the Middle East at that time: "There is, however, a special situation in the Middle East which I feel I should, even now, lay before you" (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). He continues then with the basic national aims of the United States in international affairs such as: "world peace based on justice" (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). Thereafter, from the article I to the article V included, Eisenhower underlines with a grave rhetoric how much the Middle East is upon the danger of the Communism and the Soviet Union, stressing the importance of self-determination and: "the high degree of instability in much of the Mid East" (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). He stresses the fact that all of this (the Suez Crisis) was a manipulation by the "international Communism" (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969) and he keeps using several other arguments to discredit and blame the Soviet Union, as to warn against what the intrusion of Communism in the Middle East region could represent. To continue, President Eisenhower in the article V sums up the

principal Executive declarations the United States have made in relations with the Middle East since 1950 such as the Declaration of November 29, 1956: “that a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan or Turkey would be viewed by the United States with utmost gravity” (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). But the most important articles, the core of the Eisenhower Doctrine are to be found in the article VI and VII.

In the article VI, Eisenhower explains implicitly that the Congress must join the Executive (the President) to defend: “the national integrity of other free nations” (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969) because it is: “directly related to our own security” (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969), meaning the United States’s national security. Then he develops his ideas such as full cooperation and assistance in the Middle East in: “the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence” (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). Further, he continues with military prerogatives asking the Congress to: “authorise the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid” (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). So here the American President was presenting the tools of foreign policy he intended to use during his second presidential mandate: economic assistance and development aid, military assistance and cooperation (e.g. military training and weapons delivery). The third main tool is the use of military forces on the ground (i.e. interventionism or internationalism, but under the authority of the United Nations Security Council; so internationalism with pragmatic idealism). The realist view of the international system is that states are the main actors and their power is defined by their military capabilities and their economy to sustain this military effort. This is actually exactly what President Eisenhower did in his speech, because he ends the article VI by demanding the available budget for economic and

defensive military purpose: 'sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (...) without regard to existing limitations' (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). Afterwards, he finished by asking to have an amount of \$200,000,000 available for each fiscal year 1958 and 1959 (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). Finally, in the article VII, Eisenhower speak about the Palestinian issue, and the relations between Israel and the Arab States, and the future of the Arab refugees (Eisenhower Doctrine, CFR, 1969). The American president blamed again the "International Communism", thus the Soviet Union, to aggravate the situation; even though he precised that these issues would have existed without any Soviet pressures. He expressed hen his idea of delegating this major issues to the United Nations. As Dobson wrote: "the US (...) withdrew its efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli issue; that poisoned chalice was handed to the UN" (Dobson & Marsh, 2007, p. 120). It was a firm commitment to the existing order.

Yet, the Congress, then controlled by the Democrats, refused. And it was only after Eisenhower promised not to cut off U.S. aid to Israel in retaliation for its participation in the Suez Crisis that Congress agreed to pass the Middle East resolution, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine (Hastedt, 2004, p. 144). According to Hastedt, the Eisenhower Doctrine is significant for three reasons: "First, it marked part of the general expansion of American containment policy into the developing world. Second, it is consistent with and reflects the American National Style of conducting foreign policy that emphasise universal principles, moralism, and legalism. Third, it was part of a general trend in presidential-congressional relations in which Congress ceded authority to the President to carry out foreign policy without its specific consent by passing area resolutions" (Hastedt, 2004, p. 144). To conclude, this doctrine allowed immediately Eisenhower to send 14 000 troops to Lebanon in 1958, to stop a coup by pro-Nasser Arabs (Hastedt, 2004).

2. 6. The Iranian Revolution and the Hostage crisis: major shift for the Middle East and the role of the United States

According to Baxter and Akbarzadeh, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a major turning point in the politics of the Middle East region and it had massive consequences over the US foreign policy (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008). The regional order was turned upside down in 1979 (Kissinger, 2014, p. 146). As Hastedt stresses: “the origins of the Iranian hostage crisis lay with U.S. Cold War support for the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Forced out of power by a nationalist uprising led by Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953, he was returned to power as a result of a CIA-sponsored covert action²⁷” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 246) and United Kingdom intelligence services (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008). The coup ordered by president Eisenhower was a clear example of a new trend of foreign policy and American hidden interventionism in Middle Eastern politics. It was a violation of the Iranian national sovereignty but in the eyes of the United States, it was foremost a very pragmatic policy in order to protect its economic and political interests. In a Cold War context and in logic of containment, the United States could not allow the Soviet Union to take over Iran, for the regional balance of power and for protecting the Iranian oil fields from Soviet hands. For instance, the Shah granted the United States a 40% share of the Iranian oil consortium (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 77). Finally, the Shah became a very strong U.S. ally, and was a pillar of the US foreign policy concerning the balance of power of the Middle East

