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The UN and its role in international conflicts prevention and resolution: the case study of Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone

(Master's Thesis)

Author: Bc. Veronika Schmidtová

Supervisor: doc. Ing. Mgr. Radka Druláková, Ph.D.

Author's Declaration

Herewith I declare that I have written the Master's Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.

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Acknowledgements

Abstract

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The aim of the Master's Thesis is to analyze the role of the United Nations in conflict prevention and resolution. The theoretical framework lists a set of tools that should be followed in order to achieve a success in UN peacekeeping operations. Based on the list of the tools the Master's Thesis continues with two case studies. The case study of Former Yugoslavia and its peacekeeping operation UNPROFOR is considered to be one of the biggest failures of the UN peacekeeping. In contrary, the case study of Sierra Leonean's peacekeeping operation UNAMSIL then represents a successful UN peacekeeping operation. The Master's Thesis is concluded by a comparative analysis of these two case studies which evaluates the development and the implementation of these tools in each of the case studies. The analysis brings the answer to the research question which asks why some UN peacekeeping operations are successful whereas others completely fail.

Keywords

International peace and security, peacekeeping, United Nations, UNAMSIL, UNPROFOR

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List of Abbreviations

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	All People's Congress
CDF	Civil Defense Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	United Nations Department od Peacekeeping Operations
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army/Yugoslav National Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
OAU	Organization of African Unity
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLA	Sierra Leone Army

SLPP	Sierra Leone Peoples Party
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General

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Introduction

The United Nations was established in 1945 in a hope that no other conflict as deadly as the previous two World Wars will happen again. Since that time, the organization evolved and went through several changes as it needed to adopt its measures accordingly with the changing world and changing nature of the crises. Even peacekeeping, which is the main interest of this Master's Thesis, went through changes and was guided by unwritten principles and by experiences of the men and women deployed to the field operations, as Guéhenno (2008) highlights.

Adolfo (2010) additionally points out that the concept of peacekeeping, as one of the four components of peacebuilding[1], is the main UN strategy for conflict prevention and resolution. Adolfo (2010) furthermore explains that this concept was coined by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 'Agenda for Peace' document from 1992.

Therefore, De Carvalho, & Abdenur (2016) explain that since the 1990s attempts to reform the mechanisms delivering peace and security by the UN have been undertaken. The UN faced criticism already during this period due to several failed peacekeeping operations. The organization, for instance, failed to protect civilians in Bosnia and failed to prevent genocide in Rwanda. As a response to these failures and to point out that there is a need for change in the agenda of maintaining peace, Brahimi Report[2] was released in 2000. This report led to positive changes and helped to create the architecture of the UN peacebuilding, of which the peacekeeping is part of.

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[1] The concept of Peace Building consists of four components: preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building (Adolfo, 2010).

[2] Officially known as the 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (2000)' (UN General Assembly & Security Council, 2000).

Nevertheless, De Carvalho, & Abdenur (2016) argue that the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the UN in 2015 brought certain questions about the ability of the organization to effectively address its main aim stated in the UN Charter which is to maintain international peace and security around the world.

Since the celebrations of the seven decades of the UN's existence took place, some (e.g. McGreel, 2015; Shearer, 2015; Rice-Oxley, 2015) were questioning whether the UN is still a relevant organization and can effectively address international peace and security around the globe. Rice-Oxley (2015) points out for The Guardian one of the examples which are the reasons why people might claim that the UN is not doing its job right. She said: *"The UN's agonising indecision over Syria is just one of a succession of stalemates that show up its irrelevance"*. On the other hand, David Shearer (2015), who served the organisation in senior posts for instance in Rwanda, Belgrade, Afghanistan, and Iraq, emphasizes the need of such a global body as follows: *"Like everybody says, if you didn't have the UN you'd have to invent it"*. But still, he admits that even the UN cannot be flawless: *"But it's imperfect, of course it is, and everybody knows that it is"*.

De Carvalho, & Abdenur (2016) furthermore bring a better light on the UN and highlight that beside the level of criticism, since these more than seven decades, the UN has evolved into the most important tool for conflict management worldwide. And therefore it is very difficult to claim and criticize whether the conflict prevention works. And accordingly, De Carvalho, & Abdenur (2016) emphasized that there is a need to set a mechanism and to list tools which could be used to evaluate conflict prevention.

The author of the Master's Thesis tends to incline to the opinion that the UN is still the most effective institution which maintains international peace around the globe. The author decided to support this statement by building on two case studies of the UN peacekeeping operations. The first analyzed case study is the United Nations

Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed to Former Yugoslavia in 1992[3]. The second case study is the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) which took place in 1999.

The main aim of the thesis is to analyze a list of tools used in the UN peacekeeping operation. These tools are presented by the United Nations itself and elaborated by several authors such as Guéhenno (2008), Koops, MacQueen, Tardy & Williams (2015), and Howard (2008). Furthermore, the tools are assumed to be the ones that were tested in previous operations and so forth they helped to bild peace and if followed, a peacekeeping operation concludes as successful.

Based on this set of tools the main body of the thesis analyzes two case studies of author's choice. UNAMSIL is considered to be one of the most successful UN peacekeeping operations. UNPROFOR, in contrary, is seen as one of the biggest failures of the UN peacekeeping which together with other failed operations[4] brought certain criticism to the organization. The author analyzes these two case studies and based on the theoretical framework from the first chapter defines the obstacles that the missions had to face and that lead to a failure of one of them. Furthermore, when analyzing the nature and the development of the case studies, at the end, the author is able to compare these case studies and to fulfil the aim of the thesis.

To elaborate on this background the author will be able to answer the research question which asks why some UN peacekeeping operations are successful whereas others completely fail. Furthermore, based on the list of tools and their fulfillment from the side of the UN peacekeepers the author will be able to analyze why some missions can be successful while others completely fail.

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[3] For the purpose of this Master's Thesis the author focuses specifically on the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the reason that the proportions of this thesis are not as wide as the whole case would need.

[4] UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) (United Nations, 2017, c).

The decision to choose these two particular peacekeeping operations was based on the fact that both of them were deployed to the environment of a civil war and at the very beginning of the establishment of the concept of peacekeeping. Furthermore, they were deployed at the time when the UN went through organizational changes. At the same time, the UN faced high criticism for its failed peacekeeping operations and so forth was about to adopt an approach attempting the reform of the mechanisms delivering international peace and security. Last, but not least, these case studies were chosen based on the authors' assumption and to the authors' best knowledge that these particular case studies have not face a proper comparative analysis yet.

The use of these two peacekeeping operations might be a limitation for a general conclusion whether the UN is still a relevant[5] organization when maintaining peace and security worldwide. Nevertheless, the outcome of this comparative analysis brings a conclusion that if there was no deployment of the UN peacekeepers the situation in Former Yugoslavia would probably escalate much more and in Sierra Leone, the conflict would probably trigger more violence and would not terminate as quickly and relatively smoothly. Another limitation is the scanty number of sources for the case of Former Yugoslavia. The author assumes that the reason for this is that it is in general more likely to provide information about a successful case that the other way around.

The Master's Thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to the theoretical and methodological approach. In first place, it presents the UN and its role in conflict prevention and resolution. Further, it focuses specifically on peacekeeping operations as a single tool within the wider framework of peace-building. This chapter aims to analyze the nature of the UN peacekeeping operations. The main goal is to analyze a list of tools and mechanism that needs to be followed in a case of a peacekeeping

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[5] For the purpose of this Master's Thesis the author assumes its relevance is based and measured only on the peacekeeping operations.

mission when aiming its success. An essential source is the UN Charter and the UN Security Council Resolutions and Mandates.

When measuring success and failure, the listed tools are *principles of consent, partiality, and the use of force*. Furthermore, the *concept of legitimacy and credibility* is discussed together with other factors.

The second and the third chapters are dedicated to the selected case studies. They are lined up chronologically: the UNPROFOR started in 1991 and UNAMSIL in 1995. Another aspect of this arrangement is that first was chosen the failed mission and highlights, in accordance with the theoretical approach from the first chapter, what mistakes were caused and whose false was it. This chapter is followed by the case study of a successful peacekeeping operation to show how, on contrary, this theoretical approach was followed rather, but not always, smoothly and therefore what led to its successful evaluation.

The chapter on the case study of UNPROFOR deployed to Former Yugoslavia in 1992 shows the failure of the UN peacekeeping operations. Based on the official reports and documents of the UN this chapter analyzes the profile of the mission and its mandate and development. The chapter aims to point out the mistakes that were done on all sides to the conflict and which led to the failure of the peacekeeping operation.

The chapter on the case study of UNAMSIL deployed to Sierra Leone in 1999 shows the successful case of the UN peacekeeping operations. Based on the official reports and documents of the UN this chapter analyzes the profile of the mission and its mandate and development which resulted in accomplishing the tools stated in the introductory chapter.

The fourth chapter, based on the previous analysis of case studies, aims to compare these two missions, their nature, and development. This comparison takes into consideration the tools and implemented in both of the missions and follows their use toward the successful completion of the peacekeeping operations. The chapter points out the differences between these two case studies and mainly the possible mistakes that were done and that prevented the success in the case of Former Yugoslavia.

Chapters are followed by a conclusion which sums up the Master's Thesis and presents the fulfillment of the goal and answers clearly the research question based on the comparative analysis.

As for the sources, the very beginning of the first chapter which provides the general information about the role of the UN in conflict prevention and resolution works with books such as 'The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' written collectively by Koops, MacQueen, Tardy & Williams (2015) or 'United Nations peacekeeping operations: principles and guidelines' approved by Guéhenno in 2008 and for instance this chapter works with 'Understanding peacekeeping' written collectively by Bellamy, Williams & Griffin in 2010. The author also uses 'Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations' written by Rubin & Jones in 2007. The core of the first chapter which is dedicated to the tools of peacekeeping is based on the official UN website on peacekeeping and furthermore, the author of the thesis refers to Guéhenno and Koops, MacQueen, Tardy & Williams again who elaborate on the core principles and further specify them. Electronic sources are single chapters of the web page of the UN peacekeeping, namely 'Mandates and the legal basis for peacekeeping', 'United Nations Peacekeeping', 'United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations' and 'Success in peacekeeping'.

The case studies of the second and the third chapters are mainly based on the official reports and documents of the UN and unofficial documentation provided for instance by the Department of Public Information of the UN. The author also works with a report released by The Human Rights Watch (1995). The chapter also includes commentaries made by experts for online journals such as The Guardian or The Telegraph. They help underline the statements made by the UN on conclusions of the peacekeeping operations. The author includes quotations made by McGreel (2015), Rice-Oxley (2015) and Spencer (2015). All of the commentaries come from 2015 when the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the UN took place.

As for the research design and methods used, the first introductory chapter is based on qualitative analysis of secondary data collected from official UN reports and papers

and from articles and books of the authors listed above. To analyze the list of tools that need to be followed when deploying a UN peacekeeping operation, the author leans on the official UN website on Peacekeeping. The first chapter works also with the UN Charter and on top of that with specific UN Security Council resolutions. The case studies are analyzed primarily based on the UN reports and archives providing a very detailed structure of the development of each peacekeeping operation. The core of the Master's Thesis is the comparative analysis of the case studies which explains the diverging outcomes of the peacekeeping efforts.

1 The UN in international conflicts prevention

Guéhenno (2008) describes conflict prevention as *"the application of structural or diplomatic measures"* (Guéhenno, 2008, p. 17) to prevent tensions between states or within the states and *"disputes from escalating into violent conflict"* (Guéhenno, 2008, p. 17). In ideal situation, this tool should be driven by the means of early warning in combination with clear analysis and gathering information about the factors triggering certain conflict. Activities implemented in conflict prevention may also include *"the use of Secretary General's 'good offices'[6], preventive deployment or confidence-building measures"* (Guéhenno, 2008, p. 17).

Rubin & Jones (2007) elaborate on the statement above and agrees that an essential role in conflict prevention plays the office of the Secretary General and its capabilities to mediate the situation together with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

Throughout the time of its existence the UN has not only grown by the numbers of the personnel deployed to the field operations, it has also grown by means such as complexity, Guéhenno (2008) elaborates on what have been said by Adolfo (2010) and by De Carvalho, & Abdenur (2016) in the introductory part of the Master's Thesis. At the current agenda peacekeeping is facilitating political process at the international level through establishing a national dialogue, protecting civilians, demobilization, and disarmament. Guéhenno (2008) also highlights the importance of the rule of law, protecting human rights and helping the countries affected by conflicts toward transition.

1.1 The UN Peacekeeping

Goulding (1993) defines peacekeeping as operations established by the UN and deployed to the field *"with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve*

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[6] "…good offices are variously employed in support of national peace processes underway, to help initiate new ones, in response to sudden political crises, or to help prevent or avert conflicts that threaten" (Whitfield, 2015).

conflicts between them, under United Nations command and command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary" (Goulding, 1993, p. 455).

The end of the Cold War is considered to be one of the milestones in changing the nature of the UN peacekeeping. At that time, the Security Council became more cooperative and at that time Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was actually in favor or changing the nature of peacekeeping. At this point, multidimensional peacekeeping came into practice and was implemented to accompany the implementation of peace processes (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015).

Several authors (for instance Guéhenno (2008), Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin (2010)) agreed on the fact that peacekeeping and its evolution are products of the effects of the Cold War. Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams (2015) further elaborate on this fact claiming that *"... peacekeeping was not envisaged in the UN Charter, but has proved vital in providing a limited contribution to peace and security in trouble spots around the world."* The authors add that in the late 1940s peacekeeping *"was performed by small teams of unarmed UN observers."* The very first force was deployed in 1956 in the Sinai to *"secure the peace by acting as a buffer between formerly hostile nations. This deployment is *"now regarded as the 'traditional' form of peacekeeping... which was based on the consent of the host state or states... its respect for sovereignty was reflected in the neutrality... and the restrictions on the use of force to peacekeepers' self - defence..."* (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015, p. 44).

Kertcher also adds his insight on changes in the development of the UN peacekeeping and points out that *"the major source of change was an alliance between Western states which were veterans in contributing to peacekeeping operations and Eastern European states led by the Soviet Union."* (Kertcher, 2012, p. 611). He also adds that these two groups of states felt the need for the UN which could deploy multifunctional peacekeeping operations to deal with conflicts as the new world order of the 1990s was quickly changing.

In general, during the 1990s the peacekeeping operations needed to strengthen and professionalize its planning management. The main aim of the reform at that time was to make sure that the growing number of personnel deployed in the field operations and these at the Headquarters have the access to clear guidance of the multidimensional tasks which they needed to tackle (Guéhenno, 2008). Current peacekeeping operations are driven by the lessons learned in the past decades and they reflect the reform.

