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**(Dis)continuity of State Identity: Germany, Japan and
the Legacy of the Second World War**

(Master's Thesis)

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Author's Declaration:

Herewith I declare that I have written the Master's Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources.

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List of Abbreviations

WWII: The Second World War

FPA: Foreign Policy Analysis

IR: International Relations

FRG: Federal Republic of Germany (used synonymously to “West Germany”)

GDR: The German Democratic Republic

USA: The United States of America

USSR: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (used synonymously to “the Soviet Union”)

PRC: The People's Republic of China

Nazi: National Socialist

NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

IMT: The International Military Tribunal (used synonymously to “the Nuremberg Trials”)

IMTFE: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (used synonymously to “the Tokyo Trials”)

ECSC: the European Coal and Steel Community

Euratom: the European Atomic Energy Community

EEC: the European Economic Community

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Introduction

This paper explores factors which influence various policy choices vis-à-vis the reconciliation of countries whose reputation was damaged due to the injustice they committed unto other countries. This complex issue of achieving discontinuity of the wrongdoer's state identity through reconciliatory policies is studied by analysing the Second World War perpetrators: Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and their subsequent, post-war polities. Both countries are compared regarding their individual responses to the same factors of either an internal or external nature. By assessing the significance of internal and external forces throughout time, this paper seeks to answer whether the remarkable difference in trajectory between Germany and Japan following the Second World War is more of a result of domestic predispositions (national identity and culture) or external forces (the countries' position in the changing international system, etc.). This paper seeks to answer following research question:

“To what extent is the (dis)continuity of the state identity of Germany and Japan the result of internal (or external) forces?”

By answering the research question, this paper utilises both a comparative method and qualitative analysis. Since internal and external factors are analysed on different levels of analysis and are inherently theorised by different International Relation theories in academia, this research provides a complex (yet by no means complete), interdisciplinary perspective on the topic. The final synthesis of external and internal factors is facilitated by the constructivist concept of fluid identity – providing an explanation for the research question.

Significance

The legacy of the Second World War, the largest international conflict in history, remains an important factor in the foreign relations of many countries. The memory of mass killings, hateful propaganda, unprecedented inhumane treatment of entire nations perpetrated on a massive scale by the fascist regimes of Germany and Japan poses a difficult obstacle for the modern German and Japanese states in attaining cordial relationships with the countries which suffered under their rule during the war. The comparison of German and Japanese policies explores different approaches to their seriously damaged international reputation. Whereas the unreconciled legacy of WWII significantly deteriorates relations between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China, South Korea and Japan, Germany enjoys a relatively friendly neighbourhood within Europe.

As the primary victims of the Second World War die-out, the role of the state in promoting its remembrance narrative becomes more significant in shaping perceptions of the neighbouring countries. Thus, the importance of state-sponsored collective memory as a factor in international relations increases, and remembrance of history becomes more of a political project used for both domestic and international political purposes. Furthermore, the states' approach to their history provides an important indication of the government's self-identification/self-branding policy. Considering this transition, the issuance of an apology represents a change in the state's identity.

Time frame

This paper focuses on two periods of history – both following the Second World War. First, the period after new, post-WWII West German and Japanese states gained independence and thus became fully-fledged state actors. This period reflects more independent nation-building – for Japan **after 1952** when the state officially regained its full political sovereignty after signature of the Treaty of San Francisco; and, for West Germany **after 1955**, when the official military occupation of West Germany ended. Second, the period after the end of the Cold War with its geopolitical shift towards multilateralism, new wave of globalisation and the global financial crisis of 2008, will be addressed.

Structure

The presented paper's body consists of four chapters. The first chapter outlines the paper's research design: its methodology and theoretical background. The second chapter provides background for Germany's and Japan's history of official remembrance of the Second World War; and, portrays how contemporary Germany and Japan are viewed by their victimised neighbours. The subsequent two analytical chapters provide comparison of internal and external factors on (West) Germany's and Japan's foreign policy formulation (and identity). Finally, the discussion chapter provides a summary of this paper's goals, findings, conclusion and prospects for future research.

Literature

The paper's analysis builds on a wealth of preceding research in multiple disciplines: primarily the conclusions of Foreign Policy Analysis and other fields covered by IR literature, but also Culturalism (cultural comparative analysis), Memory Studies and Sociology. Attention is given to domestic (German or Japanese) sources and foreign analysts. The objective of "reconciliation" of different perspectives on one international phenomenon is, according to

the author, vital for understanding complexity of policy and identity analysis, since they inhabit both the international sphere and the domestic, social and cultural spheres. Furthermore, primary sources including speeches of government officials, survey data or judicial documents are analysed to assess the differences of both countries' official remembrance strategy.

Considering the limited scope of this paper, the analysis provided seeks to deliberate only the most prominent factors affecting the two state's identification centred around "national identity and culture" for the internal factors and "location" (both geographical and structural) for the external factors. The thesis' argument of "complexity" of IR phenomena welcomes analysis of a much broader nature, which would exceed this paper's capacity. Similarly, the paper focuses on West Germany as the predecessor of a current unified Germany and omits analysis of East Germany during the Cold War due to the derision of East German identity following the unification of Germany in 1990. All these omissions are thus opportunities for future extension of herein outlined research.

1. Theoretical and Methodological Framework

The following chapter clarifies the methodology and theoretical background for the research.

1.1. Methodology:

The paper utilises both comparative and qualitative analysis to answer the research question.

1.1.1. Comparative Analysis

Units of Comparison: (West) Germany and Japan (state units)

State-centric perspective is compatible with mainstream International Relation's theories including Wendt's constructivism and thus provides the best theoretical intersection between external and domestic influences on foreign policy choices. For the analysis of effects of the Cold War, West Germany (as the closer representant of unified Germany) is compared to Japan.

Frame of Reference: Legacy of WWII atrocities and efforts to reconcile.

Atrocities are understood in this paper as extraordinarily widespread and unjustifiably inhumane treatment of civilians and prisoners of war, which is perceived as a wrongdoing committed on the populations conquered during WWII war efforts. This behaviour (mass killings, torture, sex slavery, etc) is traditionally objected by both moral and legal norms. Whereas until the end the Second World War war-time excesses were constrained mainly by customary law, the victors' justice embodied in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials¹ codified and was the first to persecute "crimes against humanity", defined as "inhumane acts [...] committed against any civilian population"² commonly of widespread and systemic nature. More specifically, the major attention is given to: historically unprecedented persecution of Jews and other segments of population deemed "racially inferior" by in the case of Germany; and to the Nanjing massacre and forced prostitution of "comfort women" in the case of Japan.

The Second World War is selected as context for this thesis because it represents the largest conflict in history, which due to massive technical advances in both weaponry and media resulted in vast, often purposeful human suffering framed and conveyed to national publics by photography and motion pictures. The Second World War was also an incidence of total

¹ "Special proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo January 19, 1946." International Military Tribunal for the Far East, p. 23.

² "Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, entered into force Aug. 8, 1945".

war in which powerful nation-states centring whole national economies and civilian life around military endeavours. More significantly still, it was a war where state ideologies and different worldviews (or even world systems) and moral codes collided with both sides using their own narrative of events through antagonistic state propaganda. As a result, with a civilian population involved on such a scale in the conflict, grievances and civilian casualties were engraved into collective memories, exacerbating the sentiment of injustice and national hatred towards the perpetrators of their perceived national suffering. Mere political or military capitulation did not suffice, the capitulation of the entire nation was required, the terms of which were dictated by the victors. Consequently, the victors' narrative of the entire conflict was adopted and readily diffused to anyone, who would listen – including the militarily occupied areas of Germany and Japan.

Grounds of Comparison:

Germany and Japan, both former expansionist Axis powers, inherited ruined international reputation due to their crimes against humanity and aggressive territorial expansionism in the build-up and during WWII. Both countries employed state ideology of racial superiority to legitimise their expansionism.

Points of Comparison:

First, perception of the countries by “its victims during WWII,” and both countries' official remembrance will be addressed. Then, salience of the states' national identity and culture (manifested in the nature of nationalism, state ideology during WWII, and the states' attitude towards revisionism) as well as the countries' location in the international arena (determining their role in shifting power dynamics of the Cold war, or the states' attitudes towards regional integrations) on the foreign policy reconciliatory choices in Germany and Japan will be compared.

Premise: Whereas Japan still faces hostility in relations with the countries it occupied during WWII resulting from ineffective reconciliation, Germany enjoys friendly and collaborative relations with the countries occupied by Nazi Germany.

1.1.2. Qualitative Analysis

Aim of Analysis: Explanation of (dis)continuity of German and Japanese state identity (the reasons for success or failure in reconciliation)

Subject of Analysis: Internal and external factors affecting the countries' policies vis-à-vis reconciliation with formerly occupied countries

Hypothesis: Internal factors are more significant in explaining the (dis)continuity of state identity of Germany and Japan

Dependent variable: (dis)continuity of the state identity of Germany and Japan

Independent variable: Internal or external forces

1.2. Theoretical background:

1.2.1. Clarification of Important Terms

Identity: Due to theoretical ambiguity and multi-layered concept of identity in social sciences, this paper will make distinction of two kinds of identity.

State identity: Refers to identity of the state, it is the result of both internal self-identification (through foreign policy choices of the state) and external perception of the identity of the state by other international actors.

National identity: Refers to collective identity of the nation in question. This societal identification is understood as having two components – identification with the shared bloodline (ethnic principle) and identification with political institutions, citizenry and territory (civic/territorial principle).³

1.2.2. Foreign Policy as the Intersection of External and Internal Forces

Foreign policy is the state's conscious outward behaviour in relation to other states in the international arena. International Relations' subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis originated in 1950s to uncover mechanisms behind states' behaviour and foreign policy decision making.

³ This distinction is made as analogy of Anthony D. Smith's distinction of ethnic and civic/territorial nationalism. Source: Smith, Anthony D. 1991. *National Identity*, p. 82.

Since foreign policy provides the means by which a given state defines itself as distinct from external entities, it must be seen as one of the elements of state identity.⁴

Resources and constraints of foreign policy:

The foreign policy of a given, rational state depends upon an intersection of “the desired” and “the possible”.⁵ The possibility of a certain foreign policy is determined by both internal resources (wealth, military capability, population) and favourability of external factors. Conversely, desirability of the policy is a result of domestic political will, which is shaped by both domestic and international considerations. Recognition of external, as well as, internal constraints on the free policy choice of the states allows fair comparison of the two countries’ policies on reconciliation.

The approach of this paper, inspired by J. David Singer, takes a middle ground in the “free will vs. determinism”⁶ philosophical debate to accommodate both neorealist claims of determinist nature of the international system and constructivist perspectives according agency to the state units. Thus, both culture with its effects on national identity (an internal factor) and the international system (an external factor) are interpreted as structural effects setting boundaries for individual state’s political action (agency).

Levels of analysis: one world, many perspectives

Methodologically, to examine the significance of both internal and external factors on the reconciliation policy of Germany and Japan, two levels of analysis will be employed. First, internal factors affecting the states’ policy choice will be examined on a state level⁷ using a reductionist (atomist) perspective. Secondly, the external factors on the states’ policy choice will be assessed on the international level. Both levels of analysis will use the state as the unit of analysis. Thus, in the first case, the effects of sub-state factors such as culture, political groups and ideologies will be assessed in relation to the state’s behaviour (identity). In the second, both effects of the international system (holistic approach) and important international

⁴ Druláková, Radka and Petr Drulák. *Tvorba a analýza zahraniční politiky* p. 9.

⁵ Ibid, p. 21.

⁶ Singer, J. David. 1961. “The level-of-analysis problem in international relations,” p. 85.

⁷ This level of analysis can be described in literature either as “state” or “sub-state level”, depending whether the author uses three basic (Individual/State/International System) or four basic levels of analysis (Individual/Sub-state/State/International System). In this paper, the state in the state-level analysis of internal factors affecting the foreign policy choice or identity conceives of a state as of a “necessary fiction” that gives agency to the sub-state entities.

players (reductionist/atomist approach) on the behaviour (identity) of the state will be addressed.

Each of these perspectives (state level vs. international level; holist vs. reductionist) are associated with a different branch of International Relations' theories (Table 1). Thus, the relative importance of internal and external factors on a state's behaviour mirrors different ontological starting points. In order enable final discussion evaluating relative significance of internal and external forces, a cross-level analysis must be employed. As Owen Temby notes⁸ the levels of analysis provide only a methodological tool and should not be confused (as they often are) with ontological conclusions. A complex image of international relations as an intersection of interconnected influences is desirable, because as Singer states, that explanation or prediction offered on different levels of analysis may (and often does) vary considerably, but "the empirical referents remain essentially the same"⁹.

Table 1: Relationship Between Agent and Structure, Levels of Analysis and Theories of IR

| | Levels of analysis | | |
|-------------------------------|---|---|--|
| Agent and structure | Individual | State | International System |
| Holism | Classical realism Neoclassical realism Liberal intergovernmentalism Constructivism | Constructivism | World systems theory Constructivism |
| Atomism (reductionism) | | Classical realism Neoclassical realism World systems theory Liberal intergovernmentalism | Institutionalism Neoclassical realism Neorealism Liberal intergovernmentalism |

Source: Temby (2015)

⁸Temby, Owen. 2015. "What are Levels of Analysis and what Do They Contribute to International Relations Theory?" p.735 - 737.

⁹ Singer, J. David. 1961. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations," p. 91.

In theory, as Temby argues, there are “as many potential levels of analysis as there are social structures”¹⁰. Thus, the methodological choice of levelled analysis will always be limited and selective. In this light, the presented paper omits the individual level of analysis not because the author deems psychological disposition and temperament of policymakers insignificant. Similarly, the nature of the state’s formal bureaucratic apparatus is not made the primary concern of the state level analysis of domestic factors. All these are not innocent methodological choices, but they were made with specific research question in mind – which concerns itself with a long-term perspective, analysing a policy trend over time, which should theoretically diminish the importance of changing personalities and procedural specificities.

The aim of this paper is to assess the relative importance of internal (subjective, socio-cultural) factors that differentiate nation-states¹¹ and external factors that affect states indiscriminately of their internal characteristics. Thus, the answer to the research question with the levels of analysis in mind seeks to enlighten whether the states’ behaviour (identities) depend more on the characteristics of the individual state/nation or its position/role in the international system. The individual level of analysis lacks the methodological tools and frames of reference to address this question effectively.

Issues facing macro and micro level analysis

This dilemma between “inaccurate homogenisation” of the systemic focus on one hand and “a marked exaggeration of the differences” of the sub-systemic actors on the other, was addressed by J. David Singer in 1961¹² but remains to a large extent unreconciled in the discipline of International Relations to this day. According to Singer, the danger lies particularly in over-differentiation of states (nations) as actors (although both above mentioned extremities should be avoided) as “comparison and contrast [in comparative analysis of foreign policy] can proceed only from observed uniformities”¹³.

Thus, tendency to cluster states based on their characteristics into typologies aims to find a common ground for comparison to predict foreign policy choices. For instance, James Rosenau identified three categories that clustered states’ foreign policy choices based on the size, wealth

¹⁰ Temby, Owen. 2015. "What are Levels of Analysis and what Do They Contribute to International Relations Theory?" p.731.

¹¹ See, for example: Singer, J. David. 1961. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations," p. 82.

¹² Singer, J. David. 1961. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations," p. 83.

¹³ Ibid, p. 83.

(level of economic development) or political system of the country.¹⁴ Pierre Renouvin with Jean-Baptiste Duroselle added national identity (mentality) and geographical location to cluster another nation-types.¹⁵

Competition and co-existence of internal and external factors?

In addition, different factors gain gravity at different times based on the state's foreign policy constraints and options. Thus, use of multiple levels of analysis is helpful in capturing important sources of states' policy choices over time. For these purposes, constructivism provides the greatest variety of tools since it operates on each level of the analysis.¹⁶

The presented paper concentrates on the period after the Second World War, focusing mainly on two important moments. First, the period of the post-war state reconstruction with the victors' influence on the formation of modern national institutions and ideologies will be addressed. Second, the period after the end of Cold War and 2008 financial crisis will be assessed to shed light on current dynamics in the states' foreign policies and identities regarding their Second World War legacies in an increasingly multipolar world.

Rationality – two different explanations behind foreign policy choices

Stephen G. Walker uses the definition of rational behaviour as “behaviour that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation”¹⁷. In this light, Walker¹⁸ conceives of two different types of rationality which might produce even contradictory behaviour. Firstly, “Substantive Rationality” or “Objective Rationality” ignores the properties of the actor and thus only problematises constraints originating from an external situation. Secondly, “Bounded Rationality” considers both subjective limitations of knowledge or intellect (or other capacities) of the decision-maker which may hamper objective optimal choices.

Furthermore, Walker describes actors (state's decision-makers) as inhabiting the internal “World of Beliefs” created by their “emotional, cognitive and motivational processes”, distinct

¹⁴ Rosenau, James N. 1966. “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy.”

¹⁵ Druláková, Radka and Petr Drulák. *Tvorba a analýza zahraniční politiky* p. 56 – 57.

¹⁶ Temby, Owen. 2015. “What are levels of analysis and what do they contribute to international relations theory?” p.736.

