

Abstract

Key words: Arabization, Islamization, Berbers, structuration theory, practice theory,

Since the beginning of the 21st century the possibility of disseminating information has become easier than ever in terms of speed, scope, and breadth. As this empowers people to make more informed decisions new non-state actors have emerged including trans-national movements. While seemingly non-threatening, trans-national movements established for the purpose of fighting against cultural homogenization policies propagated by the state may threaten the security/identity of the state as this may lead to instability. Nowhere is this more evident than in the region of North Africa as evidenced by the emergence of Berber transnational movements which were created as result of North Africa governments developing Arabization and Islamization policies in order to coerce Berber groups into abandoning their language and culture. Due to the fact that Islamization and Arabization are social forces which have dominated the structure of North African society for more than a millennium, this raises questions as to how these policies differ from other forms of transmission which had come before as Arabization and Islamization had not led to conflict. In order to better conceptualize this relationship this study turns to several approaches and models which have evolved from “practice theory” including Giddens’ structuration theory (1984) and ‘territorial design’ models developed by Atzili & Kadercan (2017).

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Introduction

Upon gaining their independence in the 20th century the countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya enacted homogenization policies as it was believed that this would lead to greater national cohesion and stability. Rather than accomplish these goals, however, these policies have led to cleavages between Berber groups and the state as Berbers perceive these policies to be discriminatory. Recognizing that Islamization and Arabization are dominant forces in the structure of North African society, and that Berbers previously did not object to Islamization and Arabization in the past, this situation raises the question of how the operation of Islamization and Arabization differ today.

Believing that the operation of Islamization and Arabization are linked to different agents, transmission, and intent this study turns to approaches developed from “practice theory” as these approaches primarily focus on “what practitioners do” (Adler & Poliot 2011) and can be applied to historical comparative analysis. More specifically, emphasis will be placed on Giddens’ structuration theory (1984) as his model deconstructs social realities at the system, state, and individual levels by examining the relationship between agencies and structure within any given system, and ‘territorial design’ models developed by Atzili & Kadercan (2017) which link together the social and objective world.

Beginning with a general definition of practice theory overall, chapter one is further subdivided into sections which include detailed accounts of structuration theory, critics of structuration theory, and finally an alternative method which combines elements of both structuration theory and ‘territorial design’ models.

After explaining the approach developed in this research, chapter two then moves on to an examination of the terms Arabization, Islamization, and Berber transnationalism as these terms are both diverse and complex, and Berbers as well as they are a specific group which is difficult to define. After presenting descriptions of these terms and addressing how they will be defined in this research, this study then moves on to the case study at hand.

Split into sections delineated by time period, chapter three offers an in-depth look into the various actors associated with changes to the operation of Islamization and Arabization, the various structural changes that have occurred and have been re-enforced as a result of these different actors, and lastly an analysis into determining characteristics of systems to conceptualize the difference between alterations to societal structure vs. alterations to the societal system overall.

In closing this study will examine the practices associated with the most recent era in order to determine their impact and influence on the relationship today between Berbers and national governments.

1. Practice theory

Although developed in other disciplines including sociology and philosophy Schatzki, Cetina, and von Savigny (2001) indicate a growing interest in the use of “practice theory” in international relations or as they refer to the “practice turn” in international relations. Since the concepts and logics associated with practice theory are not well known within international relations, it may be useful to first outline some of the core concepts connected with practice theory (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Core concepts of practice theory

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|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Practices” are a result of habits/habitus which are evolutionary (Hopf 2010). |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interrelated practices form a “field” or “doxa” (knowledge, ideas, and values members of a specific field have in common) (Cornut 2015). |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Symbolic domination” indicates that actors in fields are composed into two groups: the dominant and the subordinate (Pouliot 2008). |

As the primary units of analysis, “practices” are defined by Adler & Pouliot (2011) as “socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world” (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, 4). Identifying the differences between behavior, action, and practices they further explain that:

the concept of behavior evokes the material dimension of doing, as a deed performed in or on the world; then the notion of action adds an ideational layer, emphasizing the meaningfulness of the deed at both the subjective and intersubjective levels; and, finally, the term ‘practice’ tacks another layer on the edifice or, better put, makes it hang together as one coherent structure, by pointing out the patterned nature of deeds in socially organized contexts (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, 5).

Breaking down this definition, Cornut (2015) indicates that practices are characterized as embodied, shared, and patterned; embodiment being linked to the subjective realm, shared being linked to the collective or inter-subjective, and patterned linked to regularity and repetition.¹ Put more simply, practices should be conceptualized as the evolution of social habits as it is believed that both practices and habits are the result of “unintentional, unconscious, involuntary, and effortless” behavior or way of thinking as practices and habits “account for what most of us do most of the time” (Hopf, 2010, 547).

Several interrelated practices form a “field” of practice, or what Cornut (2015) refers to as a “community of practice with no joint enterprise.” Different from Wenger’s community of practice (2000) which is characterized by mutual engagement and the production of a shared repertoire of communal resources, a ‘field of practice’ is instead characterized by hierarchy, struggles for domination, and differences.

Known in practice theoretical research as “doxa” (the knowledge, ideas, and values members of a specific field have in common), this term is often compared to games (Cornut 2015). For example, Pouliot (2008) conceived fields as a game in which “All the contestants [associated with a field] agree on what it is they are seeking—political authority, artistic prestige, economic profit, academic reputation, and so on” (Pouliot, 2008, 275) and everyone agrees on the rules of the game. Although hierarchical relationships leads to the contestants, or practitioners, using domination or subversion in order to achieve their goals, Pouliot (2008) further indicates that both the dominant and the dominated generally abide by the rules of the game as a result of what is known as “symbolic domination.”


¹ For example, there are certain practices associated with the wearing of hats inside public restaurants if one considers that the wearing is linked to behavior, the removal relating to action, and the reason for the removal relating to (social) practices which have evolved over time.

Summing up what has been illustrated thus far it can be said that fields of practice require at a minimum two groups who are: aware of their position relative to one another, competitively seek the same goals, and whose interaction is based on habits/practices.²

1.1 Structuration theory

One approach which explores practices further is structuration theory as this theory focuses on the relationship between agents and structures by analyzing “neither the experience of the individual actor, nor any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered through time and space” (Giddens 1984, 2). As is the case with the introduction of any new theory, this section begins first with a discussion of the terms associated with the theory and the underlying assumptions. Since many of these ideas are quite difficult to visualize, included below is a diagram developed by Giddens in order to better illustrate how the theory is conceptualized (see fig. 2).

Fig. 2: Forms of interaction in structuration theory (Whittington 2015)



Source: Giddens (1984, p. 29)

² A further example of practices based on this definition would include two political opponents who recognize their differences, seek the same goals, and follow certain (political) habits/practices in order to attain their goals.

Beginning first with an explanation of the diagram itself it is important to note that taken all together it is meant to signify the inner workings of social systems in general by illustrating the reciprocal relationship (duality) between the structure and actors. Focusing on the duality between agents and structure, structuration theory posits that there exists this reciprocal link between agency and structure by assuming that structures provide the rules and resources while agents exercise control over these rules and resources through acceptance or rejection within the system. Corresponding to these claims it can be said that interactions represent agency, or the ability to choose otherwise; structure represents the allocation of rules and resources available; and finally, modalities which are represented by the space in which actors and structure converge (Whittington 2015).³

Explaining this relationship further Whittington (2015) indicates that the three characteristic forms of interaction (communication, power, and sanction) are analytically linked with three corresponding structural dimensions of social systems (signification, domination, and legitimation) as communication requires signification (rules which govern talk, jargon, and image); sanctioned behavior requires legitimized rules (both legal and social norms); and power is linked to domination (the distribution of resources).

In between these dimensions are modalities, or the means by which these interactions are expressed in action which are identified as the interpretive scheme, facility, and norms. Illustrating the operation of the theory at the level of modalities, Whittington (2015) indicates that:

in communicating, people draw on interpretive schemes that are linked to structures of signification; in exercising power, they draw on what Giddens calls ‘facilities’, for example rights defined by the dimension of domination such as those pertaining to organizational position or ownership; and, in sanctioning, they

³ There are two types of resources in this case, allocative resources which include objects and other natural material, or, authoritative, which includes people.

draw on norms of appropriate behavior embedded in the structures of legitimization (Whittington 2015, 148).

Like “fields of practice” which are believed to be alterable and evolutionary, structuration theory also assumes that the habits/structure is alterable as well. Structuration theory, however, takes an additional step by claiming that these alterations are only a result of agents who influence the structure through their interactions, control over resources, or by better negotiating around the rules (Lamsal 2012), thus, denying the existence of structural constraints outside of human interpretation. Focusing more specifically on the identification of these alterations Giddens (1979) proposed that changes to the structure could be identified by examining conflicts along “time-space edges” which generally lead to social change.