Even if at that time peacekeepers were deployed into many civil war conflicts, this period after 1990 saw a significant decrease in numbers of such conflicts all over the world by a much as 40 percent and many analysts gave the credit to the peacekeeping for this (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015). Peacekeeping is a very important tool and when done well, it can protect civilians from harm of the violent conflicts, implement peace processes and generally improve the situation in conflict areas. Of course, there is always a space for improvements and that is why peacekeeping operations cannot be taken as a universal tool but they have to adapt accordingly with the situation in the international arena according to Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin (2010).

The UN has tried to develop more comprehensive strategies for prevention through the Interdepartmental Framework for Co-ordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action (generally called the Framework Team) established in 1995. This team connects all departments, funding and agencies, and the World Bank. This team is then supposed to gather all possible information, analyze the situation and based on this develop multidisciplinary strategies to be implemented by the UN organization itself (Rubin & Jones, 2007).

Today, the international life suffers the most with civil wars, states, for instance, Howard (2008). Violent conflicts trouble us the most with the effect it has on innocent people. Besides killing and injury of civilians, Howard says that civil conflicts bring "state collapse, corruption, dire poverty, rampant injustice, dislocation, environmental degradation, and disease, all of which may, in turn, instigate renewed and spreading conflict, international crime, and terrorist activity" (Howard, 2008).

The UN peacekeeping is with no doubts the most visible activity of the UN and for sure one of the most important tools that are used to *maintain international peace and security* as stated in the Charter of the UN, highlight Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams (2015). Peacekeeping disposes of strengths such as legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to effectively deploy its personnel within all around the world (United Nations, 2017, e). The UN peacekeeping "blue helmets"[7] are now recognized all over the world. Since they appeared on the international stage in the late 1940s they have become a universal element of multilateral crisis management. Although the UN is not the only organization which aims to conduct peace operations, it still is the most important institution in the field (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015).

The peacekeeping operations led by the UN are in general authorized by the Security Council, conducted under the direction of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG), and planned, managed, and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) says Guéhenno (2008) generally about the management of the peacekeeping operations.

The table on the following page, Table 1.1: The division of tasks for peacekeepers, shows the main tasks the peacekeepers deployed into field operation need to usually proceed.

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[7] A member of a UN peacekeeping force (United Nations, 2017, c).

Table 1.1 The division of tasks for peacekeepers

Military personnel	Civilian personnel
Assist in implementing peace agreement	Help former belligerents implement complex peace agreements
Monitor ceasefire or cessation of hostilities	Support delivery of humanitarian assistance
Provide a secure environment	Assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants
Prevent the outbreak or spillover of conflict	Supervise elections
Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles	Build rule of law capacity
Administer a territory for a transitional period	Promote respect for human rights
	Assist economic recovery
	Set up transitional administration as a territory moves to independence

Source: Own design based on Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin (2010)

1.2 Legal basis to maintain international peace and security

The UN Charter

The UN Charter, even if not including the word peacekeeping itself (United Nations, 2017, b) gives the United Nations Security Council the main responsibility to maintain international peace and security (Guéhenno, 2008). It states:

"WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that

Armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

To employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations" (United Nations, 1945, p. 2).

To fulfill this responsibility, Guéhenno (2008) reacts that the UN Security Council is expected to act accordingly by adopting certain measures, tools, or mechanisms such as peacekeeping operations.

The legal basis for peacekeeping operations is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. These Chapters set the rules every peacekeeping operation deployed into the field is obliged to follow (United Nations, 2017, b).

Chapter VI is dedicated to "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" (United Nations, 2017, b). This means the consent of the fighting parties. As stated in the Article 33, the pacific measures that are available to the UN peacekeeping operations are *"negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlements and resort to regional agencies or arrangements''* (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010, p. 48). See Appendix 1 for the whole quotation of Chapter VI.

Chapter VII deals with provisions related to "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression'' (United Nations, 2017, b). This Chapter is dedicated to the measures of enforcement. Article 41 and Article 42 are the most important for peacekeeping as they stress the use of non-military and military response. To authorize such forces the UN Security Council needs to identify a presence of a threat to the international peace and security (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010). See Appendix 2 for the whole quotation of Chapter VII.

Chapter VIII states the possibility of involvement of regional organizations and agencies in maintaining peace and security (United Nations, 2017, b). See Appendix 3 for the exact quotation of the Chapter VIII.

Guéhenno (2008) points out that even if every Chapter mentioned above deals with different purpose, all are at the end dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security and follow the principles stated in Chapter I of the UN Charter.

It would be also very risky and misleading to link UN peacekeeping with only one particular Chapter of the Charter.

In general, the UN peacekeeping operations identified themselves the most with the Chapter VI pf the UN Charter (Guéhenno, 2008). However, the author (United Nations, 2017, b) highlights that the Security Council should not refer to any specific Chapter of the UN Charter *"when passing a resolution authorising the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation"* (United Nations, 2017, b) and has never appealed to Chapter VI (Guéhenno, 2008).

Besides that, traditionally, the UN peacekeeping operations are derived also from Chapter IV of the Charter. This Chapter sets the powers to act of the general Assembly (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015).

When it comes to post-conflict settings where a certain state is unable to set an order and peace the UN Security Council has referred mainly to the Chapter VII of the UN Charter in recent years (Guéhenno, 2008).

The United Nations Security Council Mandates

The United Nations peacekeeping operations are based on the mandates from the UN Security Council (Guéhenno, 2008) that are formulated based on the report of the UN Secretary-General (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015). All tasks that a certain peacekeeping operation is supposed to fulfil are set out in these mandates (Guéhenno, 2008).

Planning of the concrete peacekeeping operations highlights Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams (2010), is done by small groups of individuals who do their job in accordance

with the requirements set in mandates. This personnel usually work under the Department of Peacekeeping Operation's Office of Military Affairs.

The UN Security Council sets mandates which are then the basis for a peacekeeping operation. Their tasks vary from case to case. They are dependent on the specific nature of each conflict and challenges and requirements every conflict brings (Guéhenno, 2008).

The UN Security Council has the primer responsibility to maintain international peace and security and its powers are stated in Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter. The resolutions that the UN Security Council passes are based on all the member states which are then encouraged and obliged to fulfill these resolutions while the UN Security Council instructs them to do so (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010).

The UN Security Council is composed of fifteen member states. Five member states, namely China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the USA, are permanent members, which means that they have the right to veto (e.g. a resolution). The remaining ten members are elected by the General Assembly for two years on a rotation basis (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010).

Although each conflict differs and represents specific requirements, United Nations (2017, b) points out that the organization is able to find a *"degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council"* (United Nations, 2017, b). In general, the *"peacekeeping operations can be required to:*

- *Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;*
- *Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;*
- *Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;*
- *Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance, and economic development"* (United Nations, 2017, b).

Furthermore, depending on requirements of a specific operation, UN peacekeeper are required to play a central role in following activities:

- *"Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants;*
- *Mine action;*
- *Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities;*
- *Protection and promotion of human rights;*
- *Electoral assistance;*
- *Support for the restoration and extension of State authority;*
- *Promotion of social and economic recovery and development"* (United Nations, 2017, b).

Guéhenno furthermore adds that the UN Security Council mandates are influenced by the nature and the content of the agreement reached by the parties to the conflict (2008, p.16).

The United Nations Security Council Resolutions

As a result of the work of the UN Security Council, there are a number of Resolutions that are thematically combined so they would fit a certain situation the best (United Nations, 2017, b).

There, of course, exist tasks that are mixed of these requirements and regularly assigned to the peacekeeping missions based on their nature. Therefore these are based on following UN Security Council Resolutions:

- *"Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security;*
- *Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict;*
- *Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict"* (United Nations, 2017, b).

Throughout the time as the nature of conflicts has evolved and changed, the UN Security Council has identified different issues to deal with. In the post-Cold War era,

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the UN Security Council had to expand in understanding threats. Therefore since 1990s it has identified a number of threats, including "state collapse (e.g. Resolution 794), the overthrow of a democratically elected government (e.g. Resolution 841), HIV/AIDS (e.g. Resolution 1308), international terrorism (e.g. Resolution 1373) and nuclear proliferation (e.g. resolution 1540), as well as humanitarian suffering (e.g. Resolution 770), massive human rights abuse (e.g. Resolution 1199) and the massacre of civilians (e.g. Resolution 1674) within a state" (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010, p.49).

The General Assembly

The General Assembly also plays a role in maintaining international peace and security. It has the power to push the Security Council to implement a resolution and undertake a peacekeeping operation. The General Assembly introduced and passed, in 1950, Resolution named 'Uniting for Peace' (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010). This resolution is *"empowered to recommend collective measures whenever the Security Council is unable to reach a decision"* (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010, p. 50).

1.3 Evaluation of UN Peacekeeping operations

Although the evolution of deployed operations took quite a time, it is still very difficult to simplify the outcomes of the UN peacekeeping operations as successful or failed (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015). This chapter aims to set a list of tools, based on the official UN documents in cooperation with several authors, which every peacekeeping mission has to follow to fulfill the objectives of the successful mission.

At first UN peacekeeping was carried out by the uniformed personnel (mainly by soldiers and later by police). Its activities are neither precisely named in the UN Charter, nor the term *peacekeeping* appears there. Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams explain this as follows: "*Most international lawyers working in the area, however, considered peacekeeping to be covered under the framework set out in Chapter VI ("Pacific Settlement Disputes"). Peacekeeping was originally seen as entirely distinct from activities undertaken with reference to Chapter VII ("Action with respect to Threats to*

the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression") enforcement measures" (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015, p. 2).

Howard (2008) agrees that each operation differs from another and therefore, it is not easy to generalize whether the case was successful or failed. Each operation has its own nature and challenges that need to be handled. Howard (2008) also points out that is difficult to introduce any universal set of standards for evaluation. As an example, he highlights that there already appears a huge difference in distinguishing whether we are looking at interstate or at intra-state operation. Both conflicts differ in both nature and the ways they tend to end. Therefore, there has to be a different approach to their evaluation (Howard, 2008).

Based on the previous experiences in peacekeeping operations, the UN official web page is dedicated to this topic. It names several very broad factors that are necessary for a successful peacekeeping operation. These operations need to:

- *"Be guided by the principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate;*
- *Be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population;*
- *Promote national and local ownership of the peace process in the host country"* (United Nations, 2017, a).

Aside from the ones stated above, there are other important factors that help an operation to be successful. These factors are:

- *"Genuine commitment to a political process by the parties in working towards peace (there must be a peace to keep);*
- *Clear, credible, and achievable mandates, with matching personnel, logistic and financial resources;*
- *Unity of purpose within the Security Council, with active support to UN operations in the field;*

- *Host country commitment to unhindered UN operations and freedom of movement;*
- *Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors;*
- *An integrated UN approach, effective coordination with other actors on the ground and good communication with host country authorities and population;*
- *The utmost sensitivity towards the local population and upholding the highest standards of professionalism and good conduct (peacekeepers must avoid becoming part of the problem)"* (United Nations, 2017, a).

The United Nations (2017, a) highlights that it is also very important to note that the UN peacekeeping is not just a single tool but it brings together bodies and parties such a the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, troop, police, the host governments, and external organizations in order to maintain international peace and security. The main strength of the peacekeeping lies in the UN Charter which provides the legal basis for the implementation of the UN peacekeeping operations. Even though, it would not have reached such positive results without the contribution of certain countries that provide valuable resources.

On the other hand, the important question is: "What drives the operation to a failure?" Again, a failure of an operation can be caused by a variety of factors. According to Howard (2008), these factors are such as:

- "The warring parties simply do not want to stop fighting and have the means to continue to fight;
- The major powers at the UN do not provide adequate funds or staff for the peacekeeping operation to function;
- Or the UN is beset by internal rivalries and bureaucratic meltdowns."

The principles of consent, impartiality, and use of force

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations states that the peacekeeping operations should be traditionally based on *"the classical UNEF[8] norms of consent, impartiality, and defensive use of force"* (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015, p. 47). As it was emphasized above, we cannot stick just to these three specified norms because the nature of peacekeeping operations has changed as well as the understanding of these norms has changed in order to allow the peacekeeping force to be more active in the field operations while protecting its mandates (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015).

During the Cold War, these norms were *"interpreted narrowly, reflecting the wider purpose of such forces to maintain the status quo between disputing states but also between the superpowers"* adds Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams (2015, p. 47). After the Cold War, the peacebuilding gradually evolved from relatively limited tool towards more developed, complex, and ambitious. It also gained more trust from the side of individual states. To be more specific, when it comes to consent, after the Cold War this tool has been given by the host states power to not only oversee the ceasefire, but also to be able to manage disarmament and later transition to peace (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015). Although the character of peacekeeping operations has evolved during the last seven decades of the existence of the UN, these three basic principles remained the core tool to maintain international peace and security (Guéhenno, 2008).

The principle of Consent

UN peacekeeping operations are being deployed based on the agreement among main parties of the conflict. This means that the parties are aware of the deployment of the peacekeeping operation which they approve. Parties also agree on the management

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[8] United Nations Emergency Force.

of the conflict in order to support its process which ideally leads to the end of the conflict together with the maintenance of peace and security. The consent of main parties gives the UN peacekeeping operation the necessary freedom to act, both politically and physically, to implement its mandates and to mediate the conflict to the successful resolution (Guéhenno, 2008).

When implementing the mandate, the UN peacekeeping operations must ensure that the operation follows the principle of consent of the main parties. While doing so it must also secure the continuity of the process of the operation. The process requires that all UN peacekeeping personnel taking part in the operation have to be aware of the history and traditions and cultures in the mission area. The mutual trust between the main parties is also essential. A peacekeeping operation should continuously analyze the nature of the operation and predict any violation of the principle of consent (Guéhenno, 2008). *"A peacekeeping operation must have the political and analytical skills, the operational resources, and the will to manage situations where there is an absence or breakdown of local consent. In some cases, this may require, as a last resort, the use of force"* adds Chesterman, Johnstone, & Malone (2016, p. 352).

The principle of Impartiality

It would be very difficult for peacekeeping, as part of the much more complex concept of peace operations, to remain completely neutral. Therefore, the meaning of neutrality had to be specified that the concept of impartiality in its final version applies to the implementation of the UN's mandate – in practice it means that the UN can take action against any party of the conflict that would try to undermine the peace process in any way (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015). This is reflected in the Principles and Guidelines, 2008 "which distinguish impartiality from neutrality by declaring that the UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate" (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015).

