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Terrorism and migration (The impact of immigration over terrorism with regard to the restrictiveness of migration policies)
Master dissertation

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Declaration of authorship

I, Kristina Makaveeva, hereby declare that the dissertation thesis ''Terrorism and Migration'' (The impact of immigration over terrorism with regard to the restrictiveness of migration policies) was written by myself, and that all presented results are my own, unless stated otherwise. The literature sources are listed in the list of references.

Prague, September 30th, 2019   Signature:

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Abstract

This research paper examines the relationship between immigration from ten terrorist-prone countries to ten destination countries in Europe, by exploring the effect of the restrictiveness of migration policies that the immigrants comply with.

For this purpose, literature that supports a negative and positive relationship between immigration and terrorism is reviewed, as well as the literature in terms of the positive and negative outcomes for the number of terrorist attacks that arise from the increased restrictiveness of migration policies in Europe.

In addition, a quantitative analysis is conducted through a fixed effect regression model, for which data from various sources such as Global Terrorist Dataset, Determinants of International Migration, Migrant International Policy Index and World Development Indicators and are accounted for the ten most terror-prone countries, outlined as such by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The variables which are chosen as controls are derived from the literature review findings and are labour mobility, permanent residence, family reunion, political participation, anti-discrimination, GDP per capita, GINI index and employment.

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1.Introduction

Immigration and terrorism are not new phenomena for scholars, policy makers or countries (Rudolph, 2003). On the contrary, they are key concerns in the security agenda of Europe due to the involvement of migrants in some of the major terror incidents from the last decades (Adamson 2006; Rudolph 2003). The terrorist attack of 9/11 triggered global fear and uncertainty which was further fostered by the subsequent attacks around Europe – in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Belgium, France (2015), Germany (2016), Catalonia (2017) (Rebega, 2017). These happenings created arguments for a relationship between the migration flow to Europe and the occurred therein terrorist attacks, together with a desire for tightening the restrictiveness of the migration policies. This, combined with the interconnectedness between the European countries, are the reasons why the topic has become a global concern (Dustmann, 2015).

Despite the need for specificity, the term immigration is referred to by scholars in different ways. One the one hand it is defined as the action of coming to live permanently in a foreign country, while on the other, it solely concerns the individuals who arrive at a country's border where government officials are responsible to verify their documents (Anderson & Blinder, 2015). As a consequence, most of the studies on the topic refer to immigration by encompassing all kinds of movements and fail to distinguish between permanent and non-permanent stay in a country (Bell et al., 2015). However, for the purpose of this research paper, immigration makes reference to the permanent settlement of a foreigner in a host state.

The term terrorism, according to Hutchinson (1972) is a method for constructing social fear, usually through the use of symbolic acts of terror, crime or violence and hence is a method for influencing the political behaviour of a targeted country. This definition entails that the expression has a symbolic nature, meaning ''it aims to convey a message, rather than to secure a piece of territory'' (Hutchinson, 1972). According to Hoffman (2006) ''a terrorist attack is a planned, calculated and systematic act of violence that is carried out with a political objective and thus aims political consequences''.

The scholars are divided in two main groups: those who claim that immigration leads to more terrorism and those who do not (Martinez and Lee, 2000).

According to Leiken (2004) and Bove & Bohmelt (2016) "immigration and terrorism are linked, not because all immigrants are terrorists, but because all, or nearly all, terrorists in the West have been immigrants."

Contrarily, Rumbaut and Ewing (2007) state that: "the perception that foreign-born immigrants are responsible for the increased terror rates is rooted in the public opinion and is sustained by media and political narratives, but is solely based on stereotypes (Hagan, Levi & Dinovitzer, 2008). As according to Huysmans (2000) the political elites activate the public fear from immigrants and terrorism in order to reassert the control over borders.

With regard to controlling the immigrants' entry and settlement in a country, there are two competing theoretical perspectives that explain the level of respect for human rights and opportunities that they receive, evaluated by the restrictiveness of the migration and integration policies within the host European countries.

According to the first one, ''if the domestic migration policies ease the admission and settlement of foreign citizens who reside in the new country, their social and economic integration is facilitated, which makes it less likely for radicalization to be fuelled by making it more difficult for terrorist organizations to exploit the migrant communities and implies that receiving states are expected to experience lower levels of terrorism'' (Dowty & Loescher, 1996; Adamson, 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Milton, Spencer & Findley, 2013; Bove & Bohmelt, 2017).

According to the second one, ''stricter regulations and more rigorous control mechanisms at the border, as well as within the country allow states to monitor more closely and exert greater control over specific segments of the population, but can make immigrants feel alienated from the rest of the population, prevent them from being able to integrate and thus make it more appealing to resort to terrorism'' (Bove & Bohmelt, 2017).

According to Ousey and Kubrin (2009) there are three main theories that explain why terror occurs. The *opportunity structure theory* suggests that the ''groups of people who lack opportunities for wealth or social status are probable to cope by turning to crime'' (Lee & Martinez, 2009; Merton, 1938). Secondly, the *cultural background* theory suggests that conflicts can arise between the values of the ''dominant'' and immigrant group and thereby increase the possibility for terror, since the previously homogenous group is not such anymore (Stewart, 2016; Selling, 1938). Thirdly, according to the *social disorganization* perspective ''the immigration process weakens the community's social controls and stability which in turn increases crime'' (Stansfield, 2008; Pauwels et al., 2010; Merton, 1938).

This paper responds to a lack of prior research on the country-level relationship between the two phenomena, unlike the broad availability of research on the individual and neighbourhood level relationship between immigration and terrorism (Strabag and Listhaug, 2008; Mears

2001; Reid et al., 2005). According to Shuller (2016), although immigration is fundamentally a process of social change that unfolds over time, most of the prior studies on immigration and terrorism are cross-sectional which is a limitation, because cross-sectional analysis does not show the temporal changes in one social process that affects changes in another (La Free and Dugan, 2004).

With regard to the above-presented framework, the purpose of this paper is to give an answer to two main hypotheses: *whether the increased level of immigration to Europe increases the occurrence of terrorism therein* and secondly, *whether the increased restrictiveness of the migration policies in Europe reduces the number of terrorist attacks*.

In terms of these two research questions, the quantitative analysis is done through a fixed effect regression model with the statistical tool Stata and presented in Section 6 of this paper. The analysis is done by employing data from GTD (Global Terrorist Dataset), DEMIG (Determinants of International Migration), MIPEX (Migrants International Policy Index) and WDI (World Development Indicators) for the years 2000-2017.

The quantitative research is made by gathering data for the number of terrorist attacks, measured through the number of wounded and killed people in Europe, caused by immigrants from the top ten most terror-prone countries, outlined by the IEP (Institute of Economics and Peace) as such, the number of migration inflow from there to the top ten European immigration destination countries, and the level of policy restrictiveness in Europe that the immigrants face. In addition to this, terror mechanisms such as GDP per capita, labour mobility, employment, family networks, political participation, anti-discrimination, GINI index and permanent residence of the immigrants are controlled for in separate fixed effect regression models for the purpose of controlling for each of them accordingly and are gathered from WDI and MIPEX database. A remark related to the choice of control variables can be made with regard to gender, age and education, which despite having theoretical importance for determining the occurrence of terrorist attacks, are not included since they have individual-level analysis characteristics in the case of the first two, which is not consistent with a panel data analysis, and lack of consistent data in the case of the latter.

The full overview and methodology of the quantitative analysis and the respective results are presented in Sections 6 and 7 of this paper.

2. Stylized facts about immigration, terrorism and restrictiveness of migration policies

The purpose of this section is to present past and current empirical findings about the relationship between immigration and terrorism with respect to the restrictiveness of migration policies in the ten most frequent destination countries for immigration in Europe (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) and the ten most terror-prone states, as outlined by IEP (Institute of Economics and Piece) in their Global Terrorism Index handbook for 2018 - Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Philippines, Yemen and India (IEP, 2018).

As a result, the terrorism level in the ten most terror-prone countries, the immigration level from them to Europe, the terrorism level in Europe, as a consequence from the arrival of immigrants from the terror-prone countries, and lastly, the level of terrorism, depending on the restrictiveness of the immigration policies that the immigrants face after their arrival and settlement in Europe are presented in the form of graphs, available in Appendix section of this paper.