¹⁷ Walker, Stephen G. Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer, eds. 2013. *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations*, p. 13, citing Simon, Herbert A. 1985. “Human Nature in Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, 79, p. 294.

¹⁸ Walker, Stephen G. Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer, eds. 2013. *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations*, p. 13.

but interconnected with the external objective “World of Events”, defined by “the presence, power and action of other actors”, where actors’ behaviour materialises.¹⁹ Thus, actors’ intentions based on their subjective beliefs translate into action through rationality. At the same time, “the World of Events” exerts power over and shapes the actors’ beliefs and intentions.

Since, as stated above, this paper does not focus on psychological capacities of the individuals in charge of decision-making, “irrationality” is not considered. Furthermore, the two kinds of rationality (substantive and bounded) reflect conflicting theoretical postulates of the objectivity or subjectivity of national interest in (neo)realism and constructivism respectively.

Reconciliation of internal and external factors

Reconciliation of different perspectives and explanations provided by two (or more) levels of analysis (state level and the international systemic level) is necessary to appreciate the complexity and compatibility of different approaches to study International Relations. Most importantly, the relation between often the contradictory programme of the macroscopic, structure-oriented mainstream International Relations’ theories’ focus (translated most commonly into the systemic level of analysis) and microscopic, agent-centred perspective of the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis should be assessed and bridged to enrich existing knowledge.

Although attempts of theoretical integration in Foreign Policy Analysis have been so far unsuccessful (there is no explicit model how to integrate variables at many different levels of analysis)²⁰, there is some valuable insight into reconciliation of variables. For example, the aforementioned James Rosenau as early as 1966 in his article “Pre-Theory”²¹ modelled how nation-types based on their size (large or small), wealth (developed or underdeveloped) and political system (open or closed). influence foreign policy choices through determining the importance of sets of variables. These variables are individual-level variables (personalities of leaders), role variables (**national role conception**²²), societal variables (national attributes and

¹⁹ Walker, Stephen G. Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer, eds. 2013. *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations*, p. 6 - 12.

²⁰ Hudson, Valerie M. 2014. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, p. 204.

²¹ Rosenau, James N. 1966. “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy.”

²² National role conception are “defined as foreign policy makers’ perceptions of their nations’ positions in the international system. [...] Role conception variables [are] concerned with the

more cultural variables), governmental variables (domestic politics), and systemic variables (polarity of the international system).²³ The table (Table 2) below summarizes this ranking. For example, according to Rosenau’s theory, foreign policy of a small, underdeveloped country with closed political system will be greatly affected by personal dispositions of its leader and the least affected by cultural values of the country’s subjugated society.

Table 2: Rosenau’s Pre-Theory

| Large | | | | Small | | | |
|-----------|----------|----------------|----------|-----------|----------|----------------|----------|
| Developed | | Underdeveloped | | Developed | | Underdeveloped | |
| Open | Closed | Open | Closed | Open | Closed | Open | Closed |
| Role | Role | Indiv. | Indiv. | Role | Role | Indiv. | Indiv. |
| Societal | Indiv. | Role | Role | Systemic | Systemic | Systemic | Systemic |
| Govern. | Govern. | Societal | Govern. | Societal | Indiv. | Role | Role |
| Systemic | Systemic | Systemic | Systemic | Govern. | Govern. | Societal | Govern. |
| Indiv. | Societal | Govern. | Societal | Indiv. | Societal | Govern. | Societal |

Source: The Author’s modification of a table used by Hudson (2014), the adapted version of Rosenau (1966)

Similarly, attempts of integration of IR theory and theory of Foreign Policy Analysis did not bring a united theoretical model of actor-general mainstream IR and actor-specific theory of FPA – rather, it reduced conclusions of one discipline to accommodate the framework of the other.²⁴ This is the case, for instance, of “the Walker School”²⁵, which provided helpful tools to capture behavioural side of decision making (e.g. the dual rationality mentioned above) but

perception of status [...]” Source: Wish, Naomi Bailin. 1980. “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions,” p. 532.

²³ Hudson, Valerie M. 2014. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, p. 188.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 204 – 209.

²⁵ The main conclusions are summarised in: Walker, Stephen G. Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer, eds. 2013. *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations*.

reduced the component of behavioural FPA to the equivalent of game theory to fit the prism of IR theory.

However, Stephen G. Walker's "Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis" still offers many valuable ideas on how to approach the reconciliation. Walker suggests reconciliation of this theoretical duality through belief that the two approaches are "unified theoretically by the assumption that actors are systems, too"²⁶.

Thus, both an international system and a state can be seen both as unitary agents and social structures, with both having impact on the formulation of the state's identity. Furthermore, this approach incites exploration and comparison of both international (external) arena and intrastate (internal) environment, which is the core, even existential concern for the discipline of International Relations.

1.2.3. Concept of Identity as a Theoretical Bridge

The concept of "constructed, multi-layered, fluid, relational"²⁷ state identity in International Relations' Theory brought a rare tool: how to methodologically unite factors affecting the state internally and externally in its behaviour (policy choice). David Campbell understands foreign policy as simultaneously dividing and connecting the interior and exterior – the state and the international system.²⁸

As a postmodernist, David Campbell is similar to Alexander Wendt, in that both believe that state identity is constructed, and thus changeable.²⁹ They agree that self-identification has both internal and external elements, with self-identification through distinction with "the other" being at the core of this process. Identity is seen as having relational properties. Wendt describes identity as mainly a product of interaction, "constituted by social relations"³⁰. For state identity specifically, he distinguishes four kinds of identity³¹ – the first being, "personal or corporate identity", which is shaped by the idea of oneself prior to interaction with the exterior. The remaining three, "**type, role and collective identities**" are less stable as they are

²⁶ Walker, Stephen G. Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer, eds. 2013. *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations*, p. 4.

²⁷ Goff Patricia M, and Dunn, Kevin C., eds. *Identity and Global Politics Theoretical and Empirical Elaborations*, p. 4 – 8.

²⁸ Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*, p. 60.

²⁹ See, for example: ²⁹ Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*. or Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*.

³⁰ Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 71.

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 224.

all constructed in relations to other states. “Type” identity defines states based on their ideological characteristics, “role” identity describes the state’s role in the international system and “collective” identity clusters states based on their shared ideas.³²

However, whereas Wendt understands the foreign policy of a given state as product of the state’s identity, Campbell goes further and accords more agency to the state which can both create and change its identity through foreign policy.³³ This is mainly the result of Wendt’s unsatisfactory attention to how the only self-related identity (personal/corporate identity) is constructed within the state.³⁴ As a result, Wendt’s model succeeds in explaining how external factors (interaction with other states or the international system) shape state’s identity, and consequently foreign policy choices, but ignores identity changes generated from within the state.

The concept of identity provides a theoretical bridge between comparative culturalism and mainstream constructivism. Both theoretical approaches problematise the role of norms on states’ behaviour. Whereas the former concerns itself with the domestic level analysis of “nature causes, and consequences of culture”, the latter tends to explore social structure on international level. As a result, while comparative literature seeks to explain how norms create **differences** in states’ behaviour, mainstream constructivism describes how norms shape **similarities** in states’ identity and action.³⁵ The concept of constructed identity enables researchers to explore the complex web of both internal and external sources of identification of a state.

1.2.4. Collective Memory and Reconciliation Policies

Collective memory and its role in state identity formation and foreign policy formulation

Shared memory of the past is one of the key pillars of collective identity. The academic field of Memory Studies is based on a conviction of “plasticity of memory”³⁶, the ability of memory to be unconsciously shaped or consciously manipulated by shared narratives in the society.

³² Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 224 – 230.

³³ Druľák, Petr. 2010. *Teorie mezinárodních vztahů*, p. 127.

³⁴ Zefhuss, Maja. *Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison*. In: Guzzini, Stefano, and Anna Leander, eds. 2006. *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics*.

³⁵ Farrell, Theo. 2002. “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” p. 51 – 56.

³⁶ Assmann, Aleida and Linda Shortt, eds. 2012. *Memory and Political Change*, p. 3.

This is facilitated by the “unreliability of memory”, which allows outside sources to replace memorised images and provide new interpretations of a given event.

Memory conceived of as a tool for remembering the past exists in the present. Current political or social narratives play an active role in shaping our interpretation and remembrance of the past. Contemporary memory of a distant past, thus, “establishes the meanings and significance of the past for those who may not have experienced it”³⁷.

Michael Rothberg in his book about the remembrance of the Holocaust states that: “[m]emory is closely aligned with identity”³⁸, and shows that interpretative remembrance and forgetting certain moments of the past are indispensable for certain collective identities. Thus, what a state (or a nation) chooses to remember defines how it wishes to be seen by the others. However, identity has both internal and external sources, thus, during interaction with “the Other” (an out-group – foreign nation or a state) an external interpretation of a state’s identity is constructed. The political choice of remembrance culture is important in relation to its own citizens to ensure domestic cohesion and support, as well as in relation to the international arena to promote desired self-image abroad.

Assmann and Shortt analyse³⁹ the role of “management of memory” in conflict and post-conflict resolution. They conclude that flexibility a transformative quality of memory makes memory indispensable “in processes of change and transition”⁴⁰. A fresh, more objective perspective on a distant memory of is a way to a genuine reconciliation. However, not all ideological transformations, even if masterly orchestrated, occur at the same pace. As Ladislav Holý shows⁴¹ that transformation of society’s identity responds differently on different levels with political transformation being the most flexible and socio-cultural identity being the least adaptable. As a result, detected change in political identity on the state level may not be accompanied by a deeper socio-cultural change and thus, conflict between the state and parts of its society may occur in the times of transition.

Requesting Forgiveness for Wrongdoing in International Relations

³⁷ Rothberg, Michael. 2009. *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization*, p. 4 – 29.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p 4.

³⁹ Assmann, Aleida and Linda Shortt, eds. 2012. *Memory and Political Change*.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁴¹ Holý, Ladislav. *The little Czech and the Great Czech Nation: national identity and the post-communist transformation of society*, p. 17.

Requesting forgiveness as a part of reconciliatory policy of a state is, as shown above, one of the tools for conflict resolution and amendment of international reputation. This political move gained momentum particularly during the 1990s, sometimes dubbed as “the decade of multilateralism”, with increased political pressure to mend relations with peer states to enhance cooperation in the move towards a perceived norm-based international society. Due to numerous apologetic statements (Tony Blair’s expressed regret for the Irish Potato Famine, Japan’s apologies for its aggression in the Second World War) this period became known as “the age of apologies”⁴² since the issue of apologies became a quasi-international norm.

Wrongdoing within International Relations refers to the greatest offences committed against a victimised group which perceives in its collective memory as an injustice so grave, that it cannot be forgiven and is passed to the next generation.⁴³ Wrongdoing typically includes violation of human rights, basic freedoms acknowledged by international law. However, the perception of a wrongdoing and its severity derives from a subjective interpretation of the events and thus, international consensus on what is and what is not a wrongdoing, a wrongdoer or a victim, is very rare.

Nava Löwenheim in her study⁴⁴ argues that states have different reasons for requesting forgiveness from other states. Her original typology utilises two explanatory variables: the degree of severity that a wrongdoer attributes to its wrongdoing; and, the extent to which the state perceives its image to be threatened by its negative reputation resulting from the wrongdoing.⁴⁵

Governments, according to Löwenheim, when deciding whether to issue an apology, have both external utilitarian and internal normative considerations. These are reflected upon by Alexander Wendt’s “three degrees of internalisation:”⁴⁶ coercion, self-interest and legitimacy. As a result, a request for forgiveness can be motivated by both utilitarian incentives (including, for example, benefits from good relations with a former enemy), or genuine, fully internalised moral atonement (internalisation of the norm condemning the state’s wrong) reflecting wrongdoer’s change of identity.

⁴² Löwenheim, Nava. 2009. "A Haunted Past: Requesting Forgiveness for Wrongdoing in International Relations," p. 532.

⁴³ Ibid," p. 539 - 541.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 533.

⁴⁶ Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 266 - 279

The perceived continuity of the identity of a state (or nation) enables other actors to ascribe responsibility for the past to the succeeding polities and nations. The request for forgiveness, in this light, provides a change of narrative of the “wrongdoing state” and implies conscious discontinuity of the perpetrator state’s identity. Thus, if an apology is perceived by the victim as meaningful and is accepted, both internal and external identity change are sealed, providing grounds for improved relations between the two states (nations).

2. Germany, Japan and the Memory of WWII

2.1. Perceptions of Germany and Japan in Neighbouring Countries

The two selected states share a post-war commonality of condemnation by the international community for their aggressive expansionism during the early 20th century. War crimes and crimes against humanity, ascribed to these polities, were committed within the territories which the two Axis powers occupied. The victorious powers later judged both countries' moral wrong in international war tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. Thus, under the watchful eye of the international community, many inhumane deeds committed by the two countries were uncovered, ruining their reputations.

While construction of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan as “the other” of the emerging international order after the Second World War bares significance, the countries with a first-hand memory of the horrors of Japanese and German occupation remained the actors with deeper rooted antagonism based on direct experience of injustice. Therefore, the primary focus of this chapter is the relation and the perceptions of the formerly occupied countries vis-à-vis their occupying power.

From the available information based on the opinion polls executed by Pew Research Centre, current perception of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan by countries with territories they formerly occupied vary considerably (see Table 3). Whereas European countries subject to occupation emit surprisingly positive images of the modern state of Germany (Dutch, French and Polish perception of Germany is 93 %, 82 % and 69 % **positive** respectively).⁴⁷ The perception of Japan in East and Southeast Asia is mixed: Japan enjoys an interestingly positive perception in Southeast Asia (Vietnamese, Philippine and Indonesian perception of Japan is 88 %, 82 % and 76 % **positive** respectively)⁴⁸ with a generally increasing trend between 2013 and 2017.⁴⁹ Conversely, Japan's closest neighbours present a strikingly different picture with **negative** perception reaching 69 % in South Korea (2017) and 90 % in mainland China (2017).⁵⁰ Furthermore, South Korea's and China's perception of Japan are significantly worse than their

⁴⁷ Pew Research Center. 2017. “Post-Brexit, Europeans More Favorable Toward EU”.

⁴⁸ Pew Research Center. 2013. “Japanese Public's Mood Rebounding, Abe Highly Popular.”

⁴⁹ Pew Research Center. 2017. “Japanese Divided on Democracy's Success at Home, but Value Voice of the People.”

⁵⁰ Pew Research Center. 2017. “Japanese Divided on Democracy's Success at Home, but Value Voice of the People.”

perception of other important players in the region, which eliminates the argument of general animosity between countries in the region.⁵¹

Table 3: Perceptions of Germany and Japan in Neighbouring Countries

| | Perception of Germany | Perception of Japan |
|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| The Netherlands | 93 % positive | N/A |
| France | 82 % positive | N/A |
| Poland | 69 % positive | N/A |
| Vietnam | N/A | 88 % positive |
| The Philippines | N/A | 82 % positive |
| Indonesia | N/A | 76 % positive |
| South Korea | N/A | 69 % negative |
| China (PRC) | N/A | 90 % negative |

Source: The author's compilation based on Pew Research Data (2013 and 2017)

This distinction is attributed to different roles of the occupied territories for the Japanese Empire and consequently different living conditions of its citizens under the Japanese rule. Taiwan, Korea and mainland China (Manchuria) were the first targets of Japanese expansion, and thus were integral to the war efforts of Japan. They suffered war crimes and larger-scale exploitation under Japanese rule (including mass killings, forced labour, prostitution, or cultural assimilation). Thus, two kinds of countries may be distinguished. First, territories which suffered mainly political loss of sovereignty and second, those which experienced atrocities committed on their population. In addition, the nationalist fight over disputed territories claimed by Japan and Korea (Takeshima/Dokdo islands), China and Taiwan (Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands) further refresh the memory of WWII history.

The legacy of the Second World War presents a major obstacle in the current political relationship between Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China⁵², which suggests that Japan

⁵¹ Based on 2014 data, South Korean perceptions of China are 56 % favourable and perceptions of India 59 % favourable (versus 22 % favourability in case of Japan); China's perceptions of its geopolitical rival are 30 % favourable compared to 8 % favourability in case of Japan. Source: Pew Research Center. "Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey. Q15a, b, h-j."

⁵² For example, former South Korean president Park Geun-hye expressed in preparation for her meeting with her Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe in December 2015 that the unresolved issue of Korean sex slaves ("comfort women") presents the biggest obstacle to closer ties between South

cannot or does not choose to distance itself from its militant imperial identity. Thus, Japan continues to suffer from its negative image in its immediate neighbourhood, even though the most violent and brutal crimes against humanity committed by Japan on its neighbouring countries were comparable to Nazi Germany. Interestingly, despite the fact that the Nazi state committed genocide on a continental scale⁵³, the modern German state maintains amicable relations with its neighbours; conversely, Japan, though it committed atrocities of a lesser scale remains politically isolated. It appears that, contrary to East Asia, Europe has almost completely moved past the war memories due to successful German reconciliatory policy and discontinuity of the German state identity.

The following chapters of the paper will analyse multiple internal and external factors to uncover why Germany achieved cooperative relations, and even integration, with countries it occupied and why Japan, remains politically isolated in its region due to distrust and antagonism with South Korea and China.