It is important that the UN peacekeeping operations are deployed without favoring any of the parties. Impartiality is important when maintaining consent and cooperation of all parties to the conflict. On the other hand, this meaning should not be understood a inactivity – the concept of impartiality should help to deal with parties of the conflict but should not mean inactivity during the implementation the mandate. People responsible for an operation should always, before taking action, make sure the ground for acting is set and all parties are aware, to avoid any misinterpretation of its means. In case this process would fail it could undermine the whole operation and could lead to the withdrawal of consent by one or more parties (Guéhenno, 2008).

The principle of use of force

Throughout the history of peacekeeping, Guéhenno (2008) highlights that there have been hesitations and question on whether the operation can use force and if then under what circumstances. The principle of non-use of force highlights the fact that a UN peacekeeping operation cannot use force, or can use force very limitedly and only in case of a self-defense or when defending peacekeepers or a mandate of an operation.

This fact is reflecting the main principles of international law such as sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force that could be found in Article II of the UN Charter. Peacekeeping was implemented as a non-military activity. However, the UN Charter does not represent all the rules of the international law and therefore it is mainly the aim of the Security Council to implement all necessary means and measures to protect international peace and security (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015).

Guéhenno, (2008) further elaborates on that and points out that force could be used at the tactical level, with the authorisation of the Security Council or if it is an act of self-defence and the defence of the mandate. The environments where the peacekeeping missions are being deployed are often characterized by the presence of militias and other disturbing forces some of which might to seek to undermine the peace process. In such cases, the UN Security Council is giving operations the authorisation to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians, and/or assist

the national authorities in maintaining law and order. Nevertheless, the UN peacekeeping operations should use force as the last option when other methods of persuasion have been exhausted.

In general, the principle of use of force is derived from Chapter VI of the UN Charter which is dedicated to the peaceful settlements of disputes and from Chapter IV which talks about the power that lays in the hands of the General Assembly (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015).

Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams (2015) also add that the language of non-use of force has developed throughout the time. For example, the Brahimi report moves the concept from self-defense to the defense of the mission.

To summarize the three principles, Guéhenno (2008) stresses out that these three principles are mutually interdependent and reinforce each other. It is very important to make sure that all parties involved in a peacekeeping operation are aware of the implementation of these principles and that they clearly understand their core meaning and purpose so that they are applied as effectively as possible. All together they can be understood as a guide for practitioners both in the field operation and those who serve at the Headquarters.

Over the decades and together with increasing number of operations, especially after the 1980s, deployed into the civil wars, these three principles evolved (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015). If we would take, for instance, consent, the UN peacekeepers traditionally required permission to deploy its personnel in the country from the host government while they did not necessary asked the permission from the other parties involved in a certain conflict. This can be understood very well as these other parties were, for instance, rebel militias or other radical groups (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015).

UN General Assembly (2000) points out that once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out the mandate professionally and successfully. The UN General

Assembly also stresses that consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the core principles of the UN peacekeeping.

Perception of legitimacy and credibility

Traditionally, UN peacekeeping operations are driven by the three principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force, however, during the last two decades it was proved, that in order to succeed, the missions have to be driven also by legitimacy and credibility. This means, that primarily the local population has to see the mission as legitimate and credible.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is considered to be one of the most important assets of the UN peacekeeping operations. It is based on the representation of the Member States which provides the missions with personnel and funding. The fact that the operations are directed by the UN Secretary General, as a very well-respected international figure, gives the missions the basic legitimacy. The fact of mission's performance on the ground plays a vital role as well. The fairness they implement through principles of consent and impartiality and the fact that they avoid any violent action speaks for itself (Guéhenno, 2008).

Guéhenno (2008) adds, that" *The firmness and fairness with which a United Nations peacekeeping operation exercises its mandate, the circumspection with which it uses force, the discipline it imposes upon its personnel, the respect it shows to local customs, institutions, and laws, and the decency with which it treats the local people all have a direct effect on perceptions of its legitimacy"* (Guéhenno, 2008, p. 36).

Credibility

The UN peacekeeping operations are usually deployed into a very difficult environment where violence, distress and even collapsing state system is present on daily basis. And these kinds of environments is testing the missions' credibility. Credibility

represents the capability of the operation to effectively manage and drive the operation within such moving environment. To be able to gain credibility the operation has to have a clearly defined mandate and has to dispose of relevant resources to operate within the mandate. It case that the operation is unable to achieve its credibility it could lead to general dissatisfaction or even active opposition. In that case, the overall credibility of the operation would be endangered. It would, therefore, lead to a negative meaning about the organization, meaning the UN. In general, the international audience is more likely to remember failures rather than success and therefore it is more likely to point out failed missions and doubt about the credibility of the UN as the guarantee in maintaining international peace and security (Guéhenno, 2008).

Other factors leading to success

Often confronted factor that can lead to a success of a peacekeeping operation stands within the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. To pass a mandate there must be a strong political will among the P-5. This argument is often speculated and discussed as some might think that the UN is a place where powerful states (meaning the permanent members) can achieve their political goals (Howard, 2008).

(Howard, 2008) argues that UN peacekeeping tends to be more successful when the peacekeepers are actively learning from the environment in which they deployed. The author suggests learning from the local population rather than to listen to the UN Headquarters on how to best implement mandates (Howard, 2008).

Another often forgotten factor, according to Howard (2008), for success in the UN peacekeeping operations is organizational learning. This factor is simply based on the ability of the UN Secretariat to learn during the deployed operation.

Once a UN peacekeeping operation is accomplished and the outcomes are known there comes the time to measure whether the case was a success or a failure. Author (Howard, 2008) outlines three arguments known from the various literature to measure so. First, it is necessary to study whether the main parties of a conflict were willing to stop fighting.

Second, the author points out that the outcomes of the conflict directly result from the political will within the Security Council. Third, others argue that when the three principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force are followed then peacekeeping operations are more likely to succeed (Howard, 2008).

2   UNPROFOR: A failure of UN Peacekeeping

The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Nevertheless, over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, according to Lakhdar Brahimi, Under-Secretary-General for Special Assignments in Support of the Secretary-General's Preventive and Peacemaking Efforts (Bernath & Nyce, 2002).

As indicated in the previous chapter, the period of the 1990s was the most difficult in the context of civil wars and conflicts and therefore the toughest period of time to tackle for the United Nations peacekeeping operations. The UN found itself surprised and not prepared to deal with such disasters and therefore was very much criticized for its failure. For instance, Bernath & Nyce (2002) point out in their book how helplessly the UN peacekeepers happened to stand when the Bosnian Serb soldiers took the UN troops hostage while killing thousands of civilians in areas which were supposed to be UN safe areas. The following chapter analyzes the case of the massacre that happened in former Yugoslavia and based on the theoretical background points out what might have been undervalued and done differently so the peacekeeping operation would not end up in such a disastrous way.

Srebrenica massacre is considered to be one of the biggest massacres in post-1990s and definitely the worst mass murder since the World War II in Europe. At the same time, it was one of the biggest failures of the UN peacekeeping. In this massacre, more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were slaughtered by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica, a town in eastern part of Bosnia and Hercegovina, in 1995 (Smith, 2016).

Besides the killings, more than 20,000 people were forced to leave their towns and homes. Encyclopedia Britanica (2016) calls this act an ethnic cleansing. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has concluded that these killings were, by a number of executed citizens, approaching to genocide. Surely, this conflict was extremely difficult to coordinate and find a peaceful solution for, but even if the major responsibility was pinned on senior officers of the Bosnian Serb army, the UN and its

western allies do admit that they failed to protect Bosnian civilians in Srebrenica, which was by the mandate of the UN Security Council designated a 'safe area'. In 1999, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote in a critical internal report: *"Through error, misjudgement, and an inability to recognize the scope of the evil confronting us, we failed to do our part to help save the people of Srebrenica from the [Bosnian] Serb campaign of mass murder"* (Smith, 2016).

2.1 Civil war in Former Yugoslavia

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed at the end of the World War II and composed of Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia (see Appendix 4 for the successor states of Former Yugoslavia). These countries were represented by numerous ethnic groups such as Orthodox Christian Serbs, Muslim Bosniaks, Catholic Croats, and Muslim ethnic Albanians. Ethnic tensions were common in the Balkan states but once President Josip Broz Tito took a power in 1943 he was able to coordinate them through his dictatorship. 'Serb nationalism' started to occur in 1987 when Slobodan Milosevic took over the power. In 1991 when the republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, and in 1992 when the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence, Yugoslavia started to break up along the ethnic tensions (United to End Genocide, 2016). See Appendix 5 for a brief timeline of the Bosnian war.

United to end Genocide (2016) highlights that the Serbs targeted Bosniak and Croatian civilians in means of what is known as ethnic cleansing. Throughout the period of this war, approximately 100,000 people died and more than two million were displaced. The worst event when 8,000 Bosniaks were killed in what the UN pinned 'safe areas' took place in July 1995 and is known as Srebrenica massacre or Srebrenica genocide.

Shortly after the declaration of independence around the region, the first massacre occurred. The Yugoslav army composed of Serbs invaded Croatia to protect a community of ethnic Serbs. This invasion resulted in the mass killing of Croat men. This set the beginning of ethnic cleansing in the region (United to End Genocide, 2016). Dr.

Edward Herman argues that: *"There were, in fact, multiple massacres at Srebrenica, and that the killing of Bosnian-Muslim soldiers at Srebrenica was in response to the killing of over 2,000 Serb civilians, mostly women, and children, at the location"* (Herman, 2016).

At the beginning of 1992, the Bosnian Serb forces targeted Srebrenica with an aim to gain control over the territory in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. They wanted to annex this territory to the neighboring Republic of Serbia. The forces required the expulsion of the Bosniak inhabitants who opposed the annexation. In March 1995, Radovan Karadžić[9] supervised his military forces under the leadership of General Rartko Mladic (Smith, 2016) to *"create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica"* (United to End Genocide, 2016). In late June, the Bosnia Serb military command ordered the operation. This was code-named Krivaja 95 and resulted in the massacre (Smith, 2016).

The offensive started on July 6, 1995. The Bosnian Serb forces were coming from the south while burning Bosniak homes that came across their way. Thousands of Bosniak civilians 'fled Srebrenica for the nearby village of Potočari' (Smith, 2016). At that time, Srebrenica was protected by only lightly armed 450 Dutch peacekeepers (United to End Genocide, 2016). On July 11, Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladić strolled through Srebrenica and, in a statement recorded on film by a Serb journalist, said: *"We give this town to the Serb nation… The time has come to take revenge on the Muslims"*. On the night of July 11, a crowd of more than 10,000[10] Bosniak men marched from Srebrenica through the forest hoping to reach safety. At the beginning of the following morning, Bosnian Serb officers used UN equipment[11] and *"made false promises*

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[9] President of the self-declared autonomous Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic).

[10] The exact numbers differ from source to source. For instance, United to End Genocide (2016) speaks about 15,000.

[11] *"Serb troops forced the Dutch peacekeepers to hand over their uniforms and helmets so that they could use them to lure civilians out of hiding and trick them into thinking they were headed to safety"* (United to End Genocide, 2016).

of security to encourage the men to surrender, many of which were executed" (Smith, 2016). The main responsibility for a massacre of estimated 7,800 men and boys was pinned to the Bosnian Serb forces. But the police unit from Serbia recorded a video which proved its involvement, too adds Smith (2016).

United to End Genocide (2016) stressed out the involvement and response of the international community. The American government refused to take the lead on Bosnia up to 1995 and after the Srebrenica massacre was embarrassed for its lack of action. The UN, since the beginning, was hesitating to get involved in the direct fight of the Bosnian Serb forces because it wanted to stay neutral and was afraid to threaten its neutrality between nations and groups. The international community finally responded when the Serb forces took over the town of Zepa and dropped a bomb on Sarajevo market. Finally, senior representatives of the United States and its allies decided to deploy NATO forces to defend civilians. These forces were deployed to Gorazde and later extended to Bihac, Sarajevo, and Tuzla. After three years of warfare, the region suffered by UN trade sanctions in Serbia and by military forces assault in Bosnia. This led Milosevic to agree to enter negotiations which resulted in a ceasefire.

In November 1995, the Daytona Accords[12] were signed and officially ended the war in Bosnia. This peace agreement established two semi-autonomous entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (inhabited by Bosniaks and Bosnia Croaks) and the Republika Srpska (inhabited by Serbs and including Srebrenica) (United to End Genocide, 2016).

In 2005, the Bosnian Serb government released an official report where stating that 19,473 Bosnian Serbs were involved in the killings – *"hundreds of whom remained*

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[12] *"The Dayton Accords were successful in stopping the violence and allowing the region to create some form of normality. The fact is that the Dayton Accords were not meant to be a long-term solution to the problems of the country; they were meant to stop the killing and secure peace. Eventually they were supposed to be replaced with a more streamlined government structure. The legacy, of the Dayton Accords is evident within Bosnia-Herzegovina, as its economic development has lagged behind its Balkan counterparts"* (United to End Genocide, 2016).

in official government posts". The UN criminal tribunal[13] marked some more than 20 people for their involvement in these massacres (Smith, 2016).

The EU efforts to set negotiations were unsuccessful (Conference on Yugoslavia in mid-1991 attempted to stop hostilities). The UN at the beginning refused to intervene, except limited troops delivering humanitarian aid (United Nations, 1996, b). Afterward, the UN tried to establish 'safe areas' (further explained in chapter 2.2) including Srebrenica but ineffectively.

This UN peacekeeping operation did not have the capacity to protect the people seeking safety in these areas and therefore the peacekeeping operation ended up in a total failure.

2.2 The UN Peacekeeping operation: profile and mandate

The United to End Genocide (2016) argues that the UN hesitated, at the beginning of the conflict, to get involved directly in the civil war.

On 25 September 1991, the United Nations became actively involved in the case of Former Yugoslavia. At that day, the UN Security Council met on the ministerial level and unanimously adopted Resolution 713 (1991) *"expressing deep concern at the fighting in that country and calling on all States to implement immediately a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia"* (Department of Public Information, 1996). By the Resolution, the UN Security Council invited the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar from Peru (United Nations, 2017, d), to provide his assistance in negotiations with the Yugoslavian government and all those promoting peace efforts (United Nations, 1996, b).