According to the overview of IEP (2018), after the terrorist attack on 9/11 which is considered as the commencement of terrorism, there have been four distinct trends/stages in the phenomenon.

The first stage, according to the source, started in 2002 and lasted until 2007. During this period terrorist attacks have been increasing and have occurred simultaneously with the increase in violent conflicts, as the percentage for unsuccessful attacks has ranged between 8% and 10% for every year until 2007.

The second stage, from 2007 until 2011 corresponds with the US troop surge in Iraq, after which deaths from terrorism have started to fall, despite the simultaneous steady increase in terrorist attacks. Interestingly, as the total number of attacks began to rise, the percentage of foiled/prevented attacks also increased which continued to rise even as the total number of attacks has declined (IEP, 2018).

The third stage from 2011 to 2014 is marked with an increase in terrorism by more than 35%. This coincided with the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the increased violent conflict in Iraq, the rise of ISIL and the start of the Syrian civil war. The number of countries affected by more than 1,000 terrorist deaths rose in 2012 and did not decrease, even as the number of overall attacks began to fall (IEP, 2018).

The fourth stage, from 2014 onwards is represented by a substantial decrease in deaths from terrorism, with the biggest reduction occurring in Iraq and Nigeria. The reason for this are considered to be the increased counterterrorism measures at both state and international level, the increased political stability, the winding down of the Syrian civil war and the power collapse of ISIL (IEP, 2018).

According to IEP (2018), in 2017 over 20% of attacks were unsuccessful, rising from 12% in 2014, the year in which the highest number of total attacks is recorded. The peak of deaths from terrorism was also in 2014 and it began to continuously fall for three years in a row until 2017, the year until which IEP has collected data.

As per IEP (2018), the total number of deaths fell by 27% between 2016 and 2017, as the largest decline occurred in Iraq and Syria - over 5,000 and 1,000 fewer deaths from terrorism respectively. The fall of ISIL is also reflected in a fall in terrorist activity around Europe, where the number of deaths has diminished with 75% from 827 in 2016 to 204 in 2017 and is the region with the biggest improvement from the impact of terrorism. Countries such as France, Belgium, and Germany recorded the most significant falls, while Spain, Sweden, Finland and Austria registered increases. Preliminary data for 2019 suggests this trend will continue.

Although the number of deaths from terrorism is currently at its lowest level since 2013, it still remains a major global threat. Deaths from terror attacks remain substantially higher than a decade ago and are still nearly three times as high as the number recorded in 2001, after the attack in the USA.

2.1. Graphical representation of stylized facts

The second part of this section includes a graphical representation of the level of terrorism in the 10 countries, immigration from them to Europe, the levels of terrorism in Europe post their arrival as well as the terrorism levels, as a function of the restrictiveness of the migration policies. These parameters are chosen as a result of the framework of the research paper and the presented literature in Sections 3, 4 and 5.

For the purpose of the reader's convenience, the Graphs are labelled from 1 to 5 and put in Appendix Section of this paper, together with their respective explanation and interpretation.

3. Immigration leads to less terrorism

This section of the paper provides an overview of the existing literature that finds support of the assumption that *the existence of immigrants in a neighbourhood does not influence the exhibited therein terrorism levels*.

According to Beck, Diza & Searl (2017) ''any association between immigration and terrorism is illusory and fabricated since immigration has been existent long before the rise of terrorism in the last several decades'' and that ''such connection is made common with the intent to restrict immigration'' (Beck et al., 2017). Several studies discuss that the foreign born immigrants experience or execute fewer crime, murder, arrest and imprisonment levels than the native born (Rumbaut, 2008; Butcher & Piehl, 1998; Hagan & Palloni, 1999; Mears, 2001). An observation from other researchers is that the children of immigrants who are born in the host country exhibit higher crime rates than their immigrant parents (Zhou, 1997; Morenoff & Astor, 2006; Rumbaut et al., 2006; Bersani, 2014). A study by Martinez (2000) shows that urban areas with a higher percentage of immigrants have lower murder rates. In a common study, Martinez, Lee, and Rosenfeld (2001) and Stowell (2008), examine the relationship between immigration in three cities, widely populated with immigrants: El Paso, Miami and San Diego. The results show that the arrival of immigrants therein between 1980 and 1990 did not increase the race-specific murder levels when variables such as poverty, residential instability and employment were controlled for. In two out of the six regression models (Latino immigrants in El Paso and black immigrants in Miami) the 'immigration'' variable was a statistically significant and negative predictor of murder (Martinez and Lee, 2001). Only in the case of black immigrants in San Diego, immigration had a positive and significant influence on murder levels (Martinez et al., 2005). Stowell (2008) concludes that with few exceptions, immigration is found to have a negative effect over crime.

Lee and Martinez (2009) collected reports of crime offendings at neighbourhood level in Chicago and found that Mexican Americans were involved in violence at a significantly lower rate in comparison to both black and white native citizens which was especially valid for foreign born immigrants, after controlling for poverty. Their analysis also compared neighbourhoods according to their level of risk for crime and discovered that the average male living in a ''high risk'' neighbourhood without immigrants was more likely to engage in violence than one in a ''high risk'' immigrant-populated neighbourhood (Sampson, Morenoff and Rowley, 2002). This study, however, also found that neighbourhood concentration of Latino immigrants strongly predicted a perception for disorder, despite of the actual amount of disorder or reported crimes (Sampson and Raudenbush,

2004). In relation to this, Sampson (2008) argues that the cities with concentrated immigrants are some of the safest places, contrary to cities such as New York City or Los Angeles which have experienced drastic crime increase after their immigrant population has dropped, concluding that cities with small immigration populations tend to have some of the highest crime rates. This is consistent with another assumption by Sampson (2008) which explains that there is a growing consensus for immigration to revitalize cities by adding to the previously stagnating population and contributes to fostering the economic growth. In a joint study, Sampson, Morenoff and Raudenbush (2005) report that the neighbourhood-level immigrant concentration has a significant and negative relationship with violence. Likewise, Desmond and Kubrin (2009) find that communities with greater immigrant concentration have lower average levels of violence.

Nevertheless, these studies obscure the geographic location for the impact of immigration in specific neighbourhoods, since it is important to identify the specific neighbourhoods in which immigration affects crime rates (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997). As a result, scholars such as Shaw and McKay (1969) have used mapping techniques, in order to provide more detailed information on crime in specific neighbourhoods. For doing so, Shaw and McKay (1969) examine the relationship between Italian immigration and homicide for the 1985-1995 period in two predominantly black Miami neighbourhoods. Consistent with the quantitative research, they found that immigration has not disorganized the communities in northern Miami, while their graphical evidence demonstrates that homicide levels have decreased (Shaw and McKay, 1969; Martinez 2008).

Certain authors' argument for this proposes that immigrants are actually self-selected groups of people who have ambition for achievement and thus have a low propensity to engage in illegal activities (Butcher & Piehl, 2005). Similarly, Tonry (1997) advocates that ''many immigrants are highly motivated to pursue economic opportunities that are not available in their home countries, they are willing to work hard, to defer short-term gratification in the interest of long-term advancement and hence avoid actions that put them in opposition to the mainstream norms and values of the society''.

According to Taft (1933) and Ousey & Kubrin (2010) immigrant groups serve as a protective measure against terrorism by preserving the ''old world'' through the informal family and community forces. This argument has been made by the authors also with respect to ethnic enclaves which ''encourage the preservation of the culture, promote or maintain the family and social networks and provide employment, all of which helps to reduce crime'' (Desmond & Kubrin, 2010). A similar finding by Zhou and Banskton (2006) is that even though young [Vietnamese] people live in a socially marginalized environment, they are shielded from negative influences by belonging to a

system of ethnic social relations that control them and provide them with direction (Zhou and Bankston, 1998). Along these lines, Engbersen and van der Leun (2001) claim that the limited involvement of immigrants in terrorism can be partially explained by the social support they receive from their ethnic community.