2.2. Official Remembrance in Germany and Japan

Neither Germany, nor Japan sought immediate reconciliation with their past immediately after WWII.⁵⁴ Instead, both countries first entered the phase of foreign occupation by their WWII enemies. Western Germany and Japan quickly integrated into “the West” which led to extraordinary economic growth in both cases. Due to their occupation by the allies, both countries underwent de-militarisation and adopted constitutional provisions embedding characteristics of “civilian powers” maintained to a large extent by Germany and Japan until today.⁵⁵

Korean and Japan. Source: “Japan and South Korea summit signals thaw in relations.” *The Guardian*. November 2, 2015.

⁵³ The Holocaust is usually accorded six million casualties, whereas the combined numbers of the two major atrocities connected to Imperial Japan’s expansionism (The Nanjing massacre and “the comfort women issue”) amount to up to 400 000.

⁵⁴ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 1.

⁵⁵ Hein, Patrick. 2016. “Reluctant civilian world powers? How nationalism threatens the soft power image of Japan and Germany,” p. 1- 2.

Germany

From the outset post-war Germany avoided nationalist celebration of historical events in and outside of the schools' curricula.⁵⁶

The first German request of forgiveness was issued in September 1951 By the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer's apology for the Holocaust enabled "the process of relation building between [West] Germany and Israel"⁵⁷. This step, according to Nava Löwenheim, indicates effort to regain "acceptance and degree of independence" of German politicians to normalise relations with its occupational authorities through a "new German image" with the goal of cancelling the Occupation Statute.⁵⁸ Arguably, this level of distance from WWII identity was not yet reflected in the German population.⁵⁹

After regaining sovereignty in 1955, the spectre of Nazism re-appeared as a major public concern during and after 1960s student demonstrations.⁶⁰ This effect of "generational change", according to Carmen Schmidt⁶¹, led to official condemnation of Nazi aggression. The student protests targeted officials and public figures (politicians, university professors, etc.) with National Socialist backgrounds, after the end of WWII.⁶² Importantly, between 1966 and 1969 the post of the West German Chancellor was held by Kurt G. Kiesinger, a former member of the Nazi Party. The publication of lists of Nazi-linked officials were published and the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials (1963 - 1965) renewed the general public's attention to the Nazi past.⁶³

The popular protests resulted in a regime change in 1969. The image of a "new Germany" gained considerable media attention after the famous emotional "knee fall" of West Germany's Chancellor Willy Brant in front of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising memorial in December 1970.

⁵⁶ Crossland, David. 2009. "Battle of the Teutoburg Forest: Germany Recalls Myth That Created the Nation."

⁵⁷ Löwenheim, Nava. 2009. "A Haunted Past: Requesting Forgiveness for Wrongdoing in International Relations", p. 534.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 549.

⁵⁹ Schmidt argues that majority of West Germans saw the totalitarian Nazi regime as „based on good idea) until the beginning of 1950s. Source: Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. "A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan," p. 5.

⁶⁰ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. "A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan," p. 6 - 7.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 7 -9.

⁶² Ibid, p. 6 - 7.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 6 - 7.

The international appreciation of this move was sealed by awarding Brandt with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971 for his effort to “seek reconciliation [over] the mass graves of the war”⁶⁴.

The subsequent governments, including that of current Chancellor Angela Merkel, issued further apologies and repeated that Germans are still “filled with shame”⁶⁵ and guilt for the Holocaust. State sponsored Holocaust memorials were built including the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (finished in 2004), a prominent memorial in Berlin, usage of Nazi symbolism is prohibited by law, German students are lectured about the national guilt in history classes and attend excursions to former concentration camps.⁶⁶

Overall, West Germany, and Germany after the re-unification, has convincingly depicted that it established a deprecatory relationship with its past. Internationally, this desired “identity change” aimed at disrupting the “new Germany’s” association with its Nazi past through issues of apology to victims of the Nazi regime and Germany’s internal transformation. To save its image after the news of failed de-Nazification of the state apparatus were uncovered, Germany chose the path of deeper and more genuine transformation. Intellectually, ethnically-based nationalist sentiment was meant to be curbed (or even replaced) by “constitutional patriotism” or adoption of wider “European identity” in lieu of identification with the nation state.⁶⁷

Japan

In the first decades following the war, Japan acknowledged a limited recognition of its responsibility for the suffering of countries with whom it sought to re-establish relations as a part of its “integration to the Western block”. These, often vague, apologies (such as

⁶⁴ Lionaes, Aase. 1971. “Award Ceremony Speech”.

⁶⁵ For example: Merkel, Angela. 2008. “Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel to the Knesset in Jerusalem”.

⁶⁶ This is true especially after the Holocaust was made an important part of German curricula in 1980s. Source: Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 8.

⁶⁷ The former is a term coined by Jürgen Habermas in relation to Germany and its identification with its democratic constitution with clauses granting human rights (from Habrmas, Jürgen. 1998. *Die postnationale Konstellation*). The latter is a result of “the guiding culture debate” in Germany started by Bassam Tibi, which found parallels in German and European value system. Source: Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 8 - 9.

recognising mutually caused harm) did not include a wider “request for forgiveness” which would require a favourable reaction of the recipient states.⁶⁸

The immediate interest of Japan after the end of the war was questioning-how it lost the war. The questions concerning why Japan caused so much suffering appeared later on, wherein two factors came into play.⁶⁹ Firstly, the last events of WWII in the Pacific theatre, the “inhuman” atomic bombings of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, provided basis for invention of a “victim myth” in Japan.⁷⁰ The suffering of Japanese people at the end of the war served to overshadow or even justify excessive suffering caused by the Imperial Japanese. Secondly, the two currently most sensationalised of Japanese WWII wrongdoings: the massacre of Nanjing⁷¹ and the issue of “comfort women”⁷² were not widely discussed beyond the Tokyo Trials by either Japan or the victim countries until the 1990s. This was mainly due to communist China’s unwillingness to associate its newly built identity with humiliating military defeat followed the Nanjing massacre; China’s fear of jeopardising its trade relations with Japan⁷³; and the outcast status of “comfort women” in Korean and Chinese societies⁷⁴.

The rise of right-wing political forces in 1970s Japan resulted in the growth of historical revisionism. First, the extent of the Nanjing Massacre atrocities was questioned, followed by the Japanese government “rewriting” history in the 1980s, and partial denial of the very occurrence of the Nanjing Massacre and systematic forced prostitution by some government

⁶⁸ For example, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s address to the people of Burma in 1957, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s address to the people of Australia in 1957 or Minister of Foreign Affairs address to the people of South Korea in 1965.

⁶⁹ Togo, Kazuhiko. 2010. “The Assertive Conservative Right in Japan: Their Formation and Perspective,” p. 80.

⁷⁰ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 11.

⁷¹ International Military Tribunal for the Far East estimated 200, 000 civilian and prisoners of war deaths alongside looting, rape and terror inflicted by Japanese Imperial Army. Source: International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Judgement of 4 November 1948. Chapter VIII – Conventional War Crimes (Atrocities). The Rape of Nanking. 49, 608.

⁷² There is evidence for military-operated forced prostitution of circa 200, 000 “comfort women” mainly of Korean and Chinese, but also Japanese, Filipino, Taiwanese, Burmese, Indonesian, Dutch and Australian origin. Source: Yoshimi, Yoshiki. 2009. *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II*, p. 91 – 93.

⁷³ Chang, Iris. 1997. *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*.

⁷⁴ Watanabe, Kazuko. 1999. “Trafficking in Women’s Bodies, Then and Now: The Issue of Military ‘Comfort Women’”, p. 23 – 24.

officials in 1990s and beyond.⁷⁵ Consequently, the first “textbook issue” around controversial narration of history of Imperial Japan emerged in 1982 between Japan, China and South Korea⁷⁶. The history textbook issues re-occur when a new history book adopted by the central educational board in Japan.

Similarly, in 1978, fourteen WWII class A criminals⁷⁷ were enshrined in Yasukuni shrine, the main Imperial Shinto shrine, which was forcibly privatized after WWII to separate the state from the Shinto religion.⁷⁸ Importantly, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made the first official visit⁷⁹ to Yasukuni shrine in 1985 to pay respect to the Japanese wartime heroes (including Tokyo Tribunal convicts), however, after an unprecedented condemnation of the visit by Chinese officials, Nakasone did not visit the shrine during his term again.⁸⁰ The next official visit was paid by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001, who continued the visits even though they unleashed major diplomatic rows primarily with China and South Korea, as well as domestic disputes.⁸¹ Current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, visited the shrine in his second term in December 2013.

The 1990s saw growing popular activism in neighbouring states, primarily South Korea seeking Japanese official apology and further compensation for the suffering of “comfort women. Furthermore, Iris Chang published an international bestseller “The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II” in 1997 which introduced the international audience to the largest collection of testimonies of Japanese atrocities in Mainland China of 1937 and 1938.

⁷⁵ New Jersey Hong Kong Network. 1990. “Basic facts on the Nanking Massacre and the Tokyo War Crimes Trial.”

⁷⁶ Togo, Kazuhiko. 2010. “The Assertive Conservative Right in Japan: Their Formation and Perspective,” p. 81.

⁷⁷ „Class-A War Criminals “in the context of Tokyo Trials were criminals sentenced for “crimes against peace “such as described in the 1946 charter of International Military Tribunal for the Far East pages 22 and 23.

⁷⁸ Shibuishi, Daiki. 2005. “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?” p. 198.

⁷⁹ The shrine fee was paid by the government, not from private funds of Nakasone. Source: Shibuishi, Daiki. 2005. “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?” p. 206.

⁸⁰ Shibuishi, Daiki. 2005. “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?” p. 207.

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 210 – 212.

The Japanese government, composed of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party from 1955 to August 1993, was replaced until 1996 by coalition governments.⁸² Interestingly, this three-year period saw a significant shift in official remembrance and reconciliation policy. In August 1993, the “Kono Statement” assumed the Japanese Imperial Army’s responsibility for military-ran forced prostitution, was released by Chief Cabinet Secretary Tohei Kono.⁸³ Moreover, in 1995 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama of the Social Democratic Party issued state apology for WWII atrocities committed by Japan.⁸⁴ According to Kazuhiko Togo, this statement represents the most “voluntary” and “unambiguous” expression of the Japanese government’s recognition of history.⁸⁵ Furthermore, Murayama states that the fostering of “relations of all countries based on deep understanding and trust” as the motive of the speech, emphasising cooperation with their neighbouring countries.⁸⁶ These official statements were later criticised by consecutive governments, including current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.⁸⁷ In the latest statement on Japan’s role in WWII, Shinzo Abe regretted Japan causing “immeasurable damage and suffering” on Asian civilians, however, he also stressed no desire to see subsequent generations apologise for it.⁸⁸

Summary

Although both countries officially requested forgiveness, apology for WWII aggression was better received from Germans, rather than the Japanese. Arguably, the lack of apparent political consensus on the Japanese political scene resulted in contradictory behaviour of the state officials leading to the impression that the Japanese apology was disingenuous. Furthermore, due to the lack of comprehensive reparations programmes (such as the post-war German-Israeli Reparations programme based on the 1952 treaty)⁸⁹ between Japan and

⁸² This change in political representation is often ascribed to the political turmoil caused the decline of Japan’s economy in 1990s (“the lost decade”). See, for example: Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 14.

⁸³ Koni, Yohei. “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Koni on the result of the study on the issue of ‘comfort wome’”, August 4 1993.

⁸⁴ Kazuhiko, Tōgō. 2012. *Japan and reconciliation in post-war Asia: The Murayama statement and its implications*, p. VII.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p 2.

⁸⁶ Murayama, Tomiichi. “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama ‘On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end’”, 15 August 1995.

⁸⁷ For example: “Gov’t distances itself from NHK head’s ‘comfort women’ comment.” *Japan Today*. January 27, 2014.

⁸⁸ Abe, Shinzo. “Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.” August 14, 2015.

⁸⁹ The uniqueness of this German program is discussed in the chapter “German reparations to the Jews after World War II” in: De Greiff, Pablo. 2006. *The Handbook of Reparations*.

individuals of formerly subjugated countries, nationalist conflicts between the neighbouring countries persist.⁹⁰

The difference between German and Japanese approaches to their official remembrance is obvious in the case of the countries' prominent memorials: Berlin's Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe; and, Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine. Whereas the German state reveres the former victims of its past state incarnation, the Japanese state honours the combatants responsible for partaking in war-crimes. These differences between state remembrance emphasises Germany's discontinuity of its Nazi identity and Japan's continuity of identification with its Imperial past.

⁹⁰ Despite creation of "compensation funds" for former "comfort women" by the Japanese since 1990s, apologies and compensations are deemed insufficiently official (Asian Women's Fund founded for this purpose, for instance, was filled by private donations) or not generous enough. Thus, new calls for further apology are heard every year – for 2015 example: Osaki, Tomohiro. "Abe rejects Seoul's new call for apology on 'comfort women' issue." January 12, 2018.

3. Internal Factors

Internal, or domestic, factors are: “elements outside the formal state structures of foreign policy decision making, but still within the sovereign confines of the state – societal actors, interests and values that reside in the domestic setting”⁹¹.

To avoid over-differentiation between the two countries, focus is directed towards nation-types that explain how a broad variable determines multiple characteristics of the states’ behaviour. In consequence, other often researched domestic factors⁹² such as bureaucratic apparatus, domestic audience or media influence are addressed only in relation to the broader nation-type theory, when necessary.

As already mentioned in the first chapter, national attribute theories ascribe certain behavioural traits to nation-states based on their “types”. These “categories” of nations are distinguished based on either material properties of the nations such as size, level of economic development, political regime, and geographical location or more intangible attributes, such as national identity and mentality.⁹³

Since modern German and Japanese states are comparably sized in terms of area (64th and 63th in world country size rankings with both approximately 350,000 km²)⁹⁴ and population of (82 and 127 million, respectively)⁹⁵, they are both among the most developed nations in the world, both are members of the Group of Seven (G7), and they are both open constitutional democracies, these attributes are not very significant in explaining their different policies vis-à-vis reconciliation. National identity and geographic location as internal factors, however, could have more explanatory value. Geographic location as a factor is discussed in external factors, since its primary significance lays, in the author’s view, in its geo-political context.

⁹¹ Alden, Chris, and Ammon Aran. 2017. *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*. Alden, Chris, and Ammon Aran. 2017. *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*, p. 63.

⁹² Breuning, Marjike. 2007. *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, p. 115.

⁹³ Druláková, Radka and Petr Drulák. 2007. *Tvorba a analýza zahraniční politiky* p. 56 – 57.

⁹⁴ Data from 2018: “Largest Countries in the World (by land area)”. Worldometers.

⁹⁵ Data for 2018 from: “Countries in the World by Population”. Worldometers.

3.1. National Identity as a Factor

National identity or mentality as a nation-type category formulated by Renouvin and Duroselle⁹⁶ provide a **relatively stable, culturally-rooted factor** influencing foreign policy choices. The paradox of **structural determinist power of culture** on foreign policy decision making and **decision makers agency in influencing culture (or national identity)** through policy choices is summarised by Valerie M. Hudson: "Indeed, all human activity – including foreign policy – becomes both product and a component of culture."⁹⁷

Cultural analysis utilised in security studies rivals the dominant power politics explanation of IR phenomena.⁹⁸ Despite their all-encompassing significance for foreign policy formulation⁹⁹, the concepts of both national identity and culture remain understudied and difficult to grasp with their complexity. Moreover, identity is, according to constructivists¹⁰⁰, fluid and even may be in crisis when different interpretations are contested. However, some political elites tend to define national interest in reference to "deep cultural beliefs actively shared or lying dormant among a large majority of the populace"¹⁰¹ that insures a certain level of its continuity. In democracies, official "state identity" produced by the political elite tends to align with "national/societal identity" to ensure popular support and re-election. The national identity's effect on state identity's formulation is the following:

National identity -> state (foreign and domestic policy formulation) -> state identity

National identity provides a set of beliefs and values, that lead interpretation and behaviour of the country and are the basis of the *bounded rationality* of the state. Thus, to a foreign observer judging from the perspective of *substantive rationality*, some of the state's behaviour might appear irrational. However, it all depends upon the state's definition of its "interest"¹⁰². At times, realist "survival of the state" might be the motivation for certain action, sometimes a

⁹⁶ Druláková, Radka and Petr Drulák. 2007. *Tvorba a analýza zahraniční politiky* p. 56.

⁹⁷ Hudson, Valerie M. 2014. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, p. 121.

⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 135.

⁹⁹ Claimed primarily by postmodernists.

¹⁰⁰ Hudson, Valerie M. 2014. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, p. 120.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p. 119.

¹⁰² The term appears usually as "national interest" in literature, which leads to confusion whether it refers to interest of the state or interest of the nation (society). This unnecessary ambiguity leads, in the author's view, to theoretical misunderstanding of frames of reference.

wider concept of security must be employed to conceptualise “defence of societal identity.”¹⁰³ This concept of wider security leads to defence of the core national myths to prevent loss of national identity. As Valerie M. Hudson says: “Nations may choose actions more in line with their heroic history than with more dispassionate norms of strategy and rational choice.”¹⁰⁴

Foreign policy addresses both international and domestic audiences. Thus, political elites shape both outward national interest but also, they “set the agenda and shape the attitudes of their constituencies”¹⁰⁵ through state-sponsored interpretation of the world and domestic events.