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[13] *"The UN Security Council passed resolution 827 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague, Netherlands in May 1993, before the war had even ended, after they were briefed on reports of massacres, rape and torture, extreme violence in the cities, and massive suffering of the hundreds of thousands who had been expelled from their homes"* (United to End Genocide, 2016).

The UN Secretary-General appointed former United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, as his Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia. From that time forward the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy preserved constant contact with all the parties involved. To be precise these were *'the Presidency of the European Community, the Chairman of the CSCE-participating States, Lord Carrington, then Chairman of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia, and other interested parties'* whose effort was to find a solution to the crisis. It was clear that the most valuable contribution the United Nations could make at that stage was a peace-keeping operation (United Nations, 1996, b).

The Secretary-General's Personal Envoy undertook several missions to Yugoslavia as part of a collective effort to stop fighting and to find a solution to the conflict. Mr. Vance discussed the usefulness of deploying the UN peacekeeping operation with all involved parties (United Nations, 1996, b).

On November 23, Mr. Vance called for a meeting in Geneva which the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia attended together with the Secretary of State for national Defence of Yugoslavia, and as well with Lord Carrington. This meeting led to an agreement between the Yugoslav parties of an establishment of an immediate ceasefire, and a number of other issues. Both of the Yugoslav parties expressed their wish for a quick deployment of the UN peacekeeping operation, however, while progress was made on different issues, the ceasefire agreement collapsed almost immediately (United Nations, 1996, b).

On November 27, the UN Security Council approved by its Resolution 721 (1991) the efforts made by the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy backed the statement made by Mr. Vance that the UN peacekeeping operation could not be deployed without full approval of all the parties to the Geneva agreement. On December 15, 1991, the UN Security Council approved, by its Resolution 724 (1991), the report of the UN Secretary-General which *"contained a plan for a possible peacekeeping operation"* (Department of Public Information, 1996).

By the beginning of January 1992, Mr. Vance convened a meeting in Sarajevo to remove the remaining obstacles to the acceptance of the UN plan by all parties to the conflict. This meeting was attended by the military representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the representatives of the JNA (Yugoslav People's Army/Yugoslav National Army). At this meeting, the Implementing Accords on the unconditional ceasefire was signed. Meantime the new UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected. He then sent a group of 50 military 'liaison officers' with a goal to establish communication between these two parties and to help them to resolve any difficulties that could occur (United Nations, 1996, b).

A month later, nonetheless, certain political groups in Yugoslavia were still expressing objections to the UN plan. The UN Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council to establish the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). UNPROFOR dated from February 1992 to February 1993. UNPROFOR was established by resolution 743 (1992) for an initial period of twelve months. On April 7, the UN Security Council authorized the full deployment of force by the Resolution 749 (1992). Its mandate was later extended to the five Republics of Former Yugoslavia[14], nevertheless, this case study is focused only on Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Srebrenica massacre (United Nations, 1996, b).

The UNPROFOR had originally had the mandate related only to Croatia. But it was expected that after the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), 100 UNPROFOR military observers were moved also to certain regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UN Secretary-General decided to expand this deployment by another 40 military observers to the Mostar region on April 30, 1992. Nevertheless, the risk to their lives reached an unacceptable level and therefore they were withdrawn and redeployed back to the UNPAs in Croatia. On 16 and 17 May, another headquarters

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[14] Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, and it had a liaison presence in the sixth – Slovenia (Department of Public Information, 1996).

personnel was withdrawn from Sarajevo leaving only 100 military and civilian staff to promote a local ceasefire and humanitarian activities (United Nations, 1996, b).

On May 30, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, imposed sanctions on the Federal republic of Yugoslavia (by then consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) in its resolution 757 (1992). These sanctions were imposed in order to achieve a helpful solution to the conflict. On June 29, the UN Security Council released another resolution, 761 (1992), which authorized the deployment of additional elements of UNPROFOR to 'ensure the security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo'. This peacekeeping operation was getting very large. In the period from the beginning of July 1992 to the end of January 1993, the humanitarian transit organized under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) working under the protection of UNPROFOR brought in 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines, and other humanitarian aid (United Nations, 1996, b).

On August 13, the UN Security Council adopted an additional resolution. The situation in Sarajevo was worsening and complicating the UNPROFOR's efforts to ensure security and functioning of the airport and therefore delivering the humanitarian aid. Resolution 770 (1992) enlarged the mandate of UNPROFOR and proposed that it would support the efforts of the UNHCR to deliver the humanitarian aid throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, UNPROFOR was supposed to be used to protect the humanitarian convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the red Cross (ICRC) requested so and if the Force Commander agreed that the request was doable. From November 1992 to January 1993 a total of 34,600 tons of humanitarian aid was delivered to some 800,000 in need in 110 locations throughout the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina (United Nations, 1996, b).

On Septembre 14, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 776 (1992). This resolution made no reference to the Chapter VII of the Un Charter but it allowed an enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina for these purposes (purposes of Chapter VII of the UN Charter). A separate Command was

established in Bosnia and Herzegovina under UNPROFOR to put into action this resolution (United Nations, 1996, b).

On November 16, the UN Security Council adopted yet another resolution which, among other things, it considered that observers should be deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to ease the implementation of relevant resolutions[15] (United Nations, 1996, b).

As the civil war entered another year (1993) the fightings intensified in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Serb paramilitary units were attacking cities in the area of the eastern region of the country, including Srebrenica. In mid-March, the UNHCR reported that 'thousands of Muslims were seeking refuge in Srebrenica from surrounding areas which were being attacked and occupied by Serb forces and that 30 or 40 personnel were dying daily from military action, starvation, exposure to cold or lack of medical treatment' (United Nations, 1996, b).

The UN Security Council, acting under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted yet another Resolution. Resolution 819 (1993) established 'safe area' on the territory of Srebrenica and its neighborhood locations. The mandate clearly stated that this town must stay free of any armed conflict or hostile act (United Nations, 1996, b). As a follow-up, UNPROFOR Force Commander, Commander of the Serb Forces and the Commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces signed, on April 17, 1993, agreement on demilitarization of Srebrenica. On April 21, 170 troops deployed to collect weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives, and other combat supplies, and they successfully demilitarized the town.

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[15] The resolutions in question were: resolution 713 (1991), which, inter alia, established a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; resolution 752 (1992), which, inter alia, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by units of the JNA as well as elements of the Croatian Army, cease immediately; resolution 757 (1992), which imposed comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and resolution 787 (1992), which, inter alia, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including infiltration into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease immediately (United Nations, 1996, b).

This mandate was further extended to other neighboring towns and expanded by Resolution 836 (1993) in order to protect these 'safe areas'.

Nevertheless, and despite all the adopted Resolutions and ceasefire agreements, the conflict further intensified. The militias were spread all over the country what further aggravated the access and transport of the humanitarian assistance. Finally, the UN Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) mandated the forces to use force to protect Sarajevo and the five towns which were 'safe areas'.

Once the conflict entered the year 1994 and once the situation was still not getting any better, the UN Security Council adopted yet another Resolution. Resolution 900 (1994) called upon all parties to cooperate with UNPROFOR in implementing a ceasefire. It further demanded freedom of movement for the civilians, military personnel, and the humanitarian assistance.

To proceed to the Srebrenica massacre, which was the actual failure of the UN peacekeeping. The offensive started on July 6, 1995. The Bosnian Serb forces were coming from the south while burning Bosniak homes that came across their way. Thousands of Bosniak civilians 'fled Srebrenica for the nearby village of Potočari' (Smith, 2016). At that time, Srebrenica was protected by only lightly armed 450 Dutch peacekeepers (United to End Genocide, 2016). On July 11, Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladić strolled through Srebrenica and, in a statement recorded on film by a Serb journalist, said: *"We give this town to the Serb nation… The time has come to take revenge on the Muslims"*. On the night of July 11, a crowd of more than 10,000[16] Bosniak men marched from Srebrenica through the forest hoping to reach safety. At the beginning of the following morning, Bosnian Serb officers used UN equipment[17] and *"made false*

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[16] The exact numbers differ from source to source. For instance, United to End Genocide (2016) speaks about 15,000.

[17] Serb troops forced the Dutch peacekeepers to hand over their uniforms and helmets so that they could use them to lure civilians out of hiding and trick them into thinking they were headed to safety (United to End Genocide, 2016).

promises of security to encourage the men to surrender, many of which were executed” (Smith, 2016). The main responsibility for a massacre of estimated 7,800 men and boys was pinned to the Bosnian Serb forces. But the police unit from Serbia recorded a video which proved its involvement, too adds Smith (2016).

2.3   Evaluation of the peacekeeping operation

The civil war in Bosnia and began in 1992 when the Bosniak Serbs launched a campaign of ethnic cleansing and mass murder to take over the territory where they could set an ethnically pure homeland for the Serbs. Polity (2016, b) states that the official number of killed (mostly innocent) civilians was around 250,000. In the Srebrenica massacre itself, it is estimated, that 7,600 were killed (Polity, 2016, b).

At the beginning, the operation was established in Croatia to demilitarize the designated areas. As the tensions rose, its mandate was later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the delivery of humanitarian aid and to monitor 'no fly zones' and 'safe areas'. The mandate was later extended once more to the Former Yugoslav Republic to monitor the borders (United Nations, 1996, a).

Spencer (2015) in The Guardian in its article preceding the celebrations of the UN's 70th anniversary claims that the Srebrenica massacre was even more specific failure for the UN than the Rwanda genocide. He claims that because in the case of Srebrenica, there were safe zones declared and special forces deployed to protect these zones under the mandate of the UN.

“It was one of the darkest chapters in UN history and Western powers were widely condemned for abandoning the Muslim victims to their fate,” said Sherwell, (2015) for The Telegraph.

United Nations (1996, b) summarize, speaking only about the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that UNPROFOR extended its mandate here in June 1992 as the conflict intensified. Not only the mandate but also its strength was enlarged in order to ensure functioning and security at the airport in Sarajevo and so forth the delivery

of humanitarian aid and assistance. In Septembre of the same year, the mandate war further enlarged in order to support efforts by the UN high Commissioner for refugees to deliver further humanitarian aid and to transfer it across Bosnia and Herzegovina and to protect humanitarian convoys transporting civilians. Additionally, the mandate of the protection forces was to monitor the 'no-fly' zones and the 'safe areas' which were established by the Security Council over the territories of five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo. UNPROFOR, despite the brutal fightings and killing, was authorized to use force only in self-defence in reply to attacks in these areas. Furthermore, the operation was authorized to coordinate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the use of its air power (United Nations, 1996, b).

Since deployment and even if the mandate of UNPROFOR extended several times, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not getting any better (United Nations, 1996, b).

Nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General noted in his report in February 1993 that the forces successfully kept the Sarajevo airport secure and open for the humanitarian relief despite interruptions of military action against the humanitarian aircraft. During the period between July 1992 and January 1993, the humanitarian actions organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees operating under UNPROFOR managed to bring in 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines, and other humanitarian aid (United Nations, 1996, b).

One the other hand, the operations to protect humanitarian convoys passing through Bosnia and Herzegovina were regularly disturbed *"obstruction, mines, hostile fire and the refusal of the parties on the ground, particularly, but not exclusively, the Bosnian Serb party, to cooperate with UNPROFOR"* (United Nations, 1996, b).

As the mandate later extended and additional troops were deployed to the field, a total of some 34,600 tons of relief supplies were delivered to approximately 800,000 beneficiaries in 110 locations throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (United Nations, 1996, b).

The UN Secretary-General pointed out, that the efforts of UNPROFOR were characterized *"by a regrettable tendency on the part of the host Government to blame it for a variety of shortcomings, whether real or imagined"* (United Nations, 1996, b).

UNPROFOR was largely criticized for its failure. The peacekeeping operation was not able to meet the mandate. On contrary, it must have been extremely difficult to operate in the country which did not seem to welcome the UN forces and did not tend to resolve the situation. On top of that, the UN forces were several times attacked by the local Government both by public statements and by declarations, states (United Nations, 1996, b). Furthermore, its mandate was undermined by violent attacks resulting in UNPROFOR fatalities.

To link the evaluation of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping with the theoretical approach from the first chapter. If it comes to consent we could clearly see that the UN Security Council hesitated to deploy any operation to the civil war as he saw there was no will from the fighting parties to accept such an operation. As stated in the previous sub-chapter: "the UN Security Council approved by its Resolution 721 (1991) the efforts made by the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy backed the statement made by Mr. Vance that the UN peacekeeping operation could not be deployed without full approval of all the parties to the Geneva agreement". Later on, Mr. Vance organized a meeting in Sarajevo to remove remaining obstacles to the acceptance of the UN plan to deploy a peacekeeping operation by all parties. A few months later, there were still certain parties which were still expressing objections against the UN plan (United Nations, 1996, b).

As for the legitimacy and credibility, just a few lines above the states (United Nations, 1996, b) points out that throughout the deployment of UNPROFOR, the Government was violating its reputation through public statements and declarations and so forth the mission could not be seen as credible in the eyes of the local population.

Besides these core principles that need to be fulfilled, United Nations (2017, a) lists other important points and in the case of UNPROFOR, it failed already the first one on this list which says that there must be a peace to keep in the country of the operations'

deployment. The fact that the UN Security Council waited to deploy the peacekeepers and that the parties to the conflict were not willing to accept its conditions was, according to the author of the Thesis, the core and first obstacle that the operation needed to face and therefore, other elaborated on this.

Another reasonable point on this list says that there must be a sign of the host country commitment and that it needs to provide a freedom of movement. Taking into consideration that the forces committed violations on humanitarian convoys and violation of the mandate, e.g. violation of the 'no-fly zones' and the 'safe areas'.

3 UNAMSIL: A success story in Peacekeeping

The decade of failed UN peacekeeping was about to end with another failure, this time in Sierra Leone states Bernath & Nyce (2002) from Refugees International, a global independent advocacy organization. These two advocates made a whole report on the civil war in Sierra Leone and implementation of the UN peacekeeping operation.

3.1 Civil war in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone gained independence from Great Britain in 1960 and ever since has been led by two major political parties: the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the All People's Congress (APC). Besides these political parties there appeared to be numerous military juntas that broke off their power on regular basis through military coup d'etat. These coups were so intense that the two separate presidents – Sika Stevens (APC) in the 1970s and Tejan Kabbah (SLPP) in 1990s disbanded the Sierra Leonean army (Adolfo, 2010).