While duality is certainly central to structuration theory it is not the only core assumption associated with the theory as indicated in the chart below (see fig. 3).

Figure 3: Core assumptions of Giddens’ structuration theory (1984)

| |
|---|
| • The existence of a reciprocal relationship otherwise known as duality. |
| • The societal structure and system evolve from human interaction. |
| • As the structure is created from interactions at the moment of instantiation, people are aware of structural constraints and enabling mechanisms. |
| • Structure and system changes can be identified by periods where access to greater resources leads to large scale social change. |

1.2 Critics of structuration theory

Because structuration theory’s core assumption of duality goes against the central assumptions of other theories including advocates of practice-theoretic approaches, supporters of critical realism, and Marxists there has since emerged what has come to be known as the duality vs. dualism debate with dualists arguing that the link between structure and agency was neither reciprocal nor alterable through human interaction.

Pierre Bourdieu's practice-theoretic approaches (1990), for instance, challenges Giddens' concept that interactions between agents is governed by the rules enshrined as modalities in Giddens' model arguing instead that these interactions are governed by the habits and status of the agent in terms of social, symbolic, and material resources requiring an understanding of the role of intuition and opportunism not explained by Giddens. Advocates of Bourdieu's practice-theoretic approach, for example, would likely criticize Giddens for applying the rule of 'all things being equal' in that his formulation of agency fails to take into account the status and capabilities of the various agents. As a result, it can be said that Bourdieu clearly gives greater credence to the role of agents than Giddens does.

Unlike the advocates of the practice-theoretic approach which emphasizes more creative space for agency, Archer's critical realist approach (1995, 2000) instead argues that agents may not have the ability to alter the structure of society as Giddens suggests since these structures are much more deeply rooted than Giddens assumes and that it is not possible for agents to directly influence the structure of the society as the structure of society is unknowable in the present.

Like critical realists who believe that structures are not alterable by agents consciously, Marxists such as O'Boyle (2013) also believe that Giddens' structuration theory overemphasizes the role of human agency with the "we can 'always do otherwise'" attitude, that the link between agents and structure over relies on an interpretation of 'knowledgeable subjects' through the use of hermeneutics rather than the analysis of 'objects' grounded in reality, and finally that Giddens' theory fails to take into account how structures are re-enforced or altered over time by over-emphasizing the fact that it is only in the moment of instantiation that one may detect how "instantiated rules' gradually bind space and time into institutional clusters," thus failing to explain the development of these rules a priori.

Summing up the criticisms from these other approaches it can be said that overall dualists disagree with structuration theory's ontology and epistemology, whereas Marxists take issue with the theory in terms of ontology, epistemology, and methodology (see fig. 4). Using both these criticisms and the analysis of structuration and practice theory as a point of departure for further discussion, the next section proposes a reformulation of Giddens' model in order to provide possible solutions to these concerns without altering the core concepts associated with this theory, particularly the concept of duality as this is central to the theory.


Figure 4: Critics of structuration theory

| |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dualists will contend that there is no reciprocal relationship between agency and structure. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marxists contend that no recognition is given to the constricting nature of structures and systems outside of human interpretation (O'Boyle 2013). |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marxists argue that Giddens' theory is too theoretical and not grounded in reality (O'Boyle 2013). |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocates of practice-theoretic approaches claim that Giddens' theory relies on 'all things being equal' and, therefore, does not reflect the real world (Bourdieu 1990). |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Critical realists contend that agents neither have the ability to alter the system or structure consciously, nor are agents aware of these changes (Archer 1995, 2000). |

1.3 Structuration/Territorial Approach

Similar in form to the model created by Gibbons, it should be clear that the dual relationship remains intact as this new model also recognizes the reciprocal relationship between interaction and structure with modalities representing the space where actors and structure converge (see fig. 5).

Figure 5: Structuration/Territorial Approach



Unlike Giddens' model, however, which focused only on the link between agency and structure in the social realm, this model instead animates this approach by applying these concepts to more objective variables. As a result, this study recognizes that there are transmitters and receivers rather than agents; that the transmission of ideas and space for these ideas is dependent upon the territory/territoriality; and finally that practices are moving targets which can only be identified by structural/practice changes associated with certain time periods.

Referring back to the criticisms listed above it can be said that by identifying agents as transmitters and receivers, rather than a relationship constructed on equal interactions, this then removes the 'all things being equal' dilemma as it is recognized that some agents are more capable than others. Furthermore, it can also be said that by identifying this relationship as one of domination and submission credence is given to structural constraints, but only as a result of the "symbolic domination" of agents and not structural constraints that are not interpretable.

Turning to the identification of structural/practice changes associated with certain time periods this study is willing to compromise with critical realists who, as Whittington (2015) points out, agree with the concept that structural changes may be detectable by identifying retrospectively changes in the outcomes. Hence, the identification of structural changes is then possible while avoiding the question of conscious action on the part of the agent. Identifying

structural/practice changes associated with certain time periods also offers an additional benefit as their identification may also better explain how structures are re-enforced or altered over time.

Lastly, studies relating to territory/territoriality were chosen in order to address the ‘knowledgeable subjects’ vs. ‘objects’ grounded in reality dilemma by identifying particular actors who interact on a specific geographical territory, and establish “real” institutions.

It can be said, therefore, that territoriality represents the social space (modalities) in the real world.

Beginning first with ‘territorial designs’ in general, which are defined by Atzili & Kadercan (2017) as research which examine “the delineation of the external boundaries, the constitution of the society within these boundaries, and the interaction between delineation and constitution” (Atzili & Kadercan 2017, 115), it needs to be said that territorial designs focus on territory not only as a geographical feature, but also as a space of interaction.

The delineation of borders according to Kratochwil (1986), for instance, may be linked to the facilitation and spread of ideas and resources as some delineations create a more restricted environment than others as the borders of modern states, empires, and nomadic societies are respectively Westphalian, vaguely demarcated, or porous and fluid. In addition to identifying how translucent the borders of a territory may be, studies of borders also indicate the constitutive properties of territory, which includes the political and social interactions within a demarcated space, or as Atzili (2016) describes the “flow from the institutionalization of legal, administrative, political, and cultural practices that manage and regulate the relationship between society, state, and space” (Atzili 2016, 121).

Believing that there is a link between territoriality and transmitters is Sack (1983) who defines this as human territoriality: “the attempt by an individual or group (x) to influence,

affect, or control objects, people, and relationships (y) by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack 1983, 56). It can be said, therefore, that transmitters/receivers are defined by dominant and subordinate relationships and that a group’s success/failure in asserting their own territorial design is what determines which practices/habits will become dominant in the system.

Building upon the concepts associated with structuration theory, human territoriality, and ‘territorial designs’ this study defines practices as the characteristics associated with the dominant ideas during certain time periods. Hence, practices in this case will be identified by focusing on differences in territorial designs. Because these alterations are attributed mainly to external agents who alter the allocation of resources this study identifies group (x) always as external agents and group (y) as the indigenous population.

Given the complexity associated with identifying Giddens’ “time-space edges”, this study will rely primarily on historical snapshots to capture these conflicts in order to observe better the moments of instantiation and detect the “institutional clusters” which bind structures and systems. More specifically, this study will be utilizing historical analysis methods developed by Elden (2013) which focuses on the evolution of meanings, practices, and processes associated with territory by analyzing how “the idea of a territory as bounded space under the control of a group of people, with fixed boundaries, exclusive internal sovereignty, and equal external status is historically produced” (Elden 2013, 18) and also a method developed by Kearns (2016) which instead focuses on the material institutions which govern these practices over time.

While it may seem that changes in the structure of society also indicates changes in the overall system, it is the position of this study that structural and system alterations are recognizably different in that structural alterations are linked to transition periods identified by

changes in behavior and action whereas system alterations are characterized by long term stability linked to practices.

Given the complexity associated with this approach included below is a chart outlining the core concepts of this Structuration/Territorial approach (see fig. 6).

