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Political and Economic Consequences of the European Migration Crisis for Germany

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Declaration:

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of the thesis entitled “Political and Economic Consequences of the European Migration Crisis for Germany“. I duly marked out all quotations. The used literature and sources are stated in the attached list of references.

In Prague on

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Abstract

Since 2015 massive migration movements into the European Union, mainly towards Germany have occurred, causing the so-called European migration crisis. This thesis aims to identify the political and economic consequences of this crisis for Germany. It focuses on the questions of what the political consequences on a national and international level are, what the economic consequences in terms of fiscal impact and labor market implications are, and which recommendations can be given to policy makers. As a fundamental theoretical understanding of migration is necessary to formulate a profound policy recommendation, existing political and economic theories of migration are described in the first chapter. For the identification of the political and economic consequences a thorough understanding of the European migration crisis is a prerequisite, which is why an overview of the context of the crisis is given in the second chapter. The question of the political consequences on the national and international level is answered in the third chapter. The fourth chapter provides the answer to the question of the economic consequences in terms of fiscal impact and labor market implications. The thesis relies on the analysis of several studies, official documents, reports and reliable news articles. It concludes with a policy recommendation which is consistent with the gained insights.

Key words: Migration, Europe, Germany, Refugees, Politics, Economics

Od roku 2015 masivní migrační přesuny do zemí EU a zejména do Německa způsobily tzv. evropskou migrační krizi. Cílem této diplomové práce je identifikace hlavních politických a ekonomických důsledků migrační krize pro Německo. Zaměřuje se na otázky politických důsledků a to jak na národní, tak i mezinárodní úrovni, na fiskální dopady a dopady pro trh práce a zároveň se zabývá doporučeními pro tvůrce hospodářské politiky. Základní teoretické pochopení migrace je nutností pro formulaci důkladných doporučení pro konkrétní politiky, a proto první kapitola práce popisuje existující politické a ekonomické teorie věnující se tématu migrace. Identifikace politických a ekonomických důsledků a dopadů evropské migrační krize ve druhé kapitole ovšem předpokládá pochopit také kontext událostí. Třetí kapitola se zabývá hlavními politickými důsledky na národní a mezinárodní úrovni a ekonomickými důsledky především na rozpočet a trh práce. Diplomová práce využívá analytického přístupu vybraných studií, úředních dokumentů, zpráv a spolehlivých mediálních zdrojů. V závěru práce sumarizuje hlavní doporučení, které jsou v souladu se získanými poznatky.

Klíčová slova: Migrace, Evropa, Německo, Uprchlíci, Politika, Ekonomie

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List of abbreviations

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)
AMIF	Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
BAMF	Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees)
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschland (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CEFR	Common European Framework of References for Languages
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria)
ERF	European Refugee Fund
ESF	European Social Fund
VET	Vocational Education and Training

Introduction

As the world today is getting more and more globalized and interconnected, international migration is playing an increasingly important role in many countries. Modern transportation allows for easier, cheaper and faster movement of people. Simultaneously, wars, poverty, inequality, persecution and unfavorable economic conditions promote migration and encourage people to leave their homes and search for a better life for themselves and their families in another country. (United Nations, 2016a)

Migration changes the traditional boundaries between cultures, languages, ethnic groups and nations. Even people who do not migrate themselves are affected by the movement of people in or out of their communities and by the resulting changes. Migration affects all aspects of the lives of the people involved. (UNESCO, 2016)

In 2015 the number of people who lived outside their country of origin amounted to 244 million people. That is a total of 3.3 percent of the world's population and a 41-percent-increase compared to 2000. Most of them moved to another country in search of better economic and social opportunities. Others had to flee from their country due to crises. (United Nations, 2016b)

The total number of refugees worldwide was about 20 million in 2015 (United Nations, 2016b). Due to the current mass movement of refugees, xenophobia is on the rise and many countries call for tightening border controls (United Nations Population Fund, 2015). However, if migration is managed properly and supported by appropriate policies it can bring significant economic growth and development both in the home and the host countries (United Nations, 2016a).

The UN-Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs notes:

“The rise in the number of international migrants reflects the increasing importance of international migration, which has become an integral part of our economies and societies. Well-managed migration brings important benefits to countries of origin and destination, as well as to migrants and their families.” - Wu Hongbo, UN-Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations, 2016b)

The so-called European migration crisis (also called “European migrant crisis” or “European refugee crisis”) started in 2015, when hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers entered the European Union. Many of them came from areas in Asia, Africa and from the Western Balkans. Some did not survive their risky journey across the Mediterranean Sea.

The migration crisis has significantly changed the political and economic situation of many nations. Some European countries are hardly able to cope with the current situation and the high numbers of new arrivals.

As Germany is the main destination for asylum seekers in the European Union this thesis follows the goal of identifying the political and economic consequences of the European migration crisis specifically for Germany.

In particular this thesis is trying to answer the following questions:

- What were the political consequences of the migration crisis for Germany, both on a national and international level?
- What are the fiscal impact and the labor market implications of the migration crisis for Germany?
- Which recommendations to German policy makers can be given in the context of the migration crisis?

To be able to formulate a profound policy recommendation it is necessary to possess some fundamental theoretical understanding of migration. Therefore this thesis starts off by describing existing political and economic theories about migration. Such theories exist in the fields of initiation and perpetuation of migration as well as in the field of integration.

For the analysis of its political and economic consequences for Germany, a thorough understanding of the European migration crisis is a prerequisite. Therefore Chapter Two provides an overview of the crisis, including a description of asylum seekers’ profiles, of the reasons which caused them to leave their home countries and an overview of the asylum system in Europe. The basis of the information provided includes publications by the European Commission and reports from the McKinsey Global Institute and the Migration Policy Institute.

The next chapter covers the political consequences for Germany on a national and international level. To be able to better comprehend these consequences (especially those on

the national level) an overview of Germany's asylum procedure is given in the beginning of the chapter. On the national level the thesis identifies the impact on asylum and integration policies. Also covered are the most significant impacts on certain political parties. After coverage of the consequences on the national level, the thesis moves on to identify and describe the consequences on the international level. The content of the chapter is based on the analysis of information from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), reliable news reports and official documents by the German Cabinet.

The following chapter deals with the economic consequences and focuses on the fiscal consequences and on the implications for the labor market. The analysis of the fiscal impact differentiates between immediate and long-term costs. An analysis of studies is conducted to be able to make profound statements about the long-term costs. To determine the labor market implications, the general labor market situation is analyzed first, followed by labor market statistics of people from the main non-European countries of origin of asylum seekers. To determine the chances of asylum seekers on the labor market an analysis of their qualification level in terms of language skills, vocational experience and formal education is important as well. Furthermore, specific challenges and efforts to facilitate the labor market integration of refugees are identified and described. The information provided is primarily based on surveys among employers, surveys among asylum seekers to determine their qualification level, and data from the Federal Employment Agency.

The thesis concludes with a policy recommendation which is consistent with the insights gained in the course of the investigations.

Throughout this thesis the terms "migrant", "refugee" and "migration" are frequently used. To avoid confusion and to allow for a clear distinction a definition of each term is provided below:

"Migrant": In the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants a "migrant worker" is defined as follows:

"The term 'migrant worker' refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national." - Article 2 point 1 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1990)

Based on the definition of a migrant worker given above, a working group of intergovernmental experts has come up with a broader definition of the term “migrant”:

"The term 'migrant' in article 1.1 (a) should be understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of 'personal convenience' and without intervention of an external compelling factor" - Intergovernmental working group of experts on the human rights of migrants (UNESCO, 2016)

The motivation of migrants to leave their home countries does not stem from being exposed to a direct threat of persecution or death but from a desire to improve their lives, for example by finding work, getting access to better education or by reuniting with their families. Migrants can safely return home anytime. (UNHCR, 2016)

“Refugee”: A “refugee” is a person who flees from an armed conflict or persecution. Often the situation of refugees is so desperate that they move to other countries to find safety there. Thus they become internationally recognized as refugees and obtain access to assistance from states, the UNHCR and other institutions. The denial of asylum can have deadly consequences for them. (UNHCR, 2016)

International laws define and protect refugees. Modern refugee protection is based on the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as other legal texts like the 1969 OAU (Organisation of African Unity) Refugee Convention. The legal principles which are written in these documents have influenced many other national and international laws and practices. (UNHCR, 2016)

In the 1951 Refugee Convention (in Article 1.A.2) a “refugee” is defined as any person who:

“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”. - Article 1.A.2 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951)

The distinction between “migrants” and “refugees” is important. Migrants are treated under a country’s own specific immigration laws and processes. When dealing with refugees a country has to consider norms of refugee protection and asylum which are defined not only in

national legislation but also in international law. Countries have responsibilities towards people who seek asylum on their territories. For example, they have to provide refugees with the guarantee of not being returned to the dangers they have fled, they have to make sure that refugees have access to fair asylum procedures and they have to ensure that the refugees' basic human rights are respected. (UNHCR, 2016)

Migration: (International) migration is referred to as the movement from one country to another one and includes the movement of migrants as well as refugees (Castle, 2000, p. 269).

1. Political and economic theory of migration

This chapter describes political and economic theories about the initiation and perpetuation of migration as well as about integration.

1.1 Theories about the initiation of migration

The large influx of migrants and refugees into Europe raises the question which factors might initiate migration. A variety of different theoretical concepts seek to explain the causes of migration movements. Specific economic theories include the neoclassical economic theory, the new economics of labor migration, the dual labor market theory and the world systems theory. In addition to that political factors also play an important role in the initiation of migration.

1.1.1 Neoclassical economic theory

The neoclassical economic theory is the oldest theory of migration and suggests that the most significant reason for international labor migration is wage differences between countries. The causes of these wage differences are geographic differences in demand and supply for workers. Wages are high in countries where supply of workers is lower than demand and low in countries where supply of workers is higher than demand. Countries with high wages attract workers from countries where wages are low. (Jennissen, 2007, p. 413)

When workers emigrate from a low-wage country to a high-wage country the supply of workers in the low-wage country decreases which leads to higher wages. Simultaneously, the supply of workers increases in the high-wage country, causing a decline in wages. This trend will continue until the difference in wages reflects only the costs (pecuniary and psychic) of moving from one country to another. (Massey et al., 1993, pp. 433-434)

1.1.2 The new economics of migration

Stark and Bloom (1985) state that individuals' wider social entities play an important role in the migration decision (Stark and Bloom, 1985, p. 173). This approach is referred to as the new economics of labor migration (Jennissen, 2007, p. 413).

According to this theory migration decisions are not made by individuals but by groups of related people (i.e. households / families). Households make the collective decision to send a family member abroad to minimize economic risks to the common income. Some members of the family can work in the local economy, while others seek work in a foreign country. If the economic conditions in the home country deteriorate and income decreases, the household can rely on remittances sent by the family member who works in a foreign country. (Massey et al., 1993, pp. 436-438)

It is estimated that in 2015 a total of 582 billion US-Dollars in global remittances was sent by migrants to their families in their home countries (Pew Research Center, 2016).

1.1.3 Dual labor market theory

One of the strongest proponents of this theory is Piore (1979), who argues that migration is caused by pull factors (need for foreign workers) in receiving countries and not by push factors (like low wages) in sending countries. According to the dual labor market theory international migration is caused by intrinsic labor demands of modern industrial societies. (Massey et al. pp. 440-441)

Immigration is necessary to fill certain jobs and workers are actively recruited in other countries. Such recruitment abroad was done for example by Western European countries during the 1960s (Kurekova, 2011, p. 9). In a coordinated effort the German government and employers started to recruit workers in Turkey for the German labor market and later other Western European countries also established recruiting offices in Turkey (Akgündüz, 1993, p. 155).

The intrinsic demand for immigrant labor stems from the fact that wages are not only determined by supply and demand, but also reflect social status and prestige of the worker. As a consequence simply raising wages for jobs at the bottom of an occupational hierarchy is no solution as wages on the other levels must be raised by corresponding amounts to reflect the social status of a job position (structural inflation). Formal institutional mechanisms like

union contracts or bureaucratic regulations ensure that wages correspond to people's perceived and expected hierarchies of status and prestige. Therefore attracting native workers for low-skilled jobs by raising entry level wages is inefficient. Instead, the recruiting of workers from abroad who will accept low wages is a cheaper and easier way of responding to labor-shortage. Employers need workers for whom employment is just a means of earning income and who do not care about status or prestige associated with their job. Migrants can meet this need. The wage a migrant gets paid in the host country may be way higher than wages in the country of origin. Even if migrants realize that their job is associated with a low status, they are willing to do the job because they do not see themselves as part of the host country's society. Instead they see themselves as a member of their native community, where working abroad and being able to send remittances to family members, brings along honor and prestige. (Massey et al., 1993, pp. 440-443)

1.1.4 World systems theory

This theory, which is based on the work of Wallerstein (1974), explains the phenomenon of migration with a structural change in world markets, globalization, increasing interdependence of economies as well as the development of new forms of production. For example, foreign direct investment from advanced to emerging economies has led to the expansion of export manufacturing. This development disrupted traditional work structures and promoted migration movements. (Kurekova, 2011, p. 8)

According to the world systems theory, the penetration of capitalist economic relations into the developing world inevitably leads to international migration. International migration often occurs between former colonial powers and their former colonies. This is due to the fact that during the era of the colonialization cultural, linguistic, administrative, transportation and communication links were established. As the globalization of the market economy is the cause of international migration governmental policies like regulating foreign direct investments and controlling international trade, can influence migration movements. However, such policies can be difficult to enforce - due to lobbyism of multinational companies - and may lead to international trade disputes. Therefore such policies are unlikely to be realized. When governments try to protect investments abroad with political and military actions they may generate refugee movements. (Massey et al., 1993, pp. 444-448)

1.1.5 Political theory

Political factors play an important role in the initiation of migration. In the country of origin political tensions can lead to an escalation of violence and or even to a civil war. Violence may occur between citizens (e.g. in the form of ethnic conflicts), between a government and its citizens (e.g. in the form of oppression of citizens) or between countries (wars). As a consequence of the acts of violence, people may fear for their physical well-being and decide to flee the country. (Jennissen, 2007, p. 421)

Apart from the use of violence the situation of war may also be accompanied by governmental changes, a complete collapse of the government or major protests. Such instances of political instability can lead to a sense of insecurity and a loss of confidence in authorities and therefore increase migration movements, as people fear anarchy and chaos. (Williams and Pradhan, 2009, p. 5)

Naturally, war can also have devastating consequences on the economy of the country where it takes place. The current situation in Syria, for example has a devastating impact on the local economy. Economic infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, the currency has depreciated which has led to a decrease of purchasing power, state revenues have collapsed due to a decrease in oil exports, trade has been disrupted, production of goods has decreased, there has been a rise in unemployment and poverty, etc... (ACAPS, 2013, pp. 1-2)

1.2 Theories about the perpetuation of migration

The theories propounded above have been meant to explain reasons for migration. This subchapter covers theories regarding the perpetuation of migration, namely the network theory, the institutional theory and the theory of cumulative causation.