On March 23, 1991, the civil war broke out in the country. The militant rebel group calling itself the Revolutionary United Force (RUF) led by Foday Sanko, a former member of the Sierra Leonean army, mobilized aiming to overthrow the government of at that time current President Joseph Momoh. RUF invaded the eastern region of the country (Adolfo, 2010; Galic, 2001) near the border with Liberia (United Nations (2005, a) and announced that a rebellion had begun. The RUF explained that the reason for fighting were the diamond mines that, according to RUF, the government was plundering (Adolfo, 2010; Galic, 2001).

Sierra Leonean army first tried to defend the government with the support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (United Nations 2005, a), a regional organization of which Sierra Leone was and still is a member (Galic, 2001). But, the following year, the army itself overthrew the government (United Nations 2005, a).

After the army coup, ECOWAS in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and a Special Representative, Mr. Berhanu Dinka from Ethiopia, of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, worked together to negotiate the settlement of the conflict and return the country to civilian rule. They succeeded to make a deal with the military leadership which led to a parliamentary and presidential election (United Nations 2005, a) and return to civilian rule in 1996 under the President Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (Galic, 2001; United Nations 2005, a), a member of the Sierra Leone People's Party (Ruggeri, Gizelis, & Dorussen, 2013; Malan et. All, 2002). The RUF, however, neither participated in the election process nor recognized the result. The Kabbah's rule was neither recognized by all members of the Sierra Leonean army. Therefore the attacks continued (Galic, 2001).

The peace agreement that the Special Representative Dinka assisted in negotiating became known as the Abidjan Accord (Galic, 2001). During the first years of the war, the general opinion developed a suspicion that the Sierra Leonean army collaborated with the RUF rebels (Ruggeri, Gizelis, & Dorussen, 2013). It did not take long till this suspicion was proved. The peace agreement was derailed in 1997 by another military coup. This time the Sierra Leonean army calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), under the leadership of Major Johnny Paul Koroma (Galic, 2001), joined the RUF and formed together ruling junta which refused to abdicate despite the international sanction (Galic, 2001). As a result, President Kabbah together with his government fled to exile to neighboring Guinea (United Nations 2005, a).

The positions switched again in early 1998 when this junta was overthrown by ECOMOG troops (Galic, 2001). When President Kabbah was overthrown the OAU appealed on ECOWAS to send its ECOMOG force to provide stability to the country and to defend the government. ECOWAS started negotiations with the AFRC and in later 1997 reached an agreement. This agreement called for a six-months ceasefire and for reinstatement of President Kabbah. Meanwhile, people in various regions of the country started to form local armed militias called the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) to protect themselves against the soldiers and rebels (Ruggeri, Gizelis, & Dorussen, 2013). Again, it did not take long and the agreement on a ceasefire was breached by the AFRC at the beginning of 1998.

Nevertheless, the ECOMOG forces defeated the AFRC forces, made them leave the capital of Sierra Leone – Freetown, and deployed its troops almost all over the country. As a result, President Kabbah returned to its mandate in March 1998 (Ruggeri, Gizelis, & Dorussen, 2013).

It was evident that the conflict was not going to end anytime soon and so forth the UN entered the country (Adolfo, 2010). First, the UN deployed its forces in mid-1998, as an observer mission known as the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and second, in 1999, as a regular peacekeeping mission known as the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (Adolfo, 2010).

UNOMSIL was established under the UN Chapter VI (Adolfo, 2010) to monitor the situation and advise on questions of demobilization of the rebel groups and restructuration of the security forces (Galic, 2001). The mission was initially established for a period of six months and authorized 70 military observers. However, the number of actually deployed personnel was only 41. (Bernath, & Nyce, 2002).

This mission was deployed under the UN Charter's Chapter VI 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes' and was mandated by the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC Resolution) 1181 (1998) and consisted of military and civilian element. The military element meant to the security situation as well as the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR). The civilian element was implemented to advise on political reform, report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights as well as to assist the government of Sierra Leone (Galic, 2001). The fact that UNOMSIL was deployed as an observer mission and under the Chapter VI meant that it had no power to intervene militarily. In such manner, it was an impossible mission states Bernath, & Nyce (2002). Neither disarmament nor restructuring could take place.

One of the strategies the rebel forces used in the conflict was to harm the local population. As a reaction to this threat to civilians, the UN Special Representative Dinka undertook certain diplomatic efforts aiming to open a dialogue with RUF. These efforts led to the negotiation between the government and RUF and resulted by signing of the Lomé Peace

Agreement in July 1999 (Galic, 2001). Polity (2016, a) highlights the fact that this agreement was to deploy, strengthen and expand the role of the UN.

Furthermore, signing the agreement led to the withdrawal of ECOMOG and the replacement by the UN observer mission UNOMSIL (Bernath, & Nyce, 2002). This Agreement called for the end of hostilities, the transformation of RUF into a political party, and the inclusion of RUF members into the government, the formation of the government of national unity, and the monitoring and aid of the UN and ECOMOG. Galic (2001) highlights another important part of the agreement, and certainly very questionable, which guaranteed the pardon of Mr. Sankoh and RUF for any crimes committed during the civil war, and guaranteed the RUF that it will get four cabinet posts in the new government. On top of that, Sankoh himself was put in charge of the diamond mines. Nevertheless, it was very difficult to measure the RUF's commitment to the agreement as violence continued.

In May 2000, the RUF broke the Lomé Peace Agreement when it took 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage. At that time, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair deployed forces in Sierra Leone, consisting of about 900 marines, paratroopers, and commandos. These were to stabilize the situation mainly in Freetown and to secure the perimeter around (Olanisakin, 2008). They were also meant to evacuate the foreign citizens and to protect the airport so the UN reinforcement could fly in (Bernath, & Nyce, 2002).

At this stage, UN peacekeepers were only meant to implement and monitor the peace agreement but had neither the mandate nor the capabilities to intervene as the local actors would imagine them to adhere to the agreement. When Freetown was about to be overthrown the UN, forces had to be evacuated as they truly did not have the means to defend the city and mandate of the peace agreement. This proves the fact that other actors of the conflict such as the UK troops and the ECOMOG troops were fully involved in the civil war and fully used their mandate and intention to protect the government (Polity, 2016, a).

Galic (2001) speculates that one of the reasons why the UN did not expect to enforce action could be that the UN official might have hoped that once the ECOMOG troops withdrew the situation would be stable enough that such an enforcement would not be necessary. On the other hand, the UN peacekeepers could not withdraw and leave Sierra Leone. That was clear that its mandate needed to be strengthened at some point.

Nonetheless, the rebel groups did not give up on their aims and continued to fight the Kabbah's government and took over large territories of the country. Bernath, & Nyce (2002) points out these territories were as large as more than half of the country. The aligned rebel groups succeeded to overthrow the government once more by the beginning of 1999 but were expelled by the ECOMOG troops in few weeks (Galic, 2001). The only thing that the unarmed UNOMSIL personnel could do was monitoring and reporting the ongoing cruelty and violation of human rights. Unfortunately, the UNOMSIL peacekeepers had neither the mandate nor the resources to stop these atrocities (Bernath, & Nyce, 2002).

3.2   The UN Peacekeeping operation: profile and mandate

On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council established The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (United Nations, 2005, a) under the UNSC Resolution 1270 (1999) (Adolfo, 2010). UNAMSIL was meant to be a much larger mission with a maximum of 6 000 military personnel, including 260 military observers (United Nations 2005, a). For the UNAMSIL timeline see Appendix 8.

UNAMSIL, operating under the Security Council resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999, had the following mandate:

- *"To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement;*
- *To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan;*

- *To that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centers and demobilization centers;*
- *To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel;*
- *To monitor adherence to the ceasefire in accordance with the ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) through the structures provided for therein;*
- *To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning;*
- *To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;*
- *To support the operations of United Nations civilian officials, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers, and civil affairs officers;*
- *To provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone"* (United Nations, 2005, a).

This mission succeeded the UNOMSIL operation and aimed mainly to cooperate with the local government and other parties in implementing the Lomé Agreement (1999). Other aims were to assist the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, and Reintegration plan (United Nations, 2005, a) and to support a transition to democratic governance. Since deployment, the mission helped the country to make an incredible move towards peace, 'demonstrating how the world body can respond to the needs and demands of countries emerging from conflict in a rapidly changing global environment' (United Nations, 2006). UNAMSIL dated from October 1999 to December 2005 (Adolfo, 2010).

UNAMSIL was mandated under the UN Charter's Chapter VII that is dedicated to 'Action with Respect to Threat to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'. The peacekeepers were authorized 'to take the necessary measures … to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence' (Adolfo, 2010). Deploying UNAMSIL in accordance with the Chapter VII was a step up

in comparison with UNOMSIL deployed under the Chapter VI. This time, UNAMSIL peacekeepers were allowed to actively pursue peacekeeping activities through both military and civilian arms (Adolfo, 2010).

By the beginning of 2000, the UN Security Council revised the mandate of UNAMSIL and expanded its size (United Nations, 2005, a). The strength of the Mission increased from 6,000 military personnel at the beginning of the Mission in October 1999 up to a maximum deployment of 17,500 in March 2001 (Olonisakin 2008, p. 108). This fact shows how different these two missions were as UNOMSIL only consisted of 210 military observers under the protection of a regional peacekeeping force ECOMOG. On top of that Polity (2016, a) admits that deploying such a number of military personnel made this operation the largest UN peacekeeping operation so far.

The mandate was expanded under UNSC Resolution 1289 (2000). This Resolution mandated the operation to include the provision of security at key locations in the capital city Freetown and near it, and at all disarmament sites. It was also mandated to provide free movement of people and goods and to provide relevant security for the DDR process (Adolfo, 2010).

"According to Security Council resolution 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, the mandate was revised to include the following tasks (acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations):

- *To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport;*
- *To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares;*
- *To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programme;*
- *To coordinate with and assist, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities;*

- *To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assists in their subsequent disposal or destruction"* (United Nations, 2005, a).

The UN Security Council authorized the UNAMSIL peacekeepers to take action in order to fulfil those tasks and declared that in order to act on behalf of the mandate the peacekeepers may take any necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel within its territories of deployment, and on top of that to protect civilians from physical violence threat (United Nations, 2005, a).

Other expansion of the mandate came by the end of March 2001 with the UN Secretary Council Resolution 1346 (2001). According to this resolution, the UN Secretary Council was satisfied with the progress of the UNAMSIL operation and the results achieved so far. The UN Secretary Council also welcomed the revision of the concept of this mission set in paragraphs 57 to 67 (see Appendix 6) of the report of the UN Secretaru-General and recommended to proceed to the completion of the mission (United Nations, 2005, a).

During the first two years of UNAMSIL deployment, the RUF challenged the mission militarily leaving its results uncertain and making it fear of a failure remaining the other failed missions such as the one in Somalia and Rwanda (Ruggeri, Gizelis, & Dorussen, 2013).

UNAMSIL, together with other main actors such as ECOMOG, RUF, AFRC, donor representatives, and the Kabbah Government, have established the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR). This body served as a guide for the DDR program. The DDR program suffered from key logistical weaknesses clearly warned against in DPKO literature - lack of coordination between demobilization and reintegration. As a result, hundreds of ex-combatants who had not yet reintegrated reportedly left the camps and rearmed when the May 2000 crisis erupted.

Another factor limiting the success of DDR was the lack of information[18]. Adolfo (2010) agrees on the fact of lack of information which was provided during UNOMSIL mission so the local population was not informed enough by the peacekeeper forces and so forth wrongly assumed that the peacekeepers are in the region to protect the local population although, it had neither the mandate nor the equipment to do so. This was, therefore, the lesson learned from UNOMSIL and the same mistake did not repeat within UNAMSIL.

Throughout the time the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone got very complex. With the number of deployed personnel, it basically spread across the whole country (see Appendix 7 for the deployment of UNAMSIL personnel). But the UN peacekeepers were not the only forces operating in the country. Since the mission had both civilian and military operations, all of them were brought together and worked under the UN head – the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The other forces were multiple agencies, organizations, and the Sierra Leonean government all working simultaneously to build peace in the country (Adolfo, 2010). Therefore, it is very difficult to state which institution was responsible for which outcome.

In order to stop the chaos and fighting across the whole country, the international community pressured the rebel groups to adhere to the ceasefire and put sanctions against the RUF sponsors. Furthermore, the UNAMSIL mission launched another mediation aiming to bring the two competitors back to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the mission brought more troops to start disarmament on both sides of the conflict and to monitor the ceasefire. The UK later started restructuring the Sierra Leonean army while other partners concentrated on training the local police (United Nations, 2006).

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[18] The same inability to effectively inform the public was noted in UNAMIR, and was particularly tragic in Rwanda in the face of negative broadcasts from Radio Mille Collins (Adolfo, 2010).

In 2005, the government of Sierra Leone declared that the war officially ended. The political situation was stable and Sierra Leone held its first free and fair presidential and parliamentary election with the assistance of UNAMSIL (United Nations, 2005, b).

Overall, the UNAMSIL operation completed most of the tasks it was assigned through its mandate (United Nations, 2005, b). As soon as the security situation in the country started to get better the UN mission assisted 'the voluntary return of more than half a million refugees and internally displaced persons' (United Nations, 2006) as part of the peace-building project that usually comes after the crisis with means to reconstruct the country and bring it back to normal existence. It also helped the government to gain back its authority. On top of that, the UN trained about 4,000 police personnel together with the help of Commonwealth countries. The UK concentrated mainly on the army reconstruction. UNAMSIL, therefore, got involved in creating a Special Court for Sierra Leone with an aim to prosecute those who were the most responsible for war crimes. The government also, with the help of the UN agencies, set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission[19]. The mission also helped to create a project that provided jobs to thousands of unemployed. The troops took part in reconstructing the school and hospital buildings and established and funded an agriculture project (United Nations, 2006).

An evaluation article 'Sierra Leone: A success story in peacekeeping' (United Nations, 2006) further highlights what the UNAMSIL operation has achieved: *"Over the course of its mandate, the UN disarmed more than 75,000 ex-fighters, including about 7,000 child soldiers; assisted in holding national and local government elections, which enabled people to participate in decisions that affected their daily lives; helped to rebuild the country's police force to its pre-war strength and contributed towards rehabilitating the infrastructure and bringing government services to local communities. The UN also helped the government stop illicit trading in diamonds and regulate the industry".*

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[19] Main task of this Commission was to bring together and heal those who were wounded by this civil war (United Nations, 2006).

3.3   Evaluation of the peacekeeping operation

Although the conflict in Sierra Leone started already in 1991 when the RUF forces invaded Freetown aiming to overthrow the Sierra Leonean government, the UN ignored the war for quite a long time, until the UN Secretary-General appointed Special Representative Dinka in 1995 (Polity, 2016, a).