Figure 6: Core concepts of Structuration/Territorial Approach

| | |
|---------------|---|
| Ontology: | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agents interact and transmit ideas within territory which implies that there are transmitters and receivers. |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As structure relates to not only laws, customs, social norms, but also allocation of resources, structure is reflected by the “practices” within a territory. |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Linking together the social space where action takes place to the objective reality, modalities in this case is connected to the delineation and constitutive properties of territory. |
| Epistemology: | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As there are transmitters and receivers, interaction is a result of group x influencing group y with group x representing an external group and group y is represented as an indigenous group. |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Practices represent the structure of the system and can be determined by examining both the texts associated with territory and the actual implementation of laws, social norms, and institutions. |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The delineation and constitutive properties of territory reflect the subjective and objective realities as these properties illustrate the relationship between agents and structure. |
| Methodology: | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Building upon the delineation and constitutive properties of territory this research will reconstruct the territorial designs associated with the territory under examination as changes in the delineation and constitutive properties of territory may indicate structural or system changes. |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Turning to historical approaches emphasis will be placed on the evolution of both material institutions and social practices associated with these institutions. |
| | |

2. Islamization, Arabization, and Berbers

Before moving on to the detailed case study at hand it is necessary to first outline some of the characteristics associated with the terms Islamization, Arabization and Berber transnationalism as well as offer a description of Berbers as a specific ethnic group since many readers may not be familiar with the terms and much of what has been written and said may not explain the full story. The first section, therefore, focuses on how the terms Islamization and Arabization have been misused by the media; the second section will examine myths associated with Berbers which have been propagated by government officials; and finally the last section will examine Berber transnationalism whose very possibility of existence was once questioned.

2.1 Islamization and Arabization

Often portrayed in negative terms by the media who claim that Arabization-Islamization is equated with increased religious militancy (Chaudhury 2016) or the “systematic elimination of indigenous culture” (Sennels 2015) it is the position of this study that these descriptions fail to truly capture the fuller meaning underlying these terms as their narrow definitions do not recognize that Arabization and Islamization can be applied to different situations. Therefore, this study begins by broadly defining Arabization as the spread of Arabism and Islamization as the spread of Islam while narrowly categorizing Arabization and Islamization as processes, policies, and practices which are determined by the identification of agents, transmission, and intent involved with the specific operation under examination (see fig. 7).

Figure 7: Categorization of Arabization and Islamization as processes, policies, and practices

| Operation | Process | Policy | Practices |
|--------------|-------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Agent | Non-nation-state actors | Nation-states | Nation-states |
| Transmission | Natural | Enforcement | Enforcement |
| Intent | None | Homogeneity | Homogeneity |

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| | | | Elimination Assimilation Accommodation |
|--|--|--|--|

Processes

Because no direct evidence exists as to how Islamization and Arabization spread across North Africa, scholars and researchers have been forced to speculate about their origins.

Focusing on how Islamization may have spread in quantity and quality, two different process oriented models are presented below.

Among the first models seeking to explain the spread of Islamization is a model developed by Fisher (1973) which characterized the operation of Islamization as a process that developed through three stages: quarantine, mixing, and reform. Setting this model in motion it is believed that:

In the quarantine stage, the faith is represented by newcomers---traders, perhaps, from North Africa, or, refugees, or clerics employed in providing religious services such as prayer and divination for their pagan patrons. Orthodoxy is relatively secure because there are no converts, and thus no one to bring into the Muslim community heterodox beliefs and observances drawn from his or her non-Muslim past. In most places, quarantine was not maintained indefinitely, and sooner or later, as local people converted in increasing numbers, the stage of mixing succeeded, in which people combined the profession of Islam, and as it might be the quite sincere observance of many Islamic tenets, with many pagan survivals. Finally, often after a lapse of centuries, the candle of reform, kept alight by the written word, and perhaps also by the devotion of some clerics who succeeded in maintaining an element of quarantine against the mixing all around them, burst into a conflagration and established the rule of the saints (Fisher 1973, 31).

For Fisher then the primary transmitters initially involved with the spread of Islamization included traders, refugees, and clerics, growth in quantity is a result of mixing and conversions, and quality is attributed to conservative reform.

Another model which identifies the operation of Islamization and Arabization as a three stage process is an approach created by Robinson (2004) who categorized the stages as: minority, court, and majority. In the minority stage, Robinson, too, identified newcomers as being in the quarantine zone, however, this model more specifically identifies Muslim merchants involved in the Trans-Saharan trade who lived in “Muslim” quarters within towns occupied by “pagan” or non-Muslim majorities as those in quarantine. As the religion spread from the merchants to the upper class and rulers it was then assumed that the process had entered the second stage identified as the court stage. Following this transition phase the religion would then spread to the more rural areas, thus, entering the majority stage and completing the process.

While singling out merchants specifically as primary transmitters, Robinson is less clear as to how the Islamic religion spread in quality and quantity. He does, however, offer the examples of the established conformity associated with Sunni Islam during the Ottoman period which for him represents quality, and Sufi orders and military jihadists in rural areas who represent an increased growth in quantity. For Robinson then the primary transmitters were Muslim merchants, growth in quantity is represented by groups operating outside of the mainstream religion, and quality is represented by the widespread use of one doctrine.

Although these models were primarily created in order to better conceptualize the growth of Islamization, it can be argued that these same models may also be applicable to the spread of Arabization as well since it is assumed that Arabization, too, operated initially in stages. Furthermore, these models are also useful in that both recognize that these processes operated non-linearly as evidenced by Robinson’s recognition of the “africanization” of Islam and Fisher’s identification of scenarios in which reform fails and members of even an empire might find themselves back in the quarantine zone. Hence, these models are also useful in that they

may also explain how Islamization and Arabization as processes were not as successful in certain regions.

Policies

Shifting from processes to policies it is the position of this study that policies are differentiated from processes as policies are constructed by states and deliberate in their endeavors. Islamization and Arabization as policies are, therefore, defined in relation to the state which is the primary agent associated with their operation and by their intent towards homogeneity.

While at the most basic level these policies can be linked to the three sources of political identity identified by Anderson (1986): Islam, Arabism, and the local state; other studies identify some sort of combination including Miller (2003) who links together Arabism and the local state by connecting nationalists perceptions of Arabization as an ends in itself, and studies by Mouhssine (1995) which indicate that Islamists use Arabization to achieve Islamization. Illustrating this last point Mouhssine (1995, 50) argues that:

The issue of Arabization has fed Islamist militancy in the Maghreb. The question of language and political protest are the two pillars of the Islamist discourse... The Islamist trend aims for total Arabization, seeing it as a response to Western influence which is felt through the use of the French language. Its slogan is thus Arabization for Islamization. Some scholars [...] hold that Arabization, as it was conceived and implemented would have served a seminal role in Islamist resurgence and it is around the language polemic that Islamist protest emerged (Miller 2007, 4).

Islamization and Arabization as policies are, therefore, further defined by the goals of each state.

Practices

Moving beyond the initial transmitters and states involved with the operation of Islamization and Arabization as processes and policies, practices in this sense are defined as the

re-enforcement of previous identified structural characteristics which still operate today. In a sense it can be said that practices are the sum result of these previous identified processes and policies.

2.2 Berbers

Like the terms Islamization and Arabization whose definition required further exploration, Berbers as an ethnic group also requires additional examination due to previous misidentifications associated with traditional viewpoints; declarations made by Muammar Qaddafi in 2007, which included the beliefs that “North Africa is 100% Arab” and that “Berbers are the Arabs that came via land” whose separate identity was created by colonialism (al-Rumi 2009) being just one example of this traditional viewpoint. Declarations such as these can be useful, however, as they provide a springboard on which a closer examination into Berbers as an ethnic group is possible through the debunking these myths and by challenging the common viewpoint that Berbers are Arabs.

Although there are not necessarily universal cultural characteristics by which Berbers are defined, certain attributes become more visible when one compares Berber culture to Arab culture. Among the more obvious signs that a Berber culture exists independent from their Arab counterparts are artifacts collected by the Jardin Majorelle Museum whose collection includes traditional Berber jewelry, clothing, and pottery. Also indicative of this unique identity is Berber literature including, not only stories and myths, some of which were written during the 19th century (Mezhoud 2015), but also memorable historical events which commemorate common origins and territory. Other characteristics which have been attributed to the Berbers that are less obvious centers around their political traditions, which according to The Berber (Amazigh)

Manifesto of 2000, are tribally oriented in that it is through the local community by which solutions are arrived at through dialogue and consultation (Saib 2000).

Providing evidence that Berbers are descendants of North Africa and not Arab, Maddy-Weitzman (2017) points out that anthropologists believe that the Berber language developed during the Neolithic period, and that Herodotus as well as other Greek and Roman historians recorded their existence prior to the introduction of the Arab language. Furthermore, other evidence which supports this claim is made by archeologists who have discovered numerous ancient cities including Volubilis, whose ties to Berber culture are displayed by the fact that inscriptions found here include that of Tifinagh, or letters of the Berber alphabet (Ross 2015).