1.2.1 Network theory

Migrants and non-migrants, both in countries of origin and destination are connected through interpersonal relations (kinship, friendship, shared community origin). These ties reduce costs and risks of international movement and thus increase the probability of additional migration movements. For the first migrants who move to another country, the migration process is

complicated and they cannot rely on any social structure in their country of destination. However, their friends and relatives who might follow them can rely on the help of those who are already in the country of destination. For example they might help them to find a job. Some immigration policies promote reunification between immigrants and their families who are still in their native countries and give relatives of migrants special rights of entering the country. The growth of a kind of network eventually becomes self-sustaining as every new immigrant expands it and reduces the risks of movement for his or her family and friends. With the falling costs and risks the migration flow becomes less selective in socioeconomic terms and thus more representative of society of the respective country of origin. Due to the formation and expansion of the networks the migration becomes more and more institutionalized and independent of the factors that caused it in the first place. Governments will have a hard time stopping the flows of migration as they cannot control the process of network formation. (Massey et al., 1993, pp. 448-450)

Empirical evidence for the network theory can be found for example in the work by Dolfin and Genicot (2006) who examined the effect of networks on migration from Mexico to the US.

1.2.2 Institutional theory

In the context of international migration there is often an imbalance between the number of people trying to enter a country and the limited number of visas granted by the country. In addition to that countries often set up barriers in an effort to prevent people from entering their country. These circumstances create a “business opportunity” for entrepreneurs and institutions who promote international movement. An illicit market for migration is created. Services like smuggling people across borders and counterfeiting documents are provided in return for high fees. To fight the extreme exploitation which is often intrinsic to this black market and to enforce the rights of immigrants, voluntary humanitarian organizations arise. These humanitarian groups help migrants by supplying them with things like legal advice, accommodation, social services and general counseling. Governments frequently face enormous problems controlling the migration flows as migration becomes increasingly institutionalized. (Massey et al., 1993, pp. 450-451)

1.2.3 Cumulative causation

The term “cumulative causation” was first used by Myrdal (1957). It describes a process in which an act of migration changes the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made. This typically makes additional migration more likely. (Massey et al., 1993, p. 451)


Massey and Fussell explain:

“The theory of cumulative causation posits that once the level of migration in a community reaches a certain level, migration takes on a momentum of its own, independent of the structural forces that originally caused it, leading to ‘mass migration’.” – Massey and Fussell (Massey and Fussell, 2004, p. 168)

Economic areas in the country of origin which are influenced by cumulative causation are for example the distribution of income in the country of origin and the availability of human capital in the country of origin. (Massey et al., 1993, p. 451)


The following figures illustrate the effect of cumulative causation on the distribution of income (figure 1) and on availability of human capital (figure 2) in the country of origin.

Figure 1: Effect of cumulative causation on the income distribution in the country of origin



Source: Own creation, based on information from Massey et al. 1993, p. 451-452

Figure 2: Effect of cumulative causation on the availability of human capital in the country of origin



Source: Own creation, based on information from Massey et al, 1993, p. 453

1.3 Concepts about the integration of immigrants

The theories propounded so far have tried to explain why migration occurs and why it perpetuates. Once in the host-country the migrants need to be somehow integrated into society. Two basic concepts of how to integrate migrants into the society of the host country are “multiculturalism” and “assimilation”. These concepts include severe implications for governmental policies.

1.3.1 Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism aims at protecting cultural diversity (Rodrigues, 2017). Well-known advocates of the concept of multiculturalism are the political philosophers Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka.

According to Taylor culture has a strong influence on an individual’s identity and is needed by individuals to make sense of their lives. Therefore it is important to appreciate and protect individuals’ cultural communities. Taylor argues in favor of a liberalism, which takes into

account differences between individuals and groups and enhances cultural diversity. However, he emphasizes that this commitment to promoting difference has to be consistent with fundamental rights like the right to live, liberty, free speech and free practice of religion. Taylor argues that sometimes cultural communities need to have power over certain jurisdictions in order to be able to promote their own culture; as a consequence, liberalism as described by Taylor has grave implications for public policy: Governmental power should be decentralized to make sure that communities can flourish. Being Canadian himself, Taylor believes that a form of federalism would be the best immigration policy in the Canadian context. He specifically mentions Quebec, which ought to receive self-governmental rights allowing the province to autonomously decide over certain policies. Taylor states that in order to preserve the language of a community it is in some cases justified to violate liberal values like freedom of expression. As regards Quebec, communication in English can be restricted in an effort to “protect” the French language. While Taylor contends that federalism is the appropriate option in the Canadian context that does not necessarily mean that it is an appropriate option in other contexts as well. (as cited in Rodrigues, 2017)

Kymlicka (2012) points out that in order to facilitate the implementation of multiculturalism in a society several conditions regarding national security, human rights, border control, diversity and immigrants’ economic contributions are important (Kymlicka, 2012, p. 2):

- National security: If immigrants are perceived as a threat to state security (like e.g. Muslim immigrants in the US after 9/11) multiculturalism is more controversial.
- Human rights: In case immigrants share the commitments towards human rights with the society of the host country, the multiculturalist approach will receive more support. If a state perceives that the immigrants do not respect fundamental human rights, the state is less likely to grant multicultural rights to the immigrants. According to Kymlicka in particular Muslims are often perceived as unwilling to adapt to liberal-democratic norms.
- Border control: Multiculturalism meets with more resistance from citizens when they feel like there are not enough controls at the borders of their country. This usually happens when countries are facing large numbers of asylum seekers or unauthorized immigrants.
- Diversity: The concept of multiculturalism is more likely to work when immigration is indeed multicultural, i.e. when the immigrants come from many different countries than mainly from one.

- Economic contributions: The idea of multiculturalism will receive more support when the immigrants genuinely try to contribute to society (particularly economically).

From the 1970s to mid-1990s multiculturalism was pretty popular among western democratic countries and a range of multicultural policies were implemented to promote ethnic diversity. Older ideas of a unitary and homogenous national society became less popular. Since the mid-1990s however the popularity of multiculturalism has decreased rapidly. Kymlicka gives two main reasons for this trend (Kymlicka, 2012, pp. 3-4):

1. The population of a country fears that multiculturalism is getting out of control and threatens their way of life. As a result populist right-wing parties are rising.
2. Parties on the center-left like the social democratic parties in Europe that initially argued in favor of multiculturalism have changed their opinion and now believe that multiculturalism has failed to effectively benefit the minorities and help them out of their political, economic and social exclusion because it does not address the underlying sources of their “exclusion”. They believe that instead of helping the minorities multiculturalism may have unintentionally promoted their social isolation. As a result these parties now emphasize concepts like social cohesion, civic integration, shared citizenship and common values. This new approach is sometimes described as “post-multiculturalism”.

Numerous politicians, like for example the former British Prime Minister David Cameron, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, former Prime Minister of Australia John Howard and the former Prime Minister of Spain Jose Maria Aznar have declared that multicultural policies have failed to successfully integrate immigrants (Agence France-Presse, 2011).

1.3.2 Assimilation

Assimilation is a process where a minority group adopts the attitudes and cultural characteristics of the majority group of the host country. The minority group drops its previous identity and over time adopts the values, norms, behaviors, characteristics and lifestyles of the majority group. The goal of assimilation policies is to incorporate immigrants into the society of the host country by removing deviating language, lifestyles, attitudes and cultural codes from the immigrants and replacing them with those of the host country's majority group. (Wagener, 2010, p. 3)

The classic assimilation theory dates back to the Chicago School in the 1920s but is also represented in more recent works. It assumes that immigrants and the majority group of the host country converge to each other and gradually become similar. According to this theory immigrants who have lived in the host country for a longer time and their descendants show more similarities with the majority group than immigrants who have arrived more recently in the host country. Earlier versions of this theory have met with severe criticism for being “Anglo-conformist” as they expected US-immigrants to conform to the values of a white Protestant middle-class (Brown and Bean, 2006)

One well-known and often cited classical theory of assimilation was developed by Milton M. Gordon in 1964. In his theory he describes seven stages of assimilation (table 1).

Table 1: Gordon’s seven stages of assimilation

Subprocess or Condition	Type of Stage or Assimilation	Special Term
Change of cultural patterns to those of host society	Cultural or behavioural assimilation	Acculturation
Large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of host society, on primary group level	Structural assimilation	None
Large-scale intermarriage	Marital assimilation	Amalgamation
Development of sense of peoplehood based exclusively on host society	Identificational assimilation	None
Absence of prejudice	Attitude receptional assimilation	None
Absence of discrimination	Behavior receptional assimilation	None
Absence of value and power conflict	Civiv assimilation	None

Source: Gordon, 1964, p. 71

According to Gordon acculturation does not necessarily lead to structural assimilation but structural assimilation inevitably leads to acculturation. The next stage is marital assimilation which is an inevitable by-product of structural assimilation. Marital assimilation leads to a loss of ethnic identity and identificational assimilation takes place. After that the remaining stages of assimilation follow very quickly. (Gordon, 1964, p. 80)

The degree of assimilation can be measured by using four primary benchmarks (Waters and Jiminez, 2005, p. 105):

1. Socioeconomic status: Socioeconomic status is based on education, occupation and income. Measuring these variables over a certain period of time provides information about whether immigrants catch up to native-born individuals in terms of these “human capital characteristics”. (Waters and Jiminez, 2005, p. 108)

2. Residential patterns: Massey (1985) coined the term “spatial assimilation model”. This model is based on theories by Park (1950) and states that residential concentration of immigrants decreases with higher socioeconomic attainment, longer time of residency in the host-country and higher generational status. (Waters and Jiminez, 2005, p. 109)
3. Language attainment: It is defined as immigrants’ ability to speak the national language of the host-country and the loss of the mother tongue. The so-called “three generations model” about immigrants to the US suggests that the immigrant generation remains dominant in their mother tongue, the second generation becomes bilingual (speaking parent’s mother tongue at home and English outside from home) and the third generation speaks only English. (Tran, 2010, p. 260)
4. Inter marriage: Frequently described as the litmus test of assimilation (Waters and Jiminez, 2005, p. 110), inter marriage is a clear signal for the adaption of the host country’s cultural patterns and for the adaption of a minority group into mainstream society (Qian and Lichter, 2007, p. 70).

1.3.3 Alternative approach

The concepts of multiculturalism and assimilation both share the idea of a society consisting of a majority and a minority group. Multiculturalism endorses separation of the minority from the majority while assimilation endorses assimilation of the minority to the majority. Having been popular in the past multiculturalism is now often seen as promoting communal segregation and mutual incomprehension. Arguments against assimilation are that it means removing diversity and enforcing homogenization and loss of vitality. The loss of diversity would be wasteful because diversity does not only contribute to cultural vitality but can also improve social and economic performance. Furthermore, freedom to choose one’s own culture is a fundamental human right – as long as the culture is coherent with the universal values of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law. (Council of Europe, 2008, pp. 13-18)

The council of Europe sums up the concerns with each approach with the following words:

“Assimilation to a unity without diversity would mean an enforced homogenisation and loss of vitality, while diversity without any overarching common humanity and solidarity would make mutual recognition and social inclusion impossible.” – Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 14)

As a consequence the council of Europe suggests a new approach called “intercultural dialogue” whose characteristics it describes as follows:

“Unlike assimilation, it recognises that public authorities must be impartial, rather than accepting a majority ethos only, if communalist tensions are to be avoided. Unlike multiculturalism, however, it vindicates a common core which leaves no room for moral relativism. Unlike both, it recognises a key role for the associational sphere of civic society where, premised on reciprocal recognition, intercultural dialogue can resolve the problems of daily life in a way that governments alone cannot.” – Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 20)

This approach seems like an ideal solution; however, the promotion of reciprocal recognition and intercultural dialogue in the civic society constitutes a challenging task.

2. European migration crisis

A thorough understanding of the European migration crisis is a prerequisite to analyze its political and economic consequences for Germany and to formulate a profound policy recommendation. Therefore this chapter provides an overview of the profile of asylum seekers, reasons for the crisis, and the European asylum system.


2.1 Profile of asylum seekers in Europe

This subchapter includes an overview of the number of asylum seekers coming to Europe, their demographics, and the routes they take.

2.1.1 Number of asylum seekers

Today the total flow of migration worldwide includes approximately 247 million people. 90 percent of them are migrants who left their country of origin voluntarily, usually for economic reasons, but 21 million are refugees who fled from conflict and persecution (Woetzel et al., 2016, pp. 1-6).