In sum, a substantial literature indicates that, contrary to the public opinion and belief, immigrants are no more likely to engage in crime and terror, than their native-born counterparts, explained by the existence of family bonds, willingness of immigrants to purpose economic opportunities which are not available in their country, as the perceived levels of disorder in immigrant communities is not empirically supported. These suggestions are further tested within the quantitative analysis in Section 6 through the variables employment, permanent residence and family reunion.

4. Immigration leads to more terrorism

This section of the paper examines the existing literature that supports a *positive relationship between immigration and terrorism*.

According to Kirk (1996), there is a causal relationship between immigration and terrorism, due to the fact that immigration leads to ''demographic and social transitions that affect terror rates'' (Kirk, 1996). There are three directions of the framework, as pointed out in the Introduction section of this paper, each of which emphasizes different causal mechanisms.

The first one suggests that immigration increases terrorism by raising the share of the population with a "terror-prone" demographic profile, that ''terrorism follows a distinctive age pattern with offending rates being highest among teens and young adults'' (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983; MacKinnon, 2010; Thomas and Shihadeh, 2013; Koopmans, 2010) and that male immigrants are involved in terror at significantly higher rates than females (Elliot & Maguire, 2008). According to Ousey and Kubrin (2009), if the immigration flow increases the percentage of the population which is young and male, then crime rates are also expected to increase. Other researchers such as Bove and Bohmelt (2016) and Beck et al., (2017) claim that the flow of migrants constitutes a physical link through which terrorism can spread from the terror-prone nation to a receiving one. Similarly, as per Beck, Diza & Searl (2007), despite the fact that immigrants can have positive intentions, they are a vehicle through which terrorism spreads from a terrorist-prone nation to a previously unaffected one, due to the ideological, cultural or ethnic differences between the dominant and immigrant community (Beck, Diza and Searl, 2007). Kundnani (2014) claims that, especially in the case of Muslim migrants, even if the values they have are not radical or violent, the cultural and religious heritage differences are the foundation upon which terrorism is built.

The second direction of the framework is that terror rates increase when immigration breaks down the networks and institutions, necessary for an effective socialization and control of citizen behaviour which leads to instability within a society (Turk, 2004; Bursik, 1988). Equivalently, according to Bankston, Lee, Martinez and Rosenfed (2001), immigration is a potentially major drive for population or residential change and is thus a critical factor behind the disruption of social controls that increases the crime rates. From this network perspective, Bove and Bohmelt (2016) and Dowty and Loescher (1996) write that migration flows affect the opportunity for and patterns of social interaction which make it more likely that ''ties are developed between regular immigrants and terrorist groups''. They point out that the process of joining a terrorist group is in three steps - developing social affiliation, intensification of the existing beliefs and formal acceptance of the need for terrorism (Bove and Bohmelt, 2016). Bearing in mind this process, then social bonds between people are of significant importance, since the potential pool of terrorists are clusters of people who are connected through social ties with common views and a sense for community (Bove and Bohmlet, 2016). Further, with regard to exploiting the migrant communities for joining a terrorist group, especially with regard to Muslim or Arab diaspora communities, is how differently they are perceived to be in comparison to the western nations to which they migrate and the opportunity for integration they have (Castles, De Haas & Miller, 2013). With regard to the latter, it is believed that Europe has failed to assimilate the immigrants from the migrant crisis in 2016, while studies outline this to be a major reason for the occurred terrorist attacks since, due to the feelings of discontent and alienation, fostered by the social and economic hardships that immigrants face. Both of these considerations increase the probability that, in spite of the good intentions that immigrants can have, terrorist organizations will successfully manipulate them through social networks and further their radical agendas (Mazzoni, 2018).

Ultimately, if the migrants' country of origin is prone to terrorist activities, the terrorist organizations might make use of the social bonds that are created through the inflow of migrants to other countries, and therefore spread the terrorist activities across borders (Bove and Bohmelt, 2016). Correspondingly, in their study of immigration patterns, Leiken and Brooke (2004) report that the decision to migrate is usually affected by the availability of relatives and friends in specific regions who can provide assistance in finding housing or employment and thus lead to the outcome that pre-migration networks determine the country destination patterns and that migration flows comprise social ties and networks that exist before the actual migration (Winters, Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001). Thus, ''it becomes evident that a pre-existing social framework is a necessary requirement for joining, forming or engaging with terrorist groups'' (Perliger and Pedahzur, 2011) where actors are linked with each other through a "complex web of self-organized direct and

mediated exchanges" (Sageman, 2004) which implies that terrorist organizations need pre-existing links, nodes and networks to pursue their goals (Sageman, 2004). Thus, it is assumed that migration flows from terrorist prone countries facilitates the diffusion of terrorism in the destination country by providing a dense framework of prior trusted relationships among the immigrants (Bove and Bohmelt, 2016).

The third perspective for a positive relationship between immigration and terrorism highlights the extent of economic and social deprivation that the immigrants are faced with. This viewpoint posits that higher immigration elevates terrorism by increasing the share of the population with low educational attainment, low labour market skills and thus poor prospects for employment (Kostakopoulou, 2001). A research by Butcher & Piehl (1998) and Portes and Rumbaut (2006) documents that the recent waves of immigrants are less skilled than both earlier immigrants and natives, and that the immigrants' employment prospects are decreased accordingly which narrows down their residential options. As a result, many immigrants can be channelled to live in neighbourhoods, located in or around urban ghettos where they are likely to be further exposed to unemployment and economic deprivation and increase their criminal activities in response to labour market competition with immigrants (Hagan and Palloni, 1999; Shaw & McKay, 1969; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1920; Reid et al.,2005). In the context of Italy - immigrants earn significantly less than natives, partly due to the fact that they are disproportionally young and low skilled: as of 2000, 65% of immigrants were between 18 and 39 years old, 54% were male and 85% of them had no (recognized) education (Del Boca & Venturini, 2003). In line with this research, another one suggests that higher levels of immigration create a new pool of low-skilled, low-wage labour that competes with and may displace existing low-skilled workers (Perlman & Waldinger, 1997). This means that ''temporal increases in immigration can contribute to higher crime rates among both low-skilled native-born and immigrant workers'' (Butcher & Piehl, 1998).

Further, according to Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) immigrants and locals are faced with different probability for conviction and employment opportunities. LaLonde and Topel (1991) and Borjas (1998) document that ''immigrants in the U.S. experience worse labour market conditions, which would predict a higher crime propensity'', while Butcher and Piehl (2005) emphasize that the punishment immigrants face includes higher costs, as well as a risk for deportation.

In sum, according to scholars, immigration from terrorist-prone countries can increase crime and terrorism through the higher share of population with crime-propensity who is faced with barriers for integration within the new host country, is perceived as different from the native community, maintains social ties with pre-migration clusters of people and has a high probability to be

economically or socially deprived in comparison to native citizens. With regard to the quantitative analysis in Section 6 of this paper, the chosen variables are GDP per capita, GINI index and employment.

5. Impact of migration policy restrictiveness over terrorism

5.1. Overview of European migration and integration policies

This section of the paper deals with the *way European countries control the entry and stay of non-European immigrants into the new (host/destination) country* and the available theoretical research which discusses *the impact of the policies' restrictiveness over the probability of terrorism to occur through its effect over the immigrant population.*

The terrorist attacks from 9/11 led to a securitization of migration (Zucconi, 2004), meaning that countries employed policies to control the inflow of immigrants and while some migration policies are introduced as general security measures, others are created specifically in response to the occurred terrorist activities (Bove and Bohmelt, 2016). Institutions have introduced measures for international cooperation such as information sharing over evidence-gathering which they consider to help with the identification of potential terrorists, as for instance, data gathered by law-enforcement agencies across Europe is shared under the "principle of availability" (Brown and Korff, 2009), while surveillance activities such as the use of biometric information in identification documents are used to identify potential terrorists (Brown and Korff, 2009; Bellair, 2000; Byrne and Marx, 2011). Moreover, to tackle the internationalism of terrorism, countries have introduced regulations that allow the withdrawal of entry and stay permits and the revocation of citizenship due to potential danger (Epifanio, 2011).

