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International and Diplomatic Studies

China in Africa - Gamer Changer from The African Perspective?

Master's Thesis


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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

Herewith I declare that I have written the Master's Thesis on my own and I have cited all sources

Prague, 26th June 2019

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'M' or 'W' shape with a horizontal line extending to the right, positioned above a dotted line.

Author's Signature

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADS	Approved Destination Status
AEI	American Enterprise Institute
AHRDF	African Human Resources Development Fund
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
AUCCC	African Union Conference Centre and Office Complex
B-O-T	Build-Operate-Transfer
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CABC	China-Africa Business Council
CABC	China-Africa Business Council
CADF	China-Africa Development Fund
CAJCCI	China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry
CARI	China Africa Research Initiative
CCB	China Construction Bank
CCEC	China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCPIT	China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
CDB	China Development Bank (),
CGWIC	China Great Wall Industry Corporation
CNBC	Consumer News and Business Channel
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Company
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CPC	Communist Party of China
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECS	East China Sea
EU	European Union
EXIM	Export-Import Bank of China
FMPRC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola
FOCAC	Forum on China-African Cooperation
ICBC	Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
ICMB	Intercontinental ballistic missile
IDA.	International Development Association
IDSA	Institute for Defence Students and Analyses
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KMT	Kuomintang

LSE	London School of Economics
MOFCOM	The Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NICAF	Nigeria-China Friendship Association
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
OBOR	One Belt One Road
OEC	The Observatory of Economic Complexity
ODA.	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PPPs	Public-Private Partnership
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSC	Politburo Standing Committee
ROC	Republic of China
SACP	South African Communist Party
SCMP	South China Morning Post
SCS	South China Sea
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SGR	Standard Gauge Railway
Sinopec	China Petrochemical Corporation
SINOSURE	China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation
SMEs	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SOEs	State-own enterprises
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
VOA	Voice of America
WEO	World Economic Outlook
WTO	World Trade Organization

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1. INTRODUCTION

“For centuries, Europeans dominated the African continent. The white man arrogated to himself the right to rule and to be obeyed by the non-white; his mission, he claimed, was to “civilise” Africa. Under this cloak, the Europeans robbed the continent of vast riches and inflicted unimaginable suffering on the African people. All this makes a sad story, but now we must be prepared to bury the past with its unpleasant memories and look to the future” – Kwame Nkrumah.

Everything beyond this point of the thesis centres on the underlining metaphysics of the quote above, i.e. Africa’s continuous pursuit of ultimate sovereignty, development, and her need to have her identity respected. This eventually has led to *China in Africa*. Prior to *China in Africa*, western governments have been Africa’s main trading partner, and provider of aid and development assistance. Conditionalities which seemed to undermine the sovereignty of African States and suggest neo-colonialism accompanied these trades, aid and development assistance. *China in Africa* on the other hand provided African governments an alternative to Western financing without conditions, by 2009, China surpassed the United States to be Africa’s largest trading partner (Beery & Yan 2007; Aibanga & Boukoro 2010).

According to Robert (2008, p1), “China and Africa desperately need each other. China cannot easily grow without Africa. Nor can sub-Saharan Africa (a collection of forty-eight disparate countries) subsist, and now prosper, without China. Africa and China, in Auden’s terms, have at last met, and their recently forged and continuously reinvigorated, mutually reinforced, interactive relationship is already tight and will for decades grow ever stronger, more thoroughly intertwined. Both benefit significantly from this remarkably symbiotic relationship.” Though *China in Africa* have attracted accolades, it has also attracted criticism even within Africa. Example include a comment made by Former Zambian acting president, Guy Scott in 2007, he said “our textile factories can’t compete with cheap Chinese imports subsidised by a foreign government. People are saying: ‘We’ve had bad people before. The whites were bad, the Indians were worse, but the Chinese are worst of all.’” (Peter 2012). Indeed, the entry of Chinese state-owned enterprises, small and medium scale companies have aroused concerns of neo-colonialism, labour rights, and unfair trade competition. This thesis explores historical foundation of China-African relations, dimension of its interest today, as well as its impacts within the political and economic dimensions in order to provide answers to the research questions.

1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As the thesis develops, the rhetoric question remains; “is China a messiah or a dangerous dragon?” The core research questions include;

- Is China-Africa relations truly a game changer for African countries?

- Does China-Africa relations serve as a model for other leading developing countries to pursue their interest in Africa?
- Who stands to benefit the most from China-Africa relations?

1.2. THESIS OUTLINE and LITERATURE REVIEW

The First chapter includes the introduction which provides a brief overview of this thesis, as well as the research questions which subsequent chapters would provide answers. It also contains the methodology and data analysis. The second chapter lays the foundation for further development of this thesis. In this chapter, I will put forth the PRC's history, the dimensions of its national interest including its foreign policy, and finally an historical overview of Sino-African relations. The goal of the second chapter is to assist in comprehending which factors and events have contributed to shaping the PRC's overall behaviour and interest in Africa today.

The third chapter introduces us to the core of the thesis and will provide answers to the research questions. This chapter analyses China's interest in Africa, its African policy, trade, aid and development assistance. Also included in this chapter would include a case study analysis of China's bilateral relations with Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya. The fourth chapter constitutes a comparative analysis of China in Africa vs the West in Africa. It explores the conditionality versus non-conditionality. After this, I would provide an executive summary and references to literatures and materials.

For literature review, a lot of literatures exist on China-African relations. Some have been written from a critic sinophobic point of view by authors who have neither resided in China nor any African country. In the course of this thesis, literatures postulating both positive and negative impact of China's engagements will be reviewed, and the concluding analysis be made *from the African prospective*.

The primary literature will be '*China and Africa: A century of Engagement*' by David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman (2012). This literature covers a well-balanced, analytical and foundational study of China-Africa relations. It gives a comprehensive insight of not only China relations with Africa as a continent, but also individual bilateral relation. The authors of this literature have combined historical, topical and geographical approaches to reveal accurately and completely China-Africa relations. The second primary literature is '*China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*' by Robert Rotberg (2008). Some of the key areas this literature cover includes China's interest in African oil, military and security relations, the influx and goals of Chinese aid to sub-Saharan Africa, human rights issues, and China's overall strategy in the region. Third literature

Other literature source (secondary) will include news articles, published academic articles, and interviews. The aim of the secondary literature source is to provide up-to-date information. It

also provides me the opportunity to compare different sides of the story. The secondary literature source will be an asset during the case study since the case study is associated with observations, interviews, and ethnography.

1.3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS

The reason for conducting a research is either to explore a new topic, describe a social phenomenon or explain a cause and effect. Most studies are combination of two of the above mentioned or more (Gerald 2011). For this thesis research, I have used a mixed method research, combining analysis of three case studies and a comparative analysis between China and the West in Africa. I have also framed certain factors into dimensions. Mixed method research is a synthesis based on qualitative and quantitative research, it acknowledges the importance of both mentioned methodological approaches and adds a third methodological insight that is informative and provides useful research results. One of the main aspects of mixed methods is that it relies on data collection, analysis and inference techniques in combination with the logic of mixed methods research to address one's research question. It also includes broader socio-political realities, power relations and particular resources (Johnson, Anthony and Liza 2007).

For data analysis I chose to research three case studies regarding relations between China and Nigeria, China and South Africa and finally, China and Kenya. I combined qualitative and quantitative methods to better the data insight into their political and economic bilateral relations with China. Case studies can be analyses of persons, events, periods, policies, institutions or other systems that are studies by one or more methods. They may be descriptive or explanatory, quantitative or qualitative; case study research is sometimes used to describe a series of cases, which explore the causal relations between particular subjects and objects or certain succession of events (Prashant 2013). Additionally, I have made a comparative analysis between China and the West in Africa. Comparative analysis is a subtype in which two conditions are met: a) data must stem from two or more cases – countries, cities, corporations, etc. and b) the researcher must strive to explain and not only describe. It might occur that comparative analysis takes place where a societal characteristic is exposed to have an effect on the dependent variable – object of interest (Chris 2001).

2. CHINA

“The Glory is not in never falling, but in rising every time you fall” - Chinese Proverb

2.1 PEOPLE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) FORMATION

Archaeological evidence found near Beijing by the Archaeological Institute of America suggest about 2 million years ago, hominids of which would later evolve to become modern humans inhabited the area known today as the PRC (Russell & Roy 2000). Through scientific research and excavations, scholars and historians have been able to trace its history from the first dynasty (Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasty 2070 BC – 1600 BC) to Imperial China (Qin, Han, Jin, Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan and Ming dynasty 210 BC – 1600 AD) and to the last imperial dynasty (Qing dynasty 1644 AD – 1912 AD) which was overthrown by the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and eventually led to the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) (Ping-ti 1970; Derk 1986; Samuel 2004; Mark 2010; Kenneth 2011).

Following the establishment of the ROC on 1st January 1912, a government was formed and Sun Yat-Sen of the Kuomintang (KMT) became the first provisional president (Eileen 1997). Sun Yat-Sen presidency was short lived, it was later handed over to Yuan Shikai who in 1915 proclaimed himself Emperor. Yuan's proclamation met several backlash and opposition which eventually made him re-establish the ROC (Stephen 2006). At the time of his death in 1916, the country was internally divided politically with territories still under control of regional warlords until 1924 when Chiang Kai-Shek (Moscow schooled and one of Sun Yat-Sen lieutenants) became leader of the KMT Military Academy and forged an alliance with the Communist Party of China (CPC) founded years earlier in 1920 to form the First United Front (KMT-CPC Alliance) to combat regional warlords with support of the Soviet Union. When Sun Yat-Sen's successor Chiang Kai-Shek became head of the KMT, he was able to unify the country and move its capital to Nanjing where he initiated democratization of the ROC (Suisheng 2000; Chang 1944).

The period from 1925 onwards marked an important period in the rise and growth of the CPC. Following the death of Sun Yat-Sen in 1925, the KMT had split into two (right wing led by Chiang Kai-Shek and left wing led Wang Jingwei). Suspensions arose implying that the Soviets were using the CPC to destroy the KMT from within. Actually, this was true, the Soviets supported the CPC and the Left Wing of KMT with finance and intellectual resources in its agenda to spread communism (Robert 2005).

“All wars signify the failure of conflict resolution mechanism, and they need post-war building of faith, trust and confidence” - Abdul Kalam

In December 1927, the left wing of KMT having expelled the CPC a few months earlier came under attack and were forced out of its self-established capital of Wuhan by the Red Army established

by the CPC and led by Mao Zedong (Dennis 2006). This eventually marked the beginning of the First Chinese Civil War that lasted ten years. During this period, the CPC expanded drastically and allied itself with regional warlords with the sole aim to suppress the KMT and take control of mainland China. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-Shek was bent on annihilating the CPC despite being under attack by the external threat (Japan) during the Second Sino-Japanese War, until the Xi'an Incident. The Xi'an Incident was a political crisis in 1936, where Chiang Kai-Shek was detained by his subordinates, Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang, and forced to change his policies regarding annihilation of the CPC and instead form an alliance to attack their common enemy, Japan (Jay 2009).

“The war against invasion always stops the internal strife and unites people against the common enemy” – Napoleon III

Following the Xi'an Incident which marked the end of the First Civil War, the CPC and the KMT formed the Second United Front alliance and fought Japan. As many as 20 million Chinese lost their lives with over 200,000 Chinese massacred in the KMT capital city of Nanjing. Simultaneously, World War II broke out and was fought on numerous fronts. Japan, Germany and Italy formed an alliance formally known as the Axis Powers after the Tripartite Pact of 27th September 1940 in Berlin (Richard 2003). On the other hand, China, Soviet Union, United States and United Kingdom formed an alliance known as the Big Four, recognised in the Declaration of the United Nations to combat the Axis Powers. At the end of World War II in 1945, Japan was defeated and the Second Chinese Civil War between the CPC and KMT started. By this time, the CPC was in control of most of mainland China and the KMT retreated to the south-eastern coast of mainland China reducing its territory to only Taiwan and surrounding islands, 267 fold smaller than mainland China (Radhey 2004).

On October 1st, 1949 in a grand galore ceremony witnessed by over 300,000 people in Tiananmen Square, Chairman Mao Zedong solemnly proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a communist state (Radhey 2004). In October 1949, the Soviet Union together with the Communist Bloc officially recognized the PRC government. As years went by, more countries recognized the legitimacy of the new government with the Swiss Confederation being the first western country to establish diplomatic relations in January 1950. Despite retreat by majority of the KMT, some forces remained in mainland China and continues to wage rebellion against the PRC throughout the 1950s. In 1966, Chairman Mao Zedong launch the Cultural Revolution. It is estimated that over 10,000,000 people died as a result of this ten years revolution (Merrill 1995).

On 25th October 1971, the UNGA Resolution 2758 which recognized the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China was passed with two-third of member states voting in support of the PRC. The PRC ascended and also become the fifth member of the UNSC replacing ROC.

Following its UN victory, the CPC began formulating its national interest as well as its foreign policy to accommodate its status.

2.2 PRC'S NATIONAL INTEREST

"Politics is the art of making your selfish desire seem like the national interest"

-Thomas Sowell

In modern politics, national interest has become a common term used during the discourse of foreign policy. In Chinese language, national interest has two meanings; first is the state's interest in global politics, and second is the state's interest concerning domestic affairs. During the 1954 CPC meeting, Chairman Mao said, "our policy toward farmers is not like the Soviet's, but it is one that takes care of both the interest of farmers and the interests of the state". While during the 1989 meeting with the Thai prime minister, Deng Xiaoping said "China wants to maintain its own national interest, sovereignty and territorial integrity. China also believes that a socialist country cannot violate other countries' interests, sovereignty or territory". According to Yan (1998, p 8, 9), Chairman Mao was referring to national interest in the context of domestic politics while Deng Xiaoping was referring to national interest in the context of international politics.