²⁷ Covert action: “covert action seeks to achieve U.S. foreign-policy objectives by altering the internal balance of power in a foreign state. In popular usage covert action is all but synonymous with CIA paramilitary undertakings, but this is not always the case. (...). It remains perhaps the most controversial and difficult of all policy instruments (Hastedt, 2004, p. 105).

region. Nevertheless, the coup had grave consequences, because Iran was the sole country of the Middle East with a strong national identity and according to Tony Tunt and Denis Lacorne: “that turned the USA from an ally to a disloyal and deceitful friend” (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 77) in the eyes of the Iranian people.

Because of his authoritarianism, his uneven and controversial reforms and other social factors, the Shah was forced to flee Iran on January 16, 1979 and the Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile on February 1st (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 430). After internal manoeuvres and political fights between the revolution forces, the Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed on April 1, 1979 following a March referendum (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 432). Therefore, it was a major blow in the foreign policy in the Middle East of the United States. From the 1950s to the early 1979, all American administrations had provided billions of dollars of agricultural aid, financial assets, high-tech weaponry and military personnel among others. And president Jimmy Carter, in power since 1977, was supporting the Iranian regime of the Shah, as an economic and Cold War strategy (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2009). The US foreign policy strategy here to favours the status quo leadership to maintain stability in the region’s order, as the United States wanted it to be. The very mistake of the US foreign policy was to rely on the Shah’s regime popularity. For instance, during New Years’ Eve in 1978, Jimmy Carter said: “the great leadership of the Shah” that turned Iran into “an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world” (from Makdissi, 2002, p. 548 in Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2009, p. 79). Moreover, the Shah was admitted on the American soil for medical treatment, which was a very controversial decision because of the risk that it could feed the Iranian anger over the United States. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was opposed to it (Hastedt, 2004).

But at the surprise of all, on November 4, 1979, Iranian students and young supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini stormed the United States's embassy in Tehran and took 57 hostages from the US Foreign Service personnel (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 434). The Carter administration didn't know exactly how to respond. Hastedt acknowledges that the National security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski fostered president Carter toward a quick military action as retaliation; whereas the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was in favour of using diplomacy (Hastedt, 2004). Amongst these two foreign policy tools, Carter decided to use none, and he froze Iranian assets in the United States and imposed economic sanctions (Hastedt, 2004). Finally, after failed negotiations, on April 7, 1980, president Carter ordered a covert action, a rescue mission. On April 24, eight helicopters took off from the USS *Nimitz* in the Arabian Sea and six C-130 Hercules transports took off from Egypt to carry out the rescue mission (Hastedt, 2004, p. 247). But the mission was a disaster: three helicopters were lost in a sand storm, and after the mission has been cancelled, a helicopter C-130 fell down on the ground killing eight crew-members (Hastedt, 2004). Further, Cyrus Vance resigned, because he had not been involved in any ways in the decision making to conduct such a rescue mission. It was a political disaster, and it showed a very bad handling of foreign policy from president Jimmy Carter. Nevertheless, Hastedt identified that in a context of Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) the freezing of Iranian assets in the United States were estimated to be worth of \$8 billion. So it proved its utility (Hastedt, 2004). Further, the Shah died in Egypt in July 1980, which decrease a little bit the tensions in the conflict. And thirdly, Ayatollah Khomeini took over the Iranian Parliament, thus he didn't need the hostages anymore (Hastedt, 2004). However, Jimmy Carter was not re-elected, and the hostages were freed 30 minutes after Ronald Reagan was invested, 444 days after the Iranian stormed the US embassy (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 434).

To conclude, the Iranian Revolution, the hostage crisis and the baldy led US policy to find solutions to this crisis marked a major shift into the Middle East balance of power, in the role and the foreign policy of the United States in the region, and in the perception of the United States in the Arab people's eyes. The United States appeared vulnerable, inapt and unable to solve the situation with the ne Iranian regime. Further, it led Iran to become the great evil of the Middle East for the US. It was embodied by Ayatollah Khomeini: "America is the number one enemy ", we face "large-scale propaganda campaigns that are coordinated for it by international Zionism (...) Iran has tried to sever its relations with the Great Satan" (Khomeini, 1985,p. 304-5 in Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 80). The will from Iran to spread its Islamic revolution spirit and anti-Americanism was a major fear for the United States. It has big consequences into American opinion and civil society, and foremost into the next 30 years of American administrations (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008). Eventually, it boost the United States in their will to protect the status quo in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. As Jimmy Carter said in 1980: "Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military forces" (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, p. 89). It was here a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and also a warning to Iran on the will of the United States to remain the regional hegemon of the Middle East region.