With regard to the measures, taken by the European Union in terms of fighting terrorism and integrating immigrants, the Counter-terrorism strategy adopted in 2005 entails that terrorism should be fought by respecting the rights of citizens and is composed from four sub-categories – to prevent people from engaging in terrorism, to protect them by reducing the vulnerabilities from the occurred attacks, to pursue and investigate the terrorist activities and their planning and to respond in a well-managed way in case of occurrence (ec.europa.eu, 2019).

With regard to the European Union's migration policy, after the migration crisis in 2016, it has implemented measures to control its external borders and accounts that the illegal migration has decreased with 90% since, as the Legal Migration and Integration policy, sets the framework for legal migration and integration (consilium.europa.eu).

In terms of legal migration, the measure covers the entry and residence for categories of migrants such as qualified workers, students and researchers and their integration into the host countries. Further there is a directive for non-EU permanent workers, known as the Single Permit Directive, according to which the rights for non-European workers to reside within Europe are set. Two additional Directives were adopted in 2014 that concern seasonal and intra-corporate workers and aim to give the migrants clear employment-related rights (ec.europa.eu). Further, the EU Immigration Portal which was launched in 2011, provides information for foreign nationals who are interested in moving to the EU and is also aimed at migrants who are already in the EU and would like to move from one country to another by providing specific practical information about the necessary procedures in all EU countries for each category of migrants.

In terms of integration, although Member States are primarily responsible for integration, the EU is supporting national and local policies with policy coordination, exchange of knowledge and financial resources for better integrating the immigrants. With regard to this, it has developed Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals, Integration in the labour market and EU works and activities on integration (ec.europa.eu).

5.2. Migration policy restrictiveness and terrorism

There are two main directions of research – some of the scholars claim that open regulations/less restrictiveness of migration policies and free inflow of migrants lead to the immigrants' better inclusion within the host country and decrease the probability of terror, while others state that more restrictive border and settlement rules help for preventing the probability of terrorism, but risk to segregate the immigrant community and hence creates a probability of terrorism.

5.3. Less policy restrictiveness reduces terrorism

According to the first line of research, open and less restrictive regulations are viewed as helping immigrants to better integrate into the host country and make it easier to qualify for entry/settlement tracks such as residence and employment, lower the probability of radicalization and thereby decrease the potential grievances toward the host state (Schierup, Hansen & Castles, 2006). Thus, assigning the right to move freely to and within the host country and the availability of integration measures such as language classes, accommodation or financial and employment support can reduce the entry and settlement barriers and improve the immigrants' social and economic integration (Castles, 2006). This is in line with the so-called "catalyst paradigm" (Hainmueller, Hangartner &

Pietrantuono, 2017) which states that integration efforts, policies and regulations should be relatively open and inclusive, as they then provide the immigrants with the necessary incentives and resources to integrate and invest in a future in the host country. As per Branigan (2007) not doing so and engaging in ''abuse of human rights'' actually encourages terrorism. The statement suggests that by enabling immigrants to freely enter and settle into the new country, governments can ''win'' against the terrorist groups by supporting and respecting the human rights of the population which is a "win–win" scenario – by securing such rights, they not only comply with the normative obligations, but also experience fewer terrorist attacks (Branigan, 2007). Therefore, according to this direction of research, the availability of integration policies and less restrictive controls and regulations for immigrants reduce the potential support of extremist organizations and make them less likely to be targeted by such (Branigan, 2007).

5.4. Higher policy restrictiveness increases terrorism

Contrarily, according to authors such as Doosje, Loseman and Bos (2013), a feel of uncertainty and intergroup injustice that arises through tightened restriction policies is among the key determinants for developing a radical belief system (Rahimi Graumans, 2015). Similarly, according to Moghaddam (2005) the perception of injustice is one of the "staircases to terrorism", as individuals with perception to be economically or socially deprived can be particularly encouraged to see terrorist organizations as legitimate. Lyons-Padilla et al. (2015) claim that many of the counterterrorism policies have exclusive character that further marginalize the immigrants and can fuel support for extremism. Further, strict immigration measures such as preventive arrests, detention or deportation rebound strongly within the entire immigrant community and reduce the will of the Arab or Muslim immigrants to cooperate with the authorities in the fight against terrorism, since such measures increase the mistrust for the government and alienate also large parts of the non-violent immigrant community which would otherwise be willing to cooperate. In relation to this, Spencer (2008) states that: ''if people are deported for having connections to terrorism, this gives them the possibility of pursuing further terrorist activity abroad where the government authorities do not have the same ability to keep an eye on them''. Further, the focus of regulations on Arab or Muslim immigrants and foreigners not only risks isolating and alienating them from the host community, but it also reinforces racial, religious and gender stereotypical presumptions in the general population. If Muslim immigrants are increasingly segregated, stereotypes will become the norm and further isolate them which in turn can encourage the growth of harmful attitudes in the immigrant communities and in western populations (Lohrmann, 2000). Authors such as Fitzpatrick

(2002) believe that deporting international terrorists is a short-sighted and self-defeating policy for fighting against terrorism and that states which are able to win the support of all or a critical segment of the immigrant population can deprive terrorists from important capabilities. In addition, Kerwin (2005) points out that introducing restrictive immigration policies in the fight against terrorism is contrary to the economic idea for open and free markets. As Hoffman and McCormick (2004) explain, an important goal of most terrorist organizations is to draw attention to the grievances of the immigrants. Additionally, as per Cingranelli and Richards (1999), governmental violations of human rights such as harming the physical integrity, engaging in torture or political imprisonment promote terrorism''.

According to Abrahms (2007), such acts undermine the state's legitimacy in the eyes of the public, make it less willing to support the authorities' counter-terror efforts and make the immigrants more willing to support those of the terrorists. Similarly, according to Cole (2002): ''counterterrorism which enforces or tightens immigration laws prevents immigrants from coming forward to report potentially suspicious terrorist activities in their community if they themselves face a risk to be arrested or deported''. Further Cole (2002) points out that law enforcement is more effective when it works with, rather than against citizens and that people should obey laws, not because they worry about being caught, but because they consider the laws to be fair and legitimate (Cole, 2002). Piazza (2010) offers similar argumentation on the behaviour of potential terrorists: ''states may face increased terrorism if they discriminate against ethnic minorities that collectively suffer from disadvantages in income, housing, employment or unequal access to government social services''.

Moreover, when coupled with social ties that typically exist in immigrant populations, a symbolic or realistic threat to the cultural and economic status of the immigrants, can induce strong negative out-group attitudes and lead to violent actions which facilitate radicalization and increase the risk of terrorism (Stephan et al., 2002). Moreover, marginalized communities that lack a sense of clear belonging can be attracted to groups that offer such sense of identity for which marginalized immigrants are more likely to be most susceptible to radicalization (Wenger and Mauer, 2009; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). Similarly, according to another study: ''since people who join violent extremist movements often look for "personal significance," terrorist organizations then exploit such segregated communities (Kruglanski et al., 2009; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015; Sageman, 2004).

In conclusion, in case immigrants are aided to enter and settle within the destination country and are provided with opportunities for employment and permanent settlement, stricter immigration laws and policies may not necessarily be useful when employed in an indiscriminate way. For the purpose of the quantitative analysis in Section 6 of this paper, the variables permanent settlement and labour mobility are analysed.

6. Quantitative analysis

6.1. Overview and methodology of analysis

The quantitative analysis is done by gathering information from the GTD, DEMIG, MIPEX and WDI. For the purpose of this research paper, a sample of the ten most terrorist prone countries is created. The choice of countries is based on the findings from the Global Terrorism Index, which is an annual handbook, published by IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace) that ranks countries, according to the number of terrorist attack and is further matched by the author of the paper with data from GTD (Global Terrorist Database) and DEMIG (Determinants of International Migration) in order to outline the countries in which terror happens most frequently, as well as to which countries do immigrants from therein migrate to Europe the most. According to the latest version of the handbook for 2018 and the number of killed and wounded people from GTD, the ten most terror-prone countries are Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, Philippines, Egypt, Yemen and India. After considering this information, the number of attacks, caused by immigrants from there are found for the time period between 2000 and 2017.