Realist argue that for a state to survive and dominate others, they must be involved in power struggle and power is the most important thing for a state (Hans 2006). Effective pursuit of a state's national interest lies in its ability to have power on a galore and grand scale. A state's foreign policy is primarily to only serve its national interest in international politics. Realist sees foreign policy and national interest as tools for power and the survival of state (Robert & Sørensen 2003).

"During the Maoist era, the Chinese theory on national interest was based on the Marxist class analysis which points that, since state is the tool of the ruling class, national interests are of the ruling class. In the post-Mao era, the invoking of national (instead of class) interest is a result against the reaction against the ruling revolutionary diplomacy." -Deng Xiaoping (1998)

The PRC national interest can be analysed in four dimensions; economic, political, security and ideological/cultural interest. According to Yan (1998, p 70), these interests have different layers to which they can be analysed. They can be analysed according to the outside environment, analysed in term of power, analysed in terms of foreign policy principle, analysed in terms of the level of science and technology, and finally analysed in terms of the comprehensive effectiveness. According to Yan (1998, p 73), economic interest is the highest priority, followed by political and thereafter security and cultural interest.

	External Environment	National power	Technological level	Subjective perception
Influence on economic interest	Severe Competition	Economic backwardness	Information wealth	Economy is fundamental
	Urgent	Urgent	Important	Important
Influence on security interests	No danger of war	3 rd largest military power	Poor military technology	Must unify the country
	Not urgent	Not urgent	Important	Important
Influence on political interests	Political democracy	Scarcity of political recourses	Information helps cooperation	Ideological disputes obsolete
	Urgent	Urgent	Second priority	Second priority
Influence on cultural interests	Cultural conflicts decrease	Cultural heritage strong	Acculturation increasing	Culture doesn't affect development much
	Not urgent	Not urgent	Second priority	Second priority

Figure 1. Environment, power, technology and knowledge on China's interest

Sources: Yan Xuetong (1998). *An Analysis of China's National Interests*. P 73.

Political Dimension: Following the end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union which led to change in global order, political struggle for superiority and alliance encroached the international political scene. According to Yan (1998 p 125), the international political struggle manifests itself in four ways. First, being the fight for sovereignty. Second, being sustaining political stability. Third, being power equality amongst large and small nations. Fourth, being protecting national economic and integrating into the global economic system. In his analysis which is still valid till date, the PRC's primary political interests include; maintaining national sovereignty, protecting the Chinese people's right and interest, establishing a new rational international order, and maintaining the PRC political interest in issues of ideology.

Economic Dimension: Prior to and during the last imperial dynasty (See Chapter 2, *People Republic of China Formation*), the ROC had maintained a close-door economic policy, which means it had minimal economic communication and connection with the outside world. Under pressure from western colonial powers, it adopted a foreign economy policy. Rather than promote its international interest, this policy was a disguise to limit the influence of foreign power on the ROC domestic affair. China's first step towards establishing an economic foreign interest was after the PRC was established. The Sino-Soviet spilt and cultural revolution saw a decline in its foreign economic activities until 1970s when the Sino-US relations was normalised and the *open-door* policy established during the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress in 1978 (Yan, 1998 p 77). Economic competition replaced political competition. Between 2001 and 2004, it joined the WTO, large-scale privatization occurs, tariffs, trade, and regulation were reduced. In 2005, it became Asia's largest economy. In 2011, the Chinese State

Council issued out a White paper *China's Peaceful Development* stating its core interest. Basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development was included in the white paper (Feng 2014). In conclusion, China's economic interest includes; foreign trade, absorption of foreign capitals, technological acquisition, international tourism, international contracting and labour export. In order to achieve its economic interest internationally, joining international economic community was a necessity to eliminate trade tariffs and trade wars. These led to the establishments (or joining in some cases) of special economic organisations and forums such as the 16+1, FOCAC, WTO, Shanghai Pact, BRICS and BRI, as well as overseas SEZs (Yan 1998; The Financial Express 2019).

Security National Interest: Yan (1998, p 100) points out five key security interest of the PRC. They include; avoiding a military clash, avoiding confrontation with the United States, establishing a collective system of cooperative security, maintaining stability in the region, maintaining nuclear capability and preventing nuclear proliferation, and building a strong military force the Chinese way. These interests still remain the same today. Avoiding military clash either with the United State or anyone tops its overall security interest. Considering its history with past wars, the PRC understands the consequence of any military clash no matter the scale. They understand its effects would weaken its economy drastically.

China still faces two potential military confrontation today, first with Taiwan and second with satellite states as a result of ongoing territorial dispute. Majority of these satellite states have close relations with the United States, as such, there is a power tilt there. Miles (2015) points, "the fact remains indisputable that the United States has been the most consequential superpower in the world for the last seven decades. Yet the supremacy of the United States in world affairs has not come as the result of a global military conquest, but rather as mainly an outcome of America's ability to use its superpower status and the ecumenical appeals of its political, economic, and cultural institutions, as well as its founding values, to forge an elaborate system of alliances worldwide against common threats, regional and global. This US-led alliance system has been the most effective guarantee and protection of international peace and global commons, including the freedom of navigation, free trade and flow of information, economic prosperity, and political democratization. At the core of this alliance system are the various collective defence arrangements Washington has signed with its allies, including the North Atlantic Treaty and various bilateral treaties with the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand, resulting in hundreds of thousands of America's soldiers being forward-deployed in the world's trouble spots since the end of World War II".

Military confrontation with Taiwan, India, countries at SCS and ECS would engrave great consequences politically and economically for the PRC. In Taiwan case, it would affect the PRC's policy of peaceful unification and economical trades on both sides would stop. It is worth knowing that over 58 percent of Taiwanese working abroad works in the PRC and trade between

both sides was valued at about \$198 billion with the PRC importing over \$152 billion of Taiwanese goods in 2014 (Yan 1998; Bai 2015).



Figure 2. Map of the face off in the South China Sea

Source: Bloomberg <https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/territorial-disputes>



Figure 3. Map of disagreements above the East China Sea

Sources: Bloomberg, defence ministries of China, South Korea, Taiwan. <https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/territorial-disputes>

In regard to its neighbours in the South China Sea and East China Sea, the damage will be much. Today, the PRC claims over eighty percent of South China Sea and has ongoing dispute with Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan at South China Sea. In the East China Sea, the ongoing territorial dispute is with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The dispute with Japan is the most dangerous because Japan has a mutual defence treaty with the United States which could embroil American forces. An attack on Japan would be an attack on the United States and these

could include the United States key allies such as United Kingdom and Israel which could drag the world into another World War. Also, the PRC and Japan are the world's second and third largest economies and it is Japan's biggest trade partner, not just Japan but Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam. Any mistake or clash will threaten regional and global security, for this fundamental reason, avoiding a military clash, avoiding confrontation with the United States, establishing a collective system of cooperative security, maintaining stability in the region are its core security national interest (Robert 1964; Yan 1998; David 2018; Richard 2018).

With the cold war over, preventing nuclear proliferation and maintaining its nuclear capabilities is yet another realist strategic interest of the PRC. Yan (1980, p 108) highlights three main reasons which it is important for the PRC to pursue this interest. First, nuclear power helps protect the PRC against invasion attempts as its neighbours are not predictable. Second, it helps maintain balance of power amongst other super powers. Third, nuclear power is an important factor in maintaining the PRC's status as a great power. The PRC in 2003 sent a strong message to the whole world when it became the third country to independently send its astronauts into space on board its own rocket. This demonstrated the advancement in its space and rocket programs. The size of the PRC's nuclear force is still a factor of debate in the international community due to the secrecy. Reports by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004 stated that it has the smallest nuclear arsenal, even fewer than the United Kingdom's 200 nuclear weapons and in 2013, the United States Department of Defence congressional report stated that China has between 50 – 70 ICBMs. In realist camp, having nuclear weapon is best to ensure a nation state's security.

China is also increasing its space interest and program significantly as analysts from the People's Liberation Army suggest that future adversaries would enter war with high-tech systems supported by space-based information systems. Also, in safeguarding its national security interest, it is enhancing its military diplomacy, engaging more with regional security institutions, participating in peacekeeping operations and combined exercises with foreign militaries in order to shape its security environment.

Cultural Dimension: The PRC's traditional values and culture has influence on the country's national interest and foreign policy, this influence sometime is direct and indirect. Yan (1998, p 142) wrote, "Culture cannot change the objective world in a direct manner, but it can transform people. In turn, people will change the objective world through their perception of it. It is in this sense that cultural interests ought not to be treated lightly." The PRC's cultural national interest includes; fostering national identity, fostering social morality, reviving the tradition of respecting knowledge and rejuvenating Chinese culture. With the end of the cold war, coupled with initiation of modernization reforms and *open up policy*, the PRC government felt its culture was under threat of influence internally (ethnic separatism, e.g Tibet case) and externally (westernization). As such, it began the promotion of modern nationalism instead of traditional nationalism and introduction of Confucian humanism and its doctrine of benevolence as a governing philosophy.

In conclusion, according to the 2011 *Peaceful Development White Paper*, its overall core interest includes; security, sovereignty and development. Security includes maintenance of its political systems as defined in the CPC rule, as well as protection against terrorism and foreign attacks. Development here means the access to resources and goods needed to sustain its economy, and economic growth. Sovereignty here basically refers to the country's ability to exercise its authority over all geographical area it claims. During the 2015 United Nations General Assembly, President Xi Jinping summarized China's stance on sovereignty, he said "The principle of sovereignty not only means that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries are inviolable, and their internal affairs are not subjected to interference. It also means that all countries' right to independently choose social systems and development paths should be upheld, and that all countries' endeavours to promote economic and social development and improve their people's lives should be respected" (Astrid, Michael, and Timothy and 2018 p 15).

2.3 CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND COOPERATION

Universally, there is no single agreed definition of foreign policy. However, *Foreign Policy* magazine defines foreign policy as "a set of political goals that seeks to outline how a particular country will interact with the other countries of the world. Foreign policies generally are designed to help protect a country's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. This can occur as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through aggression, war, and exploitation. Creating foreign policy is usually the job of the head of government and the foreign minister (or equivalent)." From our working definition above, one can see that a country's foreign policy is designed to help protect and promote its national interest and values, national interest often shapes its foreign policy and vice-versa.

The PRC's rise within the international system from years of political and economic isolation over the past decades has been a valid indication of changes in global relations. Simultaneously with its rise, its foreign policy over the past decades has evolved to accommodate its status as a global power and best serve its national interest. These changes notably include; First, expansions of agents involved in formulation of its foreign policy and secondly, the scope of interest, i.e. moving from regional interest to establishing more international relations. Understanding the PRC's foreign policy means; First, to know and understand the impact of what the Chinese call 'century of humiliation' i.e. the period in which the PRC suffered and was dominated by the West and imperial Japan aggression (please refer to the subchapter, *People's Republic of China formation*). Second, is to answer the following questions. Who decides China's foreign policy and what its objectives, priorities and strategies are?

Who decides China's foreign policy?

Officially, they are three main actors or what some literature will call *agents* that are involved in making the PRC foreign policy. They include; the CPC (exerts supreme authority), the State Council (through government structures), and the PLA which continues to shape the Chinese foreign policy in area of security and military (Mikael 2015). David (2013) was able to give an up to date conceptualisations of the PRC's foreign policy decision making. As summarised by Mikael (2015), the foreign policy process consist of five concentric circles. They include; senior leaders, ministries, intelligence organs, localities and corporation and finally the society.

In David (2013) conceptualisation, only the senior leaders and the ministries make the decision, the other three only influences these decisions. The senior leaders include; President, Premier, head of the National People's Congress, and head of the Chinese's People's Political Consultative Committee. At ministries level, they include; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Concerning the role and influence of the FMPRC, Lanteigne (2013, p 26) wrote "the FMPRC is China's leading foreign policy body and has been charged with interpreting and often substantiating policy decisions made by the country's leadership, and the FMPRC has become increasingly important as an information source to policymakers as China's foreign policy deepens and diversifies. While the central decision-makers in the CCP often create and promote policy for engaging states of central importance to Beijing, including the United States, Russia, the European Union and Japan, as well as China's immediate neighbours, the FMPRC oversees more routine, low-level decision-making, including policies towards smaller states." That being said, it is clear that the CPC has an omnipresent role in all of the PRC's policymaking, both domestic and foreign. The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) which consist of seven members including the president and the State Council set the strategic guidelines and long-term policy goals of China's foreign affairs (LSE 2017).

What its objectives and strategies are?

During the 19th CPC National Congress that opened on October 2017, President Xi in his speech declared that *socialism with Chinese characteristics has ushered in a new era*. He made it known that PRC would no longer shy away from global leadership and would promote its economic model globally. His speech signalled the PRC's departure from Deng Xiaoping's doctrine of *hide your strength and bide your time* which has guided Chinese foreign policy during its emergence from period of isolation into its emergence as a global economic power (Xie 2017). The primary purpose of the PRC foreign policy remains the maintenance of the CPC absolute control and legitimacy to govern, and that economic and social stability remains the core concern of the party's leadership according to the London School of Economics foreign policy think tank, *LSE Ideas*. In clearer terms, its foreign policy objectives include safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty (including reducing Taiwan's international space), creating an international

environment favourable to its reform, opening and modernization efforts, and finally maintaining world peace and promoting common (FMPRC 2015). In order to achieve its foreign policy objects, it has adopted a *win-win all around diplomacy* strategy, which involves establishing and strengthening diplomatic relations with all nations (developed and developing), embracing all modes of international interactions (bilateral, multilateral, regional and organisational) within the political, economic, military, tourism, cultural, educational and science/technology sectors (Evan 2009).