Since the UN peacekeepers have moved to Sierra Leone to oversee a fragile peace process aiming to achieve a ceasefire and transition to democratic government, the country made an incredible progress towards peace. This peacekeeping operation demonstrated how the United Nations can respond to the needs and demands of a country in the conflict in an uncertain environment (United Nations, 2005, b).

Olonisakin, the British-Nigerian scholar, addresses in her book 'Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The story of UNAMSIL' (2008) as follows: *"When the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) concluded in 2005, it was hailed as one of the most successful UN missions to date. Yet, few people would have predicted such a happy ending for UNAMSIL in the early days of the mission"*. Bernath & Nyce in their report (2000) support the same statement.

Bernath & Nyce (2002) also admit that UNAMSIL has become an example of a successful UN peacekeeping operation. In their book, they do ask a question that this master thesis asks as well and that is: Why has UNAMSIL succeeded when so many other missions failed?

The UN operation reached truly significant outcomes throughout its mandate. It achieved to disarm tens of thousands of ex-fighters (Polity (2016, a) states an exact number of 75,000 ex-fighters), helped to rebuild and train the local police forces, contributed in the rehabilitation of the infrastructure. It assisted in the first free presidential and parliamentary election as well and on top of that, the operation helped about 500,000 (Polity, 2016, a) refugees and internally displaced people to voluntary return to their home villages and towns. Last but not least, the UN helped the government to regulate

the diamond industry and to stop the illegal trading with them. This industry played a significant role in the civil war as the rebel groups used money from diamond sales to buy weapons which kept fuelling the conflict (United Nations, 2005, b).

Nevertheless, UNAMSIL was not always expected to succeed. When the RUF rebels took about 500 UN peacekeepers hostage in May 2000, the mission was seen to collapse. This act violated the agreed ceasefire and endangered the UN peacekeeping's credibility. As a response, the international community pressured the RUF rebels to adhere to the ceasefire and it placed sanctions on the RUF sponsors. Therefore, UNAMSIL launched another mediation efforts to get the two opposing sides of the conflict back to the negotiation table. The peacekeeping operation expanded and brought more military observers and started disarming fighters from both (United Nations, 2005, b; United Nations, 2006).

Bernath & Nyce (2002) state in their report that the reason for the transition from civil war to the beginning of peace, stability and democratic government was the UN peacekeeping operation. The most visible fact supporting such a statement, and which could have been heard at the inauguration of President Kabbah, was that the refugees, who fled the country, and the internally displaced people were returning to their homes and that the country has shown remarkable recovery from the conflict since May 2000.

Here are the exact words of President Kabbah at his inauguration on July 12, 2002: *"Today, we are enjoying a substantial level of safety and security, thanks to the support of nations and organizations some of whose representatives are here today, namely, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republics of Guinea, Ghana and Mali, acting on behalf of ECOMOG4, and the current support of UNAMSIL acting under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council, the United Kingdom, the Peoples Republic of China, and the United States of America"* (Bernath, & Nyce, 2002).

Although the UNAMSIL operation shared a wide responsibility for the positive outcomes it is sure that there were other causes external to UNAMSIL that shaped the success. According to Bernath & Nyce (2002), the essential factors of success were:

1. Alignment of political will and resources: this means that the international community committed to the operation with the right mandate and resources which were one of the essential factors leading to success. It is very important to look at the number and qualities of deployed personnel as well as their equipment and logistic organization;

2. Alignment of military force with stability programs that helped foster positive alternatives to conflict, such as DDR, and civil affairs projects;

3. Long-term commitment: Bernath & Nyce (2002) point out the importance of ending the conflict as the immediate goal of a peacekeeping operation because without peaceful environment the country cannot be stable. Achieved stability then allows the development of the elements of good governance such as democratic elections, credible police, and military forces etc. The authors (Bernath & Nyce, 2002) also highlight that the absence of good governance can reopen the conflict. Therefore the peacekeeping forces must remain in place long enough to preserve the peace. This was exactly the case of UNAMSIL operation as after the peacekeeping mission they deployed peace-building operation in order to stay present and monitor the situation in the country and help the government.

Another important determinant of success following the theoretical background in Chapter 1 of this thesis is well stated and fulfilled the **mandate** of the operation. According to UN official article 'Sierra Leone: A success story in peacekeeping' from 2006 (United Nations, 2006), UNAMSIL withdrew from the country completing most of the tasks assigned through the UN Security Council mandate. UNAMSIL completed its mandate in December 2005, ending six years of peacekeeping. The article claims that UNAMSIL's achievements could serve as a model of successful peacekeeping operation for future missions.

Ruggeri, Gizelis & Dorussen (2013) argue that a credible signal, the size of the peacekeeping operation, is more important than the mandate under which the peacekeepers operate. Obviously, both of the determinants are closely related – 'A more ambitious and extensive mandate requires a larger and better-equipped peacekeeping force'.

Walter (1997) and Fortna (2008) point out that, even if the mandate approves sufficient number and quality of personnel and equipment, it can be sometimes difficult to rapidly establish an effective presence of the UN forces on the ground, especially if the environment is not stable. But they agree that the sufficient number of peacekeepers deployed to the operation is, therefore, essential 'to fulfill what is arguably its main objective, namely to assist the local actors to overcome mistrust and commitment problems'.

Olonisakin (2008) is also arguing that the size of the mission is an important factor. She also points out that it is a clear and observable factor and which can be measured easily. She says: *"The willingness of member states to either contribute or financially support a large number of troops shows their commitment to the implementation of the mandate of the mission. By limiting funding to 6,000 troops resulting in a thin deployment on the ground the Security Council showed that Sierra Leone remained a lesser priority"*. The size of UNOMSIL operation was twice extended and the number of military personnel increased from 6,000 at the beginning up to a final number of 17,500. This was an important development that helped to bring success to the mission. Better equipped and trained troops operated in RUF-controlled areas which made it possible to effectively control and lead military operations against this group.

The UN official document 'UNAMSIL: The story Behind the Success in Sierra Leone' (United Nations, 2003) brings as an example the most remarkable aspect of the peace process which, according to the article, was the disarmament of the RUF and Civil Defence Force (CDF) combatants. In Kambia, the northwest district near the border with Guinea (see Appendix 9), this process was completed without a single bullet fired. Even in Kono, an east district rich in diamond mines, where the disarmament was probably

the most difficult, the process was at the end completed successfully. The disarmament program as a tool itself was concluded as officially completed barely a year after it started which was measured as a huge success (United Nations, 2003).

Another big challenge for UNAMSIL was to assist the government in presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002. It was very early after the disarmament concluded and it was the first free election. UNAMSIL was authorized by the Security Council to provide communication and other logistic equipment to the National Electoral Commission. They used, for instance, UNAMSIL's vehicles and helicopters to move the electoral materials and personnel around the country. The mission also provided storage for ballot material and helped with their distribution. On top of that, UNAMSIL provided security during the whole electoral process starting from the preparatory period and finishing after the result's announcement (United Nations, 2003).

Together with matching deployed personnel and the size of the operation, funding goes hand in hand. A year after the UNAMSIL withdrawal, there was a conference held in London in order to show the international community's confidence in the future development of Sierra Leone. At the conference, donors pledged $800 million in aid to boost further development of the country. Development of Sierra Leoneans economy was, furthermore, supported by the returning refugees and other displaced persons. The real progress can be seen in former 'ghost towns' like Kono and Tongo Fields (see Appendix 9). These are now economically very prosperous, attracting thousands of young people. According to 'Sierra Leone: A success story in peacekeeping' (United Nations, 2006) from 2006, the economy has expanded by 7 percent since 2000 with another 6 – 7 percent growth per year (if the political and economic situation in the country remains stable) predicted by the IMF.

Another important factor leading to the success of UN peacekeeping operations listed in the theoretical background of Chapter 1 is the necessity of unity within the United Nations Security Council. Bernath & Nyce bring this argument up in their report and state that: *"UNAMSIL was successful because, after a weak beginning, the mission had the strong support of the UN Security Council and the international community.*

That support was translated into a strong mandate and a force with sufficient strength, logistics, and training to carry out its mandate".

Additionally, success in Sierra Leone was influenced by other non-peacekeeping events that happened accordingly. Bernath & Nyce name them as follows:

- International pressure on Liberian President Charles Taylor - his ability to wage war in Sierra Leone was weakening, he was facing UN sanctions, and travel and diamond bans;
- Arrest of Foday Sankoh in May 2000 – that undermined the credibility of RUF;
- The role of the British – they were responsible mainly for country-wide disarmament as a key factor leading to successful completion of the peacekeeping operation. 'UNAMSIL: A success story in peacekeeping' (United Nations, 2005, b) adds that the British also focused on restructuring the army while the international community concentrated on training the local police forces.

Support of external actors and neighboring countries is also a vital measure that drives a peacekeeping operation toward successful completion. Even if in this case, according to authors such as Bernath & Nyce (2002), UNAMSIL has been cited as a major factor in the recovery of Sierra Leone, there were other actors that helped the country to get stable and secure. UNAMSIL played a valuable role especially since May 2000 but since the beginning of the conflict ECOMOG, as an observer mission of ECOWAS, whose troops consisted of military personnel from countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, and Guinea, played a central role. In contrary with the later deployed UN troops, troops from ECOMOG actually had the mandate and means to fight against the rebel groups.

The International community was furthermore putting an effort to regulate illegal diamond trade that triggered the conflict as RUF militias were exchanging weapons for money gained from this trading. Other efforts tried to put an end to the support of RUF by Liberian president by putting sanctions and trade and travel bans on Liberia. The international community also tried to put the two opposing fighting sides back to the negotiating table to change the leadership of RUF and so on (Polity, 2016, a).

Another important measure reflecting the theoretical background that has been implemented in Sierra Leonean peacekeeping operation is the 'perseverance of UNAMSIL's leadership in persuading Sierra Leoneans to pursue a negotiated end to the war' and furthermore the political will and commitment of all the parties to the peace process (United Nations, 2003).

As reflected in the theoretical background good communication with the host country authorities and population is also significant for a success in peacekeeping operations. Ruggeri, Gizelis & Dorussen (2013) further elaborate on this aspect as: "*In the "UN Peacekeeping and Local Governance" data, cooperation is coded as an attribute of a governance event during a peacekeeping mission*". They also provide the following example to better understand this statement: "*... allowing access to humanitarian workers is not a governance event, but a cooperative response to the governance event of providing humanitarian aid…*". They further argue that communication must reflect the governance event directly and that the coding of cooperation is based on Sharp's (1971) scale of nonviolent actions and ranges from acts of omission (permissive cooperation) and commission (positive engagement). Permissive cooperation could be for example in the case of Sierra Leone 'life returning to normal' or 'refugees voluntarily returning home'. Positive engagement is even stronger approach and in our case, could represent 'participation in elections' or 'agreeing to power-sharing agreements' (Ruggeri, Gizelis, & Dorussen, 2013).

Brahimi in his report[20] underlines the importance of the fact that the UN peacekeeping operation stayed longer in the country even after the mission was already concluded as successful. This extension was based on the letter that President Kabbah sent to at that time UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. There was a tense situation in neighboring

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[20] UN Security Council Report S/2002/987, dated September 5, 2002, "Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.

Liberia and therefore the Sierra Leonean president was afraid of a spill-over effect (Bernath, & Nyce, 2002).

Overall, UNAMSIL has been concluded as a successful peacekeeping operation in 2005. Some (Olonisakin, 2008; Bernath, & Nyce, 2002) even tag this mission as an example of how the successful mission should look like or even as one of the most successful peacekeeping missions held under the United Nations Secretary Council Mandate.

Bernath & Nyce (2002) concluded UNAMSIL as follows: *"Prior to May 2000, the country was engulfed in civil war. In June 2002, there was no war, the country had conducted its first peaceful democratic elections since 1996, and refugees who had left the country a few years earlier have begun returning home. In those terms, UNAMSIL has been a successful mission…"*

'UNAMSIL: A Success Story in Peacekeeping' (United Nations, 2005, b) pointed out that despite such a wide contribution of UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone still faced many challenges few years after the peacekeeping operation was officially concluded. The country still remained fragile and needed to take concrete steps to stabilize the security situation and cultivate a culture of human rights. The economy was still widely dependent on donors as the diamond-mining industry still faced a challenge of corruption. Furthermore, a large amount of population (especially youth and ex-combatants) faced wide unemployment as a result of lack of education.

Therefore the challenges included reintegration of the ex-combatants into society, resettlement of returning refugees and internally displaced people, assistance to the new government to gain credibility and authority throughout the country and last, but not least the recovery of the economy. The NCDDR was in charge of professional training, formal education, and job placement. Furthermore, 'UNAMSIL: The Story Behind the Success in Sierra Leone' (United Nations, 2003) said that through the coordination section of DDR, UNAMSIL *"…including military observers and civil affairs officers, is facilitating reintegration programmes providing tangible benefits to the broader*

community and empowering people to cope with the psychosocial impact of reintegration".

To help meet these challenges, the, at that time newly, created UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was to take over from UNAMSIL beginning in January 2006. Its mandate is to cement UNAMSIL's gains. The new office helped the Government to strengthen human rights, realized the Millennium Development Goals, improved transparency and held free and fair elections in 2007. It also worked together with other UN agencies and missions in the sub-region and provided security for the Special Court (United Nations, 2006).

4 Comparison of case studies

4.1 The UN Peacekeeping in Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone

The introductory chapter of the Master's Thesis emphasized that both of the case studies took place after the Cold War. During the 1990s, the UN peacekeeping faced certain criticism for its failed operations. That was the time when the peacekeeping called for a need of a reform. Its concept needed to be universalized and adopted accordingly with the changing nature of the international arena, division of power and especially with changing nature of the conflicts.

Nevertheless, the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone is today considered to be one of the most successful cases of the UN peacekeeping, while the United Nations Protection Force deployed to Bosnia and Hercegovina to the territory of Former Yugoslavia, is in contrary labeled as one of the five biggest failures in the UN peacekeeping. Therefore, this Master's Thesis asks a question 'Why some peacekeeping operations succeed while others fail?'

To compare the background of the case studies, both reflected a gain of independence followed by fightings of two or more parties. Former Yugoslavia was a complex case. The territory of Former Yugoslavia was divided into 6 republics[21] including various ethnic groups[22]. The tensions started to occur when the republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Serbs living in Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav People's Army opposed this move and therefore the civil war broke out on June 26, 1991 (United Nations, 1996, b). Sierra Leone, in contrary, gained independence from Great Britain already in 1960 but since then was led by two main

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[21] Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia (United to End Genocide, 2016).