Further, for the purpose of analysing the relationship and potential impact of immigration over terrorism, data from the DEMIG country to country database is collected which includes the bilateral migration flow (from one country to another). The findings show that these countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

Due to the framework of the research paper, solely the ten most frequent European immigration destination countries are considered for the analysis. These ten countries are found by filtering the information in DEMIG database by taking into account to where do the immigrants from the ten most terrorist prone countries immigrate to the most.

Thirdly, with regard to the existing policy restrictiveness in the above-mentioned European countries of destination, information from the DEMIG Policy Database is employed. This data represents and includes a policy restrictiveness index for each respective country. The methodology for tailoring the available data for the purposes of the research is similar to the previous two – data between the years 2000 and 2017 for the chosen set of European destination countries and their respective index.

Moreover, with regard to the data about the control/confound variables, from the literature review as important and relevant for the topic of interest, data from MIPEX (Migrant International Policy Index) is collected for the purpose of finding out the level of efforts that each European country has in terms of integrating the new arrivals into its boundaries and the policy restrictiveness they face.

The chosen variables from this database are labour mobility, family reunion, permanent residence, political participation and anti-discrimination.

Lastly, data from WDI (World Development Indicators), developed by the World Bank, regarding the country development in terms of overcoming poverty is collected. The chosen variables from therein are GDP per capita, GINI index that measures the economic inequality between citizens and employment, also for the years 2000 and 2017, solely for the ten most frequent European destination countries.

After having fully collected and summarized the relevant data considering the outlined variables from the literature review section of this paper, the data is analysed with the help of STATA, by employing fixed effect regression model. This method for analysis is chosen due to the type of data that is put in use for this research paper – panel data, and allows to judge upon time-invariant variables and also such which are unobservable. In addition to this, all of the employed models include the algorithm for robust clustering, in order to account for heteroscedasticity.

The executed analysis is divided in two parts – the first part aims to show the results from conducting the analysis about the two hypotheses – whether the increased level of immigration leads to more terrorism and the second one being – whether the increased restrictiveness of immigration policies reduces the number of terrorist attacks, as all of the control variables labour mobility, family reunion, permanent residence, political participation, anti-discrimination, GDP per capita, GINI index and employment are initially not controlled for the purpose of testing the two hypotheses.

In the second part of the analysis, each of the control/confound variables is controlled for, in order to analyse the effect of each one over the coefficient of the dependent variable and the coefficients of the other confound variables in relation to the dependent one.

Due to the essence of the fixed effect regression model, there are a few key coefficients and results that are received when doing the analysis – the coefficient of the independent variables (migration flow and policy restrictiveness) over the dependent variable - number of terrorist attacks, F test, t value test, p value test and Spearman's correlation coefficient rho.

The purpose of the F value is to show whether the independent variable (either migration flow or migration policy restrictiveness) predicts the dependent variable number of attack. Statistically it is considered that in case the F value after running a fixed effect regression model is <0.05, then the independent variables do predict the dependent one in a correct way.

The p value is the marginal significance which tests the probability for occurrence of certain effect and can be a number between 0 and 1 and relates to either rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis. In order to reject the null hypothesis, which is the belief made about the sample whether the model

explains the dependent variable better than viewing the mean value of the dependent variable, the value should be lower than 0.05.

The t value represents the strength with which a certain variable impacts the dependent one. Due to the fact that for this research paper's analysis the confidence interval is set at 95%, then in case the t value is above 1.96, the null hypothesis that each coefficient is different than zero can be rejected and thus that the specific variable has a high relevance and impact over the dependent one.

The rho coefficient shows the strength and direction of correlation between variables and can have either a negative or a positive value, as a positive correlation value indicates a positive impact between the observed variables, whereas a negative one suggests an inverse relationship.

6.2. Fixed effect regression analysis – testing of hypotheses

The purpose of the first fixed effect regression analysis shown in Table 1 below is to find out how much does the immigration flow from the ten terror-prone countries to the European destination countries contribute for a change in the number of terrorist attacks, thus to test the first hypothesis.

The negative coefficient of -0.00016 for immigration means that an increase of thousand immigrants from the ten most terror-prone countries to Europe, would lead to a 0.16% increase in the number of killed and wounded people in the destination countries. This result implies that the first hypothesis is accepted/not rejected – the increased immigration to Europe leads to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks. This is also confirmed by the P value which is higher than the t value.

Due to the fact that all of the chosen control variables are included in the regression model signifies that they are initially not controlled for, for the purpose of not emphasizing on the impact of each of them which however is done further in the analysis.

In order to be able to compare with the findings presented further in the analysis after controlling for the different variables, and shown in Tables 3 to 11, if there are any changes in the value of the dependent and other independent/control variables, before and after controlling for them, it can be said that after conducting this initial analysis without controlling for variables, the coefficient for labour mobility is -0.271, as the variable measures the ability of immigrants to move within the country with regard to finding new employment opportunities or for personal reasons and that it is weakly and negatively correlated with the number of attacks. This means that despite the result is not statistically significant, a higher negative level of labour mobility leads to higher number of attacks. Similar negative relationship with a coefficient of – 2.865 is observed between the level of the immigrants' political participation and the occurrence of attacks. This inverse coefficient implies

that if there is an inverse increase in the ability to participate in the political decision making of the country, the higher is the probability of terror to occur.

The rest of the control variables GDP per capita with a coefficient of 0.001, GINI index (equality between members) with a coefficient 1.2, employment 1.6, family reunion 0.346 and anti-discrimination 0.149 show a positive relationship with the expected number of attacks. Which means that the more people earn, the higher the economical difference between people is, the more employment levels rise, the more immigrants participate in family networks and the more discriminated they feel, will rise the occurrence of terror.

These results for the impact of immigration flow to Europe over the number of occurred attacks, coincides with the part of the literature, according to which an inflow of more immigrants in a host country leads to more occurred terrorist attacks. In terms of the control variables, GDP and employment, it is the opposite, since the literature claims that poor economic conditions trigger more terrorism, whereas the model shows the opposite. Similarly, with regard to family reunion, the literature claims that being part of social family ties is expected to fasten the control and preserve the peace, but the second part of the literature claims that pre-migration network connections are a mechanism through which terror occurs. With regard to GINI index, the result is expected, since the higher the difference between individuals, the more terror attacks are expected to occur.

Table 1: Impact of immigration flow to Europe over number of terrorist attacks

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs      =         49
Group variable: countrynum                 Number of groups   =         10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1744                     Obs per group: min =          4
       between = 0.0004                                     avg =        4.9
       overall = 0.0018                                     max =          5

                                            F(9,9)             =     891.85
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9856                    Prob > F           =     0.0000

                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
migflow	-.0001644	.0002653	-0.62	0.551	-.0007646	.0004359
LabMob	-.2711341	.1811742	-1.50	0.169	-.6809785	.1387104
FamReun	.3468517	.3074947	1.13	0.288	-.3487497	1.042453
PermResid	1.333288	.6742816	1.98	0.079	-.192043	2.858619
PolPart	-2.865754	1.890104	-1.52	0.164	-7.141466	1.409958
AntiDisc	.1490037	.1014026	1.47	0.176	-.080385	.3783925
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0013582	.001151	1.18	0.268	-.0012455	.0039619
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	1.202143	2.372758	0.51	0.625	-4.165408	6.569694
Employmenttopopulationratiol	1.602546	1.544338	1.04	0.326	-1.890989	5.096082
_cons	-120.4111	71.26152	-1.69	0.125	-281.6159	40.79368
sigma_u	48.552009					
sigma_e	11.269383					
rho	.9488793	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

The second regression, presented in Table 2 below, shows the impact of the level of restrictiveness of the immigration policies over the number of attacks that occur in Europe and thus tests the second hypothesis.

The coefficient of 2.308, rounded to 2.31, means that a unit increase in the policy restrictiveness, leads to 2.31% increase in the number of terrorist attacks. Similarly to the first regression of this section explained above, the purpose of this one is not to control initially for the impact of the control variables and to only focus on the policy restrictiveness impact over the expected number of terrorist attacks.

With respect to this, the received positive coefficient of 2.31 for the relationship between policy restrictiveness and terrorism shows that the second hypothesis, stricter policies reduce the level of terrorism is also confirmed/not rejected. In addition to this, it can be seen that the P value is higher than the t value. This coincides with the literature that states that stricter policies enable countries to observe and restrict parts of the population and to control their entry and settlement within the host country, but that it is on the cost of alienating the immigrant community and enabling it to be targeted by terrorist groups or to engage with such voluntarily.