2.4 SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS

Historically, the Sino-African relations origin can be traced to the fifteenth century when Chinese merchant (Zheng He) explored the shores of East Africa for trade related purpose, fifty years before the Portuguese (Innocent 2016). Modern relations between the Africa and China began during the wake of decolonization in Africa. Historical overview of the Sino-African relations can be viewed in four distinct periods, they include; Maoist era, Economic Reform period, Post-Cold War period and Twenty-First century period.

Maoist Period Sino-African Relations: During this period (1950s till 1970s), the continent grew in important to China as Mao began distancing China from its pro-Soviet policy of *leaning to one side* as a result of the Sino-Soviet split and instead moved towards a more *three world's* approach (Marc 2009 p.132). His focus was to establish a relationship opposite to colonialism and imperialism as practised by the West, by stressing on mutual benefits, partnership and trade. Mao saw China being not just a part of the third world, but also a friend and leader since majority of third world countries were developing countries. Mao in his famous 1959 speech described Africa as an important player in the fight against imperialism and pledge to stand by Africa's side in her fight for independence. In 1964, China announced the *Eight Principles on Economic and Technical Aid* which included financial, military and medical aid given to Africa during her independence movement (Marc 2009 p.133; David & Joshua 2012). During this period, China launched its first major project of assistance to Africa which was the \$500 million Tanzania-Zambia railway. In appreciation of China's aid, assistance and support, majority of the African states mounted pressure and voted in support of the PRC to be the sole official representative of China to the UN. In conclusion, the key objectives behind Sino-African relations during the Maoist era was China's need to break international isolation, battle the Soviet Union for primacy in the world's communist movement, and displace Taiwan as the internationally recognized government of China (David & Joshua 2012).

Economic reform period Sino-African Relations: Following Mao's death and the PRC political success at the UN, there was a modest reduction in China's economic aid, trade and medical team sent in Africa. The twelfth National Congress of the CPC in 1982 marked a shift in the PRC foreign

policy from *war and revolution to peace and development*. Domestic economic reform and modernization, as well as establishing new diplomatic relations became the PRC's priority between 1980s and early 1990s (David & Joshua 2012 p. 43, 45). According to China's leading Africanist, He Weping, she said China no longer developed relations with African countries based on ideology, also it moved away from loans and emphasized on other forms of development cooperation of mutual benefits. In conclusion, by the end of the decade, 48 African countries recognised the PRC and China's relations with Africa significantly shifted from ideological/political to the economic arena (David & Joshua 2012 p. 44)

Post-Cold War period Sino-African Relations: Two events presented an opportunity to rejuvenate the Sino-African relations during this period. First was the international isolation and Western sanctions China faced following its harsh repression of the protests in Tiananmen Square. Second was the end of the East-West competition in Africa following the end of the cold war and breakup of the Soviet Union. In regard to the first, response from its *African brothers* to Tiananmen Square served as a relief and international solidarity of support for the PRC as it was highly concerned of Africa's reaction. Angola's foreign minister, Namibia's president, and Burkina Faso's president who at that time still recognized the ROC publicly supported the PRC. Botswana opened its first Asian embassy in Beijing in 1991, reaction from North African countries suggested the PRC's response to the protest was a necessary and understandable response by a legitimate government who felt threatened. In regard to the second, former Soviet countries decreased its interest, donations and commitment in Africa. China explored this opportunity by initiating a more normal relationship based on economic interaction. Sino-Africa trade grew from about \$1 billion at the end of the 1980s to about \$6 billion at the end of the 1990s and China's investments reached almost \$4 billion. (David & Joshua 2012 p. 45, 46, 47). In conclusion, it was clear that their relations were no longer base on emotions, but instead largely replaced by economic dimension (Marc 2009 p.134).

Twenty-First century Sino-African Relations: The twenty-first century ushered in a rapid growing tie between China and the African continent. To effectively coordinate their relationship in the twenty-first century, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2000 as a multilateral, diplomatic and consultative mechanism. More about FOCAC will be discussed in the next chapter. In 2006, China published a white paper titled *China's African Policy*, which stated its general principle and objectives. In 2009 it became Africa's largest trading partner with trades reaching over \$128.5 billion. In 2009, China donated \$200 million to help build the African Union Conference Centre and Office Complex (AUCCC). Also, China as increase it military force in the continent through the UN peacekeeping program. (David & Joshua 2012 p. 52; BBC 2012). Huge trades deals, infrastructure investments, and aids packages has been the core of their twenty-first century relations. China's deepened economic activities has caught the world's attention, with many literatures and commentaries implying it is a new *scramble for Africa*.

According to David & Joshua (2012 p. 52), China's increasing pragmatic approach to Africa makes every effort to appear nonthreatening. China is sensitive that its enormous economic power and growing military strength has the potential to worry mostly small, poor, and weak African countries. Hence, it constantly describes its trade, aid, and investment activities in Africa as a *win-win* strategy.

Overall discussion of Chapter 2

An in-depth view of the PRC's history, its national interest, foreign policy, as well as an historical overview of Sino-Africa relations has been made. The primary for focusing on China in this chapter was to paint a clearer picture and understand the motives and factors amounting to China's rise and *China in Africa*. It is clear the century of humiliation, international sanctions, international isolations, colonial history have without doubt played a role in China's rise and entry into Africa. My goal in next chapter is to primarily investigate;

- If China's involvements and activities in Africa presents an opportunity for Africa to become a *game changer* at the expense of its relationship with China since China postulates a win-win strategy.
- Or if China is solely using Africa to consolidate global influence, as well as sustain its over one billion population by further exploiting Africa of her natural resources like the West did during colonial times.

Literatures, debates, and commentaries have argued in favour and against *Africa becoming China's new China*. Matter of fact, this argument has dominated the discourse of Sino-African relations in foreign media. Renowned Ghanaian economist and author George Ayittey said "there's a belief that since Africa got a raw deal from the colonial West, then the Chinese must be Africa's best friend. But the evidence doesn't show that, and the main criticism is that they are building infrastructure in exchange for Africa's resources in deals that are structured to favour China".

Key Findings

- China has over the past decades grown to become not just a regional power but global power. It has survived wars, political and economic isolations as well as sanctions, and has enormously challenged western powers by increasing its global influence.
- China's core interest includes; security, sovereignty and development according to the 2011 *Peaceful Development White Paper*.
- The PSC designs the PRC's foreign policy and the FMPRC are responsible for interpreting it in the international political arena.
- The core objectives of the Chinese foreign policy include; safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty (including reducing Taiwan's international space),

creating an international environment favourable to its reform, opening and modernization efforts, and maintaining world peace and promoting common

- Sino-African relations has significantly changed from ideological dimension during the Maoist era to economic dimension in the wake of the twenty-first century.
- China decides when as well as which areas it wants to cooperate with Africa. This can be seen during the historical overview of the Sino-African relations.
- China has paved way for African countries to become significant in international issues, and in turn, Africa uses its global political influence within International Organizations as a leverage against China.

3. CHINA IN AFRICA

“China will work shoulder to shoulder with African countries as equals” – Li Keqiang

3.1 CHINA’S RENEWED INTEREST IN AFRICA

China says its relations are based on the principle of mutual trust, political equality and a win-win socio-economic partnership. It openly rejects the importance of Africa’s raw materials as its core interests.

“I can tell you that China has dealt with the African people in the poorest time and assisted Africa unselfishly. We have not taken a drop of oil from Africa and pulled a ton of ore. China is now stronger than in the past, and our assistance to Africa remains selfless. If you look through the information, the countries that get the most resources and oil from Africa through various transactions are by no means China.” -Premier Wen Jibao, 2011 Summer Davos Forum.

Premier Wen Jibao’s words indicate that China’s relation and interest in Africa is firstly based on political tie rather than for economic benefit. How true is that? Can there be other reasons for this renewed interest? Counterarguments say despite Africa’s political importance, China has increased its economic priorities to a much higher level in its domestic and foreign agenda (Yun 2014). To explore the rhetorical questions I made above, reanalysis of the dimensions of the PRC’s national interest as well as its foreign policy in the African context is necessary.

Political Dimension: China’s political interest with Africa mainly stems from its need of Africa’s support when it comes to international political matters. Currently, the 54 African states account for more than a quarter of the UN member state as well as vote, and this provides the PRC with a tremendous advantage. The PRC admission into the UN in 1971 affirmed Africa’s importance. Premier Wen Jibao during the 2011 Summer Davos Forum would confirm Africa’s role in the PRC admission into the UN when he said “we cannot forget that it is the African countries that strongly supported the restoration of the legal status of the PRC in the United Nations. We have said this before: it is African friends who have brought China into the United Nations.” The PRC’s primary political interest in Africa are; enhancing the PRC international image and influence, isolation of Taiwan, countering problematic international norms (e.g. in human right and separatist related issues), and political stability of its economic partners i.e. political stability of the African countries in which it currently has economic activities going in (Lloyd 2015).

Economic Dimension: China’s enormous population and economic growth in the last century meant it had to seek resources for its growing domestic consumption as well as opportunities for both state owned and private companies to compete in the global economy market. According to Lloyd (2015), China’s three economic interest in Africa includes; a source for natural resource imports, a growing and relatively underutilized market for exports and investment, and an

opportunity for Chinese firms to increase employment and gain global experience. More about China's economic interest and activities will be analysed in the later part of the thesis.

Security Dimension: Before now, the PRC security interest in Africa was mostly driven by its support of Africa's independence movement during the Maoist era, as well as its need to protect its foreign economic assets and diaspora during the *go out policy*. Today, its security interest is also driven by its goal to increase its political influence abroad (projecting itself as a responsible super power) and give its troops combat experience. In regard to that, the PRC has increased its peacekeeping troops worldwide with majority stationed in African countries. In 2017, it established its first overseas military base in Djibouti which the PRC describes as a naval support for anti-piracy operations and peacekeeping/humanitarian (co)operations in the Horn of Africa. Its security interest in the continent was taken to another level when the first China-Africa Defence and Security Forum, held in the summer of 2018. The forum brought top military officials from 50 African states to China to discuss regional security and military cooperation, as well as demonstrate its military equipment. Though the PRC is far behind western militaries, it is expanding its bilateral military diplomacy and security interest in Africa (Lloyd 2015; International Crisis Group 2018; Niall 2018; MOD 2018; The Washington Post 2018).

Cultural (and Ideological) Dimension: Ideological interest was the most active part of the PRC interest in Africa in the past. Its ideological interest during the Maoist era brought China to Africa's doorstep. The PRC's first aid to Africa during the Maoist era highly reflected ideological interest, this ideological interest was an effort by Mao to counter American and Soviet influence which it described as imperialism, colonialism and revisionism, and to increase the PRC international influence as well as its communist style. Following Mao's death, this ideological interest which shaped the first stage of its relations with Africa came to an end (Deborah 2009 p32; George 2009 p10; David & Joshua 2012). Following its *go out policy*, its ideological interest though different from Maoist style has been rejuvenated in a minimal form. This interest primarily lies in the CPC's need to establish and reinforce the legitimacy of its leadership style development model because Western countries consider it an authoritarian regime. According to Pew Research Centre, which is a nonpartisan American fact tank, Africa holds a favourable view of China than in other parts of the world. Cultural interest has dominated its ideological interest. Its cultural interest lies in the PRC's soft power strategy which primarily includes establishing Confucius institutions, education and cultural exchange programs, and media outlets.

- **Confucius Institutions:** As part of the PRC soft power strategy and cultural interest in Africa, several Confucius institutions have been established in some African countries. These institutions are models same way as western cultural institution. There, the Chinese language and culture is taught and promoted among Africans. In May 2018, the annual Joint Conference of Confucius Institute in Africa took place in Mozambique and was attended by

300 delegates from 40 African countries. The Confucius institutions, as well as conferences like this are fully funded by the PRC (African Center 2018; CFR 2018).

- Education exchange: Recent years has seen educational exchange between Chinese and African students. China has become one of the top international locations for Africa students. Though majority are self-funded, the China Scholarship Council also provides annual sponsorships some African students as well as Chinese students in Africa. In addition to that, the PRC also trains several administrative and government officials annually in some African States (African Center 2018; CFR 2018).
- Chinese media outlets: As a result of the PRC heighten economic activities in Africa, it has paved way for its media Channel to operate in Africa and vice-versa. It is using the media outlets to promote its culture and control the narratives about the PRC by airing Chinese films, art and music (African Center 2018; CFR 2018).

3.2 CHINA'S AFRICA'S POLICY AND COOPERATION

3.2.1. CHINA'S AFRICA'S POLICY

In 2006, China published its first African policy paper titled *China's African policy*. Highlighted was its principles and objectives regarding its foreign policy towards Africa. It includes;

- Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity.
- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African countries' endeavour for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.
- Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.
- Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.

The paper also highlighted areas and how Sino-African relations can be further enhanced. It includes;

- **In political field:** High-level visits, exchange between legislative, exchange between political parties, consultation mechanism, cooperation in international affairs, and exchange between local governments.
- **In economic field:** trade, investments, financial cooperation, agriculture cooperation, infrastructure, resources cooperation, tourism cooperation, debt reduction and relief, economic assistance, and multilateral cooperation.
- **In Education, science, culture, health and social aspects:** cooperation in human resources development and education, science and technology cooperation, cultural exchanges, medical and health cooperation, media cooperation, administrative cooperation, consular cooperation, people-to-people exchange, environmental cooperation, disaster reduction, and relief and humanitarian assistance.
- **In Peace and security:** military cooperation, conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations, judicial and police cooperation, and non-traditional security areas.