As an independent ethnic group, Berber groups are mainly distinguished by their language which is different from the dominant Arabic language spoken in the region, linguists having determined that there are 26 separate Berber dialects in North Africa (see fig. 8), although four are extinct and nine dialects are spoken by fewer than 10,000 people (Lauermann 2009). Despite the fact that usage of the Berber language has been on the decline, Amazigh, or the language of the Berbers, was spoken by as many as thirty million people in 2015, according to the World Amaigh Congress.


Figure 8: Major Tamazight Dialect Groups. Source: Gordon 2005

| Dialect Group | Estimated Population | Location |
|---------------|----------------------|--|
| Tamazight | 3,150,000 | Middle and High Atlas Mountains, Central Morocco |
| Kabylie | 3,123,000 | Grand Kabylie Mountains, Northern Algeria |
| Tachelhit | 3,000,000 | Southwestern Morocco |
| Tarifit | 1,700,000 | Rif Mountains, Northern Morocco |
| Tachawit | 1,400,000 | Aurès Mountains, Northeast Algeria |

| | | |
|---------|---------|---------------|
| Tamajaq | 640,000 | Central Niger |
|---------|---------|---------------|

In addition to the regions listed in the above table Berbers also reside in several other states including Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt (see map 1).

Map 1: Location of Berber groups across North Africa



Map legend: Dark Blue: Tuaregs; Orange: Saharian Berbers (Sanhaja, Mozabite people, Siwis); Green: Chaoui people; Red: Kabyle people; Light purple: Chenouas; Yellow: Riffian people; Purple: Zayanes (Middle-Atlas mountains Berbers, also called Amazighs); Light Blue: Shilha people.

Source: Maddy-Weizman (2017)

Besides geo-spatial distances separating Berber groups and their Arab counterparts, topographical differences are also evidence of this separation as Berber groups reside in predominantly mountainous regions or otherwise not easily accessible areas resulting in what is defined by Lacoste (1995) as the “Maghrebi demographic intervention” in which the densely populated mountain demographic distribution sometimes reaches over 50 inhabitants per km² (Dominguez 2015). Illustrating this, one only need compare the location of Berber groups from the first map (see map 1) and the topographical map provided below (see map 2).

Map 2: Topography of North Africa



Source: David Rumsey Map Collection

Unlike the first two claims which are completely false there may be some truth to the idea that the emergence of the Berbers as a separate identity can be attributed to colonialism due to the fact that colonialism and arguments against it may have led to the transfusion of ideas and words that may not have been prevalent before. Research conducted by Chaker (1997), for instance, describes how the self-perception of Berbers was altered during the colonial period taking note that:

It is obviously the direct result of the French academic production and diffusion of a scientific knowledge on the Maghreb. Before the colonial era, the Kabyl intellectual would refer to tribal groups, to social values, to saints; while after it, he started to refer to language, ancient history, and to the Maghreb's Berber character... He discovered that his country had a pre-Islamic Berber history, that his mother tongue may be considered as the only indigenous language of the Maghreb, and that since ancient times it has its own alphabet... In the XXth century, the main reference becomes language... (Miller 2003, 9).

The attribution of the emergence of Berber separatism to the importation of new concepts and ideas of expression alone, however, negates the fact that prior to their introduction Berbers as a separate group clearly already existed. Consequently, one can say that colonialism redefined what it means to be Berber, but to say that this created the Berber identity negates the fact that Berbers as an ethnic group already existed prior to colonialism.

Because it is not possible to analyze the impact of Islamization and Arabization on all Berber groups, this study has chosen the countries of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia as these countries share a common territorial history, each country pursued similar Islamization and Arabization policies following their independence in the 20th century, and residing in these countries are some of the largest Berber communities in the world totaling between 15-20 million people. Unevenly spread among these countries most estimates agree that the percentages of Berbers residing in these countries is given at 40%, 20%, 10%, and less than 1% in the countries of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia respectively (Maddy-Weitzman 2011).

2.3 Berber trans-nationalism

Because “the Berber sees himself as a member of this or that tribe, within an Islamically-conceived and permeated world---and not as a member of a linguistically defined ethnic group” (Gellner & Michaud 1972, 13) it was argued that the formation of a Berber national identity was not possible, thus, implying that a transnational identity also could not exist. More recent studies conducted by Mezhoud (2015), however, indicate that the origins of Amazigh (Berbers) as a transnational identity based group can perhaps be traced back to Morocco, Algeria, and areas in which Tauregs occupy since Amazigh as an identification emerged among these groups in the 1930’s in response to the official Islamic-Arabic terminology, preferring the term Amazigh as reference to the people, and the term Tamazight in reference to the Berber language.

Furthermore, research by Lauermann (2009), who defined Berber transnational identity as the existence of “a distinctly Amazigh (Berber) culture coupled with a desire for limited self-determination” (Lauermann 2009, 40) built on shared history, territory, and language, indicates not only the existence of Berber transnationalism, but also that it may very well be increasing as a result of education and increased migration. Also agreeing with the idea that Berber transnationalism is on the rise is Crawford (2005) who describes the Berber transnational identity as one built on modern-culturalism due to the “disseminating strikingly modern notions of their identity” both in the terms of method and message through internet forums and socio-cultural groups.

In addition to internet forums and socio-cultural groups, transnational organizations like the International Federal Council (CF) of the World Amazigh Congress are further evidence of a Berber transnational identity. Founded in 1995, the World Amazigh Congress (Congrès Mondial Amazigh, CMA), represents the Imazighen, Indigenous Peoples more commonly known as the Berbers and the Tuareg and whose primary purpose is to protect Amazigh rights.

In its 2016 report to the United Nations, for example, the World Amazigh Congress listed a number of Arabization and Islamization discriminatory policies being implemented by the Tunisian government, including those related to language, education, and culture; the same issues which were also identified by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2009.

While it is difficult to fully capture the structure or exact goals of the transnational Berber/Amazigh Culture Movement, Maddy-Weitzman’s definition does offer some insight as he defines this movement as:

an amorphous, many-headed phenomenon with a clear core demand: the official recognition of the existence of the Amazigh people as a collective and of the historical and cultural Amazighite (Berberity) of North Africa, and the adoption of policies that will ameliorate their social, economic, and cultural marginalization (Maddy-Weitzman (2017, 3).

Although the movement is based on recognition of existence, and not the overthrow of the current system in place, by insisting on equality and recognition with the already established dominant structures this comes into question as this may alter the political identity of the region; a point that will be examined in the conclusion below.

3. Islamization and Arabization of Berbers in North Africa

Largely attributed to its geographical location, the region of North Africa, also known as the Maghreb, is an area that has mainly been influenced by external agents from the Middle East rather than the rest of Africa or Europe. As a result, both the Arab language and the Islamic religion dominate in the areas of language and religion today. Exploring how this dominant relationship developed this chapter begins by further asking:

1. Who are the primary transmitters historically linked to Islamization and Arabization?
2. How did these primary transmitters alter the territorial design?
3. What are the inferred “practices” associated with these transmitters and territoriality?

As the number of groups, territorial designs, and identifiable practices associated with such activity is quite large it is not possible to analyze each subtle change in each of these areas individually. Consequently, emphasis will be placed on certain primary examples whose practices altered the transmission of Islamization and Arabization and are able to represent a general description from the period.

Organizationally, this chapter is divided into three primary sections: processes, policies, and practices each of whose operation was differentiated in the above chapter. Each section, therefore, begins with a general description of the criteria already recognized, but adds to this the identification of borders, dates, and agents in order to further support these categorizations (see fig. 9).

Figure 9: General characteristics associated with the operation of Islamization and Arabization

| Operation | Dates | Borders | Practices | Agents |
|-----------|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Process | 9 th c. BCE- 19 th c. CE | Vaguely demarcated | Economic Islam Arab | Traders Merchants Rulers |
| Policies | 19 th c. CE- 20 th c. CE | Vaguely demarcated Westphalian | Identity Nationalism | Colonial Powers National governments |
| Practices | 21 st c. CE | Regional | Policies | National governments |

Building upon these preliminary categorizations each section is further subdivided by the identification of specific transmitters, practices, and territorial designs associated with shorter periods of time in order to identify structure/system characteristics and alterations (see fig. 10).