3. From the 1980s and the end of the Cold War: the US Foreign policy in the Middle East, a change

3. 1. The Iran-Iraq War: beginning of a change

First of all, the Iran-Iraq War has been another turning point in the equilibrium of the Middle East region. The stability and the regional balance of power were deeply disturbed by the war and by its possible consequences. The seriousness and grave character of this conflict, for the region stability, for national security of United States's allies such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Israel and the danger for the national interests, especially the economic interests, of the United States, obliged the United States to take new foreign policy directions and measures. According to Hastedt: "it is significant for American foreign policy in that the war directly involved the United States in Persian Gulf politics in a manner different from what had ever occurred before" (Hastedt, 2004, p. 248). The Iran-Iraq War lasted eight years, from the Iraqi attack of September 22, 1980 to August 20, 1980 when the United Nations' cease-fire entered into force and ended the war (Cleveland & Bunton, 2004).

It is important to stress that before the war, the United States were "limited" their regional involvement by providing military and economic aid to support pro-American regimes, or at least its regional allies (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries, Israel, Egypt, Turkey). The newly elected Republican President Donald Reagan was at the very beginning of his first mandate facing a complex situation in the Middle East region. First of all, Iran and Iraq never had good relationship in the past. Saddam Hussein took power in Iraq in 1979, the same year of the Iranian Revolution, which established the Ayatollah's Islamic Republic. The United States used to have very good relations with

Iran, the regime of the Shah having been a strong ally in the region since the coup of 1953 by the CIA. But the Revolution in Iran marked a strong shift in the equilibrium of the region as it has already been said previously, and it marked a stop of the alliance between the United States and the new Islamic regime. Moreover, relations between Iraq and Iran were getting worst due to the will of the Islamic Republic of Iran to spread the Islamic revolution in every region of the Middle East (Cleveland & Bunton, 2004). Ayatollah Khomeini appealed directly the Shia²⁸ of Iraq to topple and overthrow Saddam Hussein and to go further, Khomeini: “had specifically identified Saddam Hussein and his infidel Ba’ath²⁹ party as enemies of Islam”(Cleveland & Bunton, 2004,p. 416). The conflict had thus a religious dimension, and it can explain why Iraq had then the support of the oil-rich and Sunni³⁰ countries of the Gulf States, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Cleveland appends talking about Saddam: “he also had the support of the United States” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2004, p. 416). Nevertheless, this support was really relative if inexistent before the year 1984 even though as Hastedt emphasises in his Encyclopedia: “the United States had promoted both Iran and Iraq as regional powers during the Cold War, but Iran’s power had been seriously weakened by the fall of the shah and ascent to power of Islamic fundamentalist forces” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 248). At the time, personality also played a role because

²⁸ Shia (Ali’s followers): Minority branch of Islam. The Shia considers that the Prophet’s successor must be a member of His family. Iran and Iraq are both countries with Shia majority, and the main Shia’s shrines are on their territories (Hourani, 2010)

²⁹ Ba’ath Party: “Arab political party advocating the formation of a single Arab socialist nation. It has branches in many Middle Eastern countries and was the ruling party in Syria from 1963 and in Iraq from 1968 to 2003” (Ba'th Party. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2016, from <https://global.britannica.com/topic/Bath-Party>)

³⁰ Sunni: Majority branch of Islam. The Sunni consider that the caliph (the leader) should be the most capable to hold the leadership of the community, but to be chosen from the Quraysh tribe, the tribe of the Prophet (Hourani, 2010). The most important Sunni shrines are Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia.

Saddam Hussein wanted to establish himself as the leader of the Arab world, especially since the vacuum that have left the death of Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian president (Hastedt, 2004).