Academics and analyst have come up with two remarkable observations in regard to China's foreign policy towards Africa. First, little changes in China's African policy. Second, Africa is a way lesser priority to China's overall foreign policy. In regard to the first observation, there have been no significant change in its policy towards Africa. The 2015 *African policy Paper* is not different from the first published in 2006. The significant difference is the inclusion of environmental and military related areas of cooperation. In regard to the second observation, China's foreign policy first prioritize relations with its neighbours such as East/South Asian countries as well as big powers such as the United States, Europe and Russian because they have an overall impact on its national interest. This is true because from one angle, they have smoother relations and Africa is of no direct threat. Africa according to this observation is a *foundation* rather than an *end* to China's relationship with *more important* part of the world. From another angle, Africa is still China's least trading partners after Latin America. In 2018, China's trade with Africa was a little over 4%, while fellow Asian countries accounted for 47.8%, 22.4% to North America and 19.1% to Europe. From the third angle, Africa constitutes the least priority because it constitutes a small percentage of China's overall foreign economic activities (Yun 2014; WTEEx 2019).

According to Yun (2014 p 18), some Chinese analysts have criticized the low priority of Africa in Beijing's global strategy. They call for a new understanding of the dynamics among the "key" (great powers), the "priority" (the periphery), and the "foundation" (developing countries) in China's foreign policy, and demand that China view Africa from a more strategic perspective and give it more attention. Liu Hongwu, the dean of School of Africa Studies at Zhejiang Normal University, argued that developing countries (Africa) are the strategic support, foundation and prerequisite for China's better relationship with great powers and its neighbours. Thus, Africa is

a “long-term and strategic” factor, since China will always rely on Africa for support, while the “key and priority” of China’s foreign policy are “temporary” and “ephemeral.”

3.2.2. FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (FOCAC)

During President Jiang Zemin’s visit to some African countries in 1996, the *five-point proposal* was presented for developing a long and stable Sino-African relation. The proposal included; fostering sincere friendship, common development on the basis of mutual benefit, the enhancement of consultation and co-operation in global affairs, the long-term creation of a more splendid world through a just and fair new economic and political international order, and interaction based on equality, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. His new proposal would later lead to the establishment of FOCAC. Though China pursues its interest and implement areas of its foreign policy towards Africa on bilateral level, FOCAC has been the centrepiece of its multilateral engagement with African countries (including the African Union and excluding Eswatini, since it still recognises the ROC). Founded in 2000, FOCAC as described by the AU is a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective consultation and dialogue, and as a cooperation mechanism among developing countries. Its objective is to strengthen China-Africa economic cooperation and trade relations, as well as to establish a new order that better reflect the needs and interest of China and Africa (Garth 2005; Tara 2016).

“FOCAC was originally conceived as a mechanism to strengthen and consolidate Sino-African relations. By the end of the 1990s China had provided economic aid in one form or another to almost every African country and was involved in over 800 construction projects. However, in terms of trade and investment China–Africa interaction was still limited, making up less than 2 per cent of China’s global trade. Therefore, a mechanism was needed to advance economic links to supplement China’s bilateral engagement with the continent. It was envisaged that China and Africa would be able to jointly meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world and globalization through a formal diplomatic process. Strengthening and formalizing Sino-African relations through FOCAC was widely welcomed in Africa, for as many African leaders have pointed out, China and Africa have no essential conflict of interest, and the historical relationship is viewed as a positive foundation for closer cooperation” - Garth and Farhana (2008)

FOCAC’s Operating Mechanism

To ensure smooth operations, multi-level interactions occur between China and African countries. Interaction between Heads of States constitutes the core level of interaction.

Interaction between Senior Officials who are responsible for negotiation and discussion constitutes the second level. Interaction between diplomats and host countries constitute the third level. (Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, & He 2012).

In regard to the decision-making procedure, both parties make proposals, renegotiate and implement it. To follow upon mutually agreed agendas, the Chinese Follow-up Action Committee takes the leading role. It consists of 33 members departments/agencies and is responsible for coordinating with the diplomats from African countries by holding consultations. (Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, & He 2012; FOCAC 2018).




Figure 4. Decision-making procedure of FOCAC

Source: FOCAC Twelve Years Later Achievements, Challenges and the Way Forward (Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, & He 2012)

According to Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, and He (2012), “this approach indicated an initial lack of experience in the Chinese Follow-up Action Committee, which at the FOCAC preparation stage was reliant on the Department of Africa operating under the FMPRC and still lacked the experience to deal with multilateral international mechanisms. Thus, it worked on the premise that direct contact with the African diplomatic corps was a communications shortcut, but it soon learned that this approach did not necessarily yield the expected ‘one voice’ response. This experience taught the Chinese that African diplomats do not always represent the ideas, views and vision of their home countries. Although they understood the situation in China, since they live in Beijing, this does not necessarily mean their home officials share this understanding. The committee thus decided to readjust its approach to maintain extensive and multi-level communications. This is another example of *crossing the river by groping for stones* and shows how FOCAC is constantly changing and improving its working processes.” A careful look into the

operating mechanism surely indicates that FOCAC is China driven. This fully attest to one of the key findings made in previous chapter, *China decides when as well as which areas it wants to cooperate with Africa*.

FOCAC Meetings and Outcomes

FOCAC 2000: The first ministerial conference held in Beijing from the 10th to 12th October 2000. The conference charted the direction for the development of a new, stable and long-term partnership featuring equality and mutual benefit between China and African countries (FMPRC 2004). In President Jiang's speech at the opening ceremony, he recommended that China and Africa make concerted efforts to establish a new international political and economic order by; taking part in international affairs on the basis of equality and in an enterprising spirit, strengthening solidarity and actively promoting South-South cooperation, enhancing dialogue and improving North-South relations, and looking forward into the future and establishing a new long-term stable partnership of equality and mutual benefit. The first meeting was focused on developing a common approach for dealing with the post-Cold War international system and the strengthening of China–Africa trade and investment links. From Africa's perspective, FOCAC was seen as an important opportunity to consolidate China-Africa political cooperation, build a partnership and enlarge the scope of commercial and cultural interaction to promote modernization. From China's perspective, it was for facilitating collective consultation and working together through pragmatic cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit (Garth & Farhana 2008). The key outcome includes;

- China was confirmed as an attractive partner for Africa.
- The *Beijing Declaration and the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development* was adopted
- Bilateral investment agreements were concluded with 20 African countries and investment promotion centres established in 11 African countries.
- China cancelled debt of up to \$1.3 billion to 31 African countries.
- The China-Africa Business Council (CABC) was established, as well as the African Human Resources Development Fund (AHRDF).
- China strengthened its political support for the AU and NEPAD.

FOCAC 2003: Themed “*Carrying out practical cooperation and taking specific actions*”, the Second Ministerial meeting held alongside the first China-Africa Business Conference in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) from the 15th to 16th December 2003 (FMPRC 2004). Premier Wen, in his speech proposed a *Four-Point Proposal* on how to further strengthen and consolidate the Sino-Africa relation through mutual support, democratization of international relations through intensified consultation, challenged of globalization through coordination of positions, and

enhanced cooperation at all levels. He also announced China's intention to increase aid to Africa within the FOCAC framework and promised to expand the opening of China's market to Africa and increase Chinese companies' investment in Africa. He concluded his speech with a call for China and Africa to strengthen their cooperation and build new long-term relationship based on common interest and objectives (FMPRC 2004; Garth & Farhana 2008).

The purpose of the conference was to review progress of the first conference as well as outline new and more focused action plan in the *Addis Ababa Action Plan* (2004–2006). The Chinese government made the following commitments;

- China will continue to increase assistance to African countries under the FOCAC framework.
- China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in human resources development and train up to 10,000 African personnel in different fields in three years.
- China will open market and grant tariff-free market access to some commodities from the least developed countries in Africa.
- China will expand tourism cooperation with Africa and give 8 African countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Tunisia, the approved destination status for outbound Chinese tourists who cover their own travel expenses.
- China will sponsor *Meet in Beijing* - an international art festival focusing on African arts and the "Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa".
- China will increase people-to-people exchanges with Africa and propose a "China-Africa Youth Festival" to be held in China in 2004.

According to Garth and Farhana (2008), the 2003 conference confirmed China's long term interest in Africa such as; access to Africa's raw materials, access by Africa's markets to Chinese-manufactured products, African support in the UN, African support for China's *anti-hegemonism*, promoting the idea of 'equal treatment' in international relations, and advancing the 'one-China' policy, all of which I mentioned earlier when classifying the four dimensions of China's interest in Africa.

FOCAC 2006: Themed "*Friendship, peace, cooperation and development*", the third Ministerial meeting held in Beijing from 3rd to 5th November and China declared 2006 an *Africa year*. 2006 marked 50 years since diplomatic relations was established with each other, as such, speeches, activities and remarks were centred on strategic partnership and deepening relations between China and Africa countries. President Hu Jintao in his speech laid more emphasis on the long history of China-Africa cooperation in the struggle for liberation and their common objective in regard to economic development and prosperity of its people. The highlight of the summit included; publication of China's first African policy paper, enhanced South-South cooperation to advance coordinated and sustainable economic development, a united African commitment to

the 'one-China' policy, trade expansion, new investments, and 26 African countries granted approved destination status (ADS) for inbound Chinese tourism. In general, FOCAC 2006 confirmed priorities of the earlier meetings and provided an expanded and comprehensive agenda for the future of Sino-African relations as well as the adoption of the *Declaration of the Beijing Summit and Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)* and establishment of a new type of *strategic partnership* between China and Africa featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges. (Garth & Farhana 2008; Johanna 2009; FMPRC 2006).

FOCAC 2009: Themed “*Deepening the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership for sustainable development*”, the fourth ministerial conference held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt from 8th to 9th November with ministers and representatives from China and 49 African countries in attendance. Premier Wen in his speech said Chinese people cherish the sincere friendship towards the African people, and China's support for Africa's development is concrete and real. He went further to reaffirm China's commitment to Africa by saying “whatever change may take place in the world, our policy of supporting Africa's economic and social development will not change”. African leaders showered the Chinese leader with praises. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe said, a number of countries in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa region have achieved significant progress in their trade exchanges with China, mainly due to the Chinese measures to increase the number of exported items receiving duty-free entry into their markets, while Al-Bashir of Sudan said, China has fulfilled its commitments made at the 2006 Beijing Summit to assist Africa in the fields of energy, roads and infrastructure, as well as in the critical area of fighting against serious diseases. Key outcome from the conference included \$10 billion preferential loans to African countries, \$1billion for African SMEs, and food security, agriculture and infrastructure plans (FMPRC 2009).

FOCAC 2012: Themed “*Build on past achievements and open up new prospects for the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership*”, the fifth ministerial conference held in Beijing between 19th and 20th July 2012. The conference was attended by President Hu of China, the UN secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Chairman of the Commission of the AU, several African Heads of States/Governments and ministers from about 50 African countries (FMPRC 2012). President Hu in his speech said, “In the next three years, the Chinese government will take measures in the following five priority areas to support the cause of peace and development in Africa and boost a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership”. The areas include; expanding cooperation in investment and financing to support sustainable development in Africa, continued increase of assistance to Africa to bring the benefits of development to the African people, the support African integration process through a partnership on transnational and trans-regional infrastructure development and trade, enhancing *China-Africa people-to-people friendship action* to support and promote exchanges and cooperation between people's organizations,

women, youth, academia and the media of the two sides, and promoting peace and stability in Africa by launching the “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security”, deepening cooperation with the AU and African countries in peace and security in Africa, provide financial support and training for AU peace-keeping missions. The key outcome from the conference was the \$20 billion in new credit line to African countries.

FOCAC 2015: Themed “*China-Africa progressing together: win-win cooperation for common development*”, the second summit and sixth ministerial conference held between 4th and 5th December 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa, with over 30 African Heads of State/Government in attendance. 2015 marked 60 years of Sino-African relations and FOCAC 2015 was President Xi Jinping’s first as president. The most significant highlight of the summit was the speech by President Xi of which he continuously laid emphasis on Sino-African relations, and China’s engagement in a win-win multilateral cooperation of equal partners aimed at capacity building and green sustainable development. “China-Africa relations have today reached a stage of growth unmatched in history,” President Xi told African leaders at the summit, “Let’s join hands and open a new era of China-Africa win-win cooperation and common development” (FMPRC 2015; Monika 2016). President Xi also announced the upgrading from *New-type Strategic Partnership* established in 2006 to a *Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership* to conduct *10 Major China-Africa Cooperation Plans* so as to create a blueprint for China-Africa practical cooperation and usher in a new chapter in Sino-African partnership. The areas of the 10 major China-Africa cooperation plans include areas of; industrialization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, financial services, green development, trade and investment facilitation, poverty reduction and public welfare, public health, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security. In respect of economic and trade domains, China and Africa intend to implement cooperation in industrialization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, green development, trade and investment facilitation, poverty reduction and public welfare, and public health (MOFCOM 2015). Key outcomes include; financial assistance package of \$60 billion announced by President Xi, BRI, infrastructure development agreements through PPPs and B-O-T, and access to satellite Tv for 10,000 villages in African countries.