Most asylum seekers are from developing countries where wars are taking place. They mostly flee to neighboring countries. Consequently, regions in the developing world host the vast majority of asylum seekers (figure 3). 2.3 million asylum seekers (which are about 10 percent of the asylum seekers worldwide) have come to Europe in the period from January 2015 to August 2016. (Mattern et al. 2016, p. 1-2)

Figure 3: Stock of refugees and asylum seekers by arrival region in 2015

Source: Mattern et al., 2016, p. 9

This is the largest inflow of asylum seekers into Europe since the aftermath of World War II and far higher than the number of asylum seekers at the height of the Balkan wars (figure 4). Europe was not prepared for this sudden and dramatic surge of asylum seekers. (Mattern et al., 2016, p. 1)

Figure 4: Number of asylum applications in Europe per year from 1980 until 2015




Source: Mattern et al, 2016, p. 11

2.1.2 Demographics of asylum seekers

Seventy percent of asylum seekers in Europe are male. Thirty percent of them are under the age of 18, fifty percent are between 18 and 34 years old and twenty percent are at least 35 years old. These demographics differ from the demographics of the global population of asylum seekers (figure 5). The high numbers of young men among asylum seekers in Europe may be explained by the difficulties and dangers associated with the journey to Europe. These demographics may change over time when wives and children follow the young men to Europe. (Mattern et al. 2016, p. 14)

Figure 5: Age and gender distribution of asylum seekers globally and in Europe




Source: Mattern et al., 2016, p. 14

2.1.3 Countries of origin and destination

More than half of the asylum seekers in Europe come from only three countries, namely Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (figure 6). Other countries of origin are Pakistan and African countries like Eritrea and Nigeria or the Maghreb (Mattern et al., 2016, p. 1).

Some asylum applications are from people from poor and economically unstable countries like Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. These countries are deemed to be “safe” by the EU. As a consequence asylum applications from citizens of these nations face high rejection rates of more than 99 percent. (Mattern et al., 2016, p. 17)

Figure 6: Share of asylum seekers in Europe by country of origin in 2016



Source: Mattern et al., 2016, p. 15

The number of asylum seekers in Europe is not distributed evenly across European countries (table 2). These differences in distribution can be explained with the varying attractiveness of the countries for the asylum seekers and the varying governmental policies. Almost half of the 2.3 million asylum seekers in Europe went to Germany. Together the countries of Germany, Hungary, Sweden, Italy, France and Austria accommodate about 80 percent of all asylum seekers in Europe. (Mattern et al. 2016, pp. 11-12)

Table 2: Number of asylum seekers in the top six receiving European countries

The top six receiving countries accounted for ~80% of asylum seekers Thousand		% of total arrivals to Europe	Asylum seekers per 1,000 inhabitants
Germany	1,099	48	14
Hungary	199	9	20
Sweden	172	8	18
Italy	155	7	3
France	119	5	2
Austria	116	5	14

Source: Mattern et al., 2016, p. 12

As Italy and Greece are the frontline countries to the South, they do not only face the challenge of accommodating large numbers of asylum seekers, but also have to administer the new arrivals who often arrive in peak waves. These countries have to deal with securing their borders, rescuing refugee boats and accommodating and registering the new arrivals. Hungary and Austria face huge numbers of asylum seekers who just want to pass through these countries to reach their ultimate destinations of Germany and Scandinavia. (Mattern et al., 2016, p. 11)

2.1.4 Routes taken to get to Europe

There are three main routes used by asylum seekers to come to Europe:

- The Central Mediterranean route
- The Eastern Mediterranean route
- The Western Balkan route

Most asylum seekers who use the Central Mediterranean route cross the Mediterranean Sea in smugglers' boats which depart from Libya, Tunisia or Egypt and arrive in Italy or Malta. The route is extremely dangerous and many have died on it. The Central Mediterranean route has become less used in 2015, partly due to increasing instability in Libya but is still used by people from the Sub-Saharan region who have few alternative routes to choose from. (Banulescu-Bodgan and Fratzke, 2015)

In contrast, the Eastern Mediterranean route has become increasingly popular in 2015. The route is mostly used to get from Turkey to Greece (mainly to Greek islands like Lesbos and Kos, which are near the Turkish coast). The primary reason for the increase in popularity of this route is the fact that Syrians have realized that it is easier and safer than the Central Mediterranean route. (Banulescu-Bodgan and Fratzke, 2015)

An unprecedented number of asylum seekers arrived in Greece and then tried to make their way to Western Europe using the Western Balkan route. They planned to pass through the Republic of Macedonia and through Serbia to Hungary and Croatia and from there on to Western Europe. To prevent people from re-entering the EU through Hungary's border with Serbia, Hungary built a fence on this border and the flow of asylum seekers shifted to Croatia. (Frontex, 2017)

In an effort to further decrease migration movements several Balkan states including Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia introduced stricter entry requirements and built fences on their borders (Martens, 2015). These measures drastically reduced the migration movements on the Western Balkan route (Staib and Stabenow, 2017).

2.2 Reasons for the crisis

The situation in asylum seekers' countries of origin is a major reason for the migration to Europe. However, for the sudden and massive increase of asylum applications in 2015 other factors also played an important role.

2.2.1 Situation in asylum seekers' home countries

As Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq are the main countries of origin of asylum seekers the situation in these countries is briefly described below to understand what motivates people from these areas to leave their homes and seek asylum.

The situation in Syria is quite devastating due to a current civil war in the country. The civil war grew out of pro-democracy protests in the city of Deraa in 2011. Security forces started to open fire on protestors, killing several of them. The events caused nationwide protests demanding President Assad's resignation. The protestors were not held back by the government's use of force and more and more people joined the protests and eventually

started to pick up arms. The acts of violence escalated, dragging the country into a civil war. Rebel brigades were formed to fight the government's forces. In 2012 fighting reached the capital of Damascus and the second biggest city Aleppo. The UN reported that by August 2015 250,000 people had been killed in the conflict (United Nations Security Council, 2015). Initially a conflict between those for and against Assad it is today a conflict of bigger dimensions. The conflict got a sectarian overtone as the country's Sunni majority is fighting against Assad's Shia Alawite sect. The entry of regional and world powers and the rise of the jihadist group Islamic State have led to further escalation. Many civilians have been killed by barrel bombs dropped by government aircrafts on the rebels. Terrorists execute hostages, carry out mass killings and publicly execute those who refuse to accept their rules. Chemical weapons, including sarin, chlorine and sulphur mustard, have also been used in the conflict. In September 2014 a US-led coalition started to launch air strikes against the IS in Syria. A year later Russia started an air campaign against "terrorists" but according to opposition activists the attacks mostly hit Western-backed rebels and civilians. (Rodgers et al., 2016)

In 1979 Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in an effort to establish a communist government. The Soviet-Afghan war dragged on for a period of 10 years. During this war the US supported Islamic insurgents who were fighting against the Soviets. By the 1990s the Soviets left Afghanistan and the US lost interest. Parts of the country were in a lawless and chaotic state. This gave the Taliban the opportunity to gain ground in the country. The Taliban fought against Afghanistan's warlords, but also committed human rights violations. Under its leader Osama Bin Laden the group al-Qaida set up training camps where also the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were planned. Following the 9/11 attacks the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban. (Holan, 2009)

International troops withdrew from the country between 2011 and 2014 and left Afghanistan in a poor economic and unsecure condition (United States Institute of Peace, 2017). As the international troops left, insurgent forces launched sustained attacks and the Afghan security forces suffered high casualties. Following the withdrawal the number of killed civilians also rose significantly. According to UN reports the number of civilian casualties in the first six months of 2014 was 24 percent higher than in 2013. (Human Rights Watch, 2017)

In 2003 the US and Great Britain invaded Iraq and quickly defeated Iraqi military and paramilitary forces often facing only minor resistance. However, an insurgency emerged against the US-led occupation, and the conflict continued. As violence started to decline in 2007, the US gradually reduced its military presence and officially withdrew from the country

in 2011. The main argument for the 2003 invasion was that Saddam Hussein's government possessed and produced weapons of mass destruction - an accusation which later turned out to be erroneous. In December 2003 Saddam Hussein was captured, and executed three years later, as he was convicted of crimes against humanity. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2011)

In 2013 jihadi fighters who had once been in control of most of Iraq's Sunni areas, but were defeated during the "surge" campaign (increase in deployment of US troops in 2007) were gaining power again. Violence escalated into a civil war and to a level not seen in Iraq since the US-led war a few years earlier, as Kurdish and Iraqi forces and their allies are fighting for control of territories with the IS. (GlobalSecurity.org, 2017)

According to a UN report, at least 18,802 civilians were killed between January 2014 and October 2015. Another 36,245 civilians were wounded during that period of time. (United Nations News Centre, 2016)

2.2.2 Reasons for the increase of asylum applications in Europe in 2015

As the number of asylum seekers in Europe drastically increased in 2015 some reasons for this trend are described in the following paragraph. Reasons for the sudden and massive increase in the number of asylum applications in 2015 are among others:

Changes to Macedonia's asylum law: In June 2015 Macedonia passed a law which allowed asylum seekers to pass through the country within 72 hours. Previously they were not allowed to legally transit the country. (Associated Press, 2015)

Before Macedonia passed this law, the route from Libya to Italy was the preferred route to Europe. The route from Turkey to Greece would have been much shorter and safer, but the route from Greece through the Balkans to Northern and Western Europe was way more complicated than the route through Italy. When the new law was passed the route through the Balkans opened up, making it easier, safer and cheaper for the asylum seekers to reach their final destination, which led to a massive increase in migration movements. (Sly, 2015)

Syrian government policies: Syria's government announced increasing efforts to enlist more reservists to serve in the army to fight the rebellion. This forced conscription affects all men who completed the compulsory military service in the past 10 years. These are basically all men under the age of around 30. Many Syrians who fled to Europe stated that the reason for them to leave their home country was to escape the forced conscription. Simultaneous to the

increasing efforts to enlist reservists the Syrian government has made it easier for Syrians to acquire passports and therefore it has become easier to leave the country. Therefore, many Syrian watchers think Assad purposely encourages the refugee flow to get rid of potential opponents in Syria. Assad, on the other hand, blames the West for the increasing number of refugees as he accuses Western countries of fomenting “terrorism” in Syria by supporting the opposition. (Sly, 2015)

The situation in Middle Eastern countries: There is no hope for refugees in nearby Middle Eastern countries like Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan to which many (mainly Syrians) have fled initially. In these countries the refugees have no secure legal status and they are not formally recognized as refugees. Most do not receive work permits and many children do not have access to education. (Kingsley, 2015)

In addition to that there has been a drastic shortfall in UN funding, leading to a lack of food and healthcare in refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan (Grant, 2015).

Germany’s suspension of the Dublin agreement for Syrian asylum seekers: Another major reason for the increase in migration numbers in 2015 was Germany’s suspension of the Dublin Regulation for asylum seekers from Syria (see chapter 3.3.1 “Suspension of the Dublin regulation for Syrian asylum seekers”). In addition to the suspension of the Dublin agreement TV footage of Germans welcoming asylum seekers has encouraged asylum seekers to make the trip to Germany (Sly, 2015).

2.3 Asylum system in Europe

This subchapter provides an overview of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the Dublin Regulation, financing of the CEAS, the Temporary Protection Directive and criticism of the CEAS.

2.3.1 The Common European Asylum System

Since 1999 the EU is striving to create a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (BAMF, 2016a).

Today the CEAS consists of (European Commission, 2017a):

- a legal framework which covers all aspects of the asylum process
- a support agency called “European Asylum Support Agency” with the tasks of supporting the implementation of the legal framework and facilitating cooperation among EU members

Its major purpose is to ensure that all EU countries protect the rights of asylum seekers. The CEAS includes minimum standards and procedures which should be met by EU members when processing and deciding on asylum applications. (Open Society Foundations, 2016)

To outline the main issues linked to the creation of the CEAS and to encourage constructive suggestions to tackle these issues, a large public consultation was conducted. All relevant stakeholders (i.e. EU institutions, national, regional and local authorities, academia, non-governmental organizations, individuals, etc...) were invited to contribute to the consultation. (European Commission, 2007, p. 15)

The responses were the basis for a “Policy Plan on Asylum” presented by the European Commission in 2008. With the aim of setting common high standards and stronger cooperation among EU countries the following new rules have been agreed upon (European Commission, 2017b):

- The revised Asylum Procedures Directive to increase the fairness, speed and quality of asylum decision
- The revised Reception Conditions Directive to guarantee humane conditions and fundamental rights for asylum seekers
- The revised Qualification Directive to clarify the grounds for granting international protection
- The revised Dublin Regulation to increase protection of asylum seekers while the state who is responsible for processing the application is determined
- The revised EURODAC (European Dactyloscopy) regulation allows law enforcement to access the EU database containing fingerprints of asylum seekers when necessary to prevent or investigate serious crimes like murder or terrorism

Asylum rules not covered by the CEAS are decided on a national level and therefore differ between EU member countries. Main areas which are not covered by rules of the CEAS but by national rules are (Aiyar et al., 2016, p. 11):

- Under which conditions residency is granted

- Which countries are deemed “safe countries of origin”
- The level of support asylum seekers receive
- How quickly asylum seekers are allowed to enter the labor market

2.3.2 The Dublin Regulation

The previously mentioned Dublin regulation plays an especially important role in the European migration crisis and is therefore explained in more detail below.

According to the Dublin regulation asylum seekers do not have the right to choose in which EU state they want to settle. If the member state in which they apply for asylum is not the one responsible, they should be transferred to the responsible state. (European Commission, 2016, p. 3)

Generally, the member state where the asylum seeker first enters the EU is responsible for the registration, but few exceptions (like family reunions) exist (Aiyar et al., 2016, p. 3). Asylum seekers who move on to other EU states from the country where they have been registered can be sent back to that country where their asylum application is then processed. Many refugees try to avoid being registered in the country where they first arrive (mostly Italy and Greece). (Lyons, 2015)

A strict application of the Dublin regulation puts high pressure on gateway countries in the EU (e.g. Italy and Greece) as they are officially responsible for the processing of large numbers of asylum applications (Aiyar et al. 2016, p. 11).