Furthermore, in 1984, Iraq was forced to review its attitude on the international scene, namely with the United States. The Middle East country have seen its oil-capacities largely reduced because of the conflict and several Iranian attacks against oil strategic places. Then, Iraq was forced to borrow abroad to finance its war effort (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 417). Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were the two major lenders; they supplied Iraq together between \$50 and \$60 billion worth of assistance during the conflict (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Moreover, Iraq's dependency on the Gulf States obliged Saddam Hussein to improve its attitude and relations with other United States' allies in the region. For instance, Baghdad shifted its aggressive stance toward Israel, and restored good relations with Egypt. In return: "Egypt supplied Iraq with ammunition, spare military parts, and military advisers" (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 418). Following this "efforts" made by Iraq, the United States restored its diplomatic relations, which were severed since 1967, and the Six Days War (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). The first tool of foreign policy used by United States was to provide Iraq with military intelligence. Secondly, the Reagan administration asked, even pressured its allies not to sell any weapons to Iran (it was the case of France for instance). This is a way of foreign policy that Hastedt qualified as the double standard in judging behavior of states, which, is one of the consequences of the American Style (Hastedt, 2000, p. 40). Finally, the United States campaigned for an embargo against Iranian oil because what was really at stake here for he United States was not human rights, respect or defending and spreading democracy. No, it was foremost to defend oil reserves and the access to oil, for the country and its Western allies. As Cleveland and Bunton cleverly stressed:

“For the United States in the 1980s, the demon of the Middle East was Ayatollah Khomeini, not Saddam Hussein, and Washington was willing to ignore brutality of Hussein’s regime in order to prevent the spread of the kind of Islamic radicalism and anti US sentiment represented by Khomeini. What was at stake for the United States in this war, as in that of 1991, was not human rights but oil reserves” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 418).

Ronald Reagan had to be very pragmatic in this complex situation. He did not wanted to send military troops on the ground, at least not at a high scale. He wanted to preserve the regional balance of power, in order to guaranty the same privileged access to crude oil from the Ormuz Strait. Maintaining the status quo was another strategic goal, because even though Reagan feared an Iranian victory, he was not in favour of a very strong Saddam Hussein’s Ira neither. His administration had to use several foreign policy tools to prevent any Iraqi defeat because as Cleveland and Bunton underlined: “if Iraq were defeated, then it seems likely that the Gulf states would either fall to Iran or at the very least come within Iran’s orbit. This was an alarming prospect for the US government” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p. 418). Moreover, as the regional hegemon, the United States had the mission to protect its allies, namely Israel and Saudi Arabia. The United States could not let Iran win the war because it is the fiercest enemy of Israel in the Middle East region (Iran never recognised Israel, except during the time of the shah). Then, Saudi Arabia being the champion of the Sunni Islam, was another strong adversary of the newly Shia Islamic Republic of Iran. Saudi Arabia has always been, from the 1950s a very special partner of the United States for the simple reason that it possesses the largest reserves in crude oil of the world.

Map 4: Iraq and Iran in the 1980s



Source: *A History of the Modern Middle East*, p. 417

Besides, all of these elements can explain the decision taken by the United States to intervene more directly from the year 1987. In 1987, Iran increased its attacks against the oil tankers from Kuwait. The United States decided to intervene on the ground by allowing the Kuwait's ships to use the US flag instead of Kuwaiti. Thus, if Iran had attacked these vessels, it would have been the equivalent of an attack on an

American ship. In parallel, the U. S. navy increased its activities and began to patrol actively the Persian Gulf (Hastedt, 2004). So here, President Reagan used military intervention, in logic of containment, but not to contain the Soviet Union, but to prevent a spread of Iranian influence if not control over the region. However some casualties marked this intervention: “in 1987 an Iraqi aircraft accidentally hit the USS *Stark* with a missile, killing 37 sailors. In July 1988 the USS *Vincennes* shot down an Iranian civilian airliner, killing 290 people” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 248). This accidents fostered the American Congress to debate on the legality of the decision of President Reagan to use force in the Persian Gulf in the summer 1987, but it did not took action.

To conclude, on August 20, 1988 the war was ended when the Ayatollah Khomeini accepted the UN cease-fire, followed by Saddam Hussein (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). “Neither side had achieved its objectives” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 418). The status quo was achieved by the United States, and Saddam Hussein even offered to return and restored the Algiers Agreement of 1975. But at then end, about 262 000 Iranian were dead, 105 000 Iraqis (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Thanks to its foreign policy, the United States “played an important role in persuading Iran’s leaders to seek an end to the war” (Cleveland & Bunton, p. 418). The United States had protected the national interests of the country namely the oil flow, and they have maintain the status quo in the region, preserved more or less the balance of power in the Middle East, and they have protected its regional allies, foremost Saudi Arabia and Israel from the Iranian threat.