Figure 10: Specific characteristics associated with the operation of Islamization and Arabization

| Systems | Dates | Borders | Practices | Agents |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------------------|
| Pre-Islamic/Post-nomadic System | 8th c. BCE- 7th c. CE | Towns | Economic | Traders, Colonizers |
| Muslim Conquest | 7th c. – 11th c. | Muslim Towns | Economic/Islam | Nomads Clerics Merchants |
| Islamic System | 11th c.- 19th c. | Capital Cities | Islam Arab | Islamic Rulers Nomads |
| Colonialism | 19th c.- 20th c. | Colonies | Identity | Colonial Powers |
| Post-Colonial System | 20th c. | Nation-State | Nationalism | National Governments |

3.1 Processes

Figure 9a: Islamization and Arabization as processes

| Operation | Dates | Borders | Practices | Agents |
|-----------|---|-----------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Process | 9 th c. BCE- 19 th c. CE | Vaguely demarcated | Economic Islam Arab | Traders Merchants Islamic Rulers |

While neither the Phoenicians nor Romans influenced the operation of Islamization and Arabization, this study begins with these two external agents as their introduction of new trade practices offers an example of alterations in the structure of society. The first subsection, therefore, will be focusing on the evolution of trade practices developed during the Phoenician and Roman era.

Trade practices from the Phoenician and Roman eras would continue to play a role after the 7th century, but more importantly would be the alterations to the religious practices from the 7th-11th centuries as Islamization grew in quantity which is illustrated by the growing number of Muslim towns associated with this period. The second subsection, as a result, will be examining the primary transmitters associated with Muslim towns.

Emerging in the 11th century Islamic empires led by religious leaders would take over the role as primary agents ushering in a new era that would last up to the 20th century. The last subsection, therefore, focuses on the role of imperial rulers as primary transmitters and the construction of empires whose legitimacy was based on certain religious ideals which indicate longevity, or quality.

Since the external demarcated borders associated with this era say very little about the actual organization of territory this study would instead like to draw attention to towns as a specific territory which evolved from sources of wealth, to religious centers, and in some cases into capital cities. Primary analysis of territorial designs from this period, as a result, will be linked to towns.

In addition, it is also worth noting that many of these towns would be linked to later periods as they were located along the Trans-Saharan trade routes, possessed geo-strategic

importance, or were topographical areas easy to access and dominate. The locations of many future towns, as a result, were often built on the foundations of these early settlements also indicating continuity.

3.1a Pre-Islamic/Post-nomadic System

Figure 10a: Characteristics associated with the Pre-Islamic/Post-nomadic System

| Systems | Dates | Borders | Practices | Agents |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|---------|-----------|---------------------|
| Pre-Islamic/Post-nomadic System | 8th c. BCE-7th c. CE | Towns | Economic | Traders, Colonizers |

Primary transmitters


Because the nomadic way of life entails moving to different locations depending upon the season, it is plausible that permanent settlements may not have existed in the region prior to the foundation of Carthage in the 8th century BCE. Consequently, researchers including Wester-Ebbinghaus (2016) believe that the establishment of towns and trade relations indicates that the Phoenicians were the first group to directly influence the Numidians (Berbers) residing in the region as their interaction contributed to Berber groups transitioning from hunter-gathering and pastoralism to sedentary pastoral-agricultural organization. Besides the Phoenicians, the Romans, too, are believed to also have had an influence on the Berber ethnic groups during this period as the transformation of towns into colonial possessions whose sole purpose was to serve Rome would have also altered the territorial design.

Territoriality

Although the first towns founded by the Phoenicians including the settlements of Carthage, Icosium (modern day Algiers), and Rabat in the 8th century BCE (see map 3), may

have been little more than trading posts that were occupied only seasonally, Saoud (2004) indicates that these first towns had a tremendous impact as they represent the earliest urban development in the region and the creation of the first administrative, military, and religious institutions.⁴ While designated as Phoenician/Carthaginian towns, research by Wester-Ebbinghaus (2016) indicates that Berbers were allowed to reside in both Phoenician and Carthaginian towns often fulfilling roles in the military. Resulting from this contact, Maddy-Weitzman (2017, 4) points out also that Berber groups “emulated Carthage’s territorial consolidation” creating “larger Hellenic-style monarchic entities.” The founding of these towns, therefore, may have been instrumental in the founding of the Berber city of Cirta in the 2nd century BCE, though no evidence of this exists to date.

Map 3: Locations of early Phoenician towns




Source: Saoud (2004)

⁴ Often overlooked, the creation of currency is also indicative of institutions. Therefore, evidence of currency displaying Phoenician, Roman, or Libyan marks is further evidence of established institutions and areas of control.

In contrast to the mainly congenial relationship between the Carthaginians/Phoenicians and Berber groups, the relationship between Romans and Berbers on the other hand was one of inequality as the Romans perceived Berbers to be “uncivilized”, or barbaric. Consequently, Berbers were allowed to neither reside in Roman towns, nor were they allowed to settle in the agricultural productive areas as these were required for Roman settlements (Saoud 2004). Providing further evidence of this, Nisan (2002) points out how the Roman occupation coincided with the first mass movement of Berbers to more mountainous regions including the Kabyle region of Algeria and the Nafusa mountain range in Libya, areas still considered today to be Berber strongholds.


While it is difficult to say with any certainty the exact extent of control over territory these early empires possessed, it is clear from the maps below (see maps 4 and 5) that this extent was reliant on the presence of other towns. Furthermore, these maps also illustrate the role of topography in that both empires largely resided on the coast avoiding the mountainous terrain around these areas and the Sahara desert in the south.

Map 4: Extent of territory controlled by the Phoenicians



Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

Map 5: Extent of territory controlled by Rome around 100 BCE.



Source: ExploreTheMed

Practices

While there are a number of examples illustrating the evolution of trade practices from this period perhaps most informative is an account given by Herodotus in the 4th century BCE.

Setting trade in motion Herodotus notes that first:

The Carthaginians unload their wares and arrange them on the beach; then they re-board their boats and light a smoky fire. When the native inhabitants see the smoke, they come to the shore and, after setting out gold in exchange for the goods, they withdraw. The Carthaginians disembark and examine what the natives have left there, and if the gold appears to them a worthy price for their wares, they take it with them and depart; if not, they get back on their boats and sit down to wait while the natives approach again and set out more gold, until they satisfy the Carthaginians that the amount is sufficient. Neither side tries to wrong the other, for the Carthaginians do not touch the gold until it equals the value of their goods, nor do the natives touch the goods until the Carthaginians have taken away the gold. (Book IV, 196) (Cartwright 2016)

Trade practices built on equality was perhaps nothing new as Berber groups are tribally oriented.

However, to develop trade relations with “others” in such a way is much more complex than it appears as it requires reciprocal understood (trade) practices.

Linking this back to the structuration/territorial approach from chapter one, it should be clear that:

- 1) Both the Phoenicians and Romans represent group (x) and Berbers represent group (y).
- 2) The territorial designs associated with group (x) were focused on either trade or colonialism as indicated by their delineation of territory regarding residency.
- 3) New trade practices emerged as evidenced by the founding of Berber towns and the introduction of Berber currency which may not have existed prior.

3.1b Muslim Conquest

Figure 10b: Characteristics associated with the Muslim Conquest

| Transition | Dates | Territory | Structure | Agents |
|-----------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------------------|
| Muslim Conquest | 7th c. – 11th c. | Muslim Towns | Economic/Islam | Nomads Clerics Merchants |

Primary Transmitters

In the late 7th century Muslim armies began what many have dubbed the “penetration” of North Africa, or the initial Islamization process (Robinson 2004), as this invasion by conquest led to the occupation of the main towns and agricultural areas along the Mediterranean coastline spreading all the way to Morocco within two hundred years. The military, however, was not in this region to convert the indigenous population, nor teach the Arab language. Instead, as the models from the second chapter indicate it seems more plausible that Islamization and Arabization was initially dependent upon nomads, clerics, and merchants as these classes are linked to towns.

Further supporting this claim is Saoud (2004) who indicates that the first three Islamic dynasties founded in the 9th century: the Idrissids in Morocco, the Rustamids in Algeria, and the Aghlabids in Tunisia, who while Islamic, were not interested in the spread of Islamization and Arabization as these rulers were often engaged in internal disputes (see map 6).

Map 6: Extent of territory controlled by early Muslim dynasties.




Source: Fanack

Territoriality

Although the Muslim armies were instrumental in the expansion of territory along the Mediterranean coastline there is general agreement that these armies avoided both the Sahara desert and the mountains above the plains. Islamic and Arab influence, therefore, would have been initially restricted to these areas. By the 10th century, however, it is clear that Muslims had moved beyond this quarantine zone as evidenced by the establishment of the inland Muslim towns of Sijilmassa, Constantine (Cirta), Meknes, and Fes. Furthermore, the Muslim city of Quirawan founded in the 7th century would prove instrumental in the spread of Islamization to other regions including the rest of North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy as a result of its geographical location (Saoud 2004). While many of these towns were founded in order to serve the role of creating space for mosques, they were also centers of wealth along the Trans-Saharan trade routes which led to the rise of the Islamic dynasties listed above and their founding of capitals including Fes, Tahart, and Tunis which were used as bases in which to project their power. Capitals during this period, however, changed often due to internal disputes which led to

the destruction of the previous capital consequently leading to the rise of different capital cities and a growing number of cities already in ruin as early as the 13th century (see map 7).