Several studies argue that the Dublin system is ineffective (Den Heijer et al., 2016, p. 3-4). In 2013 for example 76.358 requests for transfers were made, out of which 56.466 were accepted by the receiving state. However, only 15.938 (20% of the requests) were actually carried out. The most often cited reason for not carrying out the transfer is absconding of the asylum seeker. Other reasons may include illness of the asylum seeker, voluntary return to the country of origin, and difficulties with the coordination of transfer logistics. (Fratzke, 2015, p. 11-12)

2.3.3 Financing

To strengthen financial solidarity (i.e. sharing of costs) with EU countries which experience a large influx of asylum seekers, the European Refugee Fund (ERF) was created. The ERF was

allocated 630 million euro over the period from 2008 to 2013. Except for Denmark all EU countries participated in the ERF. (European Commission, 2017c)

In 2014 the ERF merged with the European Integration Fund and the European Return Fund into the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) which was set up for the period of 2014 to 2020 with a total of more than 3 billion euros. Like with the ERF Denmark is the only EU country which is not part of the AMIF. The AMIF promotes the efficient management of migration flows as well as the implementation, strengthening and development of a common approach to asylum and migration among EU countries. (European Commission, 2017c)

More specifically it contributes to the achievement of the following objectives (European Commission, 2017c):

- Promotion of the CEAS by ensuring a uniform application of corresponding EU legislation
- Support of legal migration to the EU while considering labor market needs and promotion of effective integration of immigrants
- Reduction of irregular migration by promoting fair and effective return strategies
- Ensuring that EU countries which are experiencing a large influx of asylum seekers can count on the support of the other EU countries

Possible beneficiaries of the AMIF include (European Commission, 2017c):

- State / federal authorities
- NGOs
- Humanitarian organizations
- Education and research organizations
- Local public bodies
- Private and public law companies

Possible concrete actions funded by the AMIF include (European Commission, 2017c):

- Improvement of accommodation and reception services for asylum seekers
- Education and language training
- Information measures and campaigns in countries outside of the EU on legal migration channels
- Information exchange and cooperation between EU countries

Further funds to finance integration policies are the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund (Kraatz and Dimova, 2016, p. 3).

2.3.4 The Temporary Protection Directive

In 2001 the Temporary Protection Directive was developed. This directive provides the framework for a common and coordinated response of EU member states regarding the management of a mass influx of refugees. (European Commission, 2017b)

As stated in the official document the directive established “minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons” and promotes “a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof” (Council Directive 2001/55/EC, 2001).

Furthermore, the directive allows for the application of group categorization of asylum-seekers. This means that statuses of asylum seekers who are part of a specific, recognized protected group (e.g. Syrians) do not need to be determined individually. Members of such groups do not need to individually prove “a well-founded fear of persecution”, as specified in the 1951 Refugee Convention to be granted protection. This relieves the administrative burden of having to investigate each individual asylum application. The protection would initially be limited to one year, but may be extended by vote. (Akkaya, 2015)

Despite of the fact, that it was created exactly for situations like the current migration crisis, the Temporary Protection Directive has not been applied on it so far. This may be due to the ongoing debate about the somewhat unclear definition of “mass influx”. (Akkaya, 2015)

According to the UNHCR, “mass or large-scale influx” cannot be identified in absolute terms but

“should be understood as referring to a significant number of arrivals in a country, over a short time period, of persons from the same home country who have been displaced under circumstances indicating that members of the group would qualify for international protection, and for whom, due to their numbers, individual refugee status determination is procedurally impractical” – UNHCR (UNHCR, 2000, p. 13)

The fact that absolute terms regarding the required number of entering displaced persons to be considered as “mass influx” are missing, leaves room for interpretation and debate. Furthermore, despite of several occasions (e.g. the war in Kosovo) where it could have been

used the directive has never been implemented. Possible reasons why it has never been used may also include the argument that it might serve as an additional attraction for refugees to enter the EU, and the fact that the directive may not be politically feasible, as it includes the idea of burden-sharing, which is particularly unpopular in smaller EU states whose resources are already strained. (Akkaya, 2015)

2.3.5 Criticism

One central aim of the European asylum policy is the reduction of secondary movements within the EU. Differing attractiveness of member states leads to secondary movement (i.e. travel from one EU country to another) of asylum seekers within the EU. As some areas of asylum law are not covered by the CEAS, but by national law, the EU can only to a limited extent address the different levels of attractiveness of its member states. The EU tries to harmonize asylum laws, but is far from creating a level playing field as recognition rates, procedural standards and reception conditions differ widely among member states. (Den Heijer et al., 2016, pp. 2-5)

To avoid becoming the destination of “asylum shoppers”, some member states may decide to provide lower standards than others (Den Heijer et al., 2016, p. 2). Denmark for example decided to halve its social security benefits for asylum seekers to reduce the number of asylum seekers entering the country. (The Guardian, 2015)

As mentioned earlier, several studies suggest that the Dublin system is ineffective. It is also perceived as unfair by some member states, as it assigns high responsibilities on the countries of first entry. As a consequence of the high burdens, states like Italy and Greece have decided to suspend the rules of the CEAS and have stopped registering asylum seekers and instead just let them pass through to other EU countries. Other EU members have quitted sending back asylum seekers to the country of first entry to put less pressure on these countries. (Den Heijer et al., 2016, p. 5)

These issues clearly demonstrate that the Dublin regulation needs to be reformed / that an EU wide distribution mechanism should be considered.

Another point of criticism is that EU law allows for what Den Heijer et al. call “free rider behavior” (Den Heijer et al., 2016, p. 6). A typical example is the case of Denmark, which is fully enjoying benefits like being part of the Schengen free travel area but refuses to take part in initiatives like the resettling of refugees from Italy and Greece (The Local, 2015).

The circumstances described above demonstrate the conflict between the interests of the EU as a whole and the individual national interests of some member states.

3. Political consequences for Germany

The migration crisis has brought along several political consequences for Germany on the national and international level. To be able to better understand and comprehend these consequences, some fundamental knowledge about the asylum procedure in Germany is needed. This is why this chapter starts off with a description of the asylum procedure in Germany and then goes on to identify the political consequences on the national and international level.

3.1 Asylum procedure in Germany

In order to be able to better comprehend the political consequences of the migration crisis for Germany, it is necessary to be familiar with the asylum procedure in Germany. Therefore, this subchapter covers the registration process of asylum seekers, how they are allocated across Germany's federal states (in German: "Bundesländer"), and the benefit system for them.

3.1.1 Registration of asylum seekers

When asylum seekers arrive in Germany they must first contact the authorities and let them know that they want to apply for asylum. They can do so either directly at the border or later in the interior of the country. The asylum seekers are now registered and their medical condition is assessed. (Katz et al., 2016, p. 9)

The registration process involves the central storing of personally identifiable data like photographs and fingerprints. The collected data are entered into a central database and all public agencies have access to these data in order to be able to perform their respective tasks. Asylum seekers receive a "Proof of Arrival", which serves as evidence that they have registered. Furthermore, the "Proof of Arrival" documents their entitlement to reside in Germany, as well as entitlement for state benefits. (BAMF, 2016b)

In the past the registration process was slightly different. Upon their arrival the asylum seekers were counted and registered only (!) in the "electronic system for initial distribution of asylum seekers", called EASY. EASY is still used today to distribute asylum seekers

across federal states. The registration in EASY, however, does not involve the storing of personally identifiable data because the sole purpose of EASY is to determine to which federal state the asylum seekers should be sent. (Polke-Majewski, 2016)

As a consequence of the previous registration process, the exact number of asylum seekers in Germany is still unknown, since not all newcomers can immediately file an asylum application. The problem with the number of asylum seekers, according to EASY, is that people might have been registered more than once because personally identifiable data has not been recorded. In 2016 about 321,000 asylum seekers were registered in EASY. This is a clear decline compared to 2015. In 2015 more than one million were registered. According to initial calculations by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the actual numbers may be about 280,000 new arrivals in 2016 and about 890,000 new arrivals in 2015. The difference between these numbers and the numbers collected by EASY is due to multiple registrations of the same person in EASY and some asylum seekers' onward travel to other EU countries or return to their home country. (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2017)

The number of new registrations in EASY declined drastically in 2016. In January 2016 91,671 people were registered in EASY, but after the practical closure of the Balkan route and the effect of the EU-Turkey agreement, the number declined to an average of about 20,000 per month. In December 2016 the number of new EASY-registrations was 16,441. (Zeit Online, 2017)

3.1.2 Allocation of asylum seekers across the federal states

After the initial registration the asylum seekers are allocated to a reception center in one of the 16 federal states (Bundesländer) via the previously mentioned software-application "EASY" which is based on the Königstein quota system (Königsteiner Schlüssel). The Königstein quota system is recalculated annually and follows a pretty simple formula (figure 7). State population weighs one third and state tax revenue weighs two thirds. (Katz et al., 2016, pp. 9-10)


Figure 7: Formula of the Königstein quota system

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 \text{1/3 * the percentage of} & + & \text{2/3 * the percentage of} & = & \text{The percentage} \\
 \text{the state population as a} & & \text{state tax revenue as a} & & \text{of refugees} \\
 \text{share of the total} & & \text{share of the total} & & \text{allotted to state} \\
 \text{population in Germany} & & \text{revenue in Germany} & &
 \end{array}$$

Source: Katz et al., 2016, p. 10

Figure 8 illustrates the distribution across the federal states according to the Königstein quota system. However, some asylum seekers may ignore this distribution system and attempt to move to federal states other than those assigned. (Katz et al., 2016, p. 11)

Figure 8: Distribution of asylum seekers across Germany's federal states according to the Königstein quota system



Source: Katz et al., 2016, p. 10

An asylum seeker either receives a ticket for public transportation to travel to the assigned federal state or a form of collective transport (e.g. a bus) is organized to take several asylum seekers at once to their assigned federal state. Then, in the respective federal state, the asylum seekers have to register in the state's reception center. Initially, each federal state maintained one central initial reception center, but due to the large amounts of asylum seekers in 2015, some states have opened new facilities. Usually asylum seekers stay for a maximum of six months in these reception centers and file a personal asylum application there. (Katz et al. 2016, p. 9)

An interpreter assists the applicants during this process and all the important information is given to them in their native language (BAMF, 2016b).

After their stay in the state's reception centers the asylum seekers are distributed to municipalities within the federal state. Hereby each federal state uses its own quota system for the allocation across its municipalities (Katz et al., 2016, pp. 9-11). Most federal states take into account the population numbers of municipalities and some states also consider the economic situation of the municipalities (Geis and Orth, 2016, p. 7). Others also consider the share of prior asylum seekers already living in a municipality to avoid high concentrations of asylum seekers in one place (Katz et al., 2016, p. 11).

Because of a lack of housing facilities in the municipalities many asylum seekers were accommodated in local gymnasiums/gyms. At the peak of the crisis more than 1000 gyms of schools were used as an accommodation for asylum seekers. (Seyffarth, 2016)

3.1.3 Benefit payments for asylum seekers

Asylum seekers receive asylum welfare for 15 months. After 15 months they are entitled to social welfare benefits which are slightly higher. Asylum seekers who are accommodated in a reception center receive a pocket money of 135 euros per month as well as free food and accommodation. Asylum seekers who live in a private accommodation receive 354 euros per month to cover their living costs and their costs for rent are reimbursed. If an asylum seeker is granted refugee or asylum status he or she can register at the Federal Employment Agency to receive unemployment benefit. (Katz et al., 2016, p. 9)

The institution which decides about asylum applications is the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (Katz et al., 2016, p. 9)

3.2 Political consequences on the national level

Because of the enormous numbers of asylum seekers coming to Germany and the associated challenges, the German government has decided to make some changes to the asylum / integration law and the asylum procedure. Furthermore, the migration crisis has led to a dispute between the coalition partners CDU and CSU and to the rise of the right-wing Populist Party AfD.

3.2.1 Asylum package I

The asylum package I went into effect on October 23, 2015 and includes the following changes (Tagesschau, 2015; Pro Asyl, 2015; Deutscher Bundestag, 2015):

- Longer Stay in reception centers: Asylum seekers have to stay up to six months (not three as previously) in a reception center and are not allowed to work during their stay. It is the goal of the authorities to make a decision about the asylum application within these six months and to be able to deport people who are not granted protection directly from the initial reception center, i.e. before they are distributed across the municipalities.
- New “safe countries of origin”: Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro have been classified as “safe countries of origin”. This means that the deportation procedure of people who come from these countries and who are not recognized as refugees can be conducted faster. Furthermore, people from “safe countries of origin” have to stay in the reception center until a decision about their asylum application has been made, even if that takes longer than six months.
- Non-cash benefits: Municipalities and federal states are encouraged to provide non-cash benefits instead of cash money to asylum seekers.
- Deportation without announcement: People who are subject to deportation might be deported anytime. Authorities are not allowed to tell them the date of their deportation to prevent people from hiding in an effort to avoid their deportation.
- Access to integration courses: Asylum seekers who are likely to be allowed to stay in Germany receive access to integration courses already during their asylum procedure.

3.2.2 Asylum package II

On March 17, 2016 further changes to the German asylum law went into effect. Among the reasons for these further changes were the following (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016):

- There were still many asylum applications with little chances of success. These applications should be processed more quickly.
- Asylum seekers did only partly or even not at all respect the official distribution mechanism according to the Königstein quota system.
- Because of the high number of asylum seekers there is likely to be a great inflow of their family members in the future.
- Many deportations cannot be performed because the person who is subject to deportation holds medical conditions against the deportation.
- People working in the reception centers were not obliged to provide a criminal record certificate.

To solve the problems described above the following measures have been taken (Bundesregierung, 2016a):

- Quicker procedures: The asylum procedure will be sped up for certain groups of asylum seekers, like people from “safe countries of origin” or people who make false claims about their identity or refuse to have their fingerprints taken. The sped-up asylum procedure is supposed to take a maximum of one week. In case the asylum seeker lodges an appeal against the denial of asylum, the resulting legal procedure is meant to cover a maximum period of two weeks.
- Restrictions on family reunions: To be able to better manage the vast amount of asylum seekers, people under subsidiary protection have to wait for two years until their families can join them in Germany. Subsidiary protection is given to people who are not recognized as refugees and do not receive asylum but who are not to be deported because of humanitarian reasons.
- Lower benefits: Asylum seekers receive lower benefits. However, the constitutional laws about the minimum subsistence level have to be considered. This means, in effect, that an unmarried asylum seeker receives 10 euro less per month.
- Easier deportations: People who are denied asylum often present a doctor’s certificate to avoid deportation. As a result of the efficiency of the asylum package II, stricter regulations are enforced. A person can now be deported, even if the medical treatment

in the country the person is deported to, is worse than in Germany. Only life-threatening or other serious conditions which might get worse because of a deportation are considered.