FOCAC 2018: Themed “*China and Africa: Toward an Even Stronger Community with a Shared Future through Win-Win Cooperation*”, the third summit took place between 3rd and 4th September 2018 in Beijing, China. Prior to the summit, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Burkina Faso joined FOCAC as new members leaving only Eswatini as the lone African country still recognising the ROC. In attendance for the FOCAC summit were about 51 African Leaders as compared to 27 African leaders who attended the UNGA later the same month. The near-universal attendance s a feather in China’s cap (Abdi 2018; Shannon 2018).

“China pursues common interests and puts friendship first in pursuing cooperation. China believes that the sure way to boost China-Africa cooperation is for both sides to leverage its

respective strength; it is for China to complement Africa's development through its own growth, and it is for both China and Africa to pursue win-win cooperation and common development. In doing so, China follows the principle of giving more and taking less, giving before taking and giving without asking for return. With open arms, we welcome African countries aboard the express train of China's development. No one could hold back the Chinese people or the African people as we march toward rejuvenation” said President Xi in his keynote speech. “China and African countries are willing to enhance the alignment of strategies and policy coordination, push forward the joint development of the Belt and Road, and closely align the Belt and Road Initiative with the African Union Agenda 2063, the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the development strategies of African countries” President Xi added. FOCAC 2018 was a showcase for Beijing in regard to its growing influence in world order, the disparities in attendance between FOCAC 2018 summit and UNGA point to the shifting dynamics and priorities of the African continent (Abdi 2018). Key outcome from the summit included the announcement of the eight major initiatives for future China-Africa cooperation, announcement of \$60 billion in new financing for Africa, and adoption of the *Beijing Action Plan (2019 – 2021)* (BRICS Journal 2018; Shannon 2018; Xinhua 2018).

Next FOCAC summit is scheduled to hold in 2021 in Dakar, Senegal.

3.3 TRADE, INVESTMENT AND AID FLOW TO AFRICA

“Profit is not the first consideration, friendship is” – Zhou Enlai

Recent decades have seen trade, investments and aid increase in volume from millions to billions USD as a result of China’s increasing demand for raw materials, relatively cheap labour, China’s pursuit of being a global responsible power as well as Africa’s demand for affordable consumer products and capital. Due to lack of reliable and consistent data as the data is mostly from the Chinese side, there may be some limitations to exact accuracy of the figures in regard to aid.

3.3.1 TRADE

African Independence Era (1955 – 1966): Due to European colonial dominance of African countries prior to independence struggle, China’s trade with the continent in the late 1940’s and early 50’s with China was significantly little (less than \$20 million). With extension of its political relations and slow demand in western market, China-Africa trade began expanding. During this period, an agreement was reached between Egypt and China to establish trades offices in respective capital for three years, the Chinese trade office which opened in Cairo in 1956 would later become the centre of the CPC’s political outreach to African liberation movement. In 1966 China-Africa trade had reach a total of \$246.7 million (export to China \$87.5 million, import from China \$159.2 million) compared to \$50 million (export to China \$27 million, import from China \$23 million) in 1955. Most of its trades with the continent served to build goodwill and a means

to expand its relations with newly independent states rather than meeting actual market demand (David & Joshua 2012 p. 104, 105).

Cultural Revolution and Pre-economic Reform (1967 – 1977): Officially the Chinese cultural revolution began in 1965, at this point, African countries export to China was worth \$130.9 million and import \$125.4 million, however this figure fell due to Mao's political reform. By 1968, total China-Africa trade was at \$133.2 million compared to \$256.3 million in 1965. Due to increasing international isolation as a result of the cultural revolution, by 1971, China-Africa trade increased significantly to a staggering \$440.1 million. It was 1.7 percent of Africa's total foreign trade and 11.5% of China's total foreign trade. After accession into the UN, China's total foreign trade grew from \$3.8 billion in 1971 to \$11.9 billion in 1974. Domestic stability, depreciation of the U.S dollar and repair of the China-US relations, and new diplomatic relations was the main cause of this rapid increase in its overall foreign trade. In regard to Africa, though their trade rose to \$769 million in 1974 as compared to \$440.1 in 1971, by 1976 China-Africa fell to \$707 million. (Deborah 2009; David & Joshua 2012 p. 108).

Economic Reform Era (1978 – 1999): China's priorities during its economic reform era had shifted and moved away Africa. China's *open-door policy* designed to attract foreign trade, investment and joint ventures from Western and Asian countries couple with its interest in joining the WTO had move China closer to a market economy where profits and not political/ideological agenda became the basis for trade and economic activities (Robert 2008 p 51). By 1978, China-Africa total trade was \$918 million, in the 80s the figure fell significantly but by the end of 1999, the figure rose to almost \$7 billion. Also, during this time frame, China's total foreign trade grew from \$20.7 billion to about \$474.4 billion while Africa's total foreign trade grew at much slower pace from \$122 billion to \$287 billion. In conclusion, during this era, China had indeed gone from being anticolonial brothers-in-arms to economic and trade partners based on market principles and this highly has influence China-Africa trade characteristics in the FOCAC era (Robert 2008 p 52; David & Joshua 2012 p. 113).

FOCAC era (2000 – Present): Two significant incidents occurred in China during the economic reform era which would later shape China-Africa trade relations in the FOCAC era. They include: China's accumulation of enormous capital and wealth, and China's Increased domestic consumption rate and population. In regard to the two points raised, China saw Africa as the right destination to invest its enormous wealth as the continent was capital poor and labour was relatively cheap. Also, its natural resources and raw materials would be essential to fuel and feed the Chinese economy. These indeed constituted the core reasons to adopt the FOCAC framework in 2000 as discussed earlier. In the first ten years of FOCAC, China-Africa trade grew from \$6.3 billion to \$128.5 billion in 2010, also, China had move from being 2.6 to 13.3 percent of Africa's total foreign trade. It surpassed the United States to become Africa's largest trading partner mainly by exporting machinery, electronics and textiles, as well as importing crude oil, iron ore,

diamond, cotton and other natural resources. (David & Joshua 2012 p. 115). According to statistics from the General Administration of Customs of China, in 2018, China-Africa trade was \$204.19 billion. Among these, China's exports to Africa were \$104.91 billion and China's imports from Africa were \$99.28 billion (MOFCOM 2019). It is important to recall that Africa is not a homogeneous entity, but a collection of 54 individual states with different histories, resources, needs, and models of government. While many African economies have reaped significant short-term benefits from China's rapid growth and increasingly important trade links with the continent, the impact of that country will likely depend most readily on the commodity specialisation of each partner state, the strength of resource management frameworks and governance, economic diversification, and the creation of an equal footing for negotiation with China (Besada & O'Bright 2016 p 7, 8).

Geographical patterns of China-Africa trade in the FOCAC era is one which cannot be overlooked. For example, Angola, Sudan, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria are the major exporters of Africa's oil to China. South Africa is almost the sole exporter of ore and diamond to China, while Gabon, Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Liberia exports logs, and Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire exports cotton. This geographical trade pattern is mainly responsible for trade imbalance in some African countries, it is in response to this that President Xi during the last FOCAC summit proposed in the *eight major initiatives for future China-Africa Cooperation* to increase non-resource imports from Africa. China-Africa trade shows no sign of decreasing, the first joint Sino-African Trade Expo is scheduled between 27th and 29th June 2019 in Hunan province and the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has predicted trade volume will rise to \$400 billion by 2020 (SCMP 2014; Henry & Ben 2016; Abdi 2019).




Figure 5. Sino-African Trade 2002 - 2018

Source: CARI, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Theorizing of China-Africa Trade Patterns

According to Joshua (2012), there is a divide among researchers in regard to which economic theories of international trade best explains China-Africa trade pattern. Although these researchers generally agree that economic theories have failed to predict actual trade patterns, however, relative factor abundance theory stand predominate. Heckscher–Ohlin model which builds on David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, is the economists’ traditional explanation for bilateral trade flows between countries. It predicts that the relative abundance or scarcity of a country’s fixed factor endowments such as resources, labour, and capital compared with those of its trade partner determines what it will sell and what it will buy. A country will export goods produced with its abundant endowments and import goods produced with inputs that are locally scarce. In China-Africa case, mineral products, precious stones and metals, base metals and wood products constitutes its top import from Africa, while machinery, textiles and clothing, transport equipment, and footwear constitutes its top export to Africa.

“China–Africa trade patterns will be shaped by shifts in comparative advantage and changes in global supply chains” - Jian-Ye Wang

“The market, not grand strategy, is the Chinese motivation” - Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills.

The relative factor abundance theories have proven particularly valuable in explaining China–Africa trade because of China’s relatively scarce natural resource and that African countries’ relatively abundant natural resources tend to dominate those countries’ exports to China. Other theories include gravity trade theory, concept of increasing returns to scale, and political trade (Joshua 2012).

Consequences of Sino-African Trade Patterns

The predominate consequences of China-Africa trade pattern are; resource trade growth (Dutch disease and trade deficit for non-resource African countries), death of distance, Africans locked-out of labour-intensive sectors, and anti-Chinese African resistance narratives.

Resource Trade Growth: China in 2009 become the world’s largest energy consumer, as such, energy (petroleum) import from Africa constitute a largest percentage of its imports from Africa followed by other resources. Resource trade is expected to expand and grow, and this in turns increase resource exporters dependence on these resources and eventually leads to Dutch-disease. Also, non-resource African countries would experience trade imbalance and run a large trade deficit with China.

Death of Distance: According to Joshua (2012), “as gravity trade theory predicts, the fast-growing Chinese economy is attracting more trade from around the world, including Africa. This is

particularly true of China's trade throughout the developing world, which has rapidly grown as a part of China's total trade portfolio. More interestingly, perhaps, is the decline of distance as an important determinant in China–Africa trade.” China investments into construction of ports both home and in Africa has rendered ‘distance’ totally irrelevant. Death of distance could also be credited as being one of the key motivating elements of President Xi's Belt and Road Initiative. On one hand, the effect is positive in reference to financial aid received from China to construct these ports, on the other hand, it could be a debt trap like the Sri Lankan case.



Figure 6. China's One Belt, One Road initiative

Source: Monthly Review, <https://mronline.org/2018/10/05/a-critical-look-at-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/#lightbox/0/>

Africans Locked-out of Labour-Intensive Sectors: China's *go out* strategy has made it difficult for non-resource/manufactured African goods to enter its market and difficult for them to compete at home. Smugglers readily assist Chinese products avoid tariffs and get into African market which in turn compete with labour-intensive African products which are taxed high by national authorities. This is posed to continue as Africa continue to consume cheap Chinese consumer products and African governments prey upon, rather than protect their labour-intensive domestic manufactures. These trade patterns have also begun to have a destabilizing effect on China's relations with some African countries and has led to anti-Chinese African resistance narratives (Joshua 2012).

Anti-Chinese African Resistance Narratives: According to Joshua (2012), Chinese firms' comparative advantage in labour-intensive and capital-intensive production undermines the development of homegrown African industries that could underpin long-run stability. Its aid to autocratic regimes and its trade pattern has made it a target of disaffected, unemployed African and placed it in the crosshair. In recent years, riots and anti-Chinese protests has erupted in Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

"Predictably, China's continued profiting by access to vital resources and markets in Africa comes with the risks of inciting local anger at Chinese involvement in unlawful and unregulated activities, or perceived connivance with elites and locals in exploitative ventures" – Richard Aidoo

In August 2010 Ephrem Madebo, an Ethiopian commentator's article entitled *Autocracy: China's unsolicited export*, accused China of mixing tyranny with its material exports to Africa. The article, which appeared in *The Addis Voice*, suggested that Ethiopia's economic relationship with China was actively supporting its repressive political system (Joshua 2012).

In conclusion, it is evident that China-Africa trade has had an impressive overall impact on the economy African countries even though resource rich African countries are the main beneficiaries of Chinese trade activities. However, the main point of attention is the last two point raised above in regard to the consequence of China-Africa trade pattern. These have made China's economic activities the focal point of new anti-Chinese resistance narratives in Africa. This threatens China's image as a trusted and reliable trading partner, and If this trade patterns persists, Africans will eventually get impatient with China subsidies to its manufacturers and trade barrier against foreign goods.

3.3.2 INVESTMENTS

China's investments in Africa constitutes a fair share of its economic interest in the continent. Prior to the *go out* strategy which began in the 1990s, only state-owned, provincial, and municipal companies and corporation could invest outside China. Following liberalization of its strict approval system for outward investments in late 1980s, more enterprises were given permission to invest outside. Africa, being a continent with most numbers of developing countries was an ideal centre for Chinese investments. In 1993, the MOFCOM issued a four-part strategy to assist Chinese companies in strengthening its investments as well as trade in Africa. First, it identified natural resources as vital to development of its domestic economy. Second, it identified the markets potential in Africa's large population. Third, it identified African countries increasing attraction to Chinese projects. Fourth, it identified African countries as a target for ling-term profitable investments. Following the adoption of the FOCAC framework in 2000, China formalised its support for investment in Africa (David & Joshua 2012 p. 129).

China's Investment Pattern

Both Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises invest in Africa. SOEs mainly invest in extractive and infrastructure sector, while the private enterprises are mainly driven by market forces and then to invest beyond the extractive sector. Investments from SOEs constitutes the largest percentage of China's overall investments in Africa (Thompson & Olusegun 2014).

Data regarding China's FDI is highly contradictory and obviously limited. On one hand, MOFCOM has been accused of providing way lesser numbers than real actual numbers. On the other hand, projects and infrastructure financed by loans are categorized as Investments. For these reasons, it is impossible to give exact figures of China's FDI, instead, I will use data from AEI which covers all investments and construction contracts in my analyses in this section of China's investments in Africa. Before then, I will first look into SEZs as one of China's investment strategy.