Map 7: Islamic North Africa in the 13th century



Source: Saoud (2004)

Practices

Given the lack of direct evidence from this period it is difficult to say with any precision how the spread of Islamization in quantity occurred. Therefore, it is also difficult to define the practices associated with this period. However, the examples of the Banu Lamtuna tribe, who as a group adopted Islam in a way in which they could say that they “belonged” to the faith, but actually knew very little about it (Robinson 2004) and the Barghawata tribe who supported a faux Berber Islam between the 9th and 11th centuries (Maddy-Weitzman 2017) may offer some indication as these examples point to one possible explanation for the spread and speed of Islamic practices during this period. The spread of Islamization practices in quantity, consequently, may have simply revolved around the profession of faith as behavior and the development of certain religious physical activities linked to action.

Linking this back to the structuration/territorial approach from chapter one once again, it should be clear that:

- 1) Muslim nomads, clerics, and merchants represent group (x) and Berbers represent group (y).
- 2) The territorial designs associated with group (x) revolve around both economics and religion as indicated by the location of Muslim towns on trans-Saharan trade routes.
- 3) New religious practices in quantity emerged as evidenced by the behavior and action associated with the Islamic religion and the growing number of mosques as institutions.

3.1c Islamic System

Figure 10c: Characteristics associated with Islamic systems

| Systems | Dates | Territory | Structure | Agents |
|----------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------|--------------------------|
| Islamic System | 11th c.- 19th c. | Capital Cities | Islam Arab | Islamic Rulers Nomads |

Primary Transmitters

Unlike the dynastic empires identified in the previous era which may have been only superficially Islamic, the Almohad (1120-1269) and the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) are instead well recognized Islamic empires as indicated by the recognition of their caliphate status. Furthermore, the Almoravid Empire (1050-1147), predecessor of the Almohad Empire, is also often recognized as an Islamic empire and in this case supports the argument that changes in Islamic quality were beginning to take place as the Almoravids were a distinct population composed primarily of members from the Banu Gudala and the Banu Lamtuna tribes (see above).

Returning to the idea that alteration of quality is described as both conservative reform linked to religious clerics, and conformity described as widespread usage of one doctrine, the Almoravid and Almohad empires in this case are categorized with the former and the Ottoman Empire identified with the latter. As the Ottoman Empire is well known for its long succession of caliphs who supported Sunni Islam, focus in this case will be placed on the origins of Islamic imperial rulers and their role in conservative reform.

In the case of the Almoravid Empire, for example, most scholars link together the person of Ibn Yasin, a religious cleric, who advocated for the Sunni Maliki School of law (1042-1059) as being central to Almoravid Islamization and conservative reform (Buresi 2017). Illustrating this process is an example provided by a writer in Fez from the early 14th century which describes how Ibn Yasin, religious leader of the Almoravids:

Began to teach them the Book (Quran) and the Sunna, the ritual ablutions, the prayer, the almsgiving, and like obligations which God had imposed upon them. When they had become versed in these matters, and had become numerous, he preached to them, admonished them, made them long for Paradise and fear Hell, ordered them to fear God, to command good and forbid evil, and told them of God's reward and great recompense for these actions. Then he called upon them to make Holy War on the tribes of Sanhaja [...] saying "O Almoravids, you are a numerous body, the chiefs of your tribes and the heads of your clans. God has reformed you and led you to His straight path and put you under an obligation to be thankful for His grace and to command good and forbid evil and to fight the Holy War for His sake."

They replied: "O blessed Shaikh, make what commands you will, you will find us obedient. Were you to order us to kill our parents we should do so." (Robinson 2004, 39-40).

While initially the position of leader and imam were separate spheres of leadership, under the leadership of Yusuf b. Tashfin (1071-1106), this separation would become blurred as he was conferred with the title of "Emir of the Muslims" a position which according to (Buresi 2017) had not existed previously.

Like the Almoravids, the Almohads, too, were a Berber-Islamic empire whose Islamization was dependent upon a religious reformer. In this case, however, the religious reformer was able to take complete control as Mahdi Ibn Tumart (1120-1130) and his “orthodox successors” instead emphasized the infallibility of the Mahdi rather than any other type of legitimization. The Almohads as a group, therefore, are often defined by their opposition to the Almoravids as they perceived the Almoravids to be a group which supported an “anthropomorphist interpretation of the Book and betraying the text of Revelation” (Buresi 2017, 10).

Exploring the ideology of Mahdi Ibn Tumart further in order to grasp his conceptualization of the relationship between Islam and conservative reform, research by Garcia (1990) indicates that beginning in 1120, Ibn Tumart made it his personal mission to purify the Maghreb of certain religious practices including the consumption of alcohol and the playing of musical instruments at religious ceremonies and events as he believed this behavior was not sanctioned by Islamic doctrine. By today’s standards, therefore, this group would likely be linked to the Salafi movement.

Mahdi Ibn Tumart’s conservative ideology, however, goes beyond merely banning certain practices as Garcia (1990) indicates that this ideology was constructed around the belief that the Mahdi was infallible and that he was there to establish the kingdom of God on earth. One event which illustrates this infallibility is the example of Mahdi Ibn Tumart speaking with the dead. According to an account given in the 14th century it is said that:


Ibn Tumart ordered several of his followers to be buried alive, taking the necessary precaution to ensure them with a supply of oxygen. Ibn Tumart then proceeded to summon the Almohad community and [...] asked the ‘dead’ soldiers their whereabouts. Fascination engulfed the Almohad ranks as they heard their

deceased comrades declare the magnificence of Paradise, which they had achieved fighting and dying for the Mahdi of God. Ibn Tumart cleverly destroyed all the evidence of his trickery; that is he then deprived those buried of their needed oxygen (Garcia 1990 5-6).

Territoriality

Like the previous periods some towns were designated as capital cities. The capital cities associated with this period (Marrakesh in the case of the Almoravid and Almohad empires, and Istanbul in the case of the Ottoman Empire), however, differ from their earlier manifestations as these capitals would become seats of power belonging to empires rather than regional dynasties requiring more substantial institutions in order to exert greater control over such vast territory (see maps 8 and 9).

Map 8: Territory under the control of the Almoravids and Almohads



Source: Sutori

Map 9: Territory under the control of the Ottoman Empire



Source: Sutori

One such institution created under the Almoravid Empire, for example, was the position of governor which according to letters dating back to 1143, was a position whose power was equal to that of the ruler, but not the same status as the ruler. Describing this further the letter states that:

It is our substitute [...], for your leadership, for the conduct of your affairs, and for the government of the young and old among you; no one has the authority to these things [except for] him, [...] and we appoint the governor for all of you [...]; and everything that he will do, it is us who does it through him, and what he will say to this affect, it is as if we were saying it [...]; with our tongue, he speaks [...] so listen to him, and do not defy him (Buresi 2017, pg. 6).

Continuing this style of governance both the Almohad and Ottoman Empires also operated as de-centralized empires delegating power to others as evidenced by Almohad governors ruling over the region of al-Andalus in today's southern Spain and the positions of beys and deys who ruled over organized provinces during the Ottoman period.

Practices

Because Islamic rulers and clerics became the primary transmitters linked to Islamization during this period these groups are recognized as the dominant agents. Furthermore, Islamic empires, especially the Ottoman Empire, illustrate stability and conformity due to its longevity. Linking together the development of conservative reform and overall conformity to alterations relating to (religious) practices in quality, practices in this period are identified by:

- 1) Islamic rulers and clerics representing group (x) and Berbers representing group (y).
- 2) The territorial designs associated with group (x) are linked to Islamic empires and the position of Caliph as an institution.
- 3) New religious practices in quality emerged as evidenced by the overall recognition of Maliki Sunni Islam in the region and the conservative reform which re-enforced previously introduced Islamic practices.

3.1d Structure/System Changes

Returning to the assumption that structure and system alterations are differentiated by the length of time involved for behavior and action to evolve into practices it can be argued that the Pre-Islamic/Post-nomadic period and the Islamic period after the 11th century are indicative of system changes whereas the period associated with the Muslim conquest is instead a period of structural change.