3.2. Hofstede’s Comparison of Japanese and German Cultures

Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory first formulated in *Culture’s Consequences* enables quantitative comparison of national cultures based on their positioning on a continuum between dichotomies: high - low power distance (high - low acceptance of hierarchy); individualism - collectivism; masculinity - femininity; uncertainty avoidance - acceptance; long - short term orientation.¹⁰⁶ These, relatively stable cultural preferences, indicate types of behaviour that are acceptable for the public. Though problematic¹⁰⁷, Hofstede’s positioning of select nations is based on empirical findings and provides a rare piece of inductive research indicating generalised differences between national cultures.

Comparison of Germany and Japan’s cultural dimensions is summarised in Chart 1. Germany is described as “decentralised” with a strong middle class, “**truly individualist**” with “loyalty [...] based on personal preferences”, masculine and uncertainty avoidant, and long-term oriented.¹⁰⁸ Japan, on the other hand, is classified as mildly hierarchical, **collectivist** (“putting harmony of group above expression of individual opinions” and with “strong sense and shame for losing face”), extremely masculine (however, unlike in individualist Germany,

¹⁰³ The duality of “state security” and “societal security” was firstly closely problematised by “the Copenhagen School”. Source: McSweeney, Bill. 1999. *Security, identity and interests: a sociology of international relations*, p. 68 - 70.

¹⁰⁴ Hudson, Valerie M. 2014. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, p. 119.

¹⁰⁵ Breuning, Marjike. 2007. *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, p. 120.


¹⁰⁶ Hofstede, Geert; Gert Jan Hofstede, and, Michael Minkov. 2010. *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, p. 53 - 233.

¹⁰⁷The main criticism is centred around Hofstede’s cultural determinism, territorial generalisation of a culture and his statistical method. Source: McSweeney, Brendan. 2002. “Hofstede's Identification of National Cultural Differences - A Triumph of Faith a Failure of Analysis”, p. 92 -93.

¹⁰⁸ “Country comparisons”. Germany. Hofstede Insights.

competitiveness is inter-group, not between individuals), extremely uncertainty avoidant with all aspects of life highly ritualised, and long-term oriented.¹⁰⁹

Chart 1: Hofstede's Country Comparison of Germany and Japan



Source: modification of Hofstede Insights. Country comparisons.

Interestingly, both countries appear to be competitive (masculinity) but at the same time avoiding change (uncertainty avoidance) with Japan reaching extremity in this trend. Theoretically, the change of a state’s identity should be unpopular in both countries.

However, long-term orientation of the two countries signify pragmatism and the “ability to adapt traditions easily to changed conditions,” restraint with preference to invest and save, and even a sense of fatalism in the case of Japan.¹¹⁰ Similar pragmatism was detected by the Future Orientation Index experiment comparing countries based on big data analysis of their online searches.¹¹¹ This index ranked Germany as the first and Japan as the third most future oriented countries (out of a total of 45 examined countries).¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ “Country comparisons”. Japan. Hofstede Insights.

¹¹⁰ “Country comparisons”. Hofstede Insights.

¹¹¹ “Future Orientation Index 2012”; Methodology described in paper: Preis, Tobias et al. 2012. “Quantifying the Advantage of Looking Forward.”

¹¹² “Future Orientation Index 2012”

Furthermore, the collectivist/individualist nature of Japanese and German societies respectively plays an important role in the national identification and level of group solidarity addressed in following subchapters.

3.3. Ethnic versus Civic Nationalism

Nationalism as a political force is an important tool and source of legitimacy for the government. Anthony D. Smith argues in his work on national identity (*National Identity and The Origins of Nations*) that nationalism¹¹³, as the political force stemming from the feeling of collective solidarity and shared destiny, combines **two objects of reference** with which groups identify: **their ethnic nation and their polity**.

Importantly, Smith assumes that **nationalism is not simply an ideology, but also a cultural phenomenon**.¹¹⁴ As such, it is rooted and to some degree pre-determined, by history and culture (shared “ethnic, linguistic, and religious heritages”¹¹⁵) of the underlying “primordial ethnic community”¹¹⁶. Smith distinguishes two types of underlying *ethnie* (or ethnic community)¹¹⁷ – socially limited but territorially wide aristocratic *lateral ethnie* and compact “vertical”, *demotic ethnie*.¹¹⁸

A. D. Smith considers nationalism as being an interplay of two elements – civic (territorial) and ethnic. While **ethnic nationalism** mobilises group solidarity based on the perceived shared ethnic bond (shared bloodline, language, history and traditions), and is prevalent in the ethnically homogenous nation states of East Asia (such as Japan), **civic (territorial) nationalism**, common in Western Europe, is centred around the civic model of a nation bound by common institutions, single code of rights and duties and shared territory.¹¹⁹

The civic concept of nationalism based on territoriality allows individuals to change their national identity by choice (through migration, for example), the ethnic concept is not as

¹¹³ Defined by Smith as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of an existing or potential nation”. Source: Smith, Anthony D. 1989. “The Origins of Nations.”

¹¹⁴Smith, Anthony D. 1991. *National identity*, Introduction.

¹¹⁵Smith, Anthony D. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 74.

¹¹⁶ Smith, Anthony D. 1989. “The Origins of Nations,” p. 343 – 346.

¹¹⁷ Smith’s definition of “ethnies “: “Named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with specific territory, and a sense of solidarity.” – Source: Smith, Anthony D. 1989. “The Origins of Nations,” p. 32.

¹¹⁸ Smith, Anthony D. 1989. “The Origins of Nations,” p. 347.

¹¹⁹ Smith, Anthony D. 1991. *National identity*, p. 11.

flexible since individuals belong to a nation which is “first and foremost a community of common descent”.¹²⁰ The nation in this sense is seen as “super-family”¹²¹ and cannot be escaped. In terms of collectivities (nation-states), strong ethnic component of nationalism supports continuity of the identification with common past and traditions.

3.3.1. Bureaucratic Incorporation

In both Germany and Japan, individuals were homogenised through state-led popular socialisation, primarily through public system of education and mass media, to acquire common historical memories, national myths, shared symbols, traditions and civil ideology.¹²²

In both cases, the modern nation was created by “bureaucratic incorporation”¹²³, top down cultural diffusion led by the aristocratic elite¹²⁴ (*lateral ethnies*) through administrative apparatus which sought to incorporate subject ethnies under the culture of the “dominant ethnic core”. This process results in varying degrees of cultural fusion: Japan retains a mostly “modernised version of an older elite high culture;”¹²⁵ whereas Germany has a less hierarchical and centralised society with elements of vernacular culture included within the elite culture, resulting in more common ground in the historically recent political diversity of its territory.

Whereas political centralisation of Japan was a centuries long process, dating back to first unification by the Imperial dynasty between the fourth and the ninth century,¹²⁶ long before modern nation-state building process; Germany’s political unification did not take place until 1871. In consequence, state-led cultural unification had deeper roots in Imperial Japan than in post-WWII Germany.

¹²⁰ Smith, Anthony D. 1991. *National identity*, p. 11.

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 12.

¹²² Smith, Anthony D. 1991. *National identity*, p. 11.

¹²³ Term used by A.D. Smith: Smith, Anthony D. 1989. “The Origins of Nations,” p. 349 - 350.

¹²⁴ The “culture bearing elites” were “the traditional Prussian elites” that supported unification of Germany by “blood and iron” to ensure protection of their position in the German constitution; and aristocratic educated Japanese elites – the Shoguns or samurai and the Emperor’s court. Source: Patton, David F. 1999. *Cold War Politics in Post-War Germany*, p. 6.; Beasley, W. G. 1999. *The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan*.

¹²⁵ Smith, Anthony D. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 42.

¹²⁶ Totman, Conrad. 2005. *A History of Japan*, p 47.

A high degree of centralisation, as well as an island location contributed to an ethnically compact and territorially concentrated Japanese population. Conversely, the German case was very different.

Even though bound by shared cultural elements (such as: a common language, traditions) and to some extent the supranational institution of the Holy Roman Empire, the territory of Germany was historically constituted of dozens of duchies at a time when the surrounding states already maintained a high degree of centralisation. Furthermore, a German speaking minority existed within various Central and Eastern European countries,¹²⁷ as well as a rival German-speaking polity: Austria - both before and after the proclamation of the German Empire in 1871. Because of this delayed “marriage of state and culture”¹²⁸ and geographical dispersion of the Germanic populace, Germanic culture(s) failed to homogenise under the auspices of a central political authority, unlike Japan.

Educating Their Nations

National identity is reinforced by a state through homogenising effects of administrative centralisation, legalism and mass education.¹²⁹ During their quests of modern nation-building at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, both Germany and Japan utilised public education to promote a sense of unity and territorial integrity after unification of Germany in 1871 and regained international independence of Japan after Meiji Restoration in 1868.¹³⁰ It is important to note, that unlike the Japanese educational system, that has been since Meiji Restoration heavily centralised, German education has come through phases of centralisation under German Empire to decentralisation of education in West Germany and contemporary Germany, where the education is primarily the responsibility of an individual *Länder*, thus less allows for regional variations. Additionally, the cultural role of education in German and Japanese societies is different - with European stress on “the truth” and Japanese goal of “uplifting and consoling” the nation resulting in omission of information that would lead to “pollution” of history.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Wolff, Stefan, ed. 2000. *German Minorities in Europe: Ethnic Identity and Cultural Belonging*, p. 213 - 233.

¹²⁸ Gellner, Ernest. 1997. *Nationalism*.

¹²⁹ Smith, Anthony D. 1989. “The Origins of Nations,” p. 341 - 343.

¹³⁰ Smith, Anthony D. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 39

¹³¹ McCormack, Gavan. 2000. “Nationalism and identity in post-cold war Japan,” p. 252.

3.3.2. Foundation Myth

Japan has a strong national foundation myth which links the emergence of the Japanese nation to the state structure through the divine origin of the Japanese Imperial dynasty.¹³² The Japanese Imperial family is said to be descended from the goddess of the Sun, Amaterasu. The first known codified version of the myth dates back to the 8th century AD; and, there is evidence to suggest popularity of the myth ever since.¹³³ Due to a supposedly unbroken lineage of the Emperor's dynasty, the present-day Japan is still perceived as very much connected to its legendary foundation traditionally dating back to 660 BC. Furthermore, the foundation myth is rooted in the indigenous, and widely popular Shinto religion, which enables joint identification with the state monarch and the "extended family" of the ethnic nation. Furthermore, this legendary history incites a sense of cultural exceptionalism, and even superiority. In 1966, *Kigentsu*, a pre-war celebration of the mythical emperor Jimmu was revived and established as a national holiday called National Foundation Day.¹³⁴

Unlike Japan, Germany lacks a foundation myth, likely due to a long history of division of the German territory and its people. Among the notable regional myths connected to German political unification, the Borussian Legend stands out. The Borussian Legend is a Prussian myth originating from the turn of the 19th century, legitimizing Prussia's exceptionalism as the polity destined to unite Germany.¹³⁵ Furthermore, the most poignant pan-Germanic myth is based around Hermann, a figure that is claimed to have helped defend the tribes of *Magna Germania* during the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD. Accounts of Hermann's heroic deeds first spread in the 15th century and were reintroduced in the 19th century national revival period to provide mythical base for modern German nationalism.¹³⁶

3.4. Totalitarian State Ideology During the Second World War

The Nazi and Meiji regimes' used state ideologies as both a mobilising and legitimising tool in the war endeavour. Both used race and ethnicity as the basis for claimed ethnic superiority of the Germans (as the purest representants of the Aryan race) and the Japanese (as the god-

¹³² Beasley, W. G. 1999. *The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan*, p. 5.

¹³³ Beasley, W. G. 1999. *The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan*, p. 2 - 3.

¹³⁴ McCormack, Gavan. 2000. "Nationalism and identity in post-cold war Japan," p. 257.

¹³⁵ Hughes, Michael. 1992. *Early Modern Germany, 1477-1806*, p. xi.

¹³⁶ Benario, Herbert W. 2004. "Arminius into Hermann: History into Legend," p. 84-95.

favoured race). Thus, genetics and shared bloodline became the main means of identification with the state functioning as a protector of the race.

3.4.1. Racial Hierarchy

With both countries described as being historically “at the periphery”¹³⁷ of civilizational centres, they both sought a new regional (if not global) order with a new system of hierarchy. Japan’s rise was justified by an effort to eradicate Western influence in Asia¹³⁸ which had caused exploitation and even “degeneration” of ancient Asian civilizational centres, particularly China. Paradoxically, Japan adopted Western concepts like modern nation-building, modernisation and industrialisation to replace Western colonialism in Asia by a Japanese equivalent with the goal of creating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (announced in 1940).¹³⁹ Similarly, Nazi Germany sought to materialise their “utopian ideas of an empire ordered along racist lines”¹⁴⁰ as a means to preserve the superior race in “a struggle against ‘international Jewry [categorised as “the evil race”]’ in which their very existence was at stake.”¹⁴¹ The goal of territorial expansion, *Lebensraum* or “living space”, was viewed as vital for the development of the German race and realisation of its full potential, that is, world domination.¹⁴²

Both regimes choose racial hierarchy to legitimise an “unequal distribution of resources between “the core and peripheral group.”¹⁴³ Cultural assimilation was an option only for the most ethnically similar populations – such as Koreans or non-Germans with perceived strong “Aryan” heritage and qualities. The superior races in both countries were viewed as culture-bearing and most advanced with a sense of predestination to rule over, and “civilise”¹⁴⁴ other

¹³⁷ Smith, Anthony D. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 53

¹³⁸For example, the official reason for establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by the Japanese was the need to create “a new order in Asia, free from Western influence.” Source: Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 11.

¹³⁹ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 11.

¹⁴⁰ Longerich, Peter. 2010. *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews*, p. 423.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p. 423.

¹⁴² Ibid, p. 424 – 425.

¹⁴³ Smith, Anthony D. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 59.

¹⁴⁴ The “civilising mission” was rather a Japanese concept which was to be materialised in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, in practice, by replacing Western exploitation by a Japanese one. Source: Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 11.

racess; or, in the case of Nazi Germany: erase the inferior races. A dual moral code was applied in dealing with different ethnicities¹⁴⁵ in and outside of the states' borders, based on their status within the regimes' racial hierarchy.

Additionally, the "superior race" defined by Nazism was not as ethnically exclusive as their Japanese co-belligerents'. The superior Aryan race was deemed to be the purest in the Germanic peoples with German people described as *Herrenvolk* ("master race"), however, Nordic populaces and individuals with "Aryan physical characteristics" or heritage could be assimilated.¹⁴⁶ Interestingly, Nazi regime even created special category of "Honorary Aryans" which it accorded to the Japanese or individuals indispensable for the regime but of supposedly inferior blood.

Moreover, due to the diffusion of German speakers within Europe, Nazi Germany utilised German minorities (and other Nazi sympathisers) living in victimised countries as a *casus belli* upon ethnic grounds. What is more, the prominent target of the Nazi regime: Jewry, already faced discrimination throughout Europe well before the war.¹⁴⁷

Thus, in case of Japan, due to relative homogeneity of Japan's population and their territorial concentration on the Japanese islands, there existed a firm connection between: the state, the state definition of the "superior race" and the nation itself. While in Nazi Germany, the "chosen race" covered only part of Germany's population and also existed outside of the state's boundaries (German minorities in surrounding countries). Moreover, persecuted ethnic groups (the Jews, the Romany or the Slavs) inhabited Germany proper, unlike Japan wherein the island remained entirely ethnically homogenous. Thus, the link between the state and ethnic Germans as the "superior race" is not as significant in Germany due to the wide dispersion of the Germanic population externally, and the heterogeneity of it internally.

¹⁴⁵ Both ideologies used findings of their eugenics programmes to define moral worth entirely based on genetic fitness. For example, for distinction in treatment of Soviet Jews and Soviet Slavs: Longerich, Peter. 2010. *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews*, p. 425.; or "dual law" treatment of subjected peoples under Japanese colonisation Source: Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie. 1984. *The Japanese colonial empire, 1895-1945*. Introduction.

¹⁴⁶ Nazi Germany's obsession with racial studies and eugenics led to very detailed hierarchy of ethnic groups, for example, distinguishing between "racially pure" Sinti and Lalleri Romani people worth assimilation and the Roma, who were systematically murdered. Source: Longerich, Peter. 2010. *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews*, p. 420.

¹⁴⁷ Mass anti-Semitism was not rare before WWII in the territory of the "Allies" - leading to series of pogroms in Russian territory, the infamous Drayfus affair of 1894 in France or popularity of anti-Semitic political in Britain (e.g. British Union of Fascists) around Oswald Mosely.