Special Economic Zones – China's Developmental Model

China's domestic SEZ was a key element of China's development model that led to its economic growth during the reform era. In correspondence with China's *go out* policy which has seen growing overseas investments, the MOFCOM launched a programme to support the construction of about 50 overseas SEZ. During the FOCAC 2006 summit, amongst the commitments made by China was the announcement to establish SEZ in some African countries (Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius and Zambia) which will provide liberalized investment environments focused on strategic industries to attract companies.

They said it will maximize the developmental impact of the zones, offer an opportunity for African companies to partner with Chinese firms, improve the overall investments environment, and attract foreign capital. If true, it would contribute to a positive public perception of Chinese capital on the ground and counter accusation that China interest only lies in exploiting and extractive natural resources from African countries, but according to Tang (2015), "Except the Nigeria-Lekki zone, where the Lagos state government takes 40% of the shares in the zone, the Chinese zones rarely have Africans in their senior management. This has led some African governments to consider the zones merely as Chinese projects. However, experiences of zone development in Asia showed that successful SEZs need to have more ownership by host countries' governments. If the goal of enabling broader transformation is to be achieved, SEZs need supporting measures and policies from local authorities. Host country representatives should also participate in the management of SEZs to track and maximise their impacts on the local society. Overall, Chinese zones need to enhance their connection with host countries in multiple dimensions so that the zones and the countries can grow hand in hand". In other words,

connection and interaction between SEZs and broader development is lacking today. (Robert 2008; World Bank 2010; Tang 2015; Punch Newspaper 2016).

Measuring Chinese Investments in Africa

Data between 2005 and 2018 from *American Enterprise Institute (AEI)* and the *Heritage Foundation* shows China's total investments and contracts in Africa (excluding Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Burundi and Lesotho and Eswatini) to be \$359.92 billion. This figure represents investments and contracts in multiple sectors such as agriculture, chemicals, energy, entertainment, finance, health, logistics, metals, real estate, technology, tourism, transport, utilities and others. Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, and Kenya constitute China's main investment centres with the top sectors being energy, transport and metals. Key investors include; CNPC, CNOOC, EXIM, Sinopec, CCB, Huawei, ZTE, Tecno, etc. While the primary institutions which promote China-Africa investments include; CCPIT, CDB, SINOSURE, CABC, CADF, CAJCCI, etc (David & Joshua 2012 p. 141).




Figure 7. China's investment and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (2005 – 2018).

Source: American Enterprise Institute <http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>

In conclusion, despite the widespread broadcast of Chinese investments in Africa, the US and EU are still Africa's largest investors. Also, negative interactions with Chinese enterprises is hurting the its image in many African countries.




Figure 8. Infographic of China's total investments in Africa (2005 – 2015)

Source: SCMP <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1887975/infographic-chinas-total-investment-africa>

Note: Interactive map of China's latest (2005 to 2018) investment volume can be found <http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>

3.3.3 AID

China's aid to Africa evolved from being an anti-imperialism tool against Western influence in the 1940s, to a competitive tool for diplomatic recognition against Taiwan and leadership of the communist world since to the 1960s. During the reform era, aid to Africa was significantly decreased. Following the *go out* strategy, aid became what Deborah (2009, p. 79) calls a *springboard for investment*.

Measuring China's Aid to Africa

What is Aid? The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), defines Official Development Assistance (ODA) as grants or loans that are intended primarily to foster and promote economic development in the recipient country (Robert 2008). China has no clear definition of aid and seems to follow a broader interpretation. China may, for example, include trade concessions and provision of commercial loan to companies that assist a country's development as a foreign aid even though they do not involve any donation of funds to another government. Also, the DAC counts the value of debt relief as official aid while China does not (David & Joshua 2012 p. 148).

China does not publish annual country aid disbursement figures. Due to these lack of transparency in aid statistics, it is difficult to give exact statistics as to what the real figures are. In June 2006, Chinese Premier Jiabao announced that China's total aid assistance to Africa between 1957 and 2006 had totalled \$5.7 billion. Prior to that, in 2003, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Zhaoxing reported to FOCAC that aid to African countries between 2000 and 2003 absorbed 44 percent of China's total aid. In 2011, Bloomberg published an article stating that in 2009, China gave about 45 percent of its donor aid to African countries. Assuming the figure has been a steady percentage over the years, then one can assume China's aid assistance to Africa to be about 40 – 50 percent its total global aid.

Other kind of Chinese "Aid"

Other kind of Chinese "aid" to Africa includes interest free loans, concessional loans, turnkey projects and development assistance in health, agriculture and most recently in infrastructure.

Loans: China in recent years has become the largest bilateral lender to some Africa countries. It is estimated that China's total loans to Africa is little above \$210 billion. During the last FOCAC summit, President Xi announced \$60 billion (\$20 billion in new credit lines, \$15 billion in foreign aid: grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans, \$10 billion for a special fund for development financing, and \$5 billion for a special fund for financing imports from Africa). China has been accused of trapping Africa into a debt crisis with huge loans, but according to the African Development Bank, Africa needs a whopping \$130 to \$170 billion worth of new infrastructure

annually – from trains to power stations. The continent will also face additional costs due to climate change of \$20 to \$30 billion per year, as such, they need external help, and in particular loans. China loans come with “no conditions attached” as compared to aid and loan from its Western counterparts (The diplomat 2018; CARI 2018; Abdi 2018).

Health Assistance: China’s medical support remains one of the oldest forms of its aid assistance to the continent dating back to 1963 when Chinese healthcare workers were sent to assist Algeria after it gained independence from France. In 2006, China spent about \$35 million on health-related project (medical team dispatch, infrastructure, medical equipment and drugs) across Africa and by 2014 they were disbursing an estimated \$150 million annually. During the 2014 deadly Ebola outbreak, China dispatched more than 1,000 medical professionals without hesitation, and since 1963, about 20,000 Chinese medical workers has been sent to Africa. China now ranks among the top ten bilateral donors for health aid in Africa (Marlene & Jacky 2017; The Diplomat 2018; SCIO 2018).

Agriculture: Agriculture has for decades been a major source of income for the rural populated areas of the continent and a key element to securitizing food and reducing poverty in Africa. China over years has provided assistance to African countries’ agricultural sector. In August 2018, China hosted the first forum on China-Africa agriculture cooperation which focused on cooperation in tropical agricultural science and technology innovation, sustainable development of China-Africa tropical agricultural exchanges, upgrading cooperation platforms, and development of China-Africa agricultural and rural human resources. During FOCAC 2018, agricultural cooperation was one of the main topics, the summit stressed on the importance of helping Africa achieve food security by 2030, thus a share of the \$60 billion in grants and loans will be dedicated to agriculture. It is worthwhile to note that China’s agricultural assistance to the continent comes in form of training scientist, providing equipment, turnkey projects, and research centres, investment rather than state-to-state aid projects (David & Joshua 2012 p. 152; IFPRI 2018; Xinhuanet 2018; Antoaneta 2019).

In conclusion, lack of country-to country statistics and consensual definition what of *aid* is and what it constitutes has made it difficult to provide an accurate analysis of China’s aid to Africa. Traditional donors have critiqued these standards for not being appropriate for the aid reporting requirements because they still lack transparency and evaluation of aid data. Often economic instruments like loans, grants, turnkey projects, and even investments have been described as an integral component of China’s *aid program* in Africa, for sure one fact is certain, China’s so-called *aid program* in the FOCAC era has enabled it pursue its interest by building business, cement political ties, and trying to enhance its image as a rising but “responsible” power and important player on the world stage.

3.4. CASE STUDY

3.4.1 NIGERIA AND CHINA

Nigeria is Africa's socio-political giant and key player with a population of almost 200 million people (Africa's largest). It has a multi-ethnic and cultural society. It is Africa's largest economy, Africa's largest oil exporter, and also home to Africa's largest natural gas reserves (Robert 2008; World Bank 2019).

Relations with Nigeria

Political Dimension: Nigeria in spite of the PRC and ROC heavy lobby for recognition, Nigeria was the 22nd African state to recognize the PRC in 1971 after Egypt first did in 1956. Recognition would have come earlier but incidents such as China's attack on India in 1962, China's interference in neighbouring Cameroon, and China's support of Biafra instead of the Nigerian government during the Nigerian civil war delayed recognition. Alaba Ogunsanwo in his book *China's Policy in Africa 1958-71* concluded that even though China never officially recognized Biafra, its support for the separatist movement constituted interference in Nigerian internal affairs. After recognition, controversy returned. This time, it was over Nigeria's support of the Soviet-backed MPLA in Angola after civil war erupted in 1975. China aligned with the FNLA, a leading rival faction. China's decision to support the U.S.-backed FNLA caused many Nigerians to view Beijing's rhetorical commitment to "anti-imperialism" as hypocritical. This indeed became an issue during the second Nigeria-China dialogue in 1979. Despite Nigeria's significant importance in Africa, there were very few high-level visits from China. Former premier Li Peng's 1997 visit was China's highest-level visit after both countries formally established a Nigeria-China Friendship Association (NICAF) in 1994 (David & Joshua 2012 p. 301; Edgar 2014; The Diplomat 2016).

Since NICAF, political relations have gotten better even though Nigeria still maintains trade relations and has a Representative Office in Taiwan. In 2002, Nigeria established the Nigerian Council for the Peaceful Reunification of China, and in 2005, Nigeria issued a joint communiqué with China, reaffirming that Beijing was "the only legitimate government representing the whole of China and Taiwan is an unalienable part of its territory", and they both agreed to upgrade their relations to a *strategic partnership*. In the FOCAC era, both countries have strengthened their political relations and all Chinese and Nigerian presidents have visited each other's country while in office. In 2015, China endorsed Nigeria's bid to become of the UNSC permanent member, citing Nigeria as a *leading developing country*. In 2017, Nigeria ordered the ROC to close its office in the capital Abuja and relocate to Lagos following a \$40 billion pledge by China. Nigerian Foreign Minister Onyeama in 2017 said, "Chinese Government does not oppose trading with Taiwan as long as there is no formal contact with the government that will suggest recognition of Taiwan as sovereign country" (David & Joshua 2012 p 302, CNBC 2018, Punch Newspaper 2017, 2018).

Economic Dimension: Chinese Former Ambassador to Nigeria, H.E. Gu Xiaojie in 2016 said, “Nigeria is China’s number one engineering market, number two export market, number three trading partner and major investment destination in Africa.” Economic relations began when China sent its first trade delegate to Nigeria in 1961, barely one years after Nigeria got its independence from Britain. Since then, economic relations between China and Nigeria has grown.

Despite deepening economic relations, Nigeria runs a trade deficit with China. For this reason, during President Buhari visit to China in 2016, while acknowledging the tremendous successes in bilateral trade between Nigeria and China, he reiterated the large gap in trade in favour of China. Report by the NBS shows trade deficit between 2013 and 2016 to be \$16.9 billion. Lack of industrialization is the primary cause of the trade imbalance because Nigeria mainly imports manufactured goods from China and exports mainly natures resources. Mitigating this imbalance means Nigeria must solve the problem of industrialization, economy diversification and have a concentrate trade policy towards China (Margaret & Qi 2011; David & Joshua 2012 p 302. Efem 2018)

Aside trade, China has investment in the country. Data from AEI estimates China’s total investments and construction contracts between 2005 and 2018 to be \$49.9 billion. These investments are mainly centred in energy, transport, real estate and technology sector. SOES such has CNPC, CNOOC, Sinopec investments in the oil sector. CNOOC in 2006 acquired 45 percent stake in an offshore oil field, and recently have revealed intention to increase investment in Nigeria. Chinese construction companies are also involved in infrastructure building in Nigeria such as the Lagos-Kano rail line, Abuja-Kaduna rail line, Zungeru hydroelectric power plant, etc. China is active in every aspect of the Nigerian economy, two of its overseas SEZ are located in Nigeria. (Kafilah & Evelyn 2018; Omolade & Howard 2019).

Companies	Sector of activities	Assets (USD billion)	Employees	Investments in Nigeria
Sinopec	Oil and gas	152.80	373 375	Blocks OML 64,66, 29% stake and operating rights to block 2, Nigeria- São Tomé Joint Development Zone
CNPC	Oil and gas	470.80	1.67 million (80 000 foreigners)	Licenses for OPL 471, 721, 732, 298
SEPCO	Electric power construction	38.60	19 756	Papalanto Power Plant
CCECC	Construction	2.17	70 000	Rehabilitation of Palalanto-Lagos expressway, Athletes's village, Ikot Akpaden-Okoroette road, Lekki Free Trade Zone
CSCEC	Construction, real estate	58.90	121 500	Refinery
CNOON	Offshore oil and gas	13.8	21 000	45% interest in offshore exploitation licence, OML 130
Sinoma	Cement Engineering construction	2.9	9 000	in collaboration with Nigeria Dangot Group for cement production line EPC project in 2008
CGC	Construction	0.30	—	Kebbi Airport, Water supply project in Gombe, Sakke Dam
Huawei	Telecom	25.00	51 000	Network, handsets
ZTE	Telecom	13.00	85 232	CDMA, handsets

Figure 9. Major Chinese companies in Nigeria

Source: Margaret and Qi (2010) <http://www.oecd.org/china/49814032.pdf>




Figure 10. China's export to Nigeria 2017

Source: OEC https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/nga/chn/show/2017/




Figure 11. China's import from Nigeria 2017

Source: OEC https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/nga/chn/show/2017/




Figure 12. China's investments and construction contracts in Nigeria 2005-2018.