- Replacement of documents: Often people cannot be deported because their passport is missing. A new organization has been established specifically for the acquisition of a replacement passport.
- Obligatory provision of criminal records of employees: To ensure the safety of people living in reception centers and communal accommodations employees working in these facilities must provide a criminal record.

3.2.3 Passing of an integration law

On May 25, 2016 the federal government passed an integration law which became effective in its essential parts on August 6, 2016. This is the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany that a federal law is the legal basis for integration. (Bundesregierung, 2016b)

The new law was created in an effort to integrate people with a high probability of staying in Germany (i.e. people with a good chance of being granted asylum) as fast as possible into society and the labor market. The integration law is based on the notion that integration is in equal parts the responsibility of government, society and the people coming to Germany. According to the underlying concept, quick and effective integration requires an individual's self-initiative and willingness to integrate, which should be supported and demanded (the official motto of the law is "support and demand"; in German: "fördern und fordern"). Following this motto the new law aims at providing federal offers and stimulus to encourage people to integrate quickly. (Bundesregierung, 2016c)

It comprises the following regulations (Tagesschau, 2016):

- Job market: Asylum seekers get easier access to the job market. 100,000 low-paying jobs are created. This is similar to the system of so-called "1-euro-jobs"; however, asylum seekers will receive wages of only 80 cents per hour. The asylum seekers are obliged to do "sensible" jobs. In case somebody refuses to work, his or her benefits might be reduced to non-cash benefits covering just the existential minimum. Before the integration law was passed refugees were only allowed to work in case there was

no suitable candidate from Germany or another EU-country (preference test). With the integration law, this rule was suspended for three years in regions with low unemployment.

- Integration courses: Refugees get earlier access to integration courses than before. They can also be obliged to take part in these courses. If they refuse, they might receive fewer social welfare benefits.
- Apprenticeship: Refugees who are doing an apprenticeship are granted the right of residence in Germany for the time of their apprenticeship. This provides certainty for them and their employers. If they get a regular job after their apprenticeship, they are granted the right of residence for two more years. In case they don't get a job directly after their apprenticeship they are granted the right of residence for another half a year to find a job.
- Settlement permit: A settlement permit is now only issued after five years, not after three as previously. To get a settlement permit, refugees have to demonstrate sufficient German language skills (A2 level according to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages). Furthermore, they have to be able to make a living on their own. People who can demonstrate language skills on C1 level and are able to make a living on their own, can still get a settlement permit after three years.
- Assignment of residence: To prevent mass influx into big cities and the associated danger of the forming of ghettos, the federal states can now decide whether they want to dictate where the refugees should live and whether they want to prohibit movement into certain cities. This rule does not apply to refugees who have to move somewhere to start their job or studies.
- Obligation to cover costs for relatives: In case refugees want to legally come to their relatives who already are in Germany, the relatives have to declare that they will cover their costs of living and health insurance.

3.2.4 Dispute between CDU and CSU

Angela Merkel's management of the migration crisis caused a dispute in the political alliance of the "sister parties" CDU and CSU. Horst Seehofer (who is the chairman of the CSU and Minister President of Bavaria) and his cabinet have made the following demands in a letter to Chancellor Merkel (who is a member of the CDU) (Zeit Online, 2016a):

- Reduction of the number of refugees in Germany

- Effective securement of the EU's external borders
- Effective controls at Germany's borders

In case Chancellor Merkel does not meet these requests, the signees of the letter have threatened to file a law suit at the Federal Constitutional Court and to leave the political alliance and run their own campaign for the federal elections in 2017. (Zeit Online, 2016a)

One specific demand by Horst Seehofer is a capping on the number of asylum seekers accepted by Germany at an amount of 200,000 per year. Horst Seehofer has made this capping a requirement for participating in a coalition with the CDU again in case they win the federal election in 2017. Chancellor Merkel, however, is still strictly against this capping. Voices from members of both parties are raised asking their leaders to finally end their dispute. (Tagesspiegel, 2017)

As the Balkan Route has been practically closed and the number of incoming asylum seekers in Germany has decreased, the CSU has announced not to file a lawsuit, but to campaign together with the CDU in the upcoming federal elections (Zeit Online, 2016a).

However, Horst Seehofer still insists on a maximum limit to asylum seekers accepted by Germany and says the CSU will not participate in a coalition with the CDU again in case they win the federal elections. The fact that both parties still run the campaign together provokes the thought that the dispute about a "capping" may be used by them to attract votes from the conservative as well as from the more liberal electorate. (Otto, 2017)


3.2.5 Rise of the AfD

The fact that Horst Seehofer represents a highly conservative approach can also be seen as an effort at avoiding to lose votes to the right-wing populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland; in English: Alternative for Germany). Simultaneous to the ongoing migration crisis the popularity of the AfD has increased tremendously.

Especially in the period from the second half of 2015 to May 2016 the party's results in polls conducted by the institute "Forschungsgruppe Wahlen" increased rapidly from 3% in August 2015 to 13% in May 2016 (figure 9). (Spiegel Online, 2017)

This trend correlates with the increasing number of asylum seekers in Germany. As discussed earlier, an estimated 890,000 asylum seekers came to Germany in 2015.

Figure 9: Results of the AfD in polls conducted by “Forschungsgruppe Wahlen“ from 2013 to 2017



Source: Spiegel Online, 2017

The fact that the AfD has gained so much in popularity during the migration crisis raises the question about what political positions the party holds – especially in the context of immigration. Therefore a brief analysis of the AfD’s manifesto is provided below.

According to their manifesto (as of March 6, 2017), the AfD wants to “preserve the German culture, language and identity”. They argue in favor of a German “Leitkultur” i.e. core culture / dominant culture instead of multiculturalism. They criticize multiculturalism as an ideology which puts “imported cultures on the same level as the German culture while turning a blind eye to history”. Multiculturalism is seen as a “serious threat to social peace and the survival of the nation as a cultural unity”. The AfD states that the German Leitkultur “must be defended with self-confidence”. The German language is seen as the “central element of German identity” and must be “preserved and strengthened”. The party also states that Islam “does not belong to Germany” and that the “legal regulations of the Sharia are inconsistent with the German legislation and values”. The AfD sees “a huge challenge for the German state” in the “proliferation of Islam and a growing number of Muslims”. The party supports a general ban on “full veil” (i.e. the use of burkas or niqabs) in public. It criticizes an “ideologically poisoned climate of ‘political correctness’” when it comes to the topic of immigration and

asylum as well as a “total failure” of the asylum and migration policy conducted by the ruling parties, which leads to “immigration almost exclusively into the welfare system”. According to the AfD, the current asylum policy leads to the “threat of social and religious unrests” and to an “extinguishing of European cultures”. The party views the Geneva Convention of 1951 as “obsolete” and wants to close the exterior borders of the EU. Furthermore the AfD sees a “top priority” in the protection of citizens from “immigration-caused crime”. It wants to abandon “the limitation of security authorities by national and EU-regulations” and instead argues in favor of a “reconception of foreigner offices, police and prosecution authorities as effective agencies to ward off danger”. In addition to that it wants to re-introduce strict identity checks at Germany’s external borders and argues for a stricter enforcement of deportations. (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016)

The increase in popularity of the AfD may reflect the changed sentiment of the German electorate towards immigration. The sentiment of the German electorate changed drastically from the end of 2013 to the end of 2015, as two representative surveys conducted by the University of Bielefeld suggest. The results of the surveys have been published by Andreas Zick and Madlen Preuß (Zick and Preuß, 2016) from the University of Bielefeld. The first survey was conducted at the end of 2013 and includes answers by 1615 Germans without migration background. The second survey was conducted at the end of 2015 and includes answers of 793 Germans without migration background.

The surveys examined people’s sentiment towards a “welcoming culture”, the rights of immigrants, “recapture of the old order” and towards refugees.

The survey finds that people are less supportive towards a “welcoming culture” (in German: Willkommenskultur). The term has been frequently used in political debates and in the media. It can be understood as a way of dealing with immigrants which makes them feel that they are welcome in Germany. Among others it affects the areas of immigration policies and social life, i.e. the way how people treat immigrants. (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013)

In 2013 more than two thirds of the Germans without migration background said they would be happy about a stronger welcome culture. At the end of 2015 only 28 percent said so. When being asked if they were happy that more and more immigrants feel at home in Germany only 43 percent agreed at the end of 2015. That is more than 10 percent less than in 2013 (table 3).

These answers indicate that an increasing percentage of Germans want a decrease in the inflow of asylum seekers. Consequently, some of those people might approve of the drastic

measures proposed by the AfD to decrease the inflow of asylum seekers and might perceive them as more effective than proposals by other parties.

Table 3: Comparison of the sentiment of the German electorate without migration background towards the German “welcoming culture“ in 2013/2014 and 2015/2016

Indicators	2013/2014			2015/2016		
	Do not agree	Partly agree	Agree	Do not agree	Partly agree	Agree
A stronger welcoming culture for the migrants in Germany would make me happy	31,0	33,0	36,0	36,7	35,1	28,2
I like that so many migrants choose Germany as their new home	28,0	36,1	35,9	37,5	35,0	27,5
It like it when more and more migrants feel at home in Germany	18,9	26,4	54,7	22,6	34,1	43,3
I like that Germany is becoming more diverse and colorful	24,8	28,0	47,2	29,0	28,4	42,6

Source: Zick and Preuß, 2016, p. 4 (author's translation from German into English)

Table 4 shows how the sentiment of Germans about the rights of immigrants has changed. In the later survey more participants claimed superior rights over immigrants. The percentage of people who think that people who are new somewhere should have the same rights as everybody else decreased from 85 to 73 percent. Furthermore, a third said that people who are new somewhere should not make demands (up from a fifth in 2013). The percentage of people saying that somebody who is new somewhere should have the same rights as others also decreased.

Table 4: Comparison of the sentiment of the German electorate without migration background towards the rights of immigrants in 2013/2014 and 2015/2016

Indicators: Somebody who is new somewhere / arrived after others ...	2013/2014			2015/2016		
	Do not agree	Partly agree	Agree	Do not agree	Partly agree	Agree
... should be satisfied with less in the beginning	34,4	33,1	32,5	27,0	32,1	40,9
... should be entitled to the same as others	15,8	25,0	59,2	19,0	28,1	52,9
... should have the same rights as others	5,8	9,6	84,6	10,5	16,9	72,6
... should definitely not make demands or raise claims	49,3	31,2	19,5	34,5	33,4	32,1
... should get to the back of the line when there is not enough for everybody	57,6	25,6	16,8	49,6	26,0	24,4

Source: Zick and Preuß, 2016, p. 7 (author's translation from German into English)

The percentage of people who said that Germans should show a more self-confident behavior towards immigrants, the percentage of people who said that Germans should more frequently put young immigrants in their place, and the percentage of people who said that Germans should pay more attention to not being overrun by immigrants each increased by more than 10 percent (table 5).

Some of the people who think Germans should act more self-confident towards migrants and put them in their place might coincide with the AfD's criticism of political correctness. Some of the people who favor paying more attention to not being overrun by migrants might compare with the AfD's views of drastically decreasing the inflow of asylum seekers and stricter enforcement of deportations.

Table 5: Comparison of the sentiment of the German electorate without migration background towards a “recapture of the old order“ in 2013/2014 and 2015/2016

Indicators	2013/2014			2015/2016		
	Do not agree	Partly agree	Agree	Do not agree	Partly agree	Agree
I think it would be good if our traditions were revived	12,6	26,0	61,4	19,3	18,5	62,2
It is important that we pay more attention to our identity, values and attributes again	14,4	25,7	59,9	17,7	22,9	59,4
We should act way more confidently in public towards migrants again	42,2	24,3	33,5	31,5	24,0	44,5
In particular young migrants should be put in their place by us more	46,3	27,6	26,1	33,9	25,2	40,9
We should pay stronger attention to not being overrun by migrants	50,1	21,9	28,0	42,9	15,7	41,4

Source: Zick and Preuß, 2016, p. 10 (author’s translation from German into English)

Data from the survey conducted at the end of 2015 suggest, that while most Germans agree that refugees have a right for a better future and that the refugees’ religion should not matter, many Germans have concerns that the high numbers of refugees have bad effects on Germany’s future and security. Many Germans also think that most refugees are not really persecuted in their home country and that refugees should be sent back to their home country when the situation there has improved (table 6).

Some of the people concerned about their safety might support the AfD’s position to introduce strict controls and identity checks at Germany’s external borders as well as their stated “top priority” for the protection of citizens from “immigration-caused crime”. These people may also sympathize with the AfD’s proposal to abandon “the limitation of security authorities by national and EU-regulations”.

Table 6: Sentiment of the German electorate without migration background towards refugees in 2015/2016

Indicators	2015/2016		
	Do not agree	Partly agree	Agree
Most refugees are not persecuted in their home country	38,9	31,6	29,5
The high numbers of refugees put Germany's future at risk	38,2	26,1	35,7
The more refugees Germany accepts, the higher is the threat of terrorism	32,7	18,0	49,3
I am fine with refugees in my neighborhood the same way I am with other people	11,3	25,6	63,1
Every refugee has the right for a better future – also in Germany	8,5	21,5	70,0
Religion should not matter when accepting refugees	12,3	13,3	74,4
When the situation in their home countries got better the refugees should be sent back	18,4	26,8	54,8

Source: Zick and Preuß, 2016, p. 22 (author's translation from German into English)

3.3 Political consequences on the international level

The most significant political consequences on the international level are that Germany suspended the Dublin agreement for Syrian asylum seekers and supported an agreement between the EU and Turkey.