3.4.2. Differences Between Level of Embeddedness in the Pre-war Culture

State Shintoism, invented by Meiji élites carefully utilised Confucian (loyalty, respect for social hierarchy) and peasant traditions of indigenous folk Shinto to build a culturally rooted ideology; whereas Nazism lacked cultural roots and continuity with German historical traditions, being invented purely as “civil religion.”^{148, 149} Furthermore, state-Shinto was invented as a part of Japanese modern nation-building and was thus engraved upon the Japanese national identity, whereas, Nazi ideology appeared decades after German identity was invented during nation-building following its unification in 1871. As a result, it was easier for the post-war governments in the Germanies (and later, a re-unified Germany), to break away from the short ideological episode and establish a dialogue with the past requiring the acceptance of responsibility for the wrongdoing. Whereas renunciation of Meiji past would mean rejection of the deepest cultural values and beliefs of the Japanese nation.

The ideological background for the Nazi civil religion was invented in 1925 with the publication of Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. Its main ideological sources were the findings of Social Darwinism: claiming racial inequality and anti-Semitism. Nothing about these two sources was specifically German. Thus, the basis for “German racial superiority” was added through the idealisation of German tradition and folklore and Nordic-Germanic symbolism.¹⁵⁰ A distinction was made between the degenerate urban upper class and authentic, native peasant culture.¹⁵¹ However, since German culture was primarily invented in the process of nation-building by aristocratic elites through diffusion of high culture (Smith's lateral ethnies, see subchapter on bureaucratic incorporation), Nazi peasant imagery, as well as claims that Nazim was deeply rooted in the German past were, thus, it was inorganic and often misinterpreted, failing to create an immediate spiritual resonance with the population.

¹⁴⁸ “Civil Religion” is understood through J.J. Rousseau's 18th century interpretation (in 1762 “Contract Social”) as “quasi-religious attitudes [...] consciously ‘designed’ by leaders to exert social control over the citizenry” through adoration of the state. Source: Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 2.

¹⁴⁹ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan.”

¹⁵⁰ For instance, Nazis reimagined the myth of Hermann, the defender of the Nordic tribes against Rome. Source: Benario, Herbert W. 2004. “Arminius into Hermann: History into Legend”.

¹⁵¹ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 3 - 4.

On the other hand, the state-Shinto ideology invented by the Meiji Restoration of 1868, re-established the absolute power of the Emperor and began a phase of rapid industrialisation and modernisation as a response to threat of colonisation of Japan by Western powers. The popular, indigenous Japanese form of folk Shinto was adapted by the elites to strengthen the religious position of the Emperor. Thus, instead of veneration of natural phenomena, the Emperor, as a descendant of the Goddess of the Sun Amaterasu, was worshiped as an intermediary between the Earth and the Heaven.¹⁵² Furthermore, *Taikyō senpu*, “the Great Doctrine” proclaimed Japan as “a God-favoured country and thus superior to others”¹⁵³. It proclaimed exceptionalism of the Japanese race, as well as the divine right of their ruler, which was utilised for mass mobilisation and as justification for Japanese expansionism.¹⁵⁴ The absolute obedience to the state was taught on Confucian concepts of “loyalty” and “filial piety” and strictly enforced by the state.

Framing of the Nazi episode as a deviation from the historical national identity, orchestrated primarily by a select few (the Nazis) assisted Germany in quickly renouncing this historical heritage and further distancing themselves from Nazi identity by adopting strict anti-National Socialist ideology laws. For this reason, prominent German apologies (such as Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Kneefall Speech¹⁵⁵ in 1970 Warsaw or President Richard von Weizsäcker’s speech¹⁵⁶ in the German Parliament on May 8, 1985) implicitly see individuals, not the whole nation, as the perpetrator of the wrongdoing, asserting that the German population suffered under Naziism as well. This is different from the main Japanese apologies (importantly the 1995 Murayama Statement) which were, made on behalf of the whole nation, strengthening the sense of continuity with the past and unity of the nation.¹⁵⁷

Moreover, state Shinto’s connection to the Japanese ethnic religion (folk Shinto) provides an additional link between the present Japanese generation to their past, through ancestral worship. Even today, after the official dissolution of the state and Shinto religious union

¹⁵² Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 9 – 10.

¹⁵³ Ibid, p. 9.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 10 – 11.

¹⁵⁵ Brandt, Willy. “Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt aus Warschau, December 7, 1970. “

¹⁵⁶ Kazuhiko, Tōgō. 2012. *Japan and reconciliation in post-war Asia: The Murayama statement and its implications*, p 6.

¹⁵⁷ Kazuhiko Togo provides Murayama Statement analysis in: Kazuhiko, Tōgō. 2012. *Japan and reconciliation in post-war Asia: The Murayama statement and its implications*, p 6.

enforced by the occupational powers after WWII,¹⁵⁸ 50% to 80% of the Japanese population¹⁵⁹ practise ancestral worship at Shinto shrines. The importance of deep respect and humility towards ancestors prevents current generations from criticising their forefathers' war-time deeds. Moreover, the inability to worship *kami* (souls or deities) of Japanese historical "heroes" (the ancestors of the nation perceived as a large family), for instance in the ceremonies at the Yasukuni Shrine, would mean a major identity crisis for Japan.

3.5. Competing Sources of Present Identity

3.5.1. Identity of a Reunified German State

Until the late 1980s, the most visible German political parties (the Social Democrats, and the Greens) avoided any demonstrations of national pride, since expressions of national sentiment were deemed exclusionary or racist.¹⁶⁰ Thus, the search for, and development of, a "new," unified German identity which was to include both traditional aspects as well as an "open civil society and immigration country"¹⁶¹ was still viewed negatively by anti-nationals.¹⁶²

However, in 1990 a re-unified Germany required a sense of shared identity to enable solidarity and redistribution between two parts of the country formerly divided by history, ideology and economic development. Both Germanies were depicted as the "constitutive other" for each other following the Second World War. Importantly, the process of nation-branding after the reunification was not an equal process as it was orchestrated by West Germany, with East Germany subject to its Western brother. The question was of how to "integrate" the Eastern Germans and "the non-Germans," as the reunification coincided with large-scale immigration to Germany not only from East Germany, but other Eastern Bloc countries.¹⁶³ The new foundation myth of Germany "liberating itself through street protests and 'peaceful revolution'

¹⁵⁸ The Emperor was forced to renounce his divine status through issue of "Humanity Declaration" in 1947. Plus, 1947 Constitution's Article 1 describes the Emperor's role as a "symbol of the state".

¹⁵⁹ The spread allows for varying degrees of Shinto and Buddhist syncretism. Source: Reischauer, Edwin O., and Jansen, Marius B. 1988. *The Japanese today: change and continuity*, 215.

¹⁶⁰ Götz, Irene. 2016. "The Rediscovery of 'the National' in the 1990s – Contexts. New Cultural Forms and Practices in Reunified Germany," p. 804.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, p. 803.

¹⁶² Indeed, shortly after reunification "debates about identity" were held in Germany across political spectrum "whether national identity was necessary or should be encouraged". Source: Götz, Irene. 2016. "The Rediscovery of 'the National' in the 1990s – Contexts. New Cultural Forms and Practices in Reunified Germany," p. 807.

¹⁶³ Götz, Irene. 2016 "The Rediscovery of 'the National' in the 1990s – Contexts. New Cultural Forms and Practices in Reunified Germany," p. 806.

from the authoritarian regime in the GDR”¹⁶⁴ has been promoted as it combined both universalist values of the former West Germany (democracy, human rights protection) and implied a sense of unity and brotherhood. Divisions in German society, despite the government’s efforts to erase them, remain strong – expressed, for instance, in the usage of the terms “Wessis” and “Ossis” (in reference to former West Germans and East Germans respectively).¹⁶⁵

The “issue of German identity” remains unresolved and ambiguous with debates whether to conceive of Germany as a nation state with “the culture of ethnic Germans as the primary culture,” or “as a national state open to cultural plurality,” or a country “firmly situated in the European community.”¹⁶⁶ Clear, is the government’s effort to put stress on the civic elements of nationalism and identification with the state and its democratic values, rather than ethnic belonging. This is reflected in the 2000 reform of the German Nationality Law, which now includes territorial principle (*jus soli*) in addition to the parentage principle (*jus sanguinis*) as a basis for obtaining citizenship.¹⁶⁷

At a more superficial level, the success of a new German identity is evidenced by the example of the 2006 Football World Cup held in Germany, where positive identification with the German flag as well as widespread support for a German “unified” football field across “the nation” created an image of a fun-loving, friendly, united Germany.¹⁶⁸ In a similar vein, a 2018 exhibition in Bonn entitled “German Myths”¹⁶⁹ included “environmental protection,” the “economic miracle,” “Germany’s unexpected victory in 1954 at the Soccer World Cup,” “peace-making” and “membership [within the] European Community” alongside only one reference to the German ethnic past (“Hermann the Warrior”) as Germany’s points of identification.

¹⁶⁴ I Götz, Irene. 2016 “The Rediscovery of ‘the National’ in the 1990s – Contexts. New Cultural Forms and Practices in Reunified Germany,” p. 808.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 809.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 807 – 809.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 811.

¹⁶⁸ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 9.

¹⁶⁹ “German Myths “. Haus der Geschichte Bonn, 2018.

3.5.2. Rediscovery of Japan's Identity

Once again, the foreign domination of Japan after the Second World War, similar to that of the 19th century, led to an impressive mobilisation of the Japanese population for economic development (described by A.D. Smith as “reactive nationalism,”¹⁷⁰) transforming Japan into an economic superpower aspiring to become the economic “Number One.” Both Western and Japanese literature ascribed the phenomenon of rapid economic development to Japanese national and cultural identity with “the Japanese social relations [as] the core of Japan’s economic success,”¹⁷¹ reviving a sense of cultural superiority of the Japanese. Furthermore, the Japanese economy and its businesses maintain a strong Shinto connection, with organised religious rites within company shrines, strengthening the loyalty of employees through spirituality.¹⁷²

However, prior economic success resulted in a bubble, a bubble that burst in the 1990s bringing a recession and stagnation referred to as a “lost decade,” a national humiliation for Japan, from which it never fully recovered. The disillusionment due to economic failure led to political and social turmoil breaking the nigh-half century of political stability under the one-party conservative leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). With changing government profiles and an unclear path regarding the future of Japan, the Japanese identity was under inspection and in crisis with Japanese officials sending conflicting messages concerning Japan’s role during the Second World War.

However, in 1996 the re-instated conservative government adopted a different stance towards the Japanese past and cultural roots through a 1999 bill which declared the *Hinomaru* and *Kimigayo* as Japan’s national flag and anthem, respectively. These symbols are closely associated with Meiji Imperial Japan, thus their use (severely restricted in the first years after WWII by the Allied occupation) is highly controversial in formerly occupied countries, such as Korea and Taiwan.¹⁷³

Furthermore, the divine heritage of the Emperor has been slowly re-established through Shinto ritual accompanying the Emperor’s ascension in 1990 and the use of state symbols in

¹⁷⁰ Smith, Anthony D. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 55.

¹⁷¹ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 13.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, 14.

¹⁷³ McCormack, Gavan. 2000. “Nationalism and identity in post-cold war Japan,” p. 257.

1999 public celebration of anniversary of the ascension.¹⁷⁴ As this variety of relationship between state and religion is strictly prohibited by the constitution¹⁷⁵, it erodes the principles of democracy and constitutionalism in favour of the re-establishment of the traditional union of the state, Shinto religion and the Imperial family. This results in Japan identifying itself with “the same, unique, imperial, divine origin terms as in the 1930s,”¹⁷⁶ - this exceptionalism is based on a sense of superiority to “ordinary” Asian nations in the region.¹⁷⁷

3.6. State and Ultra-Nationalism and Revisionism

Revisionist movements renouncing blame for atrocities during the Second World War, and even defending the policies and ideologies of the war endeavour, are present in both contemporary Germany and Japan. The ideological background of these revisionists includes ultra/ethno-nationalism, Neo-Nazism, xenophobia together with identification with continuation of tradition of the Second World War era of fascism.¹⁷⁸ However, the states’ official and implicit support for these groups varies considerably.

Both Germany and Japan have had unusually stable governments with a few dominant parties in power. However, whereas Germany’s federal politics is dominated by a reconciliatory centrist coalition; in Japan, politics are dominated by a single conservative party, with some of its members actively promoting nationalist revision of Japan’s image as a perpetrator of inhumane crimes. Thus, “revisionism” in Japan is to some extent integral part of the state (of the government’s policies).

Japan

Historically, Japan has been lenient towards its militant ultra-nationalists if it was defended by nationalist reasons (such as to fight for the Emperor). For example, the 1932 attempted *coup d’etat*, known as the “May 15 Incident” was orchestrated by a faction of the Imperial Japanese Navy and civilian supporters of the ultra-nationalist “League of Blood.” The resulting trials

¹⁷⁴ McCormack, Gavan. 2000. “Nationalism and identity in post-cold war Japan,” p. 257

¹⁷⁵ The Emperor was forced to renounce his divine status through issue of “Humanity Declaration” in 1947. Plus, 1947 Constitution’s Article 1 describes the Emperor’s role as a “symbol of the state”.

¹⁷⁶ McCormack, Gavan. 2000. “Nationalism and identity in post-cold war Japan,” p. 258.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 258.

¹⁷⁸ Cincu, Adina-Elena. 2017. “Far right populist challenge in Europe.: Alternative for Germany and the National Front,” p. 27

were framed as an expression of loyalty towards the Emperor, resulting in only lenient sentences for the perpetrators.¹⁷⁹

Since 1954, large amounts of ethnonationalists were inducted into Japanese governments, and thus, far more accepting on civilian ethnonationalist movements. There is abundant evidence of connections between the LDP membership and broader ethnonationalist groups or even the *Yakuza*¹⁸⁰ – all of which are allegedly, partially funded by some of Japan's most prominent private corporations.

Among Japanese historical revisionist social groups are the ultranationalist conservative alliance *Nippon Kaigi* with about 38,000 members; the anti-Korean hate group *Zaitoku-kai* with 9,000 to 15,000 members and the unapologetic anti-comfort women group *Nadeshiko Japan* with 14,000 members.¹⁸¹ Another organisation with strong links to the LDP is *Izokukai* (Japan War-Bereaved Families Association) promoting official visits to Yasukuni shrine.¹⁸² Due to the ethnonationalist rhetoric of the current Abe administration, these aforementioned groups also have a possible ally at the highest echelons of the Japanese government.¹⁸³

Current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe himself, has a revisionist past as a prominent member of a parliamentary group campaigning for pro-Japanese revision of history textbooks,¹⁸⁴ and his past political agenda including the revision of the Constitution, or nationalisation of Yasukuni Shrine.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, Abe's grandfather is a rehabilitated "A class criminals" who later became Japan's Prime Minister.¹⁸⁶

¹⁷⁹ Beasley, W.G. 2000. *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic, and Social Change since 1850*, p. 159 – 175.

¹⁸⁰ Shibuishi, Daiki. 2005. "The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?" p. 200.

¹⁸¹ Hein, Patrick. 2016. "Reluctant civilian world powers? how nationalism threatens the soft power image of Japan and Germany," p. 2.

¹⁸² Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. "A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan," p. 14 – 15.

¹⁸³ Hein, Patrick. 2016. "Reluctant civilian world powers? how nationalism threatens the soft power image of Japan and Germany," p. 2.

¹⁸⁴ The Committee of Young Parliamentarians to Think About Japan's Future and History Education. Source: Togo, Kazuhiko. 2010. "The Assertive Conservative Right in Japan: Their Formation and Perspective," p. 84.

¹⁸⁵ Togo, Kazuhiko. 2010. "The Assertive Conservative Right in Japan: Their Formation and Perspective," p. 85.

¹⁸⁶ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. "A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan," p. 13.

Germany

Despite many efforts, neither East nor West Germany managed to banish anti-Semitism entirely from their societies.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, Germany's neo-Nazi scene remains an active part of the social life within the country. According to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Neo-Nazi and "far-right extremists" held 290 demonstrations in 2015 alone.¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, the incidents connected to anti-Semitism in Germany¹⁸⁹ as well as the re-emergence of ethnonationalism are on the rise since 1990s.¹⁹⁰ Xenophobic attitudes held by right-wing nationalists towards "foreigners" is a serious issue primarily in the former East Germany, contrary to much of the former West Germany.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, according to J.H. Brinks, with increasing distance from WWII, the relativisation of the impact and actions of the Third Reich is more common, with voices tied with "permanent presentation of [German] shame."¹⁹² However, anti-Semitic sentiment (assaults and harassment) has been reported predominantly among the growing Muslim community in Germany¹⁹³ with no aspiration to revive Nazi ideology. Paradoxically, this suggests that the incorporation of a large Muslim population within Germany both supports de-Nazification, due to the inclusivity of foreign populations; and, subjects the Jewish population of Germany to further discrimination at the hands of newer Muslim immigrants.

However, the German government's response to revisionist groups is significantly stricter and more negative, than their Japanese counterparts. Nazi symbolism, and Holocaust denial both remain illegal within Germany and multiple political parties deemed sympathetic to Nazism are barred from participating in the democratic processes of the country.¹⁹⁴ As the German government deems any anti-Semitic act to be an indicator of the state's failure to eliminate Nazism from the mainstream, cover ups and a low media presence of anti-Semitism occur to assist in the "suppression of the National Socialist past."¹⁹⁵

¹⁸⁷ Brinks, J.H. 2000. *Children of a New Fatherland: Germany's Post-War Right-Wing Politics*, p. 125.