Source: AEI <http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>

Other Dimensions: Other engagements include cooperation in finance, security, development assistance and cultural exchange. At the moment, the Nigerian government have contracts with China for military weapons. China's security interest in Nigeria is closely tied to its trade and investment interest. In 2007, China built and launched "NigComSat -1" into outer space, when NigComSat -1 failed after running out of power in 2008, China offered to replace it at no cost. This was the first time state-owned CASC provided all aspects of in-orbit delivery of a satellite to an international customer (CGWIC 2010; SCMP 2018). In 2008, China established a Confucius institute in Nigeria. In 2009 an MoU was signed between Nigerian and Chinese banks. By 2014, China and Nigeria had implemented agricultural programs aim at technical training in farming. In 2015, the Chinese Film Festival held in Lagos. In 2018 it was announced in *Punch New paper*, Chinese medical experts from Jiangxi University of Traditional Chinese Medicine would be introducing a new method for the treatment of malaria in Nigeria.

In conclusion, China-Nigeria overall relation is good. China's financial packages have attracted Nigeria, and Nigeria's economic potentials and resources have attracted China. Despite this, Nigeria is still a diplomatic challenge for China, mainly concerning oil deals.

3.4.2 CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is Africa's second largest economy and Africa's most industrialized, diversified, and advanced economy. It is one of the only four upper-middle-income economy African countries. It is also the world's largest platinum exporter, third largest ore exporter, and tenth largest diamond exporter (IMF 2016; World Bank 2017; InvestSA).

Relations with South Africa

Political Dimension: In 1950, barely a year after the PRC was established, South Africa as part of UN force in Korea fought against the PRC. In the 1960s, the Beijing and Moscow regarded South Africa as a battleground between capitalism and communism. Beijing tried to build relations with the principle African nationalist organizations, ANC and PAC but the SACP which had closer relation with Moscow, pulled the ANC towards Moscow. As the Sino-Soviet split deepened, Beijing shifted its support to the PAC and supported them with financial assistance and training. Though China was supporting the PAC, it still had trade relations with the white-minority government. By the 1980s when Sino-Soviet relations were normalised, China in 1974 had voted to exclude South African representative from the UN, and the ANC which was the leading African nationalist group signalled willingness to normalise relations with China. By 1985, China provided aid and training to the ANC and by 1987, it turned fully to the ANC and broke relations with PAC.

The 1990s was marked by fight for diplomatic recognition between the PRC and ROC when it was obvious the apartheid government would be overthrown. The ROC was reported to have contributed \$7 million to ANC leader Nelson Mandela campaign during his 1993 visit prior to his election victory in 1994. The ANC announced it had forgiven ROC for its support of white-ruled government and was ready to build relation. The ROC paid an all-expense trip to Taiwan for over 200 South African officials in 1995. On the other hand, the PRC urged South Africa to shift diplomatic relation to Beijing by emphasizing on the ideological similarity between the ANC and CPC. In 1998, South Africa switched recognition from ROC to the PRC (David & Joshua 2012 p. 344, 355).

Political relations after recognition and in the FOCAC era has grown remarkably well. During President Jiang 2000 visit, *Pretoria Declaration on Partnership* was signed between the PRC and South Africa. In 2001, the CPC invited the ANC national secretary. In 2004, their relations were upgraded to a *strategic partnership*. Both nations in 2010 during the Beijing Declaration mutually agreed to upgrade their relation to a *comprehensive strategic partnership*, thus lifting their bilateral relations to a new level. In the same years, China invited South Africa to join the BRIC grouping and South Africa subsequently joined, and it was renamed to BRICS with the 'S' standing for South Africa. In 2013, during President Xi's visit, both nations realised a joint communiqué to further boost their *comprehensive strategic partnership*. In 2015, FOCAC summit was held in

South Africa. In 2014, the CPC announced it will support and provide training to the ANC. In 2017, the first Africa Regional Centre of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) was launched in South Africa. As at 2017, South Africa was the only country to have had three states visit from President Xi. (SA News 2011; Ross 2016; Business Day 2018; China Today 2018).

Economic Dimension: As political relation strengthened, South Africa in 2004 granted China market economy status which effectively prevents South African manufacturers from proving that China gives Chinese producers an unfair advantage. This actually backed fired, South Africa manufacturers lost one-third of market share. South African trade deficit at this time was significant (David & Joshua 2012 p. 350). In 2006, while still the president of South Africa, Mbeki warned China that it could not “just come here and dig for raw materials and then go away and sell us manufactured goods (Robert 2008, p 21), he also warned fellow African leaders to “guard against sinking into a ‘colonial relationship ‘with China as Beijing expands its push for raw materials across the continent.” (Robert 2008, p 77). In 2007, he backed away from this harsh criticism and warned China not to repeat the mistakes of the colonial relationship with Africa. In the same year, President Hu, during his visit to South Africa said, China is concerned by its trade surplus, he pledged to address the trade imbalances between China and South Africa, which were heavily in China’s favour and signed agreements dealing with mining, energy, and agriculture. (Robert 2008 p68; David & Joshua 2012 p. 347). Today, South Africa is China’s largest trading partner in Africa while China has been South Africa’s largest partner for nine consecutive years. In 2017, two-way trade totalled \$39.17 billion. China’s exports electric products, textile and metal wires to South Africa, and imports mainly mineral products (Business Day 2018).

Also, China has numerous investments in South Africa, AEI estimates total investments and construction contracts to be \$14.15 billion between 2005 and 2018. In 2007, ICBC purchased 20 percent of South Africa’s Standard bank for \$5.5 billion. Chris (2018) says, ICBC was attracted both by South Africa’s status as the only African G20 member state and its developing economy with a significant middle-income consumer segment. China’s largest investment in South Africa is in the finance sector, other sectors includes energy, metal, real estate and transports. In 2018, while in South Africa for a state visit, President Xi promised \$14.7 billion of investment (Reuters 2018).

Other Dimensions: Other Chinese engagements include military cooperation and cultural exchange. South Africa is home to the highest number of Confucius Institutes in Africa and China is one of the top destinations for South African students. In 2000, Chinese vessels called outside Cape Town, and in Durban in 2011. In 2003, the first China-South African Defence Committee meeting took place and was followed by a visit from the chief of the PLA’s general staff. In 2004, South Africa frigate called at Shanghai, this was China’s first port call by a naval vessel from an African country. (Robert 2008 p170; David & Joshua 2012 p. 346).




Figure 13. China's import from South Africa 2017

Source: OEC https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/zaf/chn/show/2017/




Figure 14. China's export to South Africa 2017

Source: OEC https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/zaf/chn/show/2017/




Figure 15. China's investments and construction contracts in South Africa 2005-2018

Source: AEI <http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>

In conclusion, though their relation began with China solely pursuing its self-interest by trying to score political goal against the Soviet Union by using the PAC against the ANC and SACP during the Sino-Soviet split and later by trying to isolate the ROC, their relations over recent years have achieved a leapfrog development from a *partnership* to a *strategic partnership* and then to a *comprehensive strategic partnership* in just over 20 years. In comparison with Nigeria, South Africa tends to have a closer relationship with China thanks to South-Africa's strong civil society and strong institutional structures which protects its interest. Considering the fact that both are members of the UN, BRICS and G20, their relations is expected to grow further.

3.4.3 CHINA AND KENYA

According to the IMF's WEO, Kenya is Africa's 7th largest economy and its main exports are horticultural products.

Relations with Kenya

Political Dimension: Bilateral relations between China and Kenya was established in 1963, two days after Kenya achieved independence. At this time, China had cultivated Oginga Odinga, Vice-president to President Kenyatta. Odinga himself was the chief voice of radical ideology in Kenya as well as the chief friend of China and did not agree with Kenyatta's government favoured

approach to the United States and the Western bloc. Several incidents occurred in the mid 1960s which led to Odinga resignation as vice president. The PRC provided financially support to Odinga, and aid to groups which were opposing President Kenyatta. This wrong move by the PRC led to the expulsion of Chinese diplomats, the Chinese on the other hand retaliated by expelling a Kenyan diplomat (David & Joshua 2012 p. 266; Seifudein 2013 p 13). Relations began improving when Daniel Moi replaced President Kenyatta in 1978, and since then numerous high-level visits by leaders of both nations have occurred till date. Their bilateral relations have been upgraded to a *comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership*.

Economic Dimension: Economic relation between China and Kenya dates back to the 1960 when China provided aid assistance to Kenya shortly after independence. Today, China is Kenya's largest trading partner though it runs a huge trade deficit with China. In 2010, Kenya imported \$2 billion worth of goods from China and exported barely \$39 million in goods to China. In 2017, Kenya imported \$3.79 billion worth of goods from China and exported \$96.88 million in goods to China. Influx of cheap Chinese and Asian products have led to closure of Kenyan textile mill, Kenya manufacturers and producers can no longer compete with their Chinese counterparts. This has proven to be the hallmark of the negative side of China-Kenya relation and this pattern is highly similar to other non-resource African countries. (David & Joshua 2012 p. 267; Carole 2018). Aside trade, China has invested in multiple infrastructure construction projects in Kenya. Data by AEI estimates China's total investment and construction contracts between 2005 and 2018 to be \$16.78 billion. In 2006, China signed an oil exploration contract with Kenya which allowed CNOOC to explore oil in Kenya (Reuters 2009). In 2007, Jinchuan group purchased a 20 percent stake for mining titanium in Kenya (Reuters 2008). In 2016, China invested \$3.6 billion to construct the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway, this project is Kenya's most expensive since independence (Reuters 2018). China is also Kenya's top creditor and source of development assistance. Most of what China calls "investment", comes in forms of loans. Latest data from Kenya's Treasury shows the stock of debt to China to be \$6.2 billion (70 percent of Kenya's total bilateral debt) as at the end of 2018 (Business Daily 2019).

Other Dimension: Chinese engagements in Kenya include provision of development assistance and cultural cooperation. Kenya is one of the largest recipients of China's development assistance to Africa. Development assistance includes; donated reproductive medical equipment, agricultural machineries, contraceptives for family planning program, anti-malaria drugs, equipment for the Kenya parliament, military transport vehicles, finance of computer programs at its Foreign Ministry, as well as refurbish the Moi International Sports Centre (David & Joshua 2012 p. 268; AidData.org). China also has cultural centres established across Kenya as well as Confucius Institutes.




Figure 16. China's import from Kenya 2017

Source: OEC https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/zaf/chn/show/2017/




Figure 17. China's Export to Kenya 2017

Source: OEC https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/zaf/chn/show/2017/




Figure 18. China's investments and construction contracts in Kenya 2005-2018

Source: AEI <http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>

Other side of China-Kenya relation: Though relations with Kenya began with provision of aid and grant to score political goals against the Soviet Union which at the same time was negotiating provision of aid to Kenya shortly after independence. In recent time, economic activities have been the core of their relations and the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR project has been the key point of relations between the two.

According to David & Joshua (2012 p. 269), China sees Kenya as a gateway to expanding commercial links throughout the region. This constitutes the core reason why China is heavily investing in construction projects like the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR. Leaked contracts paper in 2018 indicates the Kenyan government reportedly waived the sovereign immunity of the Port of Mombasa, Kenya's largest and most lucrative port and used it as collateral to build the SGR project. The leaked contract also stated that only Chinese products must be used for the SGR construction. The SGR project, couple with China being Kenya's largest bilateral lender have given China huge leverage over Kenya. For instance, when the Kenyan President banned importation of Chinese fishes due to public outcry by local fishermen in 2018, China used its economic leverage by threatening to impose trade sanction which forced the government to lift the ban (Tuko 2018; Mumbi 2018; VOA 2019). Circumstances surrounding the SGR seems to far outweigh its benefit. Since its launch in 2017, it has been marred by allegations of corruption, racism and poor management. In 2018, two top officials were arrested by the Kenyan authorities for corruption

(The Diplomat 2019; VOA 2019). Reports in 2018 revealed Kenyan workers are subject to racial discrimination and abuse by Chinese supervisors, it also stated that highly qualified Kenyan staffs were assigned minor role and Kenyan workers were segregated from their Chinese colleagues in eating areas, toilets, accommodation etc. (VOA 2019).

Even on basic societal level, Chinese businesses and bosses have been accused of showing little regards for locals. In 2015, a small Chinese restaurant was shut down by Kenyan authorities, and the owner charged for operating a “no black” policy after 5pm. In 2018, a Chinese businessman identified as Liu Jiaqi was captured on video telling his Kenyan employee "Everyone, every Kenyan... like a monkey, even Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya's President). All of them." After the employee suggested Liu to go back to China if he feels that way, he responded with more abuses. "I don't belong to here. I don't like here, like monkey people, I don't like talk with them, it smells bad, and poor, and foolish, and black. I don't like them. Why not [like] the white people, like the American?" The Kenyan authorities responded by deporting him on racism ground and the Chinese embassy spokesperson released a statement saying “The personal talk and personal feeling of this young man does not represent the views of the vast majority of Chinese people, the Chinese Embassy always requires the Chinese companies and individuals to abide by the local law, stay and work legally in Kenya, making positive contribution to the friendship and cooperation between China and Kenya,” (The Jakarta Post 2018; SCMP 2018).

In conclusion, though China-Kenya relations has somehow contributed to the development of Kenya infrastructure gap, but bilateral debt, attitudes of Chinese bosses and significant trade imbalance which has given China leverage, couple with the SGR project and fear of losing the Mombasa port if Kenya default on its payment raises a lot of concern about sovereignty issues and neo-colonialism. The western media on the other hand have contributed in falsely painting this as an “Africa picture”, even though it differs from the situation in South Africa and Nigeria as discussed above.

3.4.4 Case Study Discussion

The goal of the case study was to give a better insight to China's relations and activities on a country to country level.