3.3.1 Suspension of the Dublin agreement for Syrian asylum seekers

In August 2015 an internal measure by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) was made public stating that Germany is practically suspending the rules of the Dublin agreement for Syrian refugees. The Dublin agreement has often been criticized as expensive and ineffective as well as humiliating for refugees. (Dernbach, 2015)

As mentioned previously, the Dublin agreement clarifies which EU member state is responsible for the processing of asylum claims from asylum seekers who come from a non-member state. Generally the member state where the asylum seeker first enters the EU is responsible for the registration. (Lyons, 2015)

The rules of the Dublin agreement put high pressure on Italy and Greece as they are the main countries of entry into the EU for many refugees. As a consequence these countries just stopped registering refugees and let them move on to other EU countries like Germany where they can then apply for asylum – making Germany responsible for the processing of the application. (Trimborn, 2015)

The European commission has praised Germany's decision not to send back Syrian asylum seekers to the country of first entry as an "act of European solidarity" with the member states at the external borders (Dernbach, 2015).

3.3.2 Support of the agreement between the EU and Turkey

Following intense negotiations the EU and Turkey made a deal in March 2016 on how to tackle the migration crisis. The EU's motivation for the deal was that many asylum seekers entered the EU from Turkey. (Reimann et al., 2017)

Most of the asylum seekers entered Europe from Turkey across the sea to Greece, but some also via the border with Bulgaria (Schwarze, 2017). As Germany faced a large influx of asylum seekers who entered the EU from Turkey and then moved on to Germany along the Western Balkan route, Chancellor Angela Merkel has been one of the strongest proponents for the EU-Turkey agreement (Goff-Taylor, 2017).

The agreement aims at reducing the number of refugees entering the EU via Turkey and, indeed, way fewer refugees have entered the EU from Turkey since the implementation of the deal. The agreement states that all refugees who enter the EU illegally via Turkey shall be returned to Turkey (except if the refugee faces persecution in Turkey). In exchange for the each refugee returned to Turkey, one Syrian refugee from Turkey is re-settled in the EU. Furthermore, Turkey has agreed to prevent the establishment of new routes to Europe and to take actions against human traffickers. In exchange for Turkey's efforts the EU has agreed to speed up the allocation of already assured 3 billion euro of financial aid to Turkey and to provide another 3 billion euro. Furthermore, the deal includes that negotiations about an EU-

membership of Turkey shall be taken up again and Turkish citizens shall no longer need a Visa when travelling to the Schengen zone. (Reimann et al., 2017)

The agreement has been subject to criticism. One main point of criticism is that Turkey applies strict anti-terror-laws which are also used to justify the arrest of members of the opposition or journalists. Especially since the attempted coup in July 2016 Turkey's government under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is acting increasingly authoritarian. The compliance with constitutional and democratic principles, however is a requirement for EU-membership and the agreed visa-free travel. (Schwarze, 2017)

President Erdogan antagonizes EU politicians by refusing to adjust the law and threatening to terminate the agreement (Reimann et al., 2017). While the "dirty deal" has been heavily criticized by the German opposition, Chancellor Merkel still supports the agreement (Zeit Online, 2016b).

4. Economic consequences for Germany

This chapter analyzes the economic consequences of the European migration crisis for Germany. It focuses on the fiscal impact, as well as on the implications for the labor market.

4.1 Fiscal impact

The following analysis of the fiscal impact differentiates between immediate costs and long-term costs.

4.1.1 Immediate costs

In 2016 the total expenditure associated with the migration crisis on the federal level was approximately 21.7 billion euro. The planned costs for 2017 amount to 21.3 billion euro. Despite of the financial burden of the migration crisis the government did not have to make new debts in 2016 and instead made a budget surplus of 6.2 billion euro. The amount of 21.7 billion euro spent in 2016 consists of the following items (Tagesschau, 2017):

- Combating causes of migration: 7.1 billion euro
- Reception, registration and accommodation of asylum seekers: 1.4 billion euro
- Integration measures: 2.1 billion euro
- Social benefits: 1.7 billion euro
- Transfers to relieve federal states and Municipalities: 9.3 billion euro

Not only on the federal level, but also for the federal states the costs are huge. The responsibilities of the federal states include the creation and maintenance of initial reception centers, care for unaccompanied minors, as well as health care, education and transportation of asylum seekers (Katz et al., 2016, p. 14). In 2014 the costs for the federal states associated with asylum seekers were an estimated 2.2 billion. In August 2015 the total costs were estimated to be up to 10 billion at the end of the 2015. This estimation was based on the assumption that between 700,000 and 800,000 asylum seekers arrive in Germany in 2015. (Weingartner and Plickert, 2015)

As mentioned earlier the exact number of asylum seekers who arrived in that period is unknown due to the registration process used at that time, but according to calculations by the BAMF the actual number might have been about 890,000 new arrivals in 2015. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the total costs for the federal states in 2015 were at least (!) 10 billion euro and therefore at least about 5 times higher than in 2014.

In 2016 the costs for the federal states increased further. As of March 2017 data are available for Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse and the city-state of Berlin. These four states alone spent 7.9 billion on asylum seekers in 2016. On this basis the total costs for all federal states in 2016 are estimated to be about 23 billion, which would be about 10 times higher than the costs associated with asylum seekers in 2014. (Vitzthum, 2017)

Lack of available and comparable data and missing transparency make it extremely difficult to make clear statements about the actual total costs in the federal states and also about the costs on the federal level before the crisis.

The expenses also have a positive effect as much of the money flows back into the German economy, for example in the form of money spent by refugees (e.g. on food or rent) or construction of new facilities. Ferdinand Fichtner from the German Institute for Economic Research says that the costs can also be seen as a “large economic stimulus package”. (Tagesschau, 2017)

4.1.2 Long-term costs

A variety of studies seeks to determine the long-term costs of the migration crisis for Germany. They are based on different assumptions (e.g. assumptions about the extent of future inflow of asylum seekers) and most studies include different scenarios.

To determine the long-term costs a study by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (Boysen-Hogrefe et al, 2015, p. 11-12) makes assumptions about factors like the number of arriving refugees and how fast the refugees integrate into the labor market. The study includes different scenarios. The basic scenario assumes that 3,780,000 refugees arrive between 2015 and 2020. In this case the total cost in 2022 would be 25.5 billion euro. As the authors of the study assume that the political situation in the countries of origin of the refugees will not improve significantly in the near future, they came up with another scenario. In this scenario the study assumes that the current high influx of refugees will continue and 6,700,000

refugees arrive between 2015 and 2020. This would lead to a total cost of 55 billion euro in 2022.

The study also includes a scenario in which the government invests an additional annual 1,000 euro per refugee into integration measures, and in which the total inflow of refugees is 3,780,000 (like in the basic scenario). In this scenario the study concludes that the total cost in 2022 would decrease to 21.9 billion.

Other studies do not only include the costs in their calculations, but also the positive impact on the economy.

An example of such a study is one conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (Fratzscher and Juncker, 2015). Based on different assumptions about the number of asylum seekers who are granted asylum, demographic characteristics like their age, labor market integration and the impact on the productivity and aggregate demand, the study derives different scenarios. The study finds that in the beginning the costs are clearly higher than the positive effects, but as time goes by the positive impact exceeds the costs. In the basic scenario the break-even point is reached in 2020 and in the more pessimistic scenario in 2025. The study points out that while benefits will be higher than the costs in the long-term more detailed studies are needed to give more precise forecasts.

Based on different calculations other studies like one by the Centre for European Economic Research (Bonin, 2016) also stress the importance of a fast labor market integration of refugees.

The studies on the long-term costs of the migration crisis for Germany each include different scenarios which lead to widely varying results. However, these scenarios are necessary since there is not enough reliable data about the refugees. The previous registration process of refugees led to multiple registrations of the same person and other problems and as a consequence the exact number and demographics of refugees who came in the period when this registration process was used is unknown. Several assumptions about the number of future arrivals, acceptance rates, education, qualifications, age, consumer behavior, labor-market integration and so on had to be made by economists to estimate the long-term costs of the migration crisis. Now every refugee is being properly registered when entering the country and more reliable data will become available for future studies. (Diekmann, 2016)

4.2 Labor market implications

This chapter covers the implications for the German labor market caused by the large influx of asylum seekers. It starts off with a general description of the labor market situation in Germany and then continues to describe the labor market statistics of people from the main non-European countries of origin of asylum seekers. Subsequently, asylum seekers' qualification level, challenges associated with the labor market integration and efforts taken to facilitate it are analyzed to determine the chances of asylum seekers on the labor market.

4.2.1 General labor market situation in Germany

Currently the general labor market situation in Germany is quite favorable for job-seekers. The unemployment rate in December 2016 was relatively low and lay at 3.9 percent. (OECD Data, 2016)

The long-term perspectives for migrants on the labor market seem to be good, partly because of the demographic change (shrinking and aging population) in Germany. In the upcoming years the number of people who enter the labor market after school is expected to be a lot lower than the number of people who leave the labor market and go into retirement. As a consequence the number of vacant apprenticeship positions is rising and the number of applicants for such positions is declining. In 2016, eight percent of all apprenticeship positions were vacant. Most positions were vacant in the hospitality industry, where only 29 applications were filed per 100 vacant positions. Other industries with many vacant positions are jobs in craftsmanship like baker or plumber. (Degler and Liebig, 2017, p. 32)

In a survey conducted by the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce in 2016 (DIHK, 2016) among employers offering apprenticeships 31 percent of all employers stated that they were not able to fill all vacant apprenticeship positions. This is an increase of almost 20 percent compared to 2006. (DIHK, 2016)

A survey commissioned by Ernst and Young finds that German employers see a lack of qualified employees as the most significant threat to the future development of their business (Ernst & Young, 2017).

Furthermore, according to a study by the Bertelsmann Foundation (Fuchs et al., 2015), without migration the number of people at working age which today lies at 45 million would

decrease by 36 percent (i.e. by 16 million people) by 2050 (assuming labor participation rates remain constant). The consequences of this development would include that businesses would have to reduce their operations, offer higher wages or move operations abroad. The costs of social welfare would be distributed among fewer people, making social insurance contributions more expensive for the individual. (Fuchs et al., 2015, p. 1)


4.2.2 Labor market statistics of asylum seekers

To analyze the effects of the migration crisis on the labor market the following data from the Federal Employment Agency focus on statistics of people from the main non-European countries of origin of asylum seekers. These countries are: Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria. Many asylum applications have also been filed by citizens of the Balkan states and Eastern-European countries but the very vast majority of asylum applications from these countries are not accepted and those people will most likely not stay in Germany. Therefore this analysis focuses only on the main non-European countries of asylum seekers listed above. (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2017, pp. 5-6)

Asylum seekers in Germany are not allowed to work for the first three months after their arrival in Germany and are also not allowed to work during their stay in an initial reception center which can take up to six months. In case their asylum application gets accepted they are granted the same rights to social benefits and access to the labor market as German citizens. (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2017, p. 10)

From the main non-European countries of origin of asylum seekers 178,000 people were registered as employed in January 2017 (figure 10). This is an increase of 57,000 or 47% compared to December 2015. The 178,000 people represent 0.5% of the total people employed in Germany. 131,000 of the 178,000 people had a job which required them to pay social insurance contributions while the remaining 47,000 had only marginal employment. (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2017, pp. 9-11)


Figure 10: Number of employed people from the main non-European countries of origin of asylum seekers (2010-2017)



Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2017, p. 10 (author's translation from German into English)

However, it is not only employment among people from the main non-European countries of origin of asylum seekers which has increased, but also the number of registered unemployed people and the number of people who receive social benefit payments (figure 11). The number of registered unemployed people from these countries has increased by 54 percent compared to last year and lies now at 188,000, which is the equivalent of 7.1 percent of the total number of registered unemployed people in Germany. The number of people from these countries who receive social benefits has increased by 133 percent compared to last year and lies now at 699,000, which is 11.7 percent of the total number of people receiving such benefits in Germany. In addition, the number of job-seeking people from those countries has increased. It rose by 95 percent compared to 2015 and lies now at a total of 482,000. (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2017, pp. 13-14)

Figure 11: Number of people from the main non-European countries of origin of asylum seekers who are unemployed / entitled to social benefits (2010-2017)



Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2017, p. 14 (author's translation from German into English)

4.2.3 Qualifications of asylum seekers

To be able to evaluate possible labor market integration outcomes for the hundreds of thousands of job-seeking asylum seekers it is necessary to analyze their qualification level.

Available data for the year 2015 stem from a survey called “SoKo” (abbreviation for Soziale Komponente; in English: Social Component), conducted by the BAMF among adult first-time asylum applicants. The data were collected during the asylum application procedure by BAMF staff and are therefore based on a large data volume. However, it is important to note that the data were collected on a voluntary basis and the answers were not checked for accuracy (i.e. the participants did not have to show diplomas etc. to validate their answers). The survey assessed the qualification level in terms of language skills, work experience and formal education. The results of the survey were published by BAMF-employee Anna-Katharina Rich. (Rich, 2016)

Language skills: In the survey 28 percent of asylum seekers in Germany stated that they spoke English, but less than 2 percent stated that they knew German (table 7). Relatively many asylum seekers from Syria and Iran stated that they knew English. Syrians and Iranians also reported relatively high levels of formal education. It should be noted that when assessing the language skills the survey does not differentiate between the level of skills (i.e. beginner or advanced etc.) (Rich, 2016, pp. 8-9)

Table 7: Language skills of asylum seekers from the ten main countries of origin

	Share of persons with knowledge of English	Share of persons with knowledge of German
Alle CoO	28.1	1.8
Syria	41.0	1.1
Albania	26.6	1.4
Kosovo	31.4	19.5
Iraq	14.2	0.4
Afghanistan	14.3	0.6
Eritrea	28.9	0.1
Serbia	3.4	1.9
Pakistan	4.9	0.1
Macedonia	2.0	1.3
Iran	31.3	3.0

Source: Rich, 2016, p. 9

Work experience: 65 percent of adult asylum seekers had some kind of employment in their country of origin. Overall, women were a lot less likely to have been employed. Only about one third of female asylum seekers reported to have been employed, while about 75 percent of men reported to have been employed in their home country. Women were mainly employed in the service sector and in teaching professions, while men mainly worked as temporary workers or as craftsmen. Academic asylum seekers often worked in teaching professions, in the medical sector or as engineers. (Rich, 2016, pp. 6-9)


Formal education: Table 8 provides an overview of the formal education of asylum seekers. As asylum seekers from countries like Syria (protection quota of 96 percent) are more likely to be granted asylum and to stay in Germany than asylum seekers from countries like Albania,

Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia (protection quota of less than 1 percent each), the table takes into account the protection quotas. When taking into account the protection quotas, the level of formal education among asylum seekers increases. The main reason for this is the relatively high level of education and high protection quotas among Syrian asylum-seekers and the relatively low average level of formal education among asylum-seekers from the countries with low protection quotas named above (figure 12). When looking at the data in table 8, it should be taken into account that it is hard to compare school systems and the level / quality of education among the different countries. According to the survey, almost one fifth of asylum seekers attended a university, while only 7 percent do not have any formal education. These qualities improve even further when weighed with the protection quota. (Rich, 2016, pp. 5-9)

Table 8: Formal education of asylum seekers from the ten main countries of origin

Schooling	without weighting	with weighting
University	18.4	23.2
Grammar school	21.7	24.7
General secondary schools	29.7	26.7
Primary school	23.0	19.6
No formal schooling	6.6	5.4
Other	0.5	0.4

Source: Rich, 2016, p. 9

Figure 12: Formal education of asylum seekers from the ten main countries of origin

Source: Rich, 2016, p. 5

4.2.4 Challenges associated with the labor market integration

Certain challenges including language barriers, missing skills and issues in relation to the VET (vocational education and training) system, and difficulties with the recognition of qualifications need to be overcome to guarantee a successful labor market integration of the refugees. (Rietig, 2016, pp. 4-5)

Language barriers: Almost none of the refugees speaks German when they enter the country. Being able to speak German is, however, a crucial criterion to find employment. Therefore measures need to be taken to ensure that asylum seekers learn German as soon as possible after their arrival.