¹⁸⁸ "Right-wing extremist demonstrations," *Verfassungsschutz*.

¹⁸⁹ For example: "Anti-Semitism is alive and well in Germany." *The Irish Times*. (April 28, 2018).

¹⁹⁰ Götz, Irene. 2016. "The Rediscovery of 'the National' in the 1990s – Contexts. *New Cultural Forms and Practices in Reunified Germany*," p. 810.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 810.

¹⁹² Brinks, J.H. 2000. *Children of a New Fatherland: Germany's Post-War Right-Wing Politics*, p. 125.

¹⁹³ Data from Bielefeld University's study: Zick, Andreas et al. 2017. "Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland Ein Studienbericht für den Expertenrat Antisemitismus".

¹⁹⁴ The "use of symbols and unconstitutional organizations" is prohibited by the German Criminal Code (*Strafgesetzbuch*) section 86 a.

¹⁹⁵ Brinks, J.H. 2000. *Children of a New Fatherland: Germany's Post-War Right-Wing Politics*, p. 124 – 125.

Nevertheless, WWII nostalgia resonates with certain segments of German society and in the current revival of nationalist discourse in Europe following the 2008 financial crisis, Euro and immigration crises, ethnic nationalism and racial discrimination may gain more importance in the future. German voices of an increasingly popular far-right nationalist parties like Alternative for Germany may, in the future, pose a challenge to the official state memory and narrative of its past and sentiment of war guilt. Interestingly, according to Irene Götz, the current extremist “re-nationalisation” may be the result of “de-nationalisation” of Germany’s political and economic structures.¹⁹⁶ Thus, the growing divide between the government’s identity discourse and the public sentiment may translate into change in the country’s leadership.

3.7. Summary of the Internal Factors

The differences between Japanese and German nationalism is reflected through other cultural indicators: with the former oriented towards identification through an ethnic bond; and, the latter prioritising a political and civic community. These differences are: the collectivist nature of Japanese culture versus the more individualist German culture; ancestral worship and anti-immigration policies in Japan versus the adaptive, rapidly changing ethnic composition of German society. German society.

These intertwined aspects of culture carry implications for the ability and willingness of the governments of the two countries to adopt a revised historical narrative in search of reconciliation with the victims of the past wrongs. Historically, the Japanese national identity is more oriented towards **continuity** with its ethnic past, and maintenance of its old traditions; whereas, Germany, because of its relatively recent unification and an important role of legalism and constitutionalism (reflected in strong civic rather than ethnic nationalism), may **change its state identity** more easily to absorb new immigrants. The following Table 4 summarizes the differences in Japan’s and Germany’s analysed internal factors.

¹⁹⁶ Götz, Irene. 2016. “The Rediscovery of ‘the National’ in the 1990s – Contexts. New Cultural Forms and Practices in Reunified Germany,” p. 810.

Table 4: Summary of Differences in Internal Factors

| Internal Factors | (West) Germany | Japan |
|---|---|---|
| Position of “the Nation” in the “Nation-State” | Increasing Heterogeneity (ethnic Germans: 80.8%) ¹⁹⁷ | Maintained Homogeneity (ethnic Japanese: 98.1%) ¹⁹⁸ |
| Degree of Integration to Groups | Individualist | Collectivist |
| Power Distance | Low power distance (flat) | Hierarchical (hierarchy) |
| Unity of “the State” and “the Culture” | Relatively late, 19 th century <i>(During modern nation-building era)</i> | Early, 4 th /9 th century |
| The WWII Ideology: | Based on modern ideology <i>(Disconnected from preceding cultural identification of Germans)</i> | Based on pre-modern tradition |
| The WWII Racial Hierarchy | Ambiguous and broad definition of superiority | Clear and narrow definition of superiority |
| Unity of WWII State and Nation | Questionable <i>(the Nazi leadership, anti-Semitic sentiment was not unique to or ubiquitous in German population)</i> | Significant <i>(the Japanese state and the Japanese nation)</i> |
| Perceived Perpetrator of the WWII Atrocities | National Socialists – not all Germans | Imperial Japan – all Japanese |
| Perceived Exceptionalism in Present is Stemming from: | Moral superiority, atonement, critical dialogue with its own past, anti-ethnonationalist, open borders strategy | Its unique and heroic history, long traditions, legendary divine origin |
| Current State-Sponsored Nationalism | Civic nationalism | Ethnic nationalism |

¹⁹⁷ Ethnic Germans represent 80.8% of the population (2016). Source: “Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit,” *Statistisches Bundesamt*, 2016

¹⁹⁸ The ethnic Japanese represent 98,1 % of the population of Japan (2016 estimate). Source: “The World Factbook: Japan”. CIA.

4. External factors

External factors represent external constraints upon a state's foreign policy choices. These constraints may derive from the constitutive power of the structure of the international system (structural determinism) or the behaviour of other states (state-based agency).

The physical environment of the state influences that state's behaviour either by its objective material existence (realism) or through the actor's "perception of these 'objective factors'"¹⁹⁹ (constructivism). The theme connecting several external influences to a state is its "**location.**" The location positions a state within a web of relationships with its exterior. This is true for both its geographic location and its abstract location in the power-structure of the international system.

4.1. Geographic Location as a Factor

Japan

The location of Japan, an island country bordering the vast Pacific Ocean, enabled a long period of foreign non-interference, **isolation** and **stability** based on self-sufficiency²⁰⁰. This isolation resulted in little cooperation (such as trade or military alliances) with countries of the region and just a few limited military conflicts. From the 17th century, the exclusion of foreigners from Japanese soil served as a defence against the spread of foreign religions (primarily Christianity) or the political and economic interests of imperialist countries.²⁰¹

Due to its **strategic island position**, Japan has rarely faced foreign military invasion upon its shores. Until the 20th century, the only significant invasion attempts were the Mongol invasions between 1274 and 1281, both defeated by the Japanese. Both times heavily outnumbered²⁰², the Japanese saw their victories as a divine sign of god-favoured, Japanese exceptionalism, since they were both times aided by typhoons. The typhoons, referred to in Japan as *kamikaze* ("divine wind"), were portrayed as a divine protection of Japan.²⁰³ The first

¹⁹⁹ Singer, J. David. 1961. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations," p. 86.

²⁰⁰ The only goods that Japan was not able to produce and thus depended on imports in the mid-17th century were the most luxurious items, usually imported from China. Source: Beasley, W. G. 1999. *The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan*, p. 141.

²⁰¹ For example, growing influence Jesuit religion and political interests during Tokugawa shogunate in the 17th century led to mass execution and expulsion of foreign missionaries. Source: Beasley, W. G. 1999. *The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan*, p. 147 - 150.

²⁰² McClain, James L. 2002. *Japan: A Modern History*, p. 17.

²⁰³ Winters, Harold A. et al. 2001. *Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War*, p. 13 - 14.

successful large-scale military invasion of Japan happened during the Second World War. This time, *kamikaze* was metaphorically used during the Second World War through nationalist propaganda for suicide attacks conducted by Japanese pilots, viewed as protectors of the Japanese islands.

The first successful coerced foreign interference in the Japanese islands took place only after technologically superior Western powers took interest in entering new Asian markets. Thus, in the mid-19th century, a period of 200 years of Japanese isolation (referred to as *sakoku*) was violently interrupted by forced negotiations of Western interests.²⁰⁴ After signing the unequal *Convention of Kanagawa* issued by American Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1854. As a result, Japan chose to undergo a series of reforms to overcome growing Western influence: the Meiji Restoration. This modernity led to a period of Japanese expansionism within the region, expanding to new Japanese territories first with the cession of Taiwan and Liaodong Peninsula in 1895, followed by the annexation of Korea in 1910, and expansion into Manchuria in 1931, China proper in 1937 and Southeast-Asia between 1940 to 1945.²⁰⁵

Thus, the relative lack of foreign interference in Japanese development ensured long-term **stability of the Japanese identity, distaste for foreign interference** (in politics, religion etc.) and the **primacy of domestic politics** and domestic image (as opposed to the regional or international one). Furthermore, Japan remains affected by its location “on the edge of the Eurocentric map,”²⁰⁶ being a secondary concern to European and American powers whose focus in the region has long focused upon China.

Germany

Unlike Japan, the territory of present-day Germany is located within the middle of continental Europe. Germany has thus been a historic intersection of political, economic and cultural competition of European powers. As a result, German polities were afflicted by, and partook in, many wars with other polities, ranging from: the defence of the Germanic territory against the Roman Empire, religious wars spurred by conflicting paradigms in Europe (Christianity vs. Paganism, Catholicism vs. Protestantism), pan-European Napoleonic wars, two World Wars – let alone the plethora of intra-Germanic conflict during much of its fractious history.

²⁰⁴ Beasley, W. G. 1999. *The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan*, p. 191 – 192.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 241 – 251.

²⁰⁶ Breuning, Marjike. 2007. *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, p. 127 – 128.

Furthermore, due to a higher density of competing polities within Europe, it is nigh impossible for a continental, European country not to have a vested interest in the changing distribution of power. Thus, due to highly dynamic power fluctuations in the region, different alliances were cast and scorned to ensure the balance of power, and the borders of polities were often redrawn. **The change of a state's (or other polity's) identity has been a common occurrence** The implication for modern Germany is a lengthy history in which its constituent states were often under the vassalage of widely different and often opposing religions, ideologies, and powers themselves. Furthermore, German polities experienced a lengthy subjugation to supranational European entities (notably, the Holy Roman Empire), implying **flexibility of multilevel identification** within European integration projects. Additionally, due to the need to ensure coexistence with other powers in proximity upon the European continent, elaborate foreign policy choices were necessary to ensure the survival of the state (polity). The other option was attainment of military domination and subjugation of neighbouring populace.

4.1.1. Geographic Location as the Rationale for Expansionism

Japan

Pre-war Japanese imperialism, unlike in the case of Germany or other European imperial powers, targeted Japan's neighbouring countries bound by shared cultural heritage. Pre-war Japanese imperialism, targeted direct neighbours bound by a shared cultural heritage – markedly different from contemporary European powers which targeted Africa. Along the nationalist interest of joining the prestigious club of “imperial great powers” through acquisition of colonies, **new territories had strategic value for security** the Japanese islands. The acquisition of colonies not only afforded Japan prestige akin to that of other imperial great powers – but also added an additional buffer of security for the Japanese home-island. Geographically, the Korean peninsula, previously a target of the 16th century Japanese Samurai invasion, was perceived as “a dagger thrust at the heart of Japan”²⁰⁷ meaning that securing the Korean Peninsula was of the utmost importance to preventing securing the Japanese archipelago.

The objectives of Japanese colonial policies were the consolidation of its military and political power, integration of the colonial and metropolitan economies with **the goal of economic self-sufficiency** (resulting in both over-exploitation of resources, but also massive investments in

²⁰⁷ Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie. 1984. *The Japanese colonial empire, 1895-1945*, p.15.

infrastructure and modernisation in subjugated territories), together with creating a loyal, indoctrinated populace to serve as labourers and soldiers.

Japanese justification of its 20th century expansionism was the replacement of a foreign, Western order by an Asian bloc led by the superior Japanese nation. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, announced by Japan's Foreign Minister in 1940 called for cooperation of Asian nations under Japanese rule with the promise of **freedom from Western colonial powers** in the region.²⁰⁸ However, the main reason for this pan-Asian propaganda seems to be the consolidation of Japan as a great power and acquisition of mineral resources overseas.²⁰⁹ Due to rapid industrialisation Japan was faced with a **shortage of raw materials** for its manufacturing industry which could not be satiated by its domestic resources. The industrialisation of Japan caused economic dependency on imports of energy and raw materials. Thus, its invasion into territories rich in mineral resources, like coal-rich Manchuria, was necessary to sustain its the economic growth and war endeavours.²¹⁰

Germany

Similar to Japan, Imperial Germany was a late imperial power. Following unsuccessful attempts of individual German polities before their 1871 unification, the German Empire, under the leadership of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck acquired several colonies during the 1880s and 1890s in Africa and the Pacific. However, German colonies remained underdeveloped, and perceived by the aristocracy as more "a burden and an expense"²¹¹ rather than as an opportunity. For this reason, and the fact that all German colonies were confiscated with the defeat following the First World War, German colonies never played an important economic or political role for Imperial Germany. Therefore, unlike in the case of Japan, the colonialism was not directly connected to expansionism during the Second World War.

The Nazi's geopolitical justification of expansionism was the theory of *Lebensraum* or "living space" for the Aryan-German *Herrenvolk* or "master race". The German concept of *Lebensraum* was based on Friedrich Ratzel's depiction of a population as a developing organism based on

²⁰⁸ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. "A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan," p. 11.

²⁰⁹ John Toland. 2003. *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945*, p. 447.

²¹⁰ Young, Luise. 1998. *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 82 - 93.

²¹¹ Supposedly Otto von Bismarck's description of the colonies. Source: Taylor, A.J.P. 1967. Bismarck. *The Man and the Statesman*, p. 221.

its **limits of habitat** (*Lebensraum*). Thus, the extension of *Lebensraum* was portrayed as a biological necessity for further development of the German nation. This geopolitical view of Germany's neighbourhood gained popularity in 1901 and played a role in the First World War. However, the concept was attached to a new racial dimension under Karl Ernst Haushofer's ultranationalist interpretation.²¹² This led to a definition of German *Lebensraum* on racial terms as the territory of Eastern Europe as the strategic "heartland of Eurasia"²¹³ (inhabited with racially inferior Slavic ethnicities which were to be moved to Siberia, or killed), this interpretation was subsequently adopted by Nazi Germany and urged the nation to war.²¹⁴

Similarities

Both Germany and Japan rapidly industrialised compared to their neighbours, affording them a significant military advantage and an opportunity to dominate, for the first time, in their regional power structures. Furthermore, in both 20th century Japan and Germany, repeated patterns of expansionist efforts occurred. For example, the Korean Peninsula was the target of both of Japan's largest invasions: in 1592 and in 1905. Similarly, the 13th century Baltic Crusade afforded the German Nobility an opportunity to expand their territorial holdings through their financing of the Teutonic Knights – territorial holdings, such as Prussia, would thus remain integral to the Nazi concept of an eastward expanding *Lebensraum*. In both instances, the only significant campaign of military territorial conquest for Japan and Germany targeted their historic areas of expansion.

4.2. Cold War Power Dynamics

The post-war development of Japan and West Germany (FRG), especially after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, was a product of bipolarity during the Cold War²¹⁵ both under the USA as the Western bloc's superpower. Barry Buzan describes the salience of constraints during the Cold War power structure (whether objectively existing or subjectively perceived): "During [...] the Cold War most policy makers and analysts framed their thinking in polarity

²¹² Herwig, Holger H. 1999. "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum," p. 218 – 225.

²¹³ Ibid, p. 218.

²¹⁴ Ibid, p. 220, 235 -236.

²¹⁵ Bipolarity may be defined as a distribution of power in the international system when two states account for the majority of military, economic and cultural (soft power) capacities. The other states with relatively much less power are often under strong influence of one of the superpowers or try to achieve neutrality between them. Source: Buzan, Barry. 2004. *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*, p. 33 -34.

terms.”²¹⁶ Thus, West German and Japanese alignment with the Western Bloc (or the USA specifically) meant adoption of its ideology reflected in foreign policy choices.

Additionally, the new “dialectics of good and evil” dichotomy based on the Cold War demonisation of “the constitutive Other” in the shape of the Soviet Union and communism accommodated redefinition of state identity in terms of an integration in “the good” liberal Western Bloc.²¹⁷

At the same time, the Cold War division of the Blocs (both, physical and psychological) **limited reconciliation with victimised countries of the opposite bloc**. Japan did not normalise its relations with China until 1972; Japanese – North Korean relations have not been officially established yet; West Germany did not normalise its relations with Poland until 1970 through the Treaty of Warsaw which formally recognised the People’s Republic of Poland.

The influence of the USA (the hegemon of the Western Bloc) upon the Cold War is undeniable: American aid and protection carried an ideological agenda: the prevention of communism and the, spread of democracy, free trade, capitalism and the Bretton Woods monetary system.²¹⁸ Additionally, both Japan and the FRG were tightly integrated into their Cold War blocs. Both states’ sovereignty remained constrained through constitutional means: both unable to exclude a Western military presence, nor fortify their own militaries independent of foreign approval.²¹⁹ Thus, **without effective means for self-defence** during the Cold-War, both states were coerced bilaterally (Japan) or multilaterally (Germany) into military alliances, where the USA played a *de facto* dominant decision-making role.²²⁰

²¹⁶ Buzan, Barry. 2004. *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*, p. 33.

²¹⁷ The new narrative demonizing the Soviet Union and communism could weaken or even replace the anti-German narrative of the Second World War Allies. Source: Alexander, Clarkson. 2013. *Fragmented Fatherland: Immigration and Cold War Conflict in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1980*, p. 178.

²¹⁸ Kelly, Dominic. 2014. “US Hegemony and the Origins of Japanese Nuclear Power: The Politics of Consent,” p. 825.