3.2. The Gulf War I, from containment to interventionism

On the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, several consequences could be presented. First, Iraq's armed forces grew from 190 000 to more than one million, and the country became a major regional military power (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 419). Second, rather than to have weakened the Islamic Republic of Iran, the war reinforced the Iranian national identity and the power of the Ayatollah³¹. Third, The Iraq-Iran war had cost more than \$500 billion to Iraq (Hastedt, 2004, p. 388), and with the low price of the oil-barrel, Iraq was in a critical financial situation of debt, some \$60 billion of which was owed to Saudi Arabi and Kuwait (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 479).

Moreover, it is also important to acknowledge that the Gulf war I happened in a post Cold War world. Indeed, the Soviet Union was falling into pieces as countries of Eastern Europe started to declared their freedom and independence from Moscow. As Kissinger expressed: "there was a strong believe that the end of the Cold War wans the collapse of the Soviet Union would bring peace to the world order" (Kissinger, 2014, p. 314). Retrospectively, it is easier to say that Kissinger was considerably wrong, but also because war restarted even not a year after the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, Kissinger explained as well that during the Cold War, the military rulers of the Middle East region "sought to exploit the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States " for their own national interests (Kissinger, 2014, p. 113). But the end of the Cold War era weakened their bargaining position, as it made them not indispensable (Kissinger, 2013).

³¹ Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Islamic Republic from 1979 died in June 1989 (September 24, 1902 – June 3, 1989) Ruhollah Khomeini. (n.d.). Retrieved December 06, 2016, from <https://global.britannica.com/biography/Ruhollah-Khomeini>

First of all, and as already presented, the Gulf War or Persian Gulf War was the first major international conflict of the post-Col War era (Hastedt, 2004). George H. W. Bush has been newly elected president of the United States in 1989 (Dobson & Marsh, 2007). First of all, in early 1990, the tensions between Iraq and the United States and Iraq and its Arab neighbours rose quickly. After several diplomatic incidents with the United States and its Arab neighbours, Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and other Middle East oil-producers states to lead an economic war against Iraq, because of the oil-barrel prices in the oil market. Even though a summit in May produced an agreement to limit the production of oil (Hastedt, 2004): “Hussein would soon charge Kuwait with being part of a “Zionist plot aided by imperialists”” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 388). Facing this situation, the United States foreign policy chosen tool was firstly diplomacy. Saddam Hussein met with Ambassador April Glaspie. Nevertheless, movements of Iraqi troops from the Iraq’s Republican Guard toward the Kuwait border started to worry the Bush administration, which kept believing that it was only movements aiming to intimidate. And this in spite of report from the CIA of July 31, 1990 that war was at the door. I would like to emphasise the fact that before the Iraqi invasion, the United States foreign policy toward Iraq was still active. And as Cleveland and Bunton stressed: “Up to the eve of the invasion, the Bush administration courted Iraq, providing it with billions of dollars worth of agricultural credits and turning a blind eye to its human rights abuses and its nuclear weapons program” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 480).

Nonetheless, Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 2, 1990; and: “within 11 days Saddam Hussein had moved eight divisions to within 300 to 400 miles of the Kuwait border” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 388). Six days after the invasion, Saddam Hussein announced that Kuwait became the nineteenth province of Iraq (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 478). The reaction of the United States was immediate, and the same day, President George H.

W. Bush ordered to freeze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and to stop all trade moves and financial dealings with Iraq. Afterwards on August 4, two days after the invasion, President Bush declared that this invasion “could not stand”, and the United Nations voted to impose economic sanctions (Hastedt, 2004). Further, on August 24, the United Nations authorized the use of force to impose those sanctions. Iraq rejected the UN calls for withdrawal and promised to response should force be used against it (Hastedt, 2004). It is at this moment that the US administrations entered quickly into actions by directing diplomatic efforts in order to create an anti-Iraq coalition that would support the use of force. Here, the foreign policy of the United States was quite clear: defend and protect Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi aggression. This is what explains Cleveland and Bunton when they write: “the first phase of the United States’ military response was defensive. Despite its massive military expenditures on arms and weapons, Saudi Arabia did not have the military skills and training of the Iraqi army. Thus: “the Saudi government issued a formal invitation to the United States to send troops to defend the kingdom. Operation Desert Shield was set in motion, and by October 1990 over 200 000 US troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 480).