Recognizing the importance of language skills the German government has included language training in the mandatory integration courses for asylum seekers, which were part of the integration law passed in 2016. The language training in these courses goes up to the B1 level of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). (BAMF, 2017)

However, there are three main issues associated with this language training: It is not sophisticated enough (B1 level is not sufficient), supply of these courses is limited and only asylum seekers from countries with protection quotas above 50 percent are allowed to attend these courses while their application process is still in progress. (Rietig, 2016, pp. 5-6)

According to the CEFR, the B1 level allows only to understand “the main points of clear standard input on familiar matters regularly encountered” (Council of Europe, 2001, p. 25).

There is reason to assume that this level of knowledge is not sufficient for the majority of jobs. A survey commissioned by Ernst and Young was conducted among 3000 medium-sized enterprises and finds that insufficient language skills are the main reason for employers not to hire refugees. (Ernst & Young, 2017, p. 4).

According to the CEFR, at least the B2 level is necessary for a person to “understand the main ideas of complex text on both concrete and abstract topics, including technical discussions in his/her field of specialization”. Furthermore, the B2 level would make “regular interaction with native speakers quite possible without strain for either party”. (Council of Europe, 2001, p. 25)

While training up to the B2 level might be associated with higher costs, given the importance of language skills for integration into the labor market, it might be worth the extra spending.

As interest in the integration courses is far higher than the supply, the courses are often oversubscribed (Zeit Online, 2016c), and providers have started to hire less qualified teachers, which raises concerns that the quality of the courses might suffer. (Rietig, 2016, p. 5)

One particular problem concerning the fact that asylum seekers from a country with a protection quota lower than 50 percent have to wait until their asylum application has been decided is that Afghans, who have a protection quota of just slightly below 50 percent, have to wait until being granted refugee status to attend the courses. On average this takes 14 months for Afghan asylum seekers. (Von Borstel, 2015)

A solution to this problem could be individual screenings to assess the probability of asylum seekers' entitlement to protection, but such screenings would be very resource intensive and given the current enormous pressure on the administrative system and its capacities the implementation of individual screenings is very unlikely. (Rietig, 2016, p. 6)

Missing skills and issues with the VET system: Several studies (like the already mentioned "SoKo") have tried to assess the education and skill level of asylum seekers. Results vary widely but generally the studies indicate that most asylum seekers need further training to fit the needs of the German labor market. However, Germany's world renowned VET (vocational education and training) system has been criticized as difficult for migrants to enter. (Rietig, 2016, p. 6)

The German VET system is a dual apprenticeship system, which means that an apprenticeship takes place both in firms and in public vocational schools, called "Berufsschulen" (Germany Trade and Invest, 2014, p. 2). Migrants are underrepresented in this system and studies show that they are more likely to be discriminated against. For example a study (Schneider et al., 2014) has proven that qualified candidates have not been invited for job interviews just because of the fact that they had a Turkish name. (Schneider et al., 2014, p. 33)

In addition to that some employers perceive the VET system as a youth training system and may be reluctant towards hiring adult/middle-aged migrants. (Rietig, 2016, p. 6)

However, there is evidence that this attitude may be changing. The number of people at the age of 25-29 who got an apprenticeship has more than doubled from 2000 to 2013 from 54.000 to 113.000. For the same period the number of teenagers aged 15-19 who started an apprenticeship has decreased from 843.000 to 525.000. (n-tv, 2014)

As a consequence, employers have gathered some precious experience with older apprentices and reluctance towards hiring older apprentices may be reduced further. Adult refugees could benefit from this trend since an apprenticeship is an entry-level position which does not necessarily require high formal education and can be the basis of further career opportunities.

However, experience shows that even if refugees manage to gain an apprenticeship, many of them drop out of it. This is partly due to the low wages for apprentices which cause refugees to seek a low-skilled but better-paid job instead (Vetter, 2015). The reason for this decision is that refugees want to financially support their families by sending remittances as soon as

possible and some have to pay off debts with smugglers. In addition to that, many refugees are not informed well enough about the long-term benefits of an apprenticeship. (n-tv, 2016)

An alternative to the VET system is self-employment, and a study (Sachs et al., 2016) shows that self-employment of migrants in Germany increased by 25 percent from 2005 to 2014 (Sachs et al., 2016, p. 11).

In a survey (Brücker et al., 2016) conducted in 2016 among 2,349 asylum seekers who arrived in Germany between January 1, 2013 and January 31, 2016 more than one fourth stated that they had been self-employed in their country of origin. (Brücker et al., 2016, p. 49)

Despite of the fact that recognized refugees have access to the regular supportive initiatives for entrepreneurs only few of them were able to start their own business in Germany (Degler and Liebig, 2017, p. 61). In the survey only 2 percent stated that they did so (Brücker et al., 2016, p. 49).

The reason for this low number may be the fact that financial funds and know-how about language, law, the German bureaucracy etc. are necessary for people to start their own businesses (Degler and Liebig, 2017, p. 61).

Difficulties with the recognition of qualifications: Asylum seekers and refugees face the issue of having their educational achievements or occupational skills recognized in Germany. Determining whether the degree acquired abroad is equivalent to a German one in the same field is a complex process. Despite of some attempts to smoothen the recognition process problems still persist. One particular problem is that multiple, decentralized bodies are responsible for recognizing the qualifications. Many of them employ different standards and procedures and some have a reputation of having lower requirements. As a consequence applicants travel to an authority with such a reputation and file their application there – an unfair act since not all applicants have this information. Furthermore the process of recognition takes a lot of time and effort. Applicants have to get necessary information about how to have their qualifications recognized and which documents and translations are necessary. If their degree is deemed to be not fully equivalent to a German one, they have to undergo months or even years of additional training. (Rietig, 2016, p. 8-9)

4.2.5 Initiatives to facilitate access to the labor market

Initiatives which facilitate asylum seekers' access to the labor market include legislative changes and several programs by federal agencies.

Legislative changes: In the last few years legal barriers for asylum seekers to enter the labor market have been removed. The so-called “asylum compromise” reduced the waiting time for asylum seekers to get restricted access to the labor market from nine months to three months, and the waiting time for unrestricted access from four years to 15 months. Restricted access means that the employment agency first conducted a “preference test” checking whether any German or EU citizen could do the same job. The preference test has often been criticized because the additional human resources needed to interview other candidates have often discouraged employees to hire asylum seekers. As a consequence many asylum seekers were forced to wait for 15 months until they got unrestricted access. (Rietig, 2016, p. 13-14)

As previously mentioned the integration law was passed in 2016 which temporarily suspends the preference test in regions with low unemployment and created 100,000 jobs paying very low wages of only 80 cent per hour. However, in the regions where unemployment is high the preference test is still in effect and therefore the reduction of the waiting time for restricted access to the labor market from nine to three months will be of minor effect in these regions (Lindner, 2014, pp. 36-37). Furthermore, critics point out that experience shows that “1-euro-jobs” usually fail to help integrating people properly into the labor market and that the money spent on these jobs would be better invested into training for motivated refugees (Specht, 2016).

ESF-BAMF program: The ESF-BAMF program is funded by the European Social Fund (ESF) and administered by the BAMF. It includes courses in “German for professional purposes” and participation is free of charge. The courses consist of a combination of German language lessons and professional skill building. (BAMF, 2015)

To be eligible to take part in the program people must meet certain criteria like e.g. having a migration background, being registered as job-seeking, receiving unemployment benefits and already having adequate German skills. (BAMF, 2015)

The language lessons provide the participant with skills which allow for efficient communication with peers and customers. Participants will also be trained to a level which allows them to understand more complicated texts. Furthermore, participants will be taught

what aspects to consider in formal written communication like e-mails and letters. The skill-building measures are based on the knowledge the participant already has and which knowledge he or she wants to acquire. Generally, they include technical instructions, visits at companies and also internships. (BAMF, 2015)

After completing the course the participant receives a certificate of attendance which can be highly useful for the participant's future professional career. (BAMF, 2015)

Program “Prototyping Transfer”: In order to have qualifications acquired abroad recognized certificates usually have to be provided as proof for the qualification. Often refugees cannot provide such documents. The project “Prototyping Transfer” solves this problem with a so-called “Qualification Analysis”. Qualification analysis means that a person who wants qualifications recognized needs to demonstrate the required skills in front of experts, e.g. in the form of a professional discussion or work sample. The project was launched in 2015 and is scheduled to be continued until the end of 2017. (BIBB, 2016)

5. Policy recommendation

Throughout this thesis several issues and problems associated with the European migration crisis have been identified. The following recommendations summarize these issues and include suggestions on how to solve them.

Developing a new quota system for the allocation of asylum seekers in Germany

Since the currently used “Königstein quota system” follows a very simple formula it puts a lot of pressure on the city-states of Hamburg, Berlin and Bremen as the quota system does not take into account population densities and housing conditions (price and availability) (Katz et al., 2016, p. 20). Geis and Orth (2016) emphasize that because of this and several other circumstances a new quota system to allocate the asylum seekers not only across the federal states but also across municipalities is needed. Furthermore they argue that distribution across the municipalities should follow the same principle in all federal states and take into account criteria like the labor market situation and housing capacities. They also suggest that asylum seekers who are qualified for studying should be accommodated in cities with a university. When distributing families with children across municipalities, free capacities in schools and preschools in the municipalities should be taken into account. (Geis and Orth, 2016, p. 47)

Investing more in integration / language courses

There are not enough places available in the integration courses (which include language training) provided by the BAMF for asylum seekers. Being able to speak German, however is of tremendous importance for integration into society and the labor market. As previously mentioned, a survey commissioned by Ernst and Young found out that insufficient language skills are the main reason for employers not to hire refugees (Ernst & Young, 2017, p. 4). Therefore language teaching up to the B2 level in the integration courses, instead of up to only the B1 level should be considered.

Given the importance of language skills further investments in integration / language courses and the hiring of additional, qualified teachers are necessary. Offering high-quality online language courses in addition to the language courses on site, could also help to overcome the current bottleneck. (Degler and Liebig, 2017, pp. 41-44)

However, to avoid a fiasco like with language courses provided by the federal employment agency, where 400 million euro were spent with questionable success (Astheimer, 2017), it is

important to make sure that the additional funds invested into the integration courses are spent efficiently.

Improving the process of assessing qualifications

Currently there are difficulties in assessing informal qualifications of asylum seekers which might be of relevance for their labor market integration and, apart from that, different standards are applied. Existing initiatives like the project “Prototyping Transfer” require much time and a lot of personnel resources. To efficiently assess existing qualifications recognized standardized procedures which allow the timely processing of many participants should be developed und applied uniformly. (Aumüller, 2016, p. 50)

Norway for example uses a computerized questionnaire/test to assess the skills and qualifications of asylum seekers (Degler and Liebig, 2017, p. 53).

Supporting entrepreneurs among the refugees

Despite of having entrepreneurial spirits and having been self-employed in their country of origin, only very few refugees were able to set up their own businesses in Germany. Especially when considering non-natives’ difficulties with getting an apprenticeship in the VET-system, promoting self-employment among refugees is even more important.

Pilot projects like the project “Gründerpatenschaften” by the Federal ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy are actually very useful and provide entrepreneurial refugees with a mentor who assists them in the process of starting their businesses. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2016)

While such projects are quite promising, further initiatives are necessary and should be conducted in cooperation with employment agencies to encourage and benefit of the entrepreneurial competence of refugees. (Degler and Liebig, 2017, p. 61)

Avoiding multicultural policies

Considering the factors listed by Kymlicka (2012), one must conclude that multicultural policies cannot be recommended for Germany in the context of the European migration crisis as they would meet with strong resistance by the population and could potentially further increase the already rising popularity of the right-wing populist party AfD. As a reminder: the factors influencing the success of the implementation of multiculturalism are: state security, human rights, border control, diversity, and immigrants’ economic contributions. As a survey

(Zick and Preuß, 2016) among the German population suggests, the mass-influx of asylum seekers is perceived by many Germans as a threat to national security. Furthermore, many asylum seekers are from Muslim countries, which (according to Kymlicka) are often perceived as unwilling to adapt to liberal-democratic norms. National border control is no longer maintained as Germany is part of the Schengen free travel area. In the beginning of the crisis asylum seekers were not even properly registered. The profile of asylum seekers is not very culturally diverse as more than half of them come from only three culturally relatively similar countries, namely Syria, Iraq and Iran. In addition to that the economic contributions by the asylum seekers / refugees are currently low and many are registered as unemployed and/or have to rely on benefits.