²¹⁹ The 1947 Japanese constitution’s Article 9, “the Peace Article of the Constitution”, prohibits Japan from maintaining an army and waging wars. Similarly, The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany adopted under Allied supervision in 1949, together with effective disarmament after the war prohibited German military action (until Germany’s membership in NATO in 1955, which allowed West Germany to maintain defensive forces). Source: Patton, David F. 1999. *Cold War Politics in Post-War Germany*, p. 19.

²²⁰ For example, contrary to the official “unanimity clause” of the NATO decision-making, studies have shown empirical evidence of informal “uncontested leadership” of the USA within the structure of NATO. See for example: Honkanen, Karoliina. 2002. “The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making,” p. 108 – 112.

Germany

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World war, occupied Germany was, unlike Japan, left without any central German government, and territorially divided into four zones, thus, losing both its identity and means how to sustain itself in terms of security and economy.

From its establishment in 1949, until the suspension of the occupation statute in 1955, West Germany, was under the control of the High Commission of Germany (HICOG) – a **joint multilateral administration** of British, French and American High Commissioners.²²¹ Thus, unlike Japan, the occupation control was multilateral and included two of Germany's neighbours, victims of German war atrocities. These victimised countries had at least a partial influence on the formation of FRG's state identity and institutions, with prevention of another regional ethno-nationalist military conflict on their minds.

An apology issued by the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1951) can be seen as stemming from **self-interest or coercion - not an internalised, nation-wide regret** - but an attempt to rehabilitate its image to escape international isolation and to attain independence (sovereignty) the international community.²²² The issuance of a request for forgiveness sought to ensure an improvement of West Germany's international reputation through a portrayal of the FRG as a benign European state - in sharp contrast with its past war propaganda. The rehabilitation of the FRG's image as a reliable partner was necessary to enable its integration into security alliances and other European projects vital for the security of the FRG positioned at the front-line of the Cold War.

Furthermore, the involvement of the USA, led to "a period of intensified Americanisation,"²²³ especially during the reconstruction of the German state in the aftermath of the war, reflected in new institutions such as: the *Bundesbank* (bearing resemblance to the American Federal Reserve)²²⁴ or the foreign policy of FRG. The influence of the USA can be uncovered in the aforementioned Konrad Adenauer's declaration to the people of Israel in 1951. This

²²¹ Müller, Christoph Hendrik. 2010. *West Germans against the West: Anti-Americanism in Media and Public Opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany 1949-68*, str. 2.

²²² Löwenheim, Nava. 2009. "A Haunted Past: Requesting Forgiveness for Wrongdoing in International Relations," p. 549.

²²³ Müller, Christoph Hendrik. 2010. *West Germans against the West: Anti-Americanism in Media and Public Opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany 1949-68*, str. 2.

²²⁴ Ibid, str. 2.

declaration, commiserating with the suffering of “the Jews in Germany,”²²⁵ was issued at a time when a considerable proportion of West Germans still held anti-Semitic views.²²⁶ This early apology to Israel, and the FRG’s pro-Israel foreign policy during the Cold War, were both the result of its alignment with the USA and an effort to re-build the FRG’s identity (and international image) by meeting “Allied expectations”²²⁷ of discontinuity with identification with the former Nazi regime. This explanation also clarifies why West German expressions of remorse predominantly targeted “the Jewry” but overlooked other targeted ethnicities like the Romani or the Slavs that did not play an important role in Western Bloc countries’ foreign nor domestic politics.

In 1955, although West Germany regained “the full authority of a sovereign state”²²⁸ through the suspension of the occupation statute on 5 May 1955, the occupying forces remained upon German soil **as a part of NATO deployments** once entering the collective organisation on 9 May 1955. Thus, West Germany remained a state under *de facto* occupation from 1955 onwards with foreign powers primarily responsible for the security of the country.

Due to the location of West Germany at the front-line of the Cold War, there was more external pressure upon Germany to be quickly accepted and integrated as into economic and security organisations within the Western Bloc. Moreover, West Germany’s acceptance into the international system was made more important after 1949 when the two “Germanies” competed for international recognition and legitimacy. As a result, the outward expression of

²²⁵ Interestingly, Adenauer did not apologise for his state - the Federal Republic of Germany - nor for all Germans, since he did not see the nation as a whole responsible for the atrocities. Instead he apologised because the atrocities, although committed by a few, were committed “in the name of German people”. Source: Konrad Adenauer’s declaration before the *Bundestag* on 27 September 1951, cited from: Löwenheim, Nava. 2009. “A Haunted Past: Requesting Forgiveness for Wrongdoing in International Relations,” p. 549.

²²⁶ Surveys in 1950s displaying the salience of anti-democratic and particularly anti-Semitic popular sentiments in West German society are expressed in: Löwenheim, Nava. 2009. “A Haunted Past: Requesting Forgiveness for Wrongdoing in International Relations,” p. 551; or: Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 5.

²²⁷ Löwenheim, Nava. 2009. “A Haunted Past: Requesting Forgiveness for Wrongdoing in International Relations,” p. 551.

²²⁸ Phrasing “pushed through” in the October 23, 1954 Paris Agreements by Konrad Adenauer. Source: Junker, Detlef, ed. *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, A Handbook Volume 1, 1945–1968*, p. 9.

change in state identity was perceived as sufficient evidence of West Germany's reliability (this resulted, for example, in a limited political purge after the war).²²⁹

Japan

As Japan was a geographically peripheral power in both the Second World War, and the Cold War, it was subject to unilateral American action rather than multilateral collaboration as in Europe. The Pacific region remains defended almost unilaterally by the USA, and thus the USA exerted significantly more **unilateral** power over Japan's post-war fate. The allied occupation of Japan, led by American General Douglas MacArthur, relied on American leadership with only secondary support by Britain and her Commonwealth – without (unlike in the case of post-war Germany) influence from the Soviet Union. Similarly, the post-war tribunal implementing the victor's justice was, in the case of the Tokyo Trials, relatively ~~more~~ unilateral wherein the American occupation of Japan afforded the United States significantly more authority, unlike the Nuremberg Trials of Germany.²³⁰

Under American supervision, a **new constitution** was adopted in 1947, “American “in both origin and ideology, it introduced **democracy** to the Japanese political system. Thus, unlike in the case of the FRG, where German politicians negotiated the content of FRG's constitution, a Japanese draft of the new constitution was rejected as it did not incorporate enough ideological changes; and, for the most part, copied the Meiji Constitution.²³¹ The new “American constitution” embedded both **pacifism and secularism** (a separation of the state and religion through the Emperor's public renunciation of his divine origin)²³² into Japanese politics.

²²⁹ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 7.

²³⁰ The Nuremberg Tribunal, based on 1945 international London agreement, consisted of one judge from each of the Allied countries. Unlike the IMT, the IMTFE was not established by an international agreement. General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, was granted authority to “issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and all directives supplementary thereto” in the 1945 Moscow Conference. Which gave MacArthur the right to unilaterally establish the IMTFE in 1946 and to appoint judges for the Tribunal. Source: Taulbee, James Larry. 2018. *War Crimes and Trials: A Primary Source Guide*, p. 92 – 95.

²³¹ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 12.

²³² The Emperor was forced to issue a “Humanity Declaration” (*Nigen sengen*), Shinto and the state were thus separated, religious state ceremonies prohibited, and Yasukuni Shrine privatised. Source: Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 12.

However, it did not bring major discontinuity with the identity of the Meiji Japanese Empire since **the Emperor remained as the official head of state**.

Similar to West Germany, **the presence of American troops on Japanese soil persisted** after signature of *the Treaty of San Francisco*, that officially granted Japan sovereignty in 1952. The legal basis for an American military presence in Japan is the *Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan*, that came into effect simultaneously with the Peace Treaty of 1952.²³³ This agreement, together with the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan* of 1954 embedded American special rights to control the Japanese military domain: from total freedom for installation of any land, air or sea-based American military capacity,²³⁴ to the effective veto power for the installation of foreign bases in Japan²³⁵.

The importance of American military bases in Japan grew especially with the outbreak of **Cold-War proxy wars in the region** – first the Korean War (1950 – 1953), and later the Vietnam War (1955 – 1975) and with secret installation of USA-controlled nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. Thus, Japan had been effectively remilitarised “to support US military operations in the Far East.”²³⁶

Similar to West Germany, the early re-appearance of international conflict in Japan’s neighbourhood contributed to Japan’s limited reform. Instead of a complete fascist purge from state institutions and an “ideological rebirth” of Japanese society envisioned by the Allied occupation, only a **limited purge** with emphasis on “rebuilding” rather than “reform.”²³⁷ This can be explained by the American need for **maintaining stability** of the Japanese state through continuity of its personnel to prevent chaos and the spread of communism in Japan.²³⁸ Thus, the USA came to **support Japanese conservatives**, despite their close link to Second World War ethno-nationalists and large industrial companies. Class A criminals were pardoned and released from prison and instead all Communist party officials were purged from office.²³⁹

²³³ “Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan; September 8, 1951,” Introduction.

²³⁴ Ibid, Article I.

²³⁵ Ibid, Article II.

²³⁶ Kelly, Dominic. 2014. “US Hegemony and the Origins of Japanese Nuclear Power: The Politics of Consent,” p. 832

²³⁷ Ibid, p. 831.

²³⁸ The USA was afraid of both economic and political chaos based on disruption of its established networks. Source: Kelly, Dominic. 2014. “US Hegemony and the Origins of Japanese Nuclear Power: The Politics of Consent,” p. 831.

²³⁹ Schmidt, Carmen. 2016. “A Comparison of Civil Religion and Remembrance Culture in Germany and Japan,” p. 12.

4.2.1. Regional Integration

Japan

Close alignment with the Western Bloc's superpower, the USA, simultaneously distanced Japan politically and economically from most other Asian countries.²⁴⁰ This “special partnership,” expressed through Japan’s adoption of nuclear power technologies under American supervision, was a major change in Japanese identity, be it a result of utilitarianism or simply a necessity.

According to Antonio Gramsci, hegemony involves both “the use of coercion and the construction of consensus within and between states.”²⁴¹ The purpose of Japan’s alliance with the USA may be perceived as either a constraint (due to American coercion) and an opportunity (Japanese self-interest) for post-war Japan to recover. For one-part, American dominance (asserted by positioning American military bases on Japanese Islands) in post-war Japan seriously constrained its sovereign options to unilaterally remilitarise or cooperate with its communist neighbours.²⁴² Thus, Japanese foreign policy was to a large extent shaped by American interests. On the other hand, compliance with American interests created an opportunity for Japan to boost its economy through special access to the American market (and to other markets through “US sponsorship of Japan’s membership of the Bretton Woods’ Institutions”²⁴³) while preserving its neo-mercantile policies; and, benefit from the technological transfers of nuclear energy technology all while under a security guarantee provided by the American military presence on Japanese islands.²⁴⁴ Additionally, the acquisition of nuclear power gave a sense of “exceptionalism”²⁴⁵ to Japan due to its implantation of a highly sophisticated energy technology.

²⁴⁰ Kelly, Dominic. 2014. “US Hegemony and the Origins of Japanese Nuclear Power: The Politics of Consent,” p. 820.

²⁴¹ Ibid, 820.

²⁴² Kelly, Dominic. 2014. “US Hegemony and the Origins of Japanese Nuclear Power: The Politics of Consent,” p. 832

²⁴³ Ibid, p. 832

²⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 832

²⁴⁵ Exceptionalism stemmed from the Cold War narrative that portrayed the possession of nuclear power as the sign of “relevancy” in the Cold War power hierarchy. Source: Kelly, Dominic. 2014. “US Hegemony and the Origins of Japanese Nuclear Power: The Politics of Consent,” p. 826.

Germany

Integration played a vital role for a **territorially divided**, defenceless and economically devastated Germany. Germany's **strategic location on the frontline of the Cold War**, its military and industrial capacity demonstrated during the two world wars contributed to the desire of both emerging Cold War Blocs to integrate it under their control to prevent it from joining the opponents.²⁴⁶ This became evident with intensification of the Cold War, particularly after the Berlin Blockade of 1948. Thus, West Germany and countries of the Western Bloc shared security interest of West German integration.

Immediately after the Second World War, the **USA** played an important role in the economic reconstruction of Europe and its path of integration through redistribution of the resources provided by the **Marshall Plan of 1948**, that sought to prevent the spread of communism (empirically popular in the times of economic hardship) and link European economies to the American market.

The 1950s were thus the era of German *Westpolitik* – negotiations of Chancellor Adenauer seeking to “bind the state within Western European economic, political, and military institutions.”²⁴⁷ Integration of West Germany was achieved on many levels – it became a founding member of **European economic integration projects** – first in 1951 through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), that integrated heavy industries of the member countries, and in 1957 the European Atomic Energy Community (or Euratom) and finally the European Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, in 1955, West Germany was admitted to **NATO**, securing itself within the American military umbrella over Europe. Thus, 1950s oversaw integration of West Germany's strategic industry and military under multilateral control.

Importantly, the 1970s era of the Cold War “détente” coincided with West German reconciliatory policy towards its communist neighbourhood (East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia) under Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.²⁴⁸ This was the first step for future re-integration for much of Europe East-of-the-Iron-Curtain.

²⁴⁶ Patton, David F. 1999. *Cold War Politics in Post-War Germany*, p. 3.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 2.

²⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 96 - 98.

Importantly, the two Germanies re-unified in 1990 under West Germany's Chancellor Kohl's unification policy.²⁴⁹ This ended a 45 year-long period of territorial and ideological division of Germany. With the "victory" of the Western Bloc, and the particularly the USA, a re-unified Germany succeeded West Germany in its membership in both major Western Bloc integration projects – the European Economic Community (since 1993 replaced by the European Union) and NATO.

Summary

Whereas Germany (both the FRG and the DGR and the post-unification FRG) became members of multinational economic, security and later even political unions, Japan was integrated into a single bilateral security alliance with the United States of America, lacking integration with its immediate neighbours in the region. From a neo-liberal perspective, Germany achieved a surprising discontinuity of its identity by gaining the trust of its former victims by adopting common norms, limiting its sovereignty and adopting a common identity in the integration project. Japan, on the other hand, preserves continuity of its identity and sovereignty resulting in its non-participation in any close regional partnership.

From a different perspective, both countries military and economic integration (whether in the region or not) enabled supervision of Germany's and Japan's strategic industries and military deployments (or lack thereof). Thus, rather than genuinely perceived change of identity, the perceived threat of the two states could have been the motivation for integration.

4.3. Post-Cold War International System

With the end of bi-polar power distribution during the Cold War in 1989, new power structures within the international system emerged. The nature of this power redistribution changed – whether interpreted as unipolar with a single, although declining, superpower (the USA); or multipolar with growing importance of new emerging powers (especially the PRC)²⁵⁰ – the external constraints on Germany's and Japan's foreign policy formulation.

The **diminishing primacy of the USA globally, due to the rise of regional powers**, "a shift in power and status from the global hegemon to the regional hegemons"²⁵¹ occurred. Thus, foreign politics is more shaped by the regional, rather than trans-continental powers. Thus,

²⁴⁹ The post-unification German constitution (*Grundgesetz*) was an adaptation of West Germany's constitution; Source: Patton, David F. 1999. *Cold War Politics in Post-War Germany*, p. 2.

²⁵⁰ Buzan, Barry. 2004. *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*.

²⁵¹ Dobrescu, Paul, and Malina Ciocea. 2016. "In the Antechamber of a New Global Bipolarity," p. 5.

emergence of (or the lack of) new security threats influences the states' current motivation for reconciliation.

Germany

A re-unified Germany, emboldened by its reclamation of its Eastern half, took on a greater role within the EU. Supported by its vast economy, Germany dominates the EU's and particularly the Eurozone's decision making. Furthermore, despite its status as a "civilian power,"²⁵² Germany deployed its armed forces in both the Balkans and Afghanistan.²⁵³

Germany's growing assertion is evident at a regional level. Germany's new role as a "geopolitical actor" stems from Germany's need to "balance its economic interests with the new strategic challenges of [a] newly unstable Europe."²⁵⁴ Regionally, it was reflected in unilateral negotiation in the Euro debt crisis in Greece, a dominant role in negotiations with Russia regarding the Ukrainian crisis. So too does Germany have the desire and capacity to act in its own self-interest despite objection from its EU neighbours: first with the pro-Russian energy Nord Stream 2 pipeline deal; and, more recently, its unilateral invitation of refugees during the European migration crisis.²⁵⁵

Many of Germany's new roles and policies coincide with its perception of a diminishing interest of the USA to play the role of a global geostrategic power, that left a degree of security uncertainty in Europe. Furthermore, Germany's emancipation from its subordination to American interest during the Cold War is obvious due to its lack of acquiescence to American foreign and security policy in NATO debates, such as its non-involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.²⁵⁶

Despite Germany's refusal to define its position in the international environment in terms of *Geopolitik* that carries connotation with the pre-War *Lebensraum* terminology, geopolitics was "re-appropriated" in the definition of a re-unified Germany's place in Europe, and the

²⁵² In Hans Maull's definition of the term, "civilian power" strives to improve global economy and "civilize international relations through the development of the rule of law, the respect for human rights and human security". Cited from: Hein, Patrick. 2016. "Reluctant civilian world powers? how nationalism threatens the soft power image of Japan and Germany," p. 1.