To continue, in the meantime the United States still very active in the diplomatic area was building an international coalition against Iraq, through the United Nations Security Council. The United States pushed resolutions for the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and settle a trade embargo on all goods to and from Iraq and Kuwait (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 481). Cleveland and Bunton cleverly noticed a major shift in the US foreign policy with the use of multilateral diplomacy; Countries such as Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Canada joined forces to Operation Desert Shield, and even the Soviet Union collaborated by suspending its arms shipment to Iraq. Moreover, the United States diplomacy was not only focused on the Western great powers and

allies as the Bush administration sought to convince other Arab countries to join and support Operation Desert Shield. Egypt and Syria agreed and sent troops to the coalition. As a reward: the United States cancelled \$7 billion of Egypt's military debts, and Syria received generous loans from Saudi Arabia and the European Community" (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 481). However, King Husayn of Jordan condemned the intervention and refused to join the coalition (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 481). The arrival of a major US military force in the Middle East against an Arab state was extremely unpopular, and it had great consequences later.

Quickly, Operation Desert Shield's objectives were achieved. By autumn 1990, the coalition forces were stationed in Saudi Arabia, protecting the country, and the economic sanctions imposed by the UN started to restrict imports and exports of Iraq. Thereafter, the UNSC voted on November 29 by 12-2 with the abstention of China, to set January 15, 1991 as the last deadline for Iraq to peacefully leave Kuwait territory (Hastedt, 2004). And it also authorise to "use all means necessary" to push Iraq to its unconditional withdraw. This is at this strategic and crucial moment that the US policy makers had great debates within the Bush administration over the decision whether going to war against Iraq or not. Here Glenn Hastedt used the reference of Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, who have been national security advisors to presidents Carter and Nixon respectively, who were in disagreement over the foreign policy to adopt. Brzezinski was not in favour of going to war whereas Kissinger was for it. Hastedt adds that the Chairman of the Joints chiefs of staff under president Reagan, William Crowe, was in favour of giving more time to the economic sanctions. Yet, according to Cleveland and Bunton, president Bush had already taken his decision to go to war. And in early November he had already ordered US forces in Arabia to doubled to 400 000 troops and announced his will for the coalition to switch towards an offensive military


option (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 482). Besides, the Congress started debating over the question of whether to use military force, or to keep relying upon economic sanctions. And on January 12, 1991, the Congress voted in favour of president Bush wish. So the Gulf War I is really interesting in a foreign policy analysis point of view because all the most important branches of the US power have been consulted about the war question. The president took a decision, however he needed the support and authorisation of the Congress. Importance debates occurred within the Bush administration, and other policy makers. Then the Congress finally approved the Bush decision and the United States could go to war against Iraq eventually. By January 1991, about 500 000 US troops were in the ground (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 483) and on January 16, 1991, Operation Desert Storm started (Hastedt, 2004).

The Bush administration legitimated this change of policy by using the argument of moral responsibility of liberating Kuwait. It was escorted by public and aggressive rhetoric against Saddam Hussein. For instance, the Iraqi leader was portrayed as: “a source of evil whose cries must not go unpunished” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 483). Bush who insisted on the need to eradicate Hussein’s regime compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler. Cleveland and Bunton found out that by focusing an aggressive rhetoric against Saddam and by extent turning him into the villain was a way for the Bush administration to gain the popular support for military action in Iraq.

Therefore, the air campaign began, and the coalition air forces dropped some 88 500 tons of bombs and shoot down 35 Iraqi planes (Hastedt, 2004). Iraq retaliated “smartly” by launching over thirty Scud missiles on Israel, twelve of which reached Haifa and Tel Aviv (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). It was a smart move because if Israel would had retaliated against Iraq, it would have been likely that most of the US-led coalition’s Arab partners would have left. The United States used again diplomatic pressures on

Israel to avoid such setback, and the coalition held together. Finally, on January 23, 1991 the coalition forces launched a ground assault against Iraq (Hastedt, 2004). The 27th of February, president Bush declared the liberation of Kuwait and ordered the end of the operations of the US-led coalition forces (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Eventually, on February 28, Iraq announced a cease-fire and agreed to discuss over terms for ending the war (Hastedt, 2004). Then the UNSC approved the Resolution 686, which set out the terms of the end of the conflict on March 2. Iraq agreed the day after. And on April 3: “the UNSC approved Resolution 687, which established a permanent cease-fire in the Persian Gulf War and ended international sanctions against Iraq. Iraq accepted these terms on April 6, formally ending the war” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 389).