With Nigeria for instance, China maintains a *strategic partnership*, while with South Africa and Kenya, it maintains a *Comprehensive strategic partnership*. The reason for this as stated earlier is because Nigeria is a challenge for China's diplomacy even though bilateral relation continues to deepen. For years, Chinese SOEs which owns percentage of several offshore oil blocks in Nigeria acquired since 2006 have failed to expand ownership and investments for two core reasons. First, Nigeria electoral cycle means every four years (or eight in case of victory for a second term) a new government is formed, the politics and interest of new administration may differ from previous, as such it is difficult to strike lasting deals. Second, western companies who have been

operating for decades have a stranglehold of this sector. According to Gregory (2009), “Beijing has discovered the hard way that in contemporary Nigeria the electoral cycle trumps any business deal and that when state power is transferred via an election from one elite to another, and specifically from a southern, Christian elite to a northern, Muslim one, the spoils of state come up for renegotiation. It is this cycle that makes ‘oil for infrastructure’ deals of the kind that China has negotiated in other African countries unworkable in Nigeria”, “China has accepted that to gain access to Nigerian oil, it must buy reserves rather than offer to finance and construct national infrastructure”. The difficulties in Nigeria’s energy sector has led to China harmonising its relations with oil rich Angola, and Nigeria in turn uses its economic leverage to secure loans from China.

With South Africa for instance, the *Comprehensive strategic partnership* is expected to be upgraded to *Comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership* as their all-round relation deepens. As a fellow member of G20 and BRICS, China recognises South Africa’s status as a leading developing nation and as the most advanced and industrialised economic on the continent. China also recognises South Africa’s strong working institutions, as such its approach differs. China’s approach to South Africa can be analysed not just on nation state to nation state level but also party to party level, i.e. CPC-ACN level. 2018 marked 20 years since bilateral tie between China and South Africa was established, it also marked 35 years since ties between the CPC and ANC was established (Xinhuanet 2018). The CPC has provided leadership trainings to the ANC and several high-level visits have occurred on both side over the past decades. Also, the Dalai Lama case shows the depth of China-South Africa relations. Though Dalai Lama visited South Africa in 1996 meeting with President Mandela, he since has been denied entry into South Africa. In 2009 he was denied entry and South Africa spokesman said the decision was in the best interest of the world cup game and not as a result of pressure from China. "We want the focus to remain on South Africa," and "a visit by the Dalai Lama would move the focus from South Africa onto issues in Tibet." (Scott 2009). In 2011, he was denied entry when South African Nobel Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu invited him to attend and give a lecture at his 80th birthday. Dalai Lama ended up participating through a video feed (The Guardian 2011). According to Zama Ndlovu in his blog post, he wrote “the South African government made the best decision for the whole. If we really care about our heavy dependence on China, then we must raise that particular issue with government and focus on diversifying our diplomatic and economic relationships. But for now, **it’s easier to Skype in the Dalai Lama than finding billions in alternative investments.**”. In 2014, he was to attend the Nobel Peace Laureates world summit but later cancelled his attendance and withdrew his visit application after being told it would be unsuccessful. “We have informally received contact His Holiness won’t get his visa,” said his representative. (Reuters 2014).

With Kenya, though China maintains a *Comprehensive strategic partnership*, the reality on ground does not seem to correspond to the term. Chinese activities in Kenya has been the focal point of the debate about the cost of having *China in Africa*. The SGR project which has been the highlight of China's involvement in the country has generated debates among Kenyans if Chinese loans are actually worth the risk of falling into debt traps just like Sri Lanka whose inability to repay its loans to China led it to hand over management of a key port to the Chinese under a 99-year lease agreement. Responding to allegation that China could take the Port of Mombasa, Chinese ambassador to Kenya Wu Peng said "those assumptions are groundless, and I don't think Kenya will default. Sometimes I think we should have common sense. Kenya is a sovereign state. Any asset in your country is protected by international law and should be respected by other countries. These are unnecessary worries.". He also said "any loan agreements between China and Kenya are in line with international practice. None of Kenyan national assets has been mortgaged for the SGR loan and neither would any national asset be seized or controlled by China, even in a situation of default," (Xinhuanet 2019). For a country whose chief export is horticultural product and whose overall foreign trade runs on deficit, likelihood of repaying its debt which is scheduled to begin in July 2019 is highly doubted. On the other hand, in 2018, China signed a trade deal with Kenya to increase import of Kenya's horticultural product to correct trade imbalance (Reuters 2018).

In conclusion, from the case study and discussion above, it is evident that China has offered itself as an *alternative economic partner* rather than a *development model* and this economic partnership is expected to grow even further most especially as its economic activities in these countries increases. Also, the case study shows the difference in China's approach and level of relations with different African countries.

Overall Discussion of Chapter 3

This chapter's primary goal was to analyse China's involvement in the continent. So far, an in-depth analysis of their political and economic relations has been made. These analyses have covered China's interest, approach, its policy, political and economic cooperation in Africa.

The weakest part of this chapter was the analysis of China's actual "aid" according to OECD standard. China in 2014 published a Whitepaper titled *China's Foreign Aid (2014)*, it stated between 2010 to 2012, it appropriated \$14.41 billion for foreign financial assistance in three type (aid grants, interest-free loan and concessional loan), and African and Asian countries were the major recipient.

Key Findings

- Economic dimension of China's renewed interest in Africa is its priority, followed by political interest.

- Little changes have occurred in China's African policy over the years and Africa is a lesser priority to China's overall foreign policy. Also, China is Africa's largest trading partner and Africa is China's second least trading partner according to region.
- FOCAC has been the centrepiece of China multilateral engagement in Africa. Through FOCAC, China has been able to deepen its relationship with countries of the continent.
- Principal financiers in Africa are MOFCOM, EXIM Bank, CDB, Sinosure and commercial banks.
- Energy, metal and infrastructure are the main sectors for Chinese projects in Africa.
- Resource minerals and metal are the main import from African countries, while manufacture goods are the main export to African countries, and Chinese products have competitive advantage over local products in African countries.
- China over recent years has increased its military, cultural and educational cooperation with Africa. Its economic activities in African countries have shorten infrastructure gap in the continent.
- China's "aid" is not just aid, but it includes interest-free loans, concessional loans, turnkey, B-O-T project, etc.
- According to the case study, China's approach and relations with different African countries differ significantly. It depends most readily on the commodity specialisation of each partner state, the strength of resource management frameworks and governance, economic diversification, and the creation of an equal footing for negotiation with China.
- China is an *alternative economic partner* and not a *development model* for African countries. Its relations with African countries have presented African countries with the potentials to develop, but corruption, bad governance, and weak and poor institution limits this.

4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (CHINA VS. WEST - CONDITIONALITY VS. NON-CONDITIONALITY)

*“To this day we bear the lasting scars of that dark encounter with colonialism.
We have turned east where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where
the sun sets” – Robert Mugabe*

The West has always been the continent’s main trading partner and provider of foreign capital and aid finance package. These foreign capitals and financial packages did not come free, it came with conditionalities which African countries perceived as neo-colonialism considering its history with the West. Today, that is no longer the case, China is currently the continent’s largest bilateral lender and it is what most African leaders call “a reliable partner” whose relations are deepened by historical similarities of oppression and colonialism. This chapter covers a comparison of the *West in Africa* versus *China in Africa* in respect to foreign capitals and financial aid packages.

Background

Provision of foreign capitals and financial aid packages constitute the core centre of interaction between Africa and the more developed world. China’s non-conditionality (i.e. *no strings attached*) is the core institutional feature of its foreign capitals and financial aid package model to developing countries. China believe giving out financial packages without conditionalities strengthens the position of African leaders and shows respect for sovereignty (David & Joshua 2012 p 154).

On the other hand, the West conditionalities is the core institutional feature of its foreign capitals and financial aid package model to developing countries. The West through its key financial institutions (World Bank’s IDA and IMF’s PRGF programs) believes its conditionalities contributes to democratization, liberalisation, and strengthening of institutions (Eurodad Report 2006).

According to Robert (2008, p217), “China differentiates itself from other world powers by refusing to “make demands upon other nations” sovereignty, economic models, governance or political culture.”

Approaches

China uses the *infrastructure-focused* approach, which basically means channelling finance and aid resources to recipients whose infrastructure need serves China’s long-term interest. There is an absence of conditionality in this approach as their key goal is mutual economic benefit.

On the other hand, the West uses the *aid selectivity* approach, which basically means channelling more finance and aid resources to recipients that have the institutional and policy framework to use the resources effectively, and this is where conditionalities comes in (David & Victoria 2004).

Economic reforms, social and environmental reforms, and public sector reform are the three main categories of conditionalities, failure to meet these conditions could result in failure of the recipient to secure finance and aid package (Eurodad Report 2006).

Criticism

China's has been highly criticised by the West and foreign media for its *non-interference* and *unconditionality* backed *infrastructure focused* approach. It has been criticized of not being a responsible global power and setting debt traps for African countries by not enhancing transparency, implementing anti-corruption strategies and further democratization effort. First, understanding the high importance China places on the issue of sovereignty would give a better insight why China does not set conditionalities regarding internal affairs of the recipients. One of the major pillars China's foreign policy is the principle of non-interference. Second, China argues that political development is endogenously determined by the level of economic development and that democracy should only be encouraged when a country attains a high-level of development. That is why it avoids political conditions and instead focuses on infrastructure development (Xiaobing & Adam 2012).

On the other hand, the West, through the IMF and World Bank has been highly criticized for imposing unacceptably high and rising numbers of conditions in order to gains access to their finance and aid package. In 2005, Uganda faced 197 conditions attached to its World Bank development finance grant. In 2004, Angola suddenly broke off negotiations with the IMF, characterizing its conditions as "humiliating" and announced that China's Eximbank had agreed to give Angola a \$2 billion line of credit to be repaid over twelve years with an interest rate based on the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 1.5 percent. The criticism does not just end at the numbers of conditions but also the question of *how effective these conditions are to actual development of Africa* as the conditions stated by the World Bank and IMF are market-oriented policies that forms the Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus itself has been highly criticized by leading economist (Eurodad Report 2006; Robert 2008 p 119; Xiaobing & Adam 2012)

Impact

Both approaches by China and the West has its positive and negative impact on Africa's overall development.

The core negative aspects of China's approach of unconditionality is that it fails to tackle governance related issues and tends to favour African leaders directly (of which some still leads an authoritarian regime) and not the African people. Governance related issues such as corruption leads to mismanagement of funds and inevitably deepened debt and this is the main concern of the West in regard to China's approach. On the positive side, China understands that

infrastructure plays a significant role in economic development and that lack of infrastructure is the core reason for slow economic growth of African countries. *China in Africa* has led to shortening infrastructure gap in the continent.

In regard to the rest, the core negative aspect of its approach of conditionality and selectivity is that it fails to fully understand and comprehend that Africa cannot be the West. Imposing Western economic models, and norms as prerequisites for aid is recipe for Africa's continuous underdevelopment. On the positive side, its approach understands the importance of adequate strong societal institutions. *West in Africa* has led to improved life quality, better institutions, and promotion democracy.

Similarities Rather Than Differences

Despite the differences, both donors share two fundamental things in common. First, foreign aid programs are the core tool for both China and the West to drive their respective national interests in Africa. Second, most of their foreign aid is *tied aid* which in turn serves their national interests again.



Figure 19. A cartoonist representation of supposed China-Africa win-win relations.

Source: MDXPIE <https://mdxipe.wordpress.com/2017/12/15/is-china-the-new-imperial-power-in-africa/>

EXECUTIVE CONCLUSION

“Let China sleep, for when she awakes, she will shake the world”

- Napoleon Bonaparte

For long, the West had thought history would always be on its side, they thought the future of the world would be shaped by its image. Following China’s rise, it became clear *China was going to shake the world*, at least in Napoleon words. China, like every sovereign state is pursuing its national interest and has the right to, as long as international laws are respected.

Despite the negativities surrounding China-Africa relation, of which some are true in terms of poor labour conduct and unfair competitive advantage of Chinese establishments in Africa, a careful look and comprehension of the *African situation* would indeed prove that China-Africa relations is indeed a game changer for Africa, and could even get better if potentials are well harnessed. Politically, their relations have reiterated Africa’s importance to global balance of power. An example is the disparities in attendance between FOCAC 2018 summit and UNGA 2018 which points to the shifting dynamics and priorities of the African continent. Economically, it has provided an *alternative economic partner*. Its financial packages have been essential to bridging infrastructure gap in the continent. China-Africa relations have also led other leading developing countries to pursue their interest in Africa. In 2008, the first Indian Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) held in New Delhi, and two more have followed since in 2011 and 2015. The 2015 IAFS was attended by 41 African heads of state/government. In June 2019, India for the first time granted financial support of \$15 million for the African Union Summit, scheduled to be held in Niger in early July 2019. Today, Nigeria is India’s largest trading partner in Africa, and India is Nigeria’s largest trading partner globally (IDSA 2018; The Economic Times 2015, 2019). Brazil on the other hand is increasing its influence on the continent. According to John (2013), “Thus far, the Brazilians appear to have avoided the cultural and other mistakes of the Chinese. The Brazilian relationship with Africa may prove deeper and longer lasting than that of its higher-profile rivals among the BRICS”.

China’s emergence in Africa as a counterbalance to US and Europe has been very positive for Africa by creating competition and giving African countries options. Effective management and utilization of these opportunities which China-Africa relations brings (directly or indirectly), fully rest in the hands of respective African countries. African countries must protect their interest, it is their duty to ensure their relations with China and other great powers is in line with their overall goal and interest.

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