[22] Orthodox Christian Serbs, Muslim Bosniaks, Catholic Croats, and Muslim ethnic Albanians (United to End Genocide, 2016).

political parties and aside of that there appeared to be several military juntas that broke off their power through military coup d'etats on a regular basis (Adolfo, 2010; Galic, 2001). On March 23, 1991, the civil war broke out in the country (Adolfo, 2010; Galic, 2001).

Since the beginning of the conflict in Former Yugoslavia, there was the European Community who held a Conference on Yugoslavia and tried to resolve the situation, even though, unsuccessfully (United to end Genocide, 2016). At the same year, in September 1991, the UN became actively involved and adopted its first Resolution on this case. Resolution 713 (1991) was adopted unanimously and called on all member states to put an embargo on weapons and military delivering. Nevertheless, the situation did not seem to get any better (United Nations, 1996, b).

In the case of Sierra Leone, the UN was hesitating for few years do deploy its military forces. Therefore, Sierra Leonean army tried to defend the government with the support of ECOMOG operating under ECOWAS (United Nations, 2005, a). These efforts were once successful, once failed and so forth periods of ruling military junta were changed by periods of ruling government (United Nations, 2005, a).

In Former Yugoslavia, the mandate of the Resolution 713 (1991) offered the Secretary-General to consult with the Government of Yugoslavia and all the others who were promoting a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy maintained constant contact with all parties to the conflict. The Secretary-General, so forth, maintained a mission to Yugoslavia and discussed with all parties concerned the deployment of a peacekeeping operation (United Nations, 1996, b).

In Sierra Leone, ECOWAS established a cooperation with OAU and the Special Representative Dinka from Ethiopia who was appointed by, at that time Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Therewith, an aim to cooperate within several important actors was established and implemented. As a result, this group negotiated a peace agreement and held presidential and parliamentary election (Galic, 2001; United Nations, 2005, a). It did not take long and the militias derailed another coup.

Even if the representatives of all the parties to the conflict of Former Yugoslavia met in Geneva and negotiated an agreement calling for an immediate ceasefire and the need to deploy a peacekeeping operation, the ceasefire immediately broke and so forth the UN representatives did not want to deploy a peacekeeping operation until all the parties of the Geneva meeting fully comply the Geneva agreement. Taking into consideration that the conflict in Former Yugoslavia erupted in June 1991, the UN started to talk about 'possible peacekeeping' operation as of mid-December when a small group traveled to Yugoslavia to plan its implementation. Followed by the UN Secretary-General together with his Personal Envoy worked on consolidation of ceasefire and unconditional acceptance of the UN plan by all parties including an assurance of their readiness to fully cooperate. At that time, the necessary conditions for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation still did not exist. Meantime, a new Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected and sent 50 military officers to use their 'good offices' to maintain ceasefire by facilitating communication between the two parties (United Nations, 1996, b).

In mid-1998, it was evident that the conflict in Sierra Leone was not going end any time soon and so forth the UN decided to enter the country (Adolfo, 2010). First, the UN deployed its observer mission UNOMSIL. And second, in 1999, the UN deployed a regular peacekeeping operation known as the UNAMSIL (Adolfo, 2010).

To point out, the Sierra Leonean case was not from the beginning seen to succeed. The operation reached its critical point once some 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers were taken hostage by the militia (Olanisakin, 2008). At that time, the UK deployed its military forces to secure and stabilize the situation. This occasion highlights the fact, that the UN peacekeepers were deployed to the country to mainly implement and monitor the peace agreements. They neither had the mandate nor the capabilities to intervene as the locals would imagine them to do so (Polity, 2016, a). This further proves that the ones who were fully involved in the civil war and fully implemented their mandate were the UK troops and the ECOMOG (Polity, 2016, a).

To sum up and compare the approaches to single cases. In the case of Sierra Leone, the UN had the advantage that all the parties to the conflict were, more or less (considering the military juntas), cooperative and let the UN be the negotiator of the peace agreements, presidential and parliamentary elections and so forth. The situation in Former Yugoslavia was not as favorable as in Sierra Leone. Even if the UN Secretary-General managed to meet with all the representatives of the parties to the conflict and negotiate agreements on a ceasefire and other issues, they were in absolute most of the cases almost immediately broken.

4.2 Profile and mandate

In February 1992, eight months after the conflict broke out in Former Yugoslavia, there still existed certain political groups expressing their objectives to the UN plan. At that time, the new Secretary-General suggested the UN Security Council established UNPROFOR. And so forth, on 21 February 1992, the UN Security Council established UNPROFOR under the UNSC Resolution 743 (1992) for an initial period of 12 months (United Nations, 1996, b).

United Nations (1996, b) explain that this peacekeeping operation was initially deployed to Croatia but during the time enlarged to other countries of Former Yugoslavia. By the end of April 1992, the operation enlarged to Bosnia and Herzegovina through military observers' groups. Nevertheless, despite all diplomatic efforts by the European Community, the Secretary-General representatives and UNPROFOR forces who aimed to negotiate an absolute ceasefire, the conflict further intensified. It even reached the level when the situation threatening lives of the peacekeepers was intolerable and therefore, they needed to be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina and pulled back to the 'safe-areas' in Croatia.

Many more UNSC Resolutions were implemented still appealing on all parties to the conflict to implement ceasefire and to negotiate a political solution. By the end of May 1992, acting under the UN Charter, Chapter VII, UNSC Resolution 757 (1992) adopted another widerange sanction to achieve a peaceful solution. This Resolution

appealed to all parties to create a secure environment for deliveries of humanitarian aid. Its mandate further enlarged and asked to secure the airport of Sarajevo and its neighborhood, to protect humanitarian convoys crossing the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to set 'no-fly' zones and to control the borders (United Nations, 1996, b).

Even if the situation in Former Yugoslavia was very complex and difficult as it took place across few countries UNPROFOR succeeded at least in keeping the Sarajevo airport secure and open for the humanitarian aircraft. Even if the UN Security Council authorized all member states to undertake all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions' mandates, fights further intensified, especially in the eastern part of Bosnia. The Bosnian Serb paramilitary units were attacking towns including Srebrenica. It was very difficult to manage the humanitarian efforts in the area. Thousands of people were leaving their homes and seeking refuge right in Srebrenica (United Nations, 1996, b).

The UN Security Council, acting again the Chapter VII of the UN Charter introduced Resolution 819 (1993) which pinned Srebrenica as one of the six 'safe-areas' and so forth this town was supposed to be free of any armed attacks or hostilities. UNPROFOR Force Commander, Commander of the Serb forces and the Commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces signed an agreement to demilitarize Srebrenica and its neighborhood areas. On April 21, 170 troops were deployed to collect weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives and other combat supplies and they successfully demilitarized the town. Other cities were pinned as safe areas and this mandate expanded to them as well. Nevertheless, the situation in the region was still getting worst. Another number of ceasefire agreements were signed but violated immediately (United Nations, 1996, b).

The situation reached the worst level on July 6, 1995. The Bosnian Serb forces were coming from the south while burning Bosniak homes that came across their way. Thousands of Bosniak civilians 'fled Srebrenica for the nearby village of Potočari' (Smith, 2016). At that time, Srebrenica was protected by only lightly armed 450 Dutch peacekeepers (United to End Genocide, 2016). On the night of July 11, a crowd of more than 10,000 Bosniak men marched from Srebrenica through the forest hoping to reach

safety. At the beginning of the following morning, Bosnian Serb officers used UN equipment and *"made false promises of security to encourage the men to surrender, many of which were executed"* (Smith, 2016). The main responsibility for a massacre of estimated 7,800 men and boys was pinned to the Bosnian Serb forces. But the police unit from Serbia recorded a video which proved its involvement, too adds Smith 92016).

On contrary in Sierra Leone, On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council established UNAMSIL (United Nations, 2005, a) under the UNSC Resolution 1270 (1999) (Adolfo, 2010). UNAMSIL was meant to be a mission with a maximum of 6 000 military personnel, including 260 military observers (United Nations, 2005, a). This mission aimed to cooperate with the local government and other parties in implementing the Lomé Agreement (1999). Other aims were to assist the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, and Reintegration plan (United Nations, 2005, a) and to support a transition to democratic governance (Adolfo, 2010).

UNAMSIL was mandated under the UN Charter's Chapter VII. The peacekeepers were authorized 'to take the necessary measures … to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence' (Adolfo, 2010).

By the beginning of 2000, the UN Security Council revised the mandate of UNAMSIL and expanded its size (United Nations, 2005, a). The strength of the Mission increased from 6,000 military personnel at the beginning of the Mission up to a maximum deployment of 17,500 in March 2001 (Olonisakin 2008, p. 108). The mandate was expanded under the UNSC Resolution 1289 (2000) (Adolfo, 2010).

The UN Security Council authorized the UNAMSIL peacekeepers to take action in order to fulfil the mandate and declared that in order to act on behalf of the mandate the peacekeepers may take any necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel within its territories of deployment, and on top of that to protect civilians from physical violence threat (United Nations, 2005, a).

Throughout the time the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone got very complex. With the number of deployed personnel, it basically spread across the whole country.

In order to stop the chaos and fighting across the whole country, the international community pressured the rebel groups to adhere to the ceasefire and put sanctions against the RUF sponsors. Furthermore, the UNAMSIL mission launched another mediation aiming to bring the two competitors back to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the mission brought more troops to start disarmament on both sides of the conflict and to monitor the ceasefire. The UK later started restructuring the Sierra Leonean army while other partners concentrated on training the local police (United Nations, 2006).

In 2005, the government of Sierra Leone declared that the war officially ended. The political situation was stable and Sierra Leone held its first free and fair presidential and parliamentary election with the assistance of UNAMSIL (United Nations, 2005, b).

4.3   Evaluation of case studies

Srebrenica massacre was one of the five failed UN peacekeeping operations for which the organization have been widely criticized. This operation was criticized the most for the reason that the UN peacekeeping forces were not able to protect the areas which they declared to be safe and where thousands of refugees seek safety.

Sherwell (2015) said for The Telegraph: *"It was one of the darkest chapters in UN history and Western powers were widely condemned for abandoning the Muslim victims to their fate,"* said Sherwell, (2015) for The Telegraph.

United Nations (1996, b) summarize, speaking only about the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that even though the UNPROFOR many times extended its mandate the conflict intensified. Not only the mandate but also its strength was enlarged in order to ensure functioning and security at the airport in Sarajevo and so forth the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance.

Additionally, the mandate of the protection forces was to monitor the 'no-fly' zones and the 'safe areas' which were established by the Security Council over the territories of five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo (United Nations, 1996, b).

Nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General noted in his report in February 1993 that the forces successfully kept the Sarajevo airport secure and open for the humanitarian relief despite interruptions of military action against the humanitarian aircraft. During the period between July 1992 and January 1993, the humanitarian actions organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees operating under UNPROFOR managed to bring in 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines, and other humanitarian aid (United Nations, 1996, b).

One the other hand, the operations to protect humanitarian convoys passing through Bosnia and Herzegovina were regularly disturbed *"obstruction, mines, hostile fire and the refusal of the parties on the ground, particularly, but not exclusively, the Bosnian Serb party, to cooperate with UNPROFOR"* (United Nations, 1996, b).

As the mandate later extended and additional troops were deployed to the field, a total of some 34,600 tons of relief supplies were delivered to approximately 800,000 beneficiaries in 110 locations throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (United Nations, 1996, b).

UNPROFOR was largely criticized for its failure. The peacekeeping operation was not able to meet the mandate. On contrary, it must have been extremely difficult to operate in the country which did not seem to welcome the UN forces and did not tend to resolve the situation. On top of that, the UN forces were several times attacked by the local Government both by public statements and by declarations, states (United Nations, 1996, b). Furthermore, its mandate was undermined by violent attacks resulting in UNPROFOR fatalities. To link this with the theoretical approach from the first chapter, the consent of all parties was simply not met in this case.

As for the legitimacy and credibility, just a few lines above the states (United Nations, 1996, b) points out that throughout the deployment of UNPROFOR, the Government was violating its reputation through public statements and declarations and so forth the mission could not be seen as credible in the eyes of the local population.

Besides these core principles that need to be fulfilled, United Nations (2017, a) lists other important points and in the case of UNPROFOR, it failed already the first one on this list which says that there must be a peace to keep in the country of the operations' deployment. The fact that the UN Security Council waited to deploy the peacekeepers and that the parties to the conflict were not willing to accept its conditions was, according to the author of the Thesis, the core and first obstacle that the operation needed to face and therefore, other elaborated on this.

Another reasonable point on this list says that there must be a sign of the host country commitment and that it needs to provide a freedom of movement. Taking into consideration that the forces committed violations on humanitarian convoys and violation of the mandate, e.g. violation of the 'no-fly zones' and the 'safe areas'.

The case of Sierra Leone was, had, on contrary, much brighter results. The mission helped the country to make an incredible move towards peace. Overall, the UNAMSIL operation completed most of the tasks it was assigned through its mandate (United Nations, 2005, b). On top of that, the UN trained about 4,000 police personnel together with the help of Commonwealth countries. The troops took part in reconstructing the school and hospital buildings and established and funded an agriculture project (United Nations, 2006).

Olonisakin (2008) evaluated UNAMSIL operation as follows: *"When the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) concluded in 2005, it was hailed as one of the most successful UN missions to date"*. Bernath & Nyce (2002) also admit that UNAMSIL has become an example of a successful UN peacekeeping operation.

The UN operation reached truly significant outcomes throughout its mandate. It achieved to disarm tens of thousands of ex-fighters (Polity, 2016, a) states an exact number of 75,000 ex-fighters), helped to rebuild, and train the local police forces, contributed in the rehabilitation of the infrastructure. It assisted in the first free presidential and parliamentary election as well and on top of that, the operation helped about 500,000

(Polity, 2016, a) refugees and internally displaced people to voluntary return to their home villages and towns (United Nations, 2005, b).

The case of UNAMSIL illustrates that peacekeeping is a dynamic process, where the ability to affect the underlying bargaining structures and actors' behaviours and positions determines the outcome of the mission (Fortna 2008).

Conclusion

Throughout the Master's Thesis, the author analyzes the role of the United Nations in international conflicts prevention and resolution and therefore, based on the comparative analysis of two case studies, answers the research question which asks why some UN peacekeeping operations are successful whereas others completely fail.