In addition to this, when not controlling for the confound variables, it can be seen from Table 2 that three out of the eight variables: labour mobility, family reunion and political participation are negatively correlated with the number of terrorist attacks. The respective coefficients are – 0.1, -0.283 and -0.369 which despite not being statistically significant imply that a lower level of labour mobility, opportunity for social ties with family and political participation within the country, due to policy restrictiveness, lead to higher levels of terrorist attacks.

On the contrary, the rest of the control variables in the model – permanent residence, anti-discrimination, GDP per capita, GINI index and employment are positively related with the number of terrorist attacks, which means that more of them, is expected to lead to higher occurrence of terrorism.

Thus a statistically significant result of 2.22 for employment signifies that despite the restrictiveness of policies, in case immigrants are able to participate in the labour market, they are more probable to do so by causing terror. The GINI index and the coefficient of 0.963, displaying the equality of wealth distribution between the citizens of a country, shows that the more unequal immigrants are in terms of wealth with regard to the dominant group of the society, the more they are probable to engage in terrorism. Further, the GDP per capita variable with a coefficient of 0.0008, despite impacting the level of terrorism very weakly displays a positive relationship which means that the

higher the GDP per capita, the higher the probability of terrorism to occur. Lastly, with respect to anti-discrimination and permanent residence with coefficients 0.007 and 0.682 respectively, they are also positively related with the number of attacks and imply that the higher level of anti-discrimination policies the immigrants experience and the bigger opportunities they are provided with for permanent settlement, the more terrorism is expected to occur.

Table 2: Impact of restrictiveness of immigration policies in Europe over the number of terrorist attacks

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs     =         58
Group variable: countrynum                 Number of groups  =         10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1887                     Obs per group: min =        5
       between = 0.4023                                    avg =      5.8
       overall = 0.0426                                    max =        6

                                            F(9,9)            =   11598.57
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9260                    Prob > F          =     0.0000

                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
polrestrictiveness	2.308196	8.127042	0.28	0.783	-16.07645	20.69284
LabMob	-.1027664	.0948801	-1.08	0.307	-.3174	.1118672
FamReun	-.2830159	.2659892	-1.06	0.315	-.8847253	.3186935
PermResid	.6821121	.2951208	2.31	0.046	.0145025	1.349722
PolPart	-.3691048	.3834107	-0.96	0.361	-1.23644	.4982305
AntiDisc	.0074256	.0934795	0.08	0.938	-.2040397	.218891
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0008336	.0008665	0.96	0.361	-.0011265	.0027937
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	.9633735	1.686443	0.57	0.582	-2.851626	4.778373
Employmenttopopulationratiol	2.215071	1.174398	1.89	0.092	-.4416019	4.871744
_cons	-183.9211	110.3283	-1.67	0.130	-433.5011	65.65888

sigma_u	18.559506		
sigma_e	10.416224		
rho	.76046582	(fraction of variance due to u_i)	

6.3. Fixed effect regression analysis – controlling for variables

After controlling for the variable permanent residence shown in Table 3 which represents the integration and settlement opportunities that are provided to immigrants for settling into the host European countries, the direction and strength of relationship between immigration flow over the number of terrorist attacks does not change drastically – when controlling for no variables, the relationship between immigration and terrorist attacks was –0.00016, while after controlling for permanent residence, it becomes -0.00017. Despite the small decrease, since the coefficient is negative it is expected to increase the level of terrorism. With regard to the other control variables: the coefficient for labour mobility has increased from -0.271 to -0.062, meaning that when immigrants have no opportunity to settle in the country, the occurrence of terror is expected to decrease. With regard to family reunion, the coefficient decreased from 0.346 to 0.024, but is positive, meaning that the more family ties there are, the more terror will occur. Concerning anti-discrimination, the value decreased from 0.149 to 0.018 which shows that in case immigrants feel

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discriminated against, they are expected to engage in terror, but less than when not controlling for permanent settlement. Further, GDP per capita increases from 0.001 to 0.0007 which means that the higher the earnings, the more terror attacks are expected. Correspondingly, the coefficient for employment increases from 1.602 to 2.425 which implies that a higher employment leads to more terror.

Table 3: Impact of immigration flow, controlling for permanent residence

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs      =        49
Group variable: countrynum                 Number of groups   =        10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1624                     Obs per group: min =         4
       between = 0.0045                                    avg =       4.9
       overall = 0.0003                                    max =         5

                                            F(8,9)             =    305.14
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9920                    Prob > F           =    0.0000

                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
migflow	-.000179	.0002419	-0.74	0.478	-.0007261	.0003681
LabMob	-.0620889	.1814753	-0.34	0.740	-.4726146	.3484368
FamReun	.0240367	.3107707	0.08	0.940	-.6789754	.7270489
PolPart	-3.159305	1.710391	-1.85	0.098	-7.028478	.7098683
AntiDisc	.0184027	.1112437	0.17	0.872	-.2332481	.2700535
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0007448	.0010542	0.71	0.498	-.0016399	.0031295
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	1.439911	2.393568	0.60	0.562	-3.974715	6.854537
Employmenttopopulationratiol	2.425099	1.236475	1.96	0.081	-.3720023	5.2222
_cons	-33.93541	87.21589	-0.39	0.706	-231.2315	163.3606
sigma_u	64.532789					
sigma_e	11.166597					
rho	.97092846	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

Table 4: Impact of immigration flow, controlling for labour mobility

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression              Number of obs      =        49
Group variable: countrynum                     Number of groups   =        10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1707                         Obs per group: min =         4
       between = 0.0000                                        avg =       4.9
       overall = 0.0009                                        max =         5

                                                F(8,9)             =    518.57
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9860                         Prob > F           =    0.0000

                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
migflow	-.0001701	.0002536	-0.67	0.519	-.0007438	.0004035
FamReun	.2686224	.3133001	0.86	0.413	-.4401115	.9773564
PermResid	1.014004	.4632285	2.19	0.056	-.0338918	2.0619
PolPart	-2.857221	1.855645	-1.54	0.158	-7.054981	1.340538
AntiDisc	.0733947	.0851898	0.86	0.411	-.119318	.2661074
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0009727	.0009451	1.03	0.330	-.0011652	.0031106
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	1.290126	2.387843	0.54	0.602	-4.11155	6.691802
Employmenttopopulationratiol	2.062635	1.324072	1.56	0.154	-.9326246	5.057895
_cons	-121.6955	73.27174	-1.66	0.131	-287.4476	44.05674

```
sigma_u |  49.266098
sigma_e |  11.111184
    rho |  .95159645   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
```

The subsequent analysis represents the impact of immigration over the number of terrorist attacks, when controlling for the level of labour mobility, available to the immigrants. With regard to family reunion, whose coefficient without controlling for any variables was 0.346 and after controlling for labour mobility decreases to 0.268 means that without the ability maintain the social ties as when not controlling for variables, the immigrants are less able to cause terror, despite that the level is still expected to be positive. Further, the value of permanent residence changes from 1.333 to 1.014 which is a decrease and can be interpreted as the less immigrants are able to move, the less they can engage in terror, but since the coefficient is positive there will be attacks. Thirdly, the coefficient for political participation which was -2.865 has increased to -2.857 which means that the inability to move leads to a slight increase in the opportunity to participate in the decision making of the country. In terms of anti-discrimination, whose coefficient was 0.149, has decreased to 0.073 can mean that without labour mobility, immigrants' perception for anti-discrimination decreases, but has a positive impact over the number of terrorist attacks. The GDP per capita, whose coefficient was 0.0001 has increased to 0.0009 which signifies that lack of opportunity to move within the country, increases the GDP per capita with regard to the occurrence of terrorist attacks. The GINI index, being 1.202 beforehand has increased to 1.29 which means that without labour mobility, the inequality between citizens increases which has a positive impact over terrorism. Lastly, with regard to employment whose coefficient was 1.602 has increased significantly to 2.062 means that even

without opportunity to move elsewhere within a host country, immigrants still find opportunities for employment which impact positively terrorism (more attacks).