Beginning with the Pre-Islamic/Post-nomadic period, for example, which in this study lasted from the 8th century BCE up to the 7th century, system change is represented by new trade practices including the designation of territory as areas of ownership (in this case towns), and the switch from nomadism to sedentary lifestyles. Furthermore, there are only two primary

transmitters identified with this period allowing for a long period in which both group (x) and group (y) can develop an understanding of reciprocal trade relations.

In contrast to the Pre-Islamic/Post-nomadic period, the period associated with the Muslim conquest is instead conceptualized as a transition phase as trade practices were re-enforced and religious practices were only initially being introduced. Furthermore, because Islam in its first few decades of existence supported different ideologies it is not possible for practices to develop. Also supporting the idea that this was a period of structural change is the fact that group (x) differs from the last period as they were not in a dominant position of power.

By the 11th century, however, group (x) was once again in the dominant position of power which is indicated by the power of Islamic rulers and empires dominating in the areas of religious ideology, economics, and territorial designs which taken all together represent a stable system.

Thus far focus has only been placed on how trade and religious practices evolved during this period while avoiding the process of Arabization. But, as evidence of this process is scarce, this is to be expected. Still, Robinson (2004) indicates that Arabization in quantity and quality during this period is mainly attributed to nomads who migrated from the Arabian Peninsula in the 14th-16th centuries. Arabization was, therefore, dependent upon nomads rather than the rulers, which is further illustrated by the lack of any evidence of language homogenization policies under the Ottoman Empire.

3.2 Policies

Figure 9b: Islamization and Arabization as policies

| Operation | Dates | Borders | Practices | Agents |
|-----------|-------|---------|-----------|--------|
|-----------|-------|---------|-----------|--------|

| | | | | |
|----------|---|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| Policies | 19 th c. CE- 20 th c. CE | Vaguely demarcated Westphalian | Identity Nationalism | Colonial Powers National governments |
|----------|---|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|--|

Unlike the Ottoman Empire which made no differentiation between Arabs and Berbers, and religious identity was based on one's Muslim or non-Muslim status, the colonial powers would instead make use of these differences placing them at the center of their divide and conquer strategy. Both the official and "unofficial" policies/laws created during the colonial period will, therefore, be the focus of the first subsection.

Building upon the first subsection the second subsection will then analyze the creation of counter-colonial-policies which were created in response. The second subsection, as a result, will be focusing on the creation of national policies during the post-colonial period.

As both the colonial powers and the independent countries that emerged in the 20th century are recognized nation-states, the territorial designs associated with this era are mainly linked to states rather than towns. However, attention will also be given to certain regions within these states as some policies were applicable to only specific territory in some cases.

3.2a Colonialism

Figure 10d: Characteristics associated with Colonialism

| Systems | Dates | Territory | Structure | Agents |
|-------------|---|-----------|-----------|-----------------|
| Colonialism | 19 th c.- 20 th c. | Colonies | Identity | Colonial Powers |

Primary Transmitters

Unlike the Ottoman Empire which had no designs towards homogenizing the population under its control, the colonial powers on the other hand created specific policies whose sole

object was to replace the language of Arabic/Berber with that of the colonizer. More specifically this study singles out France, as the French language, according to Benkharafa (2013), is associated with ideologies, modes of life, and values across the region even today.

Homogenization as an overall goal was limited to the sphere of language, however, as many of the religious policies propagated by France during this period were built on a divide and conquer strategy and not the establishment of one national religion.⁵

Territoriality

Although France's colonial policies in Morocco and Algeria sought the same goal, "civilizing" the natives, Maddy-Weitzman (2017) indicates that the different social, historical, and demographical factors in these territories forced France to formulate different laws for each colony. These were not the only factors, however, as geographical and topographical conditions would also play a role.

The region of Kabylie which is located in Algeria, for example, would not come under the control of France until 1857, mainly due to its mountainous terrain, but also because the Kabylie Berbers were well known for protecting their mountain refuge since the arrival of the Phoenicians (Silverstein 1996). As a result, France chose not to fight but instead created the "Kabyle Myth," or "Vulgate," which according to Maddy-Weitzman (2017) was constructed on the belief that Berbers possess a higher civilization than their Muslim-Arab counterparts due to their perceived European origins, previous Christianization, and superficial Islamism.

⁵ In addition to France, Italy, too, pursued a similar strategy by granting Berber groups judicial and religious autonomy because unlike the majority of the population who are Maliki Sunnis, most Berbers in Libya follow the Ibadi branch of Islam (Al-Rumi 2009).

Like Algeria, in Morocco, too, France used the differences between Berbers and their Muslim-Arab counterparts in order to gain an advantage after declaring Morocco a protectorate of France in 1912. However, in the case of Morocco the French colonial authorities, according to Maddy-Weitzman (2017), instead emphasized the difference between *blad al-makhzen*, the areas ruled by the Sultan, and *blad as-siba'*, the “lands of dissidence” beyond the sultan’s authority which included Berber territory. France’s colonial policies in Morocco, therefore, mainly revolved around the development of separate legal codes for rural mountainous Berber areas and the Arab regions located predominantly in the lowland or urban areas (Dominguez 2015).

While initially the formulation and implementation of these policies did not lead to conflict between Muslim-Arabs and Berbers nor Muslim-Arabs and the French, Maddy-Weitzman (2017) indicates that in 1930 the situation changed due to the creation of what is called the Berber dahir, a decree conceptualized by the French and signed by the sultan which allowed Berber groups the option to not be held accountable to the jurisdiction of sharia courts. Perceiving that this was the first step towards the conversion of Berbers to Christianity, both Berbers and Arab-Muslims organized protests against the French, but the decree would stay in force until Morocco won its independence in 1956.

Practices

Written in the 14th century Ibn Khaldūn’s The Muqaddimah: Philosophy Of History speaks of debates between Berbers and Andalusian genealogists over the Semitic and Arab origins of Berbers and that these debates had gone on for hundreds of years. But, the book also says that during the writer’s life these issues were resolved and that the learned Muslim class had

come to accept that Berbers were long-lost cousins (Maddy-Weitzman 2017). It can, therefore, be surmised that both Berbers and Arab-Muslims saw no difference between the two groups or that the differences were small enough to be overlooked.

As was noted in chapter two, however, this situation changed as colonial policies led to the identification of “others” which had not existed previously. Consequently, one could say that the practices associated with identity were altered. Since the identification of identity is a practice in itself, and this practice developed from colonial policies, it can be argued that the:

- 1) Colonial powers represent group (x) and Berbers represent group (y).
- 2) Territorial designs associated with group (x) are associated with colonial institutions and language homogenization policies.
- 3) Alteration of practices is illustrated by the identification of a separate Berber identity which emerged as a result of these policies.

3.2b Post-Colonialism

Figure 10e: Characteristics associated with Post-Colonialism

| Systems | Dates | Territory | Structure | Agents |
|----------------------|---------|--------------|-------------|----------------------|
| Post-Colonial System | 20th c. | Nation-State | Nationalism | National Governments |

Primary Transmitters

After gaining their independence in the 20th century the national governments of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya (see map 10) would become the primary transmitters associated with the operation of Islamization and Arabization as the policies created by these states supported certain Islamic and Arab standards. Not every state pursued the same policies,

however, as the goals of each state depended upon whether the political identity stressed Arabism or Islamism. As a result, it is necessary to analyze each state on a case by case basis.

Map 10: North Africa territory governed by colonial powers and their dates of independence



Source: Amy Glenn

Territoriality

As newly established independent nation-states the governments in North Africa were finally free to create their own policies without outside interference, and with the borders becoming more Westphalian firmer boundaries were established delineating the territory in which these policies would be implemented.

Given the number of policies put forward by these states only certain examples will be provided, but each case is nearly applicable to all other North African states as they all had two things in common: the construction of a national identity, and sizable Berber populations within their borders. The following examples, therefore, revolve around specific types of discrimination brought about by the state towards their Berber populations.

Morocco

Like other states in this study (Algeria and Tunisia), Morocco, too, enacted policies which placed the teaching of the Arabic language at the center of its Arabization policy, thus, denying any accommodation to other local languages or consider them to be part of the national heritage (Miller 2003). Berber languages, as a result, were neither taught in school nor used in official institutions. Other examples of Arabization according to Lauermann (2009) include both the banning of Amazigh names on birth certificates and even attempting to “Arabize” places whose origins are linked to the Tamazight language.

Regarding religion, the Moroccan government took the view that rural Berber groups who worshipped saints were considered “highly conservative, even primitive, and whose presence hindered the strategic modernizing goals of the new country” (Dominguez 2015, 6). As a result, the government of Morocco created policies which undermined the authority of local institutions that relied on saint worship.