In order to better understand the role of the United Nations in this manner the author, first, analyzes a list of tools which need to be followed when aiming a success in peacekeeping. These tools are listed based on the official documents of the United Nations and authors such as Adolfo (2010), Rubin & Jones (2007), Howard (2008), or Koops, MacQueen, Tardy & Williams (2015) who elaborate on the listed tools and further explain their meaning. To be able to answer the research question the author builds upon two case studies.

Measuring success or failure in peacekeeping operations, nevertheless, is not an easy task. There are many aspects that play a role and need to be taken into consideration. Usually, the United Nations is not the only actor trying to resolve a certain conflict, be it a civil war in case of our case studies. There are other international organizations, states, political parties, military forces, even governments of neighboring countries who play a role.

According to the author of this Master's Thesis, and based on the analyzed case studies, the very first condition which needs to be accomplished is the will of all parties to the conflict to stop this particular conflict. Without this will, the United Nations Security Council can adopt as many Resolutions as it feels to do so, but the opposing parties will most probably not respect them, either violate them. This was the case of Former Yugoslavia. There, neither strengthening of the mandate by presenting more and more Resolutions, nor the extension of the protection forces helped to resolve the conflict for the reason that the fighting parties objected the UN peacekeeping operation.

On contrary, the case study of Sierra Leone and its UN peacekeeping operation has proved that once all the parties to the conflict tend to cooperate, a peacefull resolution can be achieved. In this case, the cooperation on peacefeul agreements created easier environment for maintaining peace and security. The cooperation of external actors was also very helpful. Troops of ECOMOG operating under the mandate of ECOWAS and the UK troops helped to stabilize the security situation and opposed the military juntas while the UNAMSIL peacekeepers where mostly monitoring the situation and maintaining peace by other means. The performance of the UK troops was especially appreciated when they helped to rescue about some 500 UN peacekeepers that were taken hostage by the militias.

When it comes to promotion of the ownership of the peace process, the UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone achieved a success in this manner. All the parties to the conflict, the neighbouring countries and the local population were concerned about the role of the peacekeepers and therefore were willing to cooperate. The UNAMSIL peacekeepers, for instance, advices the Sierra Leonean Government, helped to restructuralize the army and trained police personnel. On contrary, in case of Former Yugoslavia, the fighting parties did not seem to be wellcoming the UN peacekeepers while violating the ceasefire resolutions and for instance the humanitarian convoyes.

United Nations on its official web page dedicated to peacekeeping lists several others preconditions for a successful operation. One, which is essential for the particular case of Former Yugoslavia, says that there must be a peace to keep. The UN Security Council hesitated from the beginning of the civil war whether to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation and so forth, when they finally got involved, it was too late for a reason that the civil war developed to the stage which was no more managable. There was also a lack of support from external actors. The USA, for instance, did not want to participate at all. On the other hand, in Siearra Leone, the country was not in peace at the time when the UN peacekeeping operation was deployed, but at least, all the parties to the conflict were willing to collaborate aiming to find a peaceful solution to the civil war.

To conclude this thesis, the author believes, despite several unsuccessful operations, that the United Nations is still the most relevant organization in maintaining international peace and security. Throughout its history, it has been, without no doubts, the most active organization in peace operations worldwide.

We must remember that the failed cases happened mostly during the 1990s, during the post-Cold War period, when the organization went through organizational changes and when it needed to addapt to the changing nature of the international scene and to the changing nature of the conflicts. Nevertheless, we all learn throughout the life, and so forth the United Nations also needs to learn from its failures and face challenges of the changing world.

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Appendix 1: Chapter VI of the UN Charter

Chapter VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provision of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Source: United Nations, 1945, p 8-9

Appendix 2: Chapter VII of the UN Charter

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action

may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the number and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreements referred to in Article 4, by the Security Council with the assistance of the military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The military Staff Committee, with the authorisation of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Source: United Nations, 1945, p. 9-11

Appendix 3: Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

CHAPTER VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security council.
3. The Security council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Source: United Nations, 1945, p. 11

Appendix 4: Successor states to the Former Yugoslavia

Source: United to End Genocide (2016).

Appendix 5: Brief timeline of the Bosnian war

1992	Feb 29-March 1	Bosnia's Muslims and Croats vote for independence in referendum boycotted by Serbs.
	April 6	European Union recognizes Bosnia's independence. War breaks out and Serbs, under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic, lay siege to capital Sarajevo. They occupy 70 percent of the country, killing and persecuting Muslims and Croats to carve out a Serb Republic.
	May	U.N. sanctions imposed on Serbia for backing rebel Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia.
1993	January	Bosnia peace efforts fail, war breaks out between Muslims and Croats, previously allied against Serbs.
	April	Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde in eastern Bosnia are declared three of six U.N. "safe areas". The United Nations Protection Force UNPROFOR deploys troops and Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) attacks stop. But the town remains isolated and only a few humanitarian convoys reach it in the following two years.
1994	March	U.S.-brokered agreement ends Muslim-Croat war and creates a Muslim-Croat federation.
1995	March	Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic orders that Srebrenica and Zepa be entirely cut off and aid convoys be stopped from reaching the towns.
	July 9	Karadzic issues a new order to conquer Srebrenica.
	July 11	Bosnian Serbs troops, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, capture the eastern enclave and U.N. "safe area" of Srebrenica, killing about 8,000 Muslim males in the following week. The U.N. war crimes tribunal in The Hague indicts Karadzic and Mladic for genocide for the siege of Sarajevo.
	August	NATO starts air strikes against Bosnian Serb troops.
	November 21	Following NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic agree to a U.S.-brokered peace deal in Dayton, Ohio.
	December 14	The three leaders sign the Dayton peace accords in Paris, paving the way for the arrival of a 66,000-strong NATO peacekeeping Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. The international community establishes a permanent presence in the country through the office of an international peace overseer.

Source: Own design based on Reuters (2008).

Appendix 6: Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, VI. Concept of Operation

57. UNAMSIL has revised its concept of operations, as presented in my six report (S/2000/832 of 24 August 2000), to take into account the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement, the changes in the Mission's military structure and the circumstances on the ground. Troop contributors have been consulted on this revised concept during several meetings with the Secretariat.

58. The main objectives of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone remain to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections.

59. The Mission's updated concept of operations integrates military and civilian aspects and envisages the deployment, in successive phases, into RUF-controlled areas of UNAMSIL troops, United Nations civil affairs, civilian police and human rights personnel, representatives of humanitarian agencies, and government personnel and assets to establish and consolidate State authority and basic services in these areas. It is clear that the success of this concept will very much depend on the availability of United Nations military resources and, in equal measure, on the extent to which these mutually reinforcing efforts are coordinated between the actors involved.

60. in its movement and deployment forward, UNAMSIL will continue to project the necessary military strength and determination to deter any attempt to use force against the United Nations and its mandate in Sierra Leone. The Mission's rules of engagement allow it to respond robustly to any attack or threat of attack, including, if necessary, in a pre-emptive manner. UNAMSIL military contingents continue to receive training in the application of these rules in order to ensure their uniform application.

61. The forward deployment of UNAMSIL would be carried out in stages, which are closely linked to the arrival and deployment of additional troops. In the first stage, which is currently under way, UNAMSIL is expanding its areas of operations by conducting long-range robust patrols into RUF-controlled areas. Such patrols have

reached Makeni in the north and Bendu Junction in the east, and have also included overnight stays by United Nations troops in the Makeni area. In addition to routine patrols, UNAMSIL is aiming to carry out two company-sized patrols per battalion per week. The robust patrols will remain an essential element of the concept of operations and will gradually be expanded to cover the entire country. In addition to increased patrolling, UNAMSIL will continue to maintain liaison and contact with RUF at appropriate levels across all sectors. The Mission will also continue to conduct community projects, including small engineering tasks to be carried out in conjunction with extended patrols.

62. upon the arrival of significant reinforcements provided by the third battalion and support units from Bangladesh, it is expected that UNAMSIL will possess the military capacity to enter the second stage of forward deployment by expanding its permanent presence to Lunsar, Magburak, Makeni, Zele and Mano Junction. This deployment, which is expected to commence in mid-March, would ensure freedom of movement along the East/West supply routes and would also create the necessary conditions for the resumption of organized disarmament and demobilization by ex-combatants. At the same time, patrolling will continue towards and into Bumbuna, Kabala and Kambia districts and Kailahun. UNAMSIL has made clear that it expects RUF to dismantle its checkpoints and prepare for disarmament, since the Mission and, subsequently, the Government would assume responsibility for security in these areas.

63. in the third stage, subject to the availability of troops and further consultation with troop-contributing countries, UNAMSIL would deploy further forward to the diamond producing regions and to some border areas. It is expected that this deployment could provide the necessary security for the orderly conduct of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in those locations, the extension of government authority and basic services, and serve as an additional incentive for the return of refugees to Sierra Leone.

64. at the next stage, UNAMSIL may need to establish a presence at all key towns and areas across the territory of Sierra Leone to create the necessary conditions for the holding of elections. However, it would be too early to determine whether such an expansion of the UNAMSIL area of deployment would require additional

troops. I intend to keep the security, political and humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone and in the subregion under close review and to revert to the Security Council with recommendations regarding the appropriate strength of UNAMSIL. I also intend to closely consult troop contributors at all stages of this process.

65. since my previous report, I have continued efforts to seek the urgently needed contribution to UNAMSIL of additional well-trained and well-equipped troops. Several potential troop contributors have expressed their strong interest in participating in providing troops and other military resources for service with UNAMSIL and several of them have despatched reconnaissance teams to the Mission. The Secretariat is in discussion with these and other Member States with regard to the modalities of their participation, and I hope that these discussions can be concluded very soon. When such new contingents have deployed to Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL's total military strength would reach a level of approximately 17,500 troops.

66. The military capacity corresponding to this level would enable UNAMSIL to make significant progress in its forward deployment, in particular to the diamond producing areas. As I indicated in my previous reports, to adequately discharge the tasks as identified by the Security Council in its resolution 1313 (2000) and assist the Government in regaining control of Sierra Leone's natural resources and key border areas, UNAMSIL would require up to 20,500 military personnel.

67. In this regard, I should also like to underline the particular responsibility of the Government to deploy its administration and to rebuild its institutions in the wake of the Mission's forward deployment. In my view, the forward deployment of UNAMSIL troops would serve little purpose if it is not followed up by the well-planned and well-executed extension of State authority and the gradual hand-over of security responsibilities to the country's armed forces and law enforcement agencies. These activities, which should start as early as possible and be pursued actively, would also enable the international community to consider adjusting its peacekeeping presence and to concentrate valuable resources on development, humanitarian assistance and other vital activities. The establishment of security, the return of government officials, and the resumption of normal economic and social activities in the areas now controlled by RUF would also facilitate the return of

Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced persons to their villages and towns of origin.

Source: United Nations Security Council, 2001

**Appendix 7: The deployment of UNAMSIL personnel by 2002**

Source: UN Department of Public Information, Cartographic Section

Appendix 8: UNAMSIL Timeline

1991	Start of Civil War. Foday Sankoh and RUF capture towns on border with Liberia
1991 (Sep)	New constitution adopted
1992	Captain Valentine Strasser ousts President Momoh in coup. Announces plan for multi-party elections
1995	RUF laid siege to Freetown ECOMOG established to restore peace
May 95-Mar 96	Executive Outcomes (EO), South African-based private military company, defends Freetown and trains elements of SLA
1996 (Jan)	Strasser ousted in coup by Julius Maada Bio
1996 (Feb)	Kabbah elected President
1996 (Nov)	Abidjan Accord signed with Foday Sankoh/RUF
1997 (May)	Kabbah deposed by Major-General Paul Koroma/RUF. Kabbah flees to Guinea. ECOMOG deploys
1997 (Oct)	UN Security Council sanctions against Sierra Leone 6-month peace plan agreed upon by ECOWAS and Koroma (in Conakry) Called for supervision of ceasefire by ECOMOG and UN observers
1998 (Feb)	ECOMOG drives rebels from Freetown
1998 (Mar)	Kabbah returns to Freetown
1998 (Jun)	Nigeria announces withdrawal from ECOMOG. Impending departure causes ECOWAS, US, Brits to work on peace agreement
1998 (Jul)	UNOMSIL established for period of 6 months
1999 (Jan)	RUF/Sankoh seize parts of Freetown from RUF. 5,000 dead; tens of thousands dismembered/raped; 150,000 people displaced
1999 (May)	Lomé Ceasefire Accord
1999 (Jul)	Lomé Peace Accord: Rebels included in government and assured they (including Sankoh) would not be prosecuted for war crimes
1999 (Oct)	UN authorizes UNAMSIL (6,000 military personnel including 260 military observers)
1999 (Nov/Dec)	First UNAMSIL troops arrive: 133 Kenyan soldiers plus 4 ECOMOG battalions that were converted to UNAMSIL (Rest of troops arrive over period of months) ECOMOG troops are attacked outside Freetown
2000 (Feb)	UN votes to increase UNAMSIL strength to 11,000 and expands mandate to Chapter VII
2000 (Apr/May)	UNAMSIL troops are attacked in east. Several hundred captured. RUF captures 13 armored personnel carriers and begins advance on Freetown.
2000 (May)	Rebels surround Freetown. 800 Brits and 5 warships arrive to evacuate British citizens and help secure airport. Foday Sankoh captured. UN votes to increase UNAMSIL strength to 13,000
2000 (Aug)	11 British soldiers taken hostage by militia group called West Side Boys UNAMSIL Force Commander (Jetley) departs Sierra Leone
2000 (Sep)	British forces rescue UK hostages (Operation BARRAS) India/Jordan announce withdrawal from UNAMSIL (4,800 troops) RUF attacks in Guinea. ECOWAS deploys 1796 peacekeepers at border convergence of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia.
2000 (Nov)	Abuja I Ceasefire Agreement New UNAMSIL Force Commander (Opande) arrives in Sierra Leone
2001 (Mar)	UNAMSIL deploys to rebel-held territories UN grants increase in force level to 17,500 (includes 260 military observers and 60 civilian police)
2001 (May)	Abuja II Ceasefire Agreement Disarmament of rebels begin RSLAF begins deploying to rebel-held territories
2002 (Jan)	War declared over. Disarmament of 45,000 rebels complete UN agrees to set up war crimes court
2002 (May)	Kabbah wins national election

Source: Refugees International (2002).

Appendix 9: Map of Sierra Leone

Source: geographicguide.com