Table 5: Impact of immigration flow over terrorist attacks, controlling for employment

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs      =        49
Group variable: countrynum                 Number of groups   =        10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1644                     Obs per group: min =         4
       between = 0.0009                                     avg =       4.9
       overall = 0.0026                                     max =         5

                                            F(8,9)             =    117.85
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9816                    Prob > F           =    0.0000

                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
migflow	-.000092	.0002217	-0.42	0.688	-.0005935	.0004094
LabMob	-.4789629	.1926179	-2.49	0.035	-.9146948	-.0432309
FamReun	.3818812	.2642039	1.45	0.182	-.2157896	.9795519
PermResid	1.900787	.3791722	5.01	0.001	1.04304	2.758534
PolPart	-2.681475	1.84536	-1.45	0.180	-6.855968	1.493019
AntiDisc	.2024682	.1114491	1.82	0.103	-.0496471	.4545834
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0025864	.0009858	2.62	0.028	.0003563	.0048164
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	.3076949	1.363592	0.23	0.827	-2.776964	3.392353
_cons	-92.44796	84.91453	-1.09	0.305	-284.538	99.64205

sigma_u	42.730971			
sigma_e	11.152899			
rho	.93622228	(fraction of variance due to u_i)		

After controlling for employment, the relationship between immigration and the number of terrorist attacks remains inverse – an increase in the coefficient, -0.00009 leads to an increase in terrorist attacks which is not a significant change, but is still an increase which means that terrorism is expected to increase slightly. With regard to labour mobility, whose coefficient was 0.271 it has decreased to -0.478 means that controlling for employment leads to less opportunities to move within the country either for other employment or personal reasons which increases terrorism. The family reunion coefficient before controlling for employment is 0.346 and after controlling for the variable, increases to 0.381 meaning that controlling for employment leads to strengthening the importance of the family network which positively impacts terrorism. With regard to permanent residence which had a value of 1.333, it has increased to 1.9 which means that the significance for permanent residence is strengthened with regard to the number of terrorist attacks in a positive way (more attacks). Further, the coefficient for political participation, which was -2.865, it has become -- -2.681 which signifies an increase and due to the negative coefficient means that less ability to participate in the decision making leads to more terrorism. The coefficient for GDP per capita which was 0.0001 when not controlling for any variable becomes 0.002, which is a very slight increase and

can be interpreted that more GDP per capita, leads to more terrorist activity. The GINI index decreases from 1.202 to 0.307 which means that when controlling for employment, the economic difference between individuals is equalized which despite the positive impact over terrorism, is lessened.

Table 6: Impact of immigration flow over terrorism, controlling for family reunion

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs      =         49
Group variable: countrynum                 Number of groups   =         10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1709                     Obs per group: min =          4
       between = 0.0031                                     avg =        4.9
       overall = 0.0000                                     max =          5

                                            F(8,9)             =    6734.67
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9847                     Prob > F          =     0.0000

                                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
migflow	-.0001782	.0002651	-0.67	0.518	-.0007778	.0004214
LabMob	-.2144372	.1982034	-1.08	0.307	-.6628044	.23393
PermResid	.9759487	.7771586	1.26	0.241	-.7821061	2.734003
PolPart	-2.6011	1.746287	-1.49	0.171	-6.551475	1.349276
AntiDisc	.0898625	.0703447	1.28	0.233	-.0692683	.2489933
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0011605	.0011152	1.04	0.325	-.0013622	.0036832
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	1.265449	2.441331	0.52	0.617	-4.257226	6.788124
Employmenttopopulationratiol	1.65875	1.4831	1.12	0.292	-1.696255	5.013754
_cons	-87.4821	82.08473	-1.07	0.314	-273.1706	98.20645

sigma_u	47.008448	
sigma_e	11.109361	
rho	.94710387	(fraction of variance due to u_i)

After controlling for the variable family reunion, the relationship between immigration flow and number of terrorist attacks decreases , but not significantly and remains negative, from -0.0016 to -0.00017 which means that terror can be impacted in a slightly positive way (less attacks). When taking out the effect of the family network and connections, the labour mobility of immigrants whose prior coefficient was 0.346, now decreases to -0.214 which means that immigrants are less willing to move within the country which decreases terrorism. Further, permanent residence had a value of 1.333 which has decreased to 0.975 meaning that permanent residence becomes a less important, despite positive influencing factor for terrorism. In terms of political participation, whose coefficient was -2.865 has increased to -2.6 means that when controlling for family reunion, political participation has a higher negative impact over terrorism. With regard to anti-discrimination, which had a coefficient of 0.149 has decreased to 0.089 means that the importance of anti-discrimination for terrorism becomes less, despite still being positive. The coefficient for GDP per capita, which was 0.0001 has remained the same which means that the lack of family connections has no impact

over the GDP per capita. In terms of the GINI index, whose coefficient was 1.202 has increased to 1.265 meaning that the economic inequality between the citizens has increased which means that terrorism is expected to increase. Lastly, with regard to employment, the change from 1.602 to 1.658 which is a slight increase suggests employment receives a higher importance for determining the occurrence of terrorism.

Table 7: Impact of immigration flow over terrorism, controlling for political participation

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs    =        49
Group variable: countrynum                 Number of groups =        10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1347                     Obs per group: min =       4
       between = 0.0151                                    avg =     4.9
       overall = 0.0001                                    max =       5

                                           F(8,9)           =   3684.72
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9219                    Prob > F         =    0.0000

                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
migflow	-.0001285	.0002312	-0.56	0.592	-.0006514	.0003945
LabMob	-.2625588	.2974533	-0.88	0.400	-.9354449	.4103273
FamReun	-.0201319	.2971694	-0.07	0.947	-.6923757	.6521119
PermResid	1.783874	.7126552	2.50	0.034	.1717363	3.396013
AntiDisc	.0740212	.1394909	0.53	0.609	-.2415292	.3895716
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0010996	.0014838	0.74	0.478	-.002257	.0044563
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	1.109363	2.325535	0.48	0.645	-4.151363	6.370089
Employmenttopopulationratio1	1.192559	1.672187	0.71	0.494	-2.590189	4.975308
_cons	-239.3704	99.16273	-2.41	0.039	-463.6921	-15.0487

sigma_u	21.000273					
sigma_e	11.349447					
rho	.77394681	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

After controlling for political participation, the relationship between immigration flow and the number of terrorist attacks does not increase significantly, from -0.0016 in the non-controlled model to -0.00012 and thus, is expected to increase the number of attacks. The coefficient for labour mobility increased from -0.271 to -0.262 which means that if the effect from the variable political participation is taken out, the significance of labour mobility for determining terrorism increases. With regard to family reunion, with a prior coefficient of 0.346 has decreased to -0.02 which can be interpreted as that the variable becomes less significant for the number of terrorist attacks. In terms of permanent residence, the coefficient rose from 1.333 to 1.783 which means that the variable becomes more important for the number of expected attacks. Regarding anti-discrimination, the value decreased from 0.149 to 0.074 which means that in case immigrants feel less anti-discriminated, it will have a positive impact over terrorism (less terror), when controlling for political participation. Further, the coefficient for GDP per capita which was 0.001 remained the same which means that controlling for political participation does not impact the level of GDP. The value of the GINI Index which was 1.202 declined to 1.1 which means that citizens become more

economically equal when the political participation is not accounted for which is expected to lessen the number of terrorist attacks. Lastly, with regard to employment, the coefficient declined from 1.602 to 1.192, a result that can be interpreted as the variable's impact for the number of terrorist attacks decreases, explained by controlling for political participation, but still remains positive.