Map 5: The Persian Gulf War, 1991



Source: *Britannica*

As Hastedt affirm, the Gulf War I was a major diplomatic and military success for the United States. The United States proved their military capabilities to be a swing power³². However, we can challenge the US multilateralism of the Gulf War. Because even though it was a coalition of several states, the United States was the sole decision maker for the operations (Hastedt, 2000, p. 37). This multifaced unilateralism was in reality a rejection of the balance of power and an affirmation from the United States that

³² Swing power: acting unilaterally with extraordinary speed

it was the hegemon in the Middle East region, and to some extent, the sole superpower in the international system in the neo-post-Cold War era. Moreover, a true multilateralism: “involve a genuine coalition of coequal partners of comparable strength and stature” (Krauthammer, 1990). Charles Krauthammer called it: “a pseudo multilateralism” (1990). Nonetheless, although the Gulf War has been a success, it can be questionable. The Gulf War was also a deterrence³³ failure (Kuwait was invaded) and a compellence failure (Iraq was not persuaded to leave Kuwait)(Hastedt, 2004, p. 389). Further, president Bush had targeted the person of Saddam Hussein as the great evil but he remained in power and through the 1990s and early 2000s, he defied the weapons controls of the United Nations and challenged the Middle East stability and the United States over again, until the Iraq War of March 2003 (Hastedt, 2004). Among the four major critics made by Hastedt, two are significant in my eyes. The first one is the “win the war and lose the peace” (Hastedt, 200, p.42). Indeed the USA won the war, but was not satisfied by the peace. Many thought that president Bush should have been further, destroying all Iraqi’s military capabilities, and even remove Saddam Hussein from power. Further, to me the “win the war and lose the peace” is actually a major recurrent failure of the United States in the Middle East region. It was the case with the Gulf War I, with the Afghanistan in 2001, the War of Iraq of 2003, and it will mostly be the case with Syria and foremost ISIS in a near future. Then the second critic is the usual skepticism over diplomacy by the United States, especially the capacities of other countries in their will and capabilities to negotiate. During the conflict, US diplomacy was aiming to keep

³³ Deterrence: « persuading an opponent not to initiate a particular action because the perceived benefits are outweighed by the anticipated costs and risks (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2013, p. 352). “Deterrence strategies are designed to prevent an opponent from undertaking an objectionable course of action. The most intensive studies of deterrence have focused on strategies that will prevent the use of nuclear weapons” (Hastedt, 2004, p. 127).

the allies united in their opposition to Iraq, but not to dialogue with Iraq. This is another failure that would be repeated for the Iraq War of 2003.

3. 3. The 2003 War of Iraq: the US Foreign policy on the Middle East in trouble in a new world order

Conclusion

First of all, it can be underlined that in spite of numerous changes, changes, upside down and wars, which have changed the shape and the regional order of the Middle East region, the foreign policy of the United States has been paradoxically relatively stable from the 1950s to the end of the Cold War era. Secondly, the three grand strategies that could be identified as the redline of the US foreign policy were isolationism, for the period before the Second World War. Second, due to the Cold War framework of the international arena, the grand strategy of foreign policy for this period was the containment, until the collapse of the Soviet Union. An third, even though the foreign policy of the United States changed, the grand strategy have been internationalism, or interventionism.

Paradoxically of these changes, the US foreign policy seemed to have been relatively stable. The consecutive American administrations and president have been able to use several different tools of foreign policy in order to protect the vital national interests of the country. However, the United States has known successes and failures. It has built alliances and partnership with the Arab countries of the regions whereas having a special relation with the state of Israel. The fact that the United States proved to be the sole hegemon of the Middle East helped the country to impose its will over the other regional powers, or against adversaries of the international system.

Nevertheless, One of the weaknesses of the US foreign policy in the region, which is more and more recurrent in my eyes is its “win the war and lose the peace” aspect, as Glenn Hasted has identified. By having a look on the disastrous heritage of the Iraq War of 2003 and the rise of non state actors such as Islamic terrorism embodied nowadays by the Islamic State. And looking at the non-action of president Barack Obama over the

war in Syria. Further, with the new Iran deal and the spread of Iranian influence within the region. It is with cautions that I forecast the continuity of great instability in the Middle East region. An instability, which will need a better and new approach from the United States if the country has the will to help solving the many issues of the today's Middle East. Now we have to wait and see what's the newly elected president Trump will do.