²⁵³ Hein, Patrick. 2016. Reluctant civilian world powers? how nationalism threatens the soft power image of Japan and Germany, p. 2. Hein, Patrick. 2016. "Reluctant civilian world powers? how nationalism threatens the soft power image of Japan and Germany," p. 16.

²⁵⁴ Szabo, Stephen F. 2017. "Germany: From Civilian Power to a Geo-economic Shaping Power," p. 38.

²⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 38 - 50.

²⁵⁶ Schreer, Benjamin. 2009. "A New 'Pragmatism': Germany's NATO Policy," p. 383 - 385.

world.²⁵⁷ Due to a growing threat to security in Europe and the perceived unreliability of the American security umbrella, Germany chooses to transform, into a geopolitical power and to “sacrifice its economic interests to broader security concerns.”²⁵⁸

Japan

After the end of the Cold War, Asia was transformed into “a composite power playground”²⁵⁹ with more possibilities for cooperation due to dissolution of the Cold War’s Bloc politics. The waning of the USA’s relative global power and changing regional security environment (growing threat of nuclear-armed North Korea or the rise of China)²⁶⁰ forced Japan to look beyond the USA for new partnerships. The USA-Japan alliance (under a revised, more equal Treaty of 1960) persisted after the end of the Cold War, however, with “the shared threat perception of Soviet military”²⁶¹ and communism it faces a problem of coordination of increasingly divergent interests in the changing regional environment.²⁶²

The imposed Japanese “culture of anti-militarism” and pacifist identity of post-War Japan can be interpreted, according to Jennifer M. Lind, as a self-interested way to free ride on the American investment in Japanese security through their bi-lateral alliance.²⁶³ However, with current unpredictability of the future American administration’s support of the alliance, Japanese officials (including the current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe)²⁶⁴ speculate **about revision of the 1947 Constitution, especially a repeal of the Article 9** (dubbed “the Pacifist Clause”) and to officially re-militarise as to deter hostile neighbours. Additionally, due to its “pacifist identity,” Japanese military capabilities are significantly lower than its capacity. Despite the “myth of Japan’s military weakness”²⁶⁵ and the economic stagnation during the Lost Decade, Japan possesses an impressive air and naval military capacity, making it “one of

²⁵⁷ Behnke, Andreas. 2006. “The Politics of Geopolitik in Post-Cold War Germany,” p. 416.

²⁵⁸ Szabo, Stephen F. 2017. “Germany: From Civilian Power to a Geo-economic Shaping Power,” p. 50.

²⁵⁹ Paul, Joshy M. 2008. “India and Japan: Reluctant Idealism to Practical Realism, p. 99.

²⁶⁰ Goo, Young-Wan, and Seong-Hoon Lee. 2014. Military Alliances and Reality of Regional Integration: Japan, South Korea, the US vs. China, North Korea,” p. 338.

²⁶¹ Suzuki, Motoshi. 2010. “The Politics of Coordination and Miscoordination in the Post-Cold War United States – Japan Alliance: from a Japanese Perspective,” p. 492.

²⁶² Ibid, p. 511.

²⁶³ Lind, Jennifer M. 2004. “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” p. 93 – 94.

²⁶⁴ McCormack, Gavan. 2000. “Nationalism and identity in post-cold war Japan,” p. 254.

²⁶⁵ Lind, Jennifer M. 2004. “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” p. 94.

the most powerful military forces in the world.”²⁶⁶ Yet, unlike Germany, post-war Japan never used military force abroad pursuing “non-military civilian reconstruction approach” on international missions as a Major Non-NATO Ally.²⁶⁷

The volatile tensions in the region spurred by dynamic power redistribution leads to a re-definition of state relations. Despite Japanese efforts to engage with post-Cold War China (in debates about tri-polar alliance between the USA, Japan and PRC)²⁶⁸, China’s ascent, together with its support for North Korea²⁶⁹, Japan’s policies towards China resemble containment, rather than reconciliation.²⁷⁰ In the new era of (predominantly economic) competition between Japan and China, which surpassed Japan in 2010 as the second largest world economy, Japan seeks to reassert its soft power and partnership in Russia, Australia, India and Europe.²⁷¹

Summary

Unconstrained by their subordinate position during the Cold War, both Germany and Japan attained more control over their foreign policy. Thus, as the international system transitioned from a bi-polar state to a multi-polar one, **they regained more sovereignty due to the power vacuum.** Both Japan and West Germany benefited economically from the Cold War,²⁷² thus, their position within a relatively demilitarised, economically-oriented post-Cold War international environment became significant. For example, both Germany and Japan, based on their status as major economic powers, support each other’s bids to join the United Nations Security Council as permanent members, an institution that embodies the post-Second World War order, which is an evidence of their emancipation from their Cold War subordination. Furthermore, both countries have the capacity to project their power in military contexts –

²⁶⁶ Lind, Jennifer M. 2004. “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” p. 95 – 105; 120.

²⁶⁷ Hein, Patrick. 2016. “Reluctant civilian world powers? how nationalism threatens the soft power image of Japan and Germany,” p. 16 – 17.

²⁶⁸ Hughes, Christopher W. 2009. “Japan's Response to China's Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision,” p. 844 – 846.

²⁶⁹ Goo, Young-Wan, and Seong-Hoon Lee. 2014. “Military Alliances and Reality of Regional Integration: Japan, South Korea, the USA vs. China, North Korea,” p. 329.

²⁷⁰ Hughes, Christopher W. 2009. “Japan's Response to China's Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision,” p. 838.

²⁷¹ Hughes, Christopher W. 2009. “Japan's Response to China's Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision,” p. 838.; or: Paul, Joshy M. 2008. *India and Japan: Reluctant Idealism to Practical Realism*, p. 99.

²⁷² Through American support of Japan’s economic reconstruction and its export-oriented economy and export-oriented West Germany’s integration in the emerging European market. Both countries had costs of their security shared by other Western Bloc countries.

Japan through its military forces and Germany through a greater role within NATO. There are reasons to believe that both Germany and Japan will continue to pursue national self-interest more forcefully.²⁷³

4.4. Summary of External Factors

In both Germany and Japan, the initial plans of massive political purges fascist officials were abandoned due to the rapid progression of the Cold War and necessity to stabilise the occupied countries. Thus, in both cases, there was continuity of personnel at the highest echelons of governance. During the Cold War, with their policies intrinsically linked to the USA, the states were only “semi-sovereign.”²⁷⁴ The Cold War powers embedded pacifism onto both Japan and Germany, which saved them from a costly arms race to obtain a large-scale military necessary to defend themselves during the Cold War – but, this pacifism may not be maintained during this post-Cold War era due to a lack of American oversight. In the post-Cold War world, both Germany and Japan must respond to new security threats in the context of the diminishing global power of the USA and to growing salience of their national self-interest. The Table 5 provides summary of (West) Germany’s and Japan’s external factors.

²⁷³ Schreer, Benjamin. 2009. “A New ‘Pragmatism’: Germany's NATO Policy,” p. 397.

²⁷⁴ Suzuki, Motoshi. 2010. “The Politics of Coordination and Miscoordination in the Post-Cold War United States – Japan Alliance: from a Japanese Perspective,” p. 510.

Table 5: Summary of Differences in External Factors

| External Factors | (West) Germany | Japan |
|---|---|--|
| Geographic Location | Continental/Integrated | Islandic/Isolated |
| Dominant Sphere | Regional | Domestic |
| Sovereignty After WWII | <i>De jure</i> since 1955 <i>De facto</i> limited during the Cold War | <i>De jure</i> since 1952 <i>De facto</i> limited during the Cold War |
| Post-War Occupation and Trials | Multilateral (participation of Allies including the USSR) | <i>De facto</i> unilateral (USA) |
| Involvement of Victims During Reconstruction | Yes - Partial (France, Britain) | No |
| Territorial Significance During the Cold War | Primary, frontline | Secondary, proxy wars |
| Control Over Its Remilitarisation | No | No |
| Origins of Post- War Constitution | Endogenous | Exogenous |
| Post-war Territorial Continuity | No Division into four, later two, polities. | Yes |
| Post-War Purge of Former Regime | Limited | Limited |
| Continuity of State Symbolism | Discontinuity Nazi symbolism illegal. | Continuity The same Emperor. |
| Post-War Alignment with the US | Strong Though alongside European neighbours | Very Strong |
| Regional Integration | Very Strong | Weak |
| Post-Cold War Regional Threats | Revanchist Wars (Yugoslavia, Russia) Terrorism (Middle East) Migration (Africa and Middle East) | Power Dynamism (China) Nuclear Proliferation (North Korea) |
| Influence in the Post-Cold War International System (compared relatively to the Cold War era) | Greater Regional geo-economic | Greater Regional power contested by China |

Conclusion

The preceding chapters demonstrated a wealth of internal and external factors that explain Japan's and Germany's policy choices concerning identity after the Second World War. This section discusses **the relative significance of internal and external factors** in explaining Germany's relative discontinuity, and Japan's continuity, with their *in bello* identity. In the author's view, the two most valuable factors identified for internal and external factors are: **"the type of nationalism (civic or ethnic),"** and **"the nature of the international system and the state's position within it"** respectively.

As early as 1961, J. David Singer warned against the merger of conclusions on different level of analysis without proper theoretical translation of frames of reference from one level to another.²⁷⁵ **Constructivism** (as shown in Chapter 1) seems to provide tools required for this integration because the constructivist concept of **fluid state identity** (constituted both endogenously and exogenously in its interaction within the international arena) interprets both a state's position in the international system (through its **"role identity"**), as well as, **culture and history** as factors which constitute identity. National role conception lays on an intersection of the international and state level of analysis, and it connects both foreign policy motivation based on internal discourse of a state's identity and its culturally (or historically) determined role in the given international system. From a constructivist point of view, the state's identity and subsequent foreign policy choices are the result of both internal and external identity construction.

The Case for Internal Factors

Perceptions and beliefs are properties of an actor, and thus, the objective international environment (other states, the international system) and its forces are always first observed, interpreted domestically, and, only then, reacted upon by the state actor. This is also true for foreign (external) ideas and beliefs, which, if they are to influence the perception and the interpretation of the international phenomena by a state, need to be adopted first; and thus, become part of the identity of the given state at the time of decision making. Since both Japan and Germany were occupied by foreign forces after their defeat in the Second World War: external influences were incorporated during state-building after WWII in the internal ideological and institutional constitution of post-war West Germany and Japan.

²⁷⁵ Singer, J. David. 1961. "The level-of-analysis problem in International Relations," p. 91.

However, identification with the USA-sponsored values such as human rights protection, pacifism and democracy (embedded by the Allies after the Second World War) seems to be strong in post-war Germany with a preference for “civic nationalism,” whereas Japanese identification with an exogenous “pacifist” constitution is comparatively low, with “constitutional revisionism” being part of the political campaign of Japan’s long dominating conservative party. In contrast with Germany, the Japanese identity that Japanese nationalists (including the dominant conservative party and current Prime minister Shinzo Abe) seek to restore is “rooted in tradition and blood and distilled in the person of the emperor.”²⁷⁶ Thus, civic nationalism as an internal factor enables easier state identity change because it does not rely on the past for common identity constituent symbolism, but instead upon the current state’s laws and territory. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism needs to preserve the state’s identity since its major mobilising force for national mobilisation and solidarity is the perceived “blood-tied relationship” between the individuals, the nation and the state and its history.

Salience of Factors Over Time

One way to assess the weight of external influences on national foreign policy choices and national identity is to look at the identity of a state in relation to changes in the international system over a period of time. Different factors are significant at different times, which is especially true in relation to the nature of the international system and the state’s position within it. As Valerie M. Hudson observed: the significance of culture and national identity as factors influencing a state’s behaviour was understudied during the Cold War because the bipolar rivalry constrained policy choices of non-superpowers.²⁷⁷ Conversely, identity and culture might outweigh the balance-of-power or alliance considerations of policy-makers within a more diffuse post-Cold War, multi-polar international system.

Findings

As shown in Chapter 2: Japanese national identity and culture are centred around ethno-nationalism, traditions and history, and the indigenous Shinto faith. After the Second World War and the emergence of the Cold War, the USA integrated Japan into the Western Bloc, sponsored democratisation, secularism and pacifism to break away from the Japanese Imperial fascist past. However, at the same time, the USA tolerated the cover-up of imperial

²⁷⁶ McCormack, Gavan. 2000. “Nationalism and identity in post-cold war Japan,” p. 261.

²⁷⁷ Hudson, Valerie M. 2014. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, p. 117.

atrocities, and the resurgence of Meiji-style ethno-nationalism (the USA, for example, never criticised Japanese official visits to the Yasukuni shrine)²⁷⁸ to ensure stability in Japan and the Japanese-American alliance supported by the ethno-nationalist conservatives. The reconciliation with victimised countries (particularly the PRC and PDRK) was made impossible due to the Cold War divide. Cold War era American interference in Japan resulted in many contradictions in Japan's identification. The reconciliatory moves towards "political settlement" of the past (notably the 1995 Murayama Statement) coincided with the political and economic chaos after the end of Cold War. After a period of six years of identity volatility during the 1990s, Japanese ethno-nationalism, resurged with Shinzo Abe's conservative government's discussion concerning revision of their American-written constitution.

Even though reconciliation was significantly constrained by the bi-polar international system and American influence on post-War reconstruction of Japan, a genuine desire for forgiveness was not present in Japan. This is because renouncing the historical heritage of Meiji Japan would create an identity crisis for a state whose legitimacy is built upon ethnic unity and cultural continuity. In this way, Japan's forced submission to the USA during the Cold War resulted in passivity of Japanese foreign policy rather than its substantial reform. Rather than altering Japan's ethno-nationalist identity, American influence in Japan only put it on hiatus.

In the case of Germany, discontinuity of state identity remains a frequent occurrence, even before the Second World War. The successive German states, from its origin based on civic belonging, could more easily absorb the political changes of identity. Thus, identification with new values (pacifism, liberalism, democracy), institutions and territory, exogenously given by the new Cold War Western Bloc was possible. The creation of a new German identity utilising "historical Germany" as the constitutive other was further fuelled by its integration into multilateral organisations (NATO, the European Economic Community) enabling identification with the shared values of these institutions. The level of internalisation of these new values (effectively leading to the change of identity) is reflected by Germany's continuation of its membership and even a leading role in the same multilateral organisations after the end of the Cold War.

The change of German identity thus was a reaction to external factors (a defeat in the Second World War, the loss of sovereignty, foreign interference in West Germany's state-building and

²⁷⁸ Shibuishi, Daiki. 2005. "The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?" p. 208.

its Cold War role) enabled by civic nationalism (an internal factor). Due to the high level of Germany's integration, the distinction of external and internal factors proves more difficult than in the case of Japan.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the internal factors are more significant in explaining the continuity of Japan's identity and discontinuity of Germany's identity, as well as their attitude towards reconciliation. External factors, seen as secondary, explain the level of contextual constraints to internal factors at a given time. Theoretically, power distribution within the international system influences the extent to which a state may project its power within the system to act in conformity with its perceived national interest (or national role). Bi-polarity during the Cold War and West Germany's and Japan's limited sovereignty (constraints on foreign policy formulation, decisions about national remilitarisation) heavily influenced the countries' reconciliatory policies. Even though West Germany and Japan did not have full sovereignty and was subjected to occupation or interference, the foreign powers needed to ensure stability and mobilisation of the subjected population which was best achieved through appeal to their national imagination. After the dissolution of bi-polarity, both Germany and Japan regained full sovereignty together with a greater role in the more diffuse international system, and both redefined their state identity based on their national identities (civic and ethnic respectively).

Additionally, this conclusion conforms with wider interpretation of James Rosenau's "Pre-theory" (see Table 2). If we conceive of West Germany and Japan during the Cold War as "small, developed" states (due to their semi-sovereign status and lack of military capacity) and after the end of the Cold War due to their relatively important geo-economic status as "large, developed and open" states, we identify following hierarchy of priorities: in both cases (Cold War and post-Cold War Germany and Japan): the highest priority is given to "national role conception," but, the second priority changes from "systemic" during the Cold War to "societal" (involving "national attributes" and other cultural variables) in post-Cold War era. This implies that the larger (more powerful) state is relative to other states, the greater role cultural factors play in its foreign policy.

Weaknesses

Due to the limited space of this paper, many other potential factors were omitted. Also, due to theoretical disunity of FPA and IR; and IR theories on different levels of analysis, the final synthesis of internal and external factors (different levels of analysis) is based on the author's

interpretation rather than wide consensus in IR academia. The distinction of internal and external factors is an artificial one since overlaps between the two categories are very common – especially in the case of modern Germany (because of existence of the EU).

Strengths

The presented paper provides an ambitious, multi-discipline approach to comparative analysis upon multiple levels of analysis to suggest the complexity of IR the phenomenon. Additionally, the paper recalls the policy constraints of Germany and Japan during the Cold War, and their subsequent impact upon policies during modern times.

Future Research

The topic of (dis)continuity of state identity and its remembrance culture can be applied to new frames of reference, particularly: East Germany. Furthermore, a wealth of various methodological approaches could extend the scope of current research – such as application of the individual level of analysis, focus on bureaucratic models in internal factors, or application of the perspective of different theories of IR.

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