To examine if and how the migrants and refugees will assimilate into the German society in the upcoming years, factors like their socioeconomic status, residential patterns, language attainment and intermarriage need to be subject to research.

Providing funding for refugee camps in the regions near the country of origin

A shortfall in funding led to a lack of food in refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon which was one of the main causes of the massive influx of refugees into Europe in 2015. Better funding for refugee camps could create an important buffer and could help to reduce wave-like migration patterns. (De Seabra and Moita, 2016, p. 45)

Espousing a reform of the Dublin regulation

The Dublin regulation has proven to be a failure and EU member states have consequently stopped applying its rules. A solution could be a consensus of EU-members on a fairer distribution system. For example, Schneider et al. (2013) proposed an alternative to the Dublin system as early as in 2013. Their proposed model includes the following criteria: size of the GDP (weight 40%), population number (weight 40%), size of the country (weight 10%) and unemployment rate (weight 10%). (Schneider et al., 2013, p. 6)

The implementation of such a system which considers multiple factors which are weighed respective to their relevance would ensure a fairer distribution of asylum seekers and take pressure from states of first EU-entry of asylum seekers. However, it could be difficult to implement such a mechanism due to the fact that some European countries are currently strictly against the idea of burden-sharing and because the question of how to enforce the

mechanism (i.e. how to avoid that an asylum seeker moves from the assigned country to a more “attractive” country) remains.

Creating safe and legal ways for refugees to travel

Refugees have to use highly dangerous routes across the Mediterranean Sea to get to Europe and many have not survived their journey.

To avoid such tragedies and to reduce additional stress for refugees, Germany could expand its resettlement program. Resettlement from refugee camps in countries where refugees initially flee to (e.g. Lebanon) is an effective and controlled way to deal with refugee flows and creates a safe and legal option of travel for refugees. (De Seabra and Moita, 2016, p. 41)

As indicated above, Germany does already take part in a resettlement program, but in 2015 Germany resettled only 500 refugees and the numbers for 2016 and 2017 combined are to be 1600. (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2016, p. 2)

Germany could count on the support of UNHCR when implementing an expanded resettlement program (UNHCR, 2017).

Further support might come from an EU resettlement framework, which was proposed in July 2016. If this framework was implemented Germany would be entitled to 10,000 euro for each person resettled. The funds would be provided by the AMIF. (European Commission Press Release, 2016)

The granting of humanitarian visas would provide another option of safe travel for refugees. For example Switzerland has recently offered humanitarian visas (though only in very small numbers) (Swiss Refugee Council, 2017). As De Seabra and Moita (2016) suggest consular outposts where people can apply for such a visa, could be set up for example in Libya or Turkey. Applicants would be screened and, when meeting the criteria, be granted the humanitarian visa which allows them to travel to Germany (or ideally also to other countries in the EU if an EU-wide solution can be achieved) at their own expense, for example by plane or ferry. For the refugees this would be a much cheaper and safer way of travelling than paying for smugglers. (De Seabra and Moita, 2016, pp. 41-42)

Tackling the causes of forced migration

Devastating situations in asylum seekers’ home countries have caused mass migration to the EU. A sustainable solution to the migration crisis must include the challenging task of

tackling the causes of forced migration. Apart from ending the Syrian civil war and stopping terrorism, this also includes sustainable development assistance for the refugees' countries of origin. (Mayer, 2016, p. 9)

Substantial investments targeting economic development and institutional reform increase stability and prosperity, which can eventually reduce forced migration movements. Funding targeted on measures which increase education and skills, promote political stability, strengthen the rule of law and provide hope for a better future, can help to reduce pressures for migration. (Swanson and Stevens, 2015)

As Matthias Mayer from the Integration and Education program at the Bertelsmann Foundation writes:

“Asylum policy can no longer be reduced to dealing with the people who arrive at our doorstep. Rather, it must acknowledge the connectedness of the world and the fact that people emigrate out of desperation. It is time that the EU, the United States and the world's other developed economies tackle the root causes of migration flows. If they do not, the number of migrants to Europe is bound to increase further” – Matthias Mayer (Mayer, 2016, p. 9)

Improving the basis of information

In addition to the recommendations given above the basis of information about the labor market integration of refugees should be improved. A study by the Bertelsmann Foundation (Aumüller, 2016) points out the importance of analyzing the labor market integration of the refugees with accompanying qualitative research in order to be able to develop apposite initiatives. This research would make it possible to identify precisely in which aspects of labor market integration refugees differ from regular migrants. Such an improved basis of information is an inevitable requirement to formulate profound labor market policies. (Aumüller, 2016, p. 54)

As the vast majority of existing work on the impact of migration on the labor market does not generally differentiate between regular migrants and refugees (Aiyar et al., 2016, p. 15) this would also be an important contribution to research.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed at analyzing political and economic consequences of the European migration crisis for Germany.

In particular this thesis tried to answer the following questions:

- What were the political consequences of the migration crisis for Germany, both on a national and international level?
- What are the fiscal impact and the labor market implications of the migration crisis for Germany?
- Which recommendations to German policy makers can be given in the context of the migration crisis?

As a fundamental theoretical understanding of migration is necessary to derive a profound policy recommendation, this thesis has started off with a description of political and economic theories regarding the initiation and perpetuation of migration as well as integration of migrants.

The following economic theories about the initiation of migration have been covered:

- The neoclassical economic theory (migration is caused by an individual's desire to maximize income by exploiting wage differences between countries)
- New economics of migration (decision to migrate is not made by an individual, but by a whole household to hedge against risks to the household's income)
- The dual labor market theory (migration is caused by an intrinsic demand for labor in modern societies)
- The world systems theory (migration is the result of increasing globalization)

Massey et al. (1993) suggest that as these theories explain the origins of migration at divergent levels of analysis - the individual, the household, the national and the international level - the various explanations are not necessarily contradictory. They state that it is quite possible that an individual seeks to maximize income while households act to minimize economic risk and that both decisions are made in a socioeconomic context shaped by structural forces on a national and international level. According to Massey et al. the various

theories reflect efforts to break down a complex subject into analytically manageable parts. (Massey et al., 1993, p. 433)

And indeed, it seems quite likely that in reality elements from all theories covered might play a role in the initiation of migration. Globalization and increasing interconnectedness between countries may facilitate migration (world systems theory) and migrants may prefer to move to countries where wages are relatively high (neoclassical economic theory) and chances to find employment are good due to demand for migrant workers (dual labor market theory). Furthermore, their decision to migrate might be influenced by the desire to provide economic support for family members (new economics of labor migration).

Political factors play an important role in the initiation of migration as well. Violence, wars and the threat of persecution cause migration movements. It should be noted, that while economic reasons like wage differences and reduction of risks to a household's income may be motivating factors for regular migrants, refugees' decisions to flee their country are frequently influenced by political rather than economic factors.

The next set of theories covered has referred to the perpetuation of migration. Theories which have been covered are:

- Network theory (social networks between migrants and non-migrants promote migration)
- Institutional theory (migration becomes increasingly institutionalized as entrepreneurs and organizations promoting migration arise)
- Theory of cumulative causation (an act of migration promotes further migration)

Other aspects which have also been covered are the two most significant concepts about the integration of non-natives into the host country's society as well as an alternative approach proposed by the Council of Europe. The two most significant concepts are multiculturalism and assimilation. Multiculturalist policies aim at protecting cultural diversity, while assimilationist policies aim at eliminating cultural diversity by assimilation of immigrants into the culture of the host society. The alternative approach proposed by the Council of Europe is a mix of multiculturalism and assimilation.

As a fundamental understanding of the European migration crisis is a necessary precondition for the analysis of the political and economic consequences the second chapter provided an

overview of the context of the European migration crisis, including the profile of asylum seekers, reasons for the crisis and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).

The content of the second chapter can be summed up as follows:

More than 1.8 million of mostly young, male asylum seekers have entered the EU since 2015. They are not distributed evenly across the EU and almost 50 percent of them have come to live in Germany. Assuming that the theory of cumulative causation, the institutional theory and the network theory hold true in the context of the European migration crisis (empirical evidence for it already exists in other contexts), further migration movements towards the EU can be expected in the upcoming years.

Many of the asylum seekers come from war-torn countries like Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq and have risked their lives on the journey across the Mediterranean Sea. Others come from areas like the Western Balkans and left their home countries mainly for economic reasons. The routes taken by asylum seekers have shifted over time, and political decisions have drastically reduced movements on the Balkan route. In addition to the situation in the home countries other factors like changes to Macedonia's asylum law and Germany's suspension of the Dublin regulation for Syrian refugees have led to the sudden and massive increase of asylum applications in Europe.

The CEAS is a praiseworthy attempt to establish a common asylum system throughout the EU which includes common standards for asylum seekers. However, it also includes regulations such as the Dublin regulation, which has proven to be ineffective and unfair as it puts high pressure on certain countries. A fairer distribution of asylum seekers among EU member states may be hard to implement as some EU-countries are against the idea of burden-sharing. This reluctance towards a burden-sharing and fairer distribution of asylum seekers across member states demonstrates the conflict between the interests of the EU as a whole vs. national interests of some members. This conflict of interests may also be the main reason why the temporary protection directive has not been applied.

The third chapter provided the answer to the question of what the political consequences on a national and international level are. It finds that the migration crisis has led to significant political changes in Germany. Consequences on the national level include amendments to the registration procedure and the passing of asylum packages I and II which mostly include measures tightening the asylum law. It seems like some of the measures in these packages aim to "sort out" economic migrants among the asylum seekers from refugees who flee from

violence and persecution. For example, new “safe countries of origin” have been defined, federal states and municipalities have been encouraged to provide non-cash benefits, and deportation processes have been made easier and quicker. On the other hand an integration law has been passed, which aims to integrate asylum seekers / refugees who show genuine effort and initiative to integrate faster into society. As a consequence of the mass-inflow of asylum seekers the sentiment of the German electorate towards migration has changed significantly. This change has probably been driven by news reports about asylum seekers who seek asylum solely for economic benefits or reports about crimes committed by asylum seekers. The changing sentiment has most likely played an important role in the reasons for the most significant consequence of the migration crisis on the political landscape in Germany - the rise of the right-wing populist party AfD. Furthermore, the question of whether to put a maximum limit on the number of granted asylums has caused a dispute between the “sister parties” CDU and CSU. Political consequences on the international level have been identified, like for example the suspension of the Dublin regulation for Syrian refugees (which has led to an increase of asylum applications and has been praised as an act of European solidarity) and support for the controversial EU-Turkey agreement.

The fourth chapter answered the question of what the economic consequences in terms of fiscal impact and labor market implications are.

Unsurprisingly, the fiscal impact of the migration crisis was enormous. The immediate, direct costs on the national level have been reported to amount to 21.7 billion euro in 2016. The costs for the federal states are estimated to have been 23 billion for the year 2016, which is ten times higher than in 2014. Several studies conclude that the amount of the long-term costs depends highly on how quickly the refugees get integrated into the labor market.

The implications for the labor market can be summed up as follows: Hundreds of thousands of refugees need to be integrated into the labor market. The refugees meet with quite favorable labor market conditions in Germany as the unemployment rate is relatively low and many positions have not been filled (especially in certain industries). In addition to that increasing employment rates among migrants indicate that employers are becoming less reluctant towards hiring non-native Germans. Besides that, the long-term perspective for job-seekers seems good as an ongoing demographic change might make it easier to find employment. However, missing qualifications and the fact that most asylum seekers do not speak German are major barriers towards successful labor market integration of refugees. Formal education differs widely between countries of origin and while especially Syrians

(who have high protection quotas and are the largest group of asylum seekers) have a relatively good formal education, other nationalities, like e.g. Afghans have generally rather low levels. Furthermore, only one third of female asylum seekers held a permanent job in their home countries, which could make it even harder for them to find a job in Germany. In addition to these problems, asylum seekers face the issue of having qualifications, which they acquired in their home countries, recognized in Germany.

While Germany has taken several initiatives to facilitate the labor market integration of asylum seekers (including legislative changes like the “asylum compromise” and the integration law, as well as projects like the ESF-BAMF program and “Prototyping Transfer”), further efforts are needed.

Throughout this thesis several issues and points for improvement have been identified. To address these issues a policy recommendation has been given in the last chapter of the thesis. The issues and suggestions for improvement can be summed up as follows:

- The allocation system used to distribute asylum seekers across Germany (Königstein quota system) follows a formula which is too simple. Therefore a new quota system needs to be developed.
- Integration / language courses are too often oversubscribed and are not sophisticated enough. Therefore further investments into these courses are necessary.
- Asylum seekers often have problems having their qualifications recognized as they did not bring along their necessary documents to Germany or rather lost them. Therefore a new nationwide system to assess asylum seekers' qualifications needs to be developed.
- While many asylum seekers have entrepreneurial ambitions and have been self-employed in their home countries they struggle with opening a business in Germany. Therefore nationwide projects which assist refugees in opening a business should be launched.
- The popularity of the right wing populist party AfD is increasing. Multicultural policies should be avoided as they will not receive much support and might further upset certain parts of the electorate.
- A shortfall in funding for refugee camps led to wave-like migration patterns into the EU and to Germany. To avoid such wave-like movements better funding needs to be provided to refugee camps.
- The Dublin regulation is totally ineffective and therefore needs to be reformed.

- Many refugees die on an extremely dangerous journey in small, overcrowded boats across the Mediterranean Sea. This is a humanitarian catastrophe and Germany should provide legal and non-dangerous ways into safety for refugees.
- Refugees left their home countries because of the horrible conditions there. For a sustainable solution to the migration crisis Germany and other states have to make efforts to improve the conditions in asylum seekers' home countries.

Apart from the fact, that helping those in need by granting them asylum is a humanitarian duty, an effective management of migration and successful integration of refugees can lead to long-term benefits for Germany.

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