Bibliography

Books

- Baxter, K., & Akbarzadeh, S. (2008). *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. London: Routledge.
- Beasley, R. K. (2013). *Foreign policy in comparative perspective: Domestic and international influences on state behavior* (2d ed.). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Buzan, B. (2004). *The United States and the great powers: World politics in the twenty-first century*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Cleveland, W. L., & Bunton, M. (2009). *A History of the Modern Middle East* (4th ed.). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Dobson, A. P., & Marsh, S. (2007). *US foreign policy since 1945* (2d ed.) [PDF]. London: Routledge. Retrieved May, 2016.
- Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (2013). *International relations theories: Discipline and diversity* (3rd ed.) [PDF]. Retrieved March, 2016.
- Hastedt, G. P. (2000). *American foreign policy: Past, present, and future* (4th ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Hourani, A. (2010). *A history of the Arab peoples*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Hunt, M. H. (1987). *Ideology and U.S. foreign policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kissinger, H. (2014). *World Order*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Lesch, D. W., & Haas, M. L. (2014). *The Middle East and the United States, History, Politics and Ideologies* (5th ed.) [Kindle]. Retrieved May, 2016.
- Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1993). *Politics among nations the struggle for power and peace* (6th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Paul, T. V., Wirtz, J. J., & Fortmann, M. (2004). *Balance of power: Theory and practice in the 21st century* [PDF]. Retrieved March, 2016.
- Takeyh, R., & Simon, S. (2016). *The Pragmatic Superpower*. Retrieved May, 2016.

Encyclopedias and dictionaries

- Hastedt, G. P. (2004). *Encyclopedia of American foreign policy* [PDF]. New York, NY: Facts On File.

Magazines and Newspaper Articles

- Lindsay, J. (2012, March 12). TWE Remembers: The Truman Doctrine. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved May 20, 2016, from <http://blogs.cfr.org/lindsay/2012/03/12/twe-remembers-the-truman-doctrine/>
- Krauthammer, C. (2016, December 6). The Unipolar Moment. Retrieved April 3, 2016, from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-02-01/unipolar-moment>
- President Eisenhower's Speech on the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Eisenhower Doctrine), 1957. (1969, December). Retrieved May 3, 2016, from <http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/president-eisenhowers-speech-us-role-middle-east-eisenhower-doctrine-1957/p24130>
- Smith, S. (1986). Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview. *Review of International Studies*, 12(1), 13-29. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097063>

Websites and Webpages

- Avalon Project - Truman Doctrine. (2008). Retrieved May 20, 2016, from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp
- Ba'th Party. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2016, from <https://global.britannica.com/topic/Bath-Party>
- BBC NEWS | Middle East | The Suez Crisis: Key maps. (2006). Retrieved November 11, 2016, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5195068.stm
- Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). (1998, July 20). Retrieved December 05, 2016, from <https://global.britannica.com/topic/Central-Treaty-Organization>
- Gopnik, A. (n.d.). United States - Presidents of the United States. Retrieved February, 2016, from <http://www.britannica.com/place/United-States/Presidents-of-the-United-States>

- Isolationism. (2013, July 29). Retrieved December 04, 2016, from <https://global.britannica.com/topic/isolationism-foreign-policy>
- Lynch, C. M. (n.d.). United Nations (UN). Retrieved May 23, 2016, from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations>
- Near Eastern Affairs: Countries and Other Areas. (n.d.). Retrieved May 19, 2016, from <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/>
- Nguyen, H. T. (2013, August 13). World Journal of Social Science. May, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/wjss.v1n1p20>
- The World Factbook - Middle East. (n.d.). Retrieved May 19, 2016, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_mde.html
- The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. (2014, October 20). Middle East. Retrieved May 19, 2016, from <http://www.britannica.com/place/Middle-East>
- Pajon, C., Sawicki, P., & Vaisse, J. (2004). Etats-Unis : Politique trangre, histoire, politique extrieure des USA, relations internationales, Histoire de la politique trangre amricaine - Cline Pajon, Patrice Sawicki. Retrieved October, 2014, from <http://www.thucydide.com/realisations/comprendre/usa/usa2.htm>
- • *Persian Gulf War: location*. [Map/Still]. In *Britannica Online for Kids*. Retrieved from <http://kids.britannica.com/comptons/art-54607>
- Pfaltzgraff, R., & McClelland, C. A. (n.d.). International relations. Retrieved May 20, 2016, from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/study-of-international-relations#ref846569>
- Ruhollah Khomeini. (n.d.). Retrieved December 06, 2016, from <https://global.britannica.com/biography/Ruhollah-Khomeini>
Annex definitions
- World Development Indicators| World DataBank. (n.d.). Retrieved May 19, 2016, from <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2>