In the case of the Indigenous Peoples’ and Community Conserved Territories and Areas, for example, research conducted by Dominguez (2015) indicates that the replacement of traditional leaders (descendants of saints) with government officials who refuse to respect the local traditions has led to a decline in beliefs surrounding the saints and their protection. As the worship of saints is central to Maraboutic Islam along with several other interrelated practices including the *maaruf*, a ceremonial feast attended by all the members of the tribe, it is clear that by altering saint worship this places the religion and tribe in jeopardy. As one practitioner of Maraboutic Islam puts it:

The maaruf is the one thing that brings people together to join the taqbilts (tribes or tribal factions) for if such a gathering were to be removed, all taqbilts would scatter, each taqbilt have its own opinion without common agreement. For example, if you have five taqbilts, then they will have five different opinions. Therefore we have the maaruf in order to unite our opinions. So that's why we undertake the maaruf, to gather taqbilts and honour the dead (saints) ... we honour the saints, to unite our differences. If we were to stop the maaruf, if we forget to do the maaruf, then everyone will do what he wants, opinion will be divided, and thus the people will fall apart! (Dominguez 2015)

In addition to the Islamization policy above, other policies identified by (Maddy-Weitzman 2017) include education policies stressing the idea that Moroccan history began with the arrival of "enlightened" Arab Muslims who brought Islam to their more "primitive" cousins.

Libya

Like Morocco, the Libyan state during the reign of Qaddafi also perceived Berber groups who practiced a different ideology or spoke a different language to be a threat to state identity. However, unlike Morocco these policies were more brutally enforced.

Targeting specifically the Ibadi Muslim Berber population who are neither Sunni nor Shia, al-Rumi (2009) describes Libya's Arabization policies as "language imperialism" since many of these policies were created in order to eradicate the Berber language through either censorship or the outright burning of any books relating to Berbers. In addition to these policies al-Rumi (2009) also notes that the Qaddafi regime was also known to resort to physical violence in order to achieve its aims by eliminating "dangerous" dissidents or through the use of mobs

like the Libyan Revolutionary Committees and “Libya Tomorrow” whose tactics included physical confrontation and death threats.

Summing up why the regime pursued Islamization policies built on eradicating the Ibadi religion it is the belief of Sheikh Ramadan Azuza that this hatred was linked to authority stating that: ““For the Sunnis, leadership must come from the Arab Quraysh tribe in Mecca, while Shia follow the offspring of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad [...] Ibadis choose our own leaders according to their skills, and not their ethnicity or origins”” (Zurutuza 2016).

Algeria

Like Libya, the Algerian government has also been accused of discriminating against Berber groups who proscribe to the Ibadi branch of Islam. In the town of M’zab valley, for example, a region located 600 km south of Algiers in the northern Sahara desert, Ibadi Berbers accuse the government of seizing traditional Ibadi lands in order to build communities for Arab settlers in the region and not enforcing the law pointing to police complicity in allowing attacks on Berbers and their property because they are Ibadi (Mahjar-Barducci (2014). Algerian Islamization policies can, therefore, be conceived of as indifference to religious minorities which is in sharp contrast to Algeria’s position towards linguistic minorities.

Algerian Arabization policies can be conceived as two different types of policies; straightforward policies which relate to the promotion of the Arab language and opposition to the Berber language, and ambiguous policies which emphasize the Arab language less directly.

Focusing on the latter type of policy this study turns to statements given by Ben Balla in a speech from 1963 in which he makes clear that “the place of the Arabic language in the city

that we are constructing must be eminent. We must reconcile our country, which has been depersonalized, with its history and its past, that is to say, with itself ... It is the basis of our Arabo-Islamic culture” (Kashani-Sabet 1996, 269). Arab language according to Ben Balla, therefore, has always existed in Algeria thusly negating the fact that the Berber language also existed. More recently others like Maddy-Weitzman (2017, 20) point to the updated Algerian constitution of 2016 which states that “Arabic is the national and official language ... (and) remains the official language of the state despite according Tamazight official status that same year.

Tunisia

Given that the smallest number of Berbers by national percentage resides in Tunisia it should come as no surprise that unlike the other states presented in this section Tunisia on the other hand never formulated official policies governing its use. Still, according to Jensen (2011) most Berbers residing in Tunisia argue that the government of Tunisia under the dictatorship of Ben Ali pursued de facto discriminatory policies against Berbers including the denial of registration of Berber names given to children, not allowing the Tamazight language to be taught in schools, and the banning of skits performed by Berbers who use their language at festivals.

Practices

Although each of these states created different Arabization and Islamization policies they also share several common characteristics as was noted above. As a result:

- 1) National governments represent group (x) and Berbers represent group (y).
- 2) The territorial designs associated with group (x) are associated with national governments as institutions and the nation-state as territory.

3) New practices regarding Islamization and Arabization emerged as evidenced by the creation of these national policies.

3.2c Structure/System Changes

With the exception of Algeria the colonial period was quite short for the other states of North Africa lasting less than fifty years. As a result, it should be clear that this was a period of structural change and not system change. While some might argue that the use of French in the region today challenges this claim, one has simply to point out that French is not an official language in any of these states today. One concept of note worth mentioning, however, is the conceptual perception of how a nation-state operates including the belief that a nation-state must have one “official” language.

The post-colonial period on the other hand is indicative of system changes since these states, like the empires prior to colonialism, were also able to completely dominate all spheres of life including religion, language, and territorial designs. Hence, the post-colonial era marks a stable system once again.

3.3 Practices

Figure 9c: Islamization and Arabization as practices

| Operation | Dates | Borders | Practices | Agents |
|-----------|------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|
| Practices | 21 st c. CE | Regional | Policies | National governments |

At the beginning of the 21st century most of these national governments began reversing some of their previous policies in the face of growing pressure both from within the country and

outside of it. The last section, therefore, focuses on changes in regime policies and how these changes infer different practices.

In Morocco, for instance, the Moroccan government supported the creation of institutions including the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe in 2001 whose job included protecting, researching, and promoting Berber culture and language (Maddy-Weitzman 2017). For the Moroccan government then it is obvious that the Berber and culture and language are no longer a threat to its national identity. Also in Libya following the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime in 2011, it is obvious that Ibadi Berbers are no longer considered to be a threat to the state which is indicated by the growing number of Ibadi mosques and schools (Zurutuza 2016). In addition, to this policy reversal other policy changes identified by Maddy-Weitzman (2017) include recognition of their language allowing it to be used in media and taught in schools. As was mentioned above in Algeria, too, government officials finally accorded Tamazight an official status which runs directly counter to previous Arabization policies. Unlike these other states the policies in Tunisia are unchanging which is indicated by the continual policies of denying the naming of Berber children with Berber names and denying that the language be taught at any level (Jensen 2011).

Conclusion

Because national governments are the most powerful transmitters throughout the history of Islamization and Arabization, and the nation-state has the most restrictive borders, these factors can be said to play a major role in the difference between policies and processes. But, due to changes in policies it can be argued that the practices associated with these transmitters are being altered as three of the four states in this study have since acknowledged certain demands.

Overall, the problem is not Islamization or Arabization itself as most Berbers are practicing Muslims and many have learned at the very least the vernacular Arab used in each state. Furthermore, most Berber groups would likely not support replacing Islam with pagan religions or the replacement of Arab with only Tamazight at the national level. Hence, it can be said that Berbers do not object to Islamization or Arabization dominating the structure of society.

It can be said, however, that most Berbers perceive Islamization and Arabization policies as equivalent to state-sponsored racism (Mahjar-Barducci 2014) since their objections mainly revolve around the national policies propagated by national governments. Consequently, as long as national governments continue to support repressive policies, conflict between Berbers and their national governments will likely continue.

While it is difficult to say with any certainty what role the Berber transnational movement might play in reshaping the current structure, Maddy-Weitzman (2017) believes that this movement poses no threat as “Berberism” threatens neither the territorial integrity of these states nor the power of the elites and national governments as transnational movements generally do not support the use of violence to achieve their aims.

Moving beyond the threat of physical violence, however, Berber transnational movements may still be a threat to the state since many of their objectives represent both a “subjective” threat to state’s identity and intergroup competition as these movements are based in opposition to state policies. Trans-national movements may, therefore, threaten the identity of the state as homogenization policies are often linked to the security of the state.

Put in the context of Wendt (1999) who assumes that the identity of the state matters just as much as the capabilities of states, any alterations to a state’s identity may lead to shifts in the interstate-level social structures, hence, impacting inter-state relations.

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