Table 8: Impact of immigration flow over terrorism, controlling for GDP per capita

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs      =        49
Group variable: countrynum                 Number of groups   =        10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1661                     Obs per group: min =         4
       between = 0.0003                                     avg =       4.9
       overall = 0.0003                                     max =         5

                                            F(7,9)             =    228.40
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9866                     Prob > F          =    0.0000

                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
migflow	-.0002368	.0002223	-1.07	0.315	-.0007396	.000266
LabMob	-.110907	.1373844	-0.81	0.440	-.421692	.199878
PermResid	.7767791	.6425212	1.21	0.257	-.676705	2.230263
PolPart	-2.586169	1.731459	-1.49	0.169	-6.503001	1.330664
AntiDisc	.0518578	.0535937	0.97	0.359	-.0693796	.1730951
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	1.561277	2.413656	0.65	0.534	-3.898791	7.021345
Employmenttopopulationratiol	2.470968	1.021953	2.42	0.039	.1591509	4.782786
_cons	-86.3237	86.39047	-1.00	0.344	-281.7525	109.1051

sigma_u	50.068638		
sigma_e	10.966376		
rho	.95422328	(fraction of variance due to u_i)	

After controlling for the GDP per capita, the relationship between immigration and terrorist attacks does not change significantly, but decreases from -0.0016 to -0.00018 and remains negative which implies that when the effect of GDP is omitted, there is an inverse relationship between immigration and terrorism that is expected to lead to less terrorism. The coefficient for labour mobility also changes slightly and remains negative, an increase from -0.271 to -0.155 which can be interpreted as leading to higher number of terrorist attacks. In terms of family reunion, the coefficient changes significantly from 0.346 to -0.086 which means that GDP is an important variable when considering number of attacks with respect to informal networks – the less they are, the more terrorist activities can be expected. Further, the coefficient for permanent residence prior to controlling is 1.333 and becomes 1.512 which can be interpreted as it has a bigger and positive effect over terrorism (more attacks). The political participation of immigrants has a coefficient of -2.865 before controlling and increases to -2.586 which means that the significance of this variable when controlling for GDP becomes higher, but inverse when considering the impact over terrorism which means that more terror attacks are expected. In terms of anti-discrimination, with an initial coefficient of 0.149

becomes 0.051 which despite remaining positive is a decrease in the coefficient which implies a weaker impact over terrorism, but is still expected to lead to positively impact the number of attacks. In terms of GINI index, when controlling for GDP, its coefficient changes from 1.202 to 1.561 which is a slight increase and implies that the economic inequality between citizens increases. Lastly, with regard to employment, the value changes from 1.602 to 2.47 which is a significant increase and suggests that whether employment is accounted for or not impacts the number of terrorist attacks, the more employed they are, the more terror occurs.

Table 9: Impact of immigration flow over terrorism, controlling for GINI index

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs      =          50
Group variable: countrynum                 Number of groups   =          10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1702                     Obs per group: min =           5
       between = 0.0000                                     avg =         5.0
       overall = 0.0006                                     max =           5

                                            F(8,9)             =      106.11
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9870                    Prob > F           =      0.0000

                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
migflow	-.0001493	.0002065	-0.72	0.488	-.0006164	.0003179
LabMob	-.2707583	.1457366	-1.86	0.096	-.6004375	.0589209
FamReun	.3470039	.2873441	1.21	0.258	-.3030135	.9970213
PolPart	-2.932968	1.806176	-1.62	0.139	-7.018823	1.152887
PermResid	1.333785	.4610061	2.89	0.018	.2909163	2.376653
AntiDisc	.1479915	.0908259	1.63	0.138	-.057471	.353454
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0013185	.0009211	1.43	0.186	-.0007651	.0034021
Employmenttopopulationratiol	1.318008	.6821777	1.93	0.085	-.2251851	2.861201
_cons	-62.54903	84.05422	-0.74	0.476	-252.6929	127.5948
sigma_u	51.040889					
sigma_e	10.970262					
rho	.95584451	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

When controlling for the GINI index, the coefficient of migration flow remains negative, but increases from -0.0016 to -0.0014 which means that the inequality between citizens has an inverse impact over the way migration influences terrorism – more terror attacks are expected. With regard to labour mobility, the coefficient changes with one decimal from -0.271 to -0.270 which is considered as an increase and means that the probability of immigrants to move within the country is negatively impacting terrorism (more terrorism). Further, in terms of the variable family reunion, its coefficient remains relatively similar – from 0.346, it has increased to 0.347 which means that it has an increasing impact over the number of terror attacks. In terms of permanent residence, the coefficient remains identical prior and post controlling for GINI index – 1.333. The variable anti-discrimination, with a prior coefficient of 0.149 obtains a value of

0.147 which is a slight decrease that can imply that it leads to a lower feeling of anti-discrimination which despite having a positive coefficient, has less of an impact over terrorism. The coefficient for GDP per capita was 0.0001 when not controlling for a variable and remains with the same value afterward which implies that how unequal people are with regard to wealth, does not impact how much they earn.

Lastly, with regard to employment, the coefficient decreased from 1.602 to 1.318 which implies that the significance of employment for the exhibited number of attacks becomes less when the economic equality between people is controlled for.

Table 10: Policy restrictiveness and impact over number of attacks, controlling for political participation

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs     =        58
Group variable: countrynum                 Number of groups  =        10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1842                     Obs per group: min =        5
       between = 0.2920                                    avg =       5.8
       overall = 0.0312                                    max =        6

                                           F(8,9)            =    1959.92
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9369                    Prob > F          =     0.0000

                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
polrestrictiveness	1.161863	7.869642	0.15	0.886	-16.6405	18.96423
LabMob	-.0918998	.109337	-0.84	0.422	-.3392371	.1554376
FamReun	-.3182102	.2790569	-1.14	0.284	-.9494809	.3130604
PermResid	.8017526	.2516576	3.19	0.011	.2324636	1.371042
AntiDisc	-.0365768	.0718105	-0.51	0.623	-.1990234	.1258698
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0007652	.0009022	0.85	0.418	-.0012757	.002806
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	1.09907	1.723093	0.64	0.539	-2.798838	4.996978
Employmenttopopulationratio1	2.173966	1.175542	1.85	0.097	-.4852943	4.833226
_cons	-206.0511	115.16	-1.79	0.107	-466.5611	54.45892
sigma_u	20.235885					
sigma_e	10.313894					
rho	.79379118	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

After controlling for political participation, the coefficient and direction for the relationship between the strictness of the migration policies and the occurrence of terrorism changes significantly in a downward way, despite remaining statistically significant – it declines from 2.308 as shown in Table 2 to 1.161, presented in the Table 10. This result implies that when there is no control over the confound variables, the restrictiveness of the policies over the expected terror attacks has a higher impact over the number of attacks, whereas when the effect of political participation is controlled for, the effect of the restrictiveness is reduced. Further, with regard to labour mobility, the prior coefficient is -0.102 which increased to -0.091 which implies that the variable has a slightly higher and inverse impact over the number of attacks – higher the probability of terror. With regard to

permanent residence, the value obtained without controlling for political participation is -0.369 and afterward becomes 0.801 which can be considered as a significant increase and interpreted as that political participation is an importance aspect with regard to defining the outcome of terrorism. In terms of anti-discrimination, the coefficient which is found initially is 0.007 which then changes to -0.036 which means that controlling for political participation leads to a change of relationship between how discriminated people feel and is expected to decrease terrorism. Further, considering the received coefficient for GDP per capita, it has changed from 0.0008 to 0.0007 which is a slight decrease and implies that the significance of GDP per person for the number of terrorist attacks has decreased. Lastly, the GINI index with an initial value of 0.963 changes to 1.099 which means that the higher economic inequality between people leads to more terrorist attacks.

Table 11: Policy restrictiveness and impact over the number of attacks, controlling for anti-discrimination

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression              Number of obs      =        58
Group variable: countrynum                     Number of groups   =        10

R-sq:  within  = 0.1887                         Obs per group: min =         5
       between = 0.3990                                        avg =       5.8
       overall = 0.0423                                        max =         6

                                                F(8,9)             =   2772.63
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9262                         Prob > F           =    0.0000

                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country)
```

nattacks	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
polrestrictiveness	2.336135	7.962824	0.29	0.776	-15.67702	20.34929
LabMob	-.0988575	.0974892	-1.01	0.337	-.3193934	.1216784
FamReun	-.285247	.2530258	-1.13	0.289	-.8576313	.2871372
PermResid	.6779994	.2907643	2.33	0.045	.0202448	1.335754
PolPart	-.3653081	.3464173	-1.05	0.319	-1.148959	.4183423
GDPpercapitaPPPconstant201	.0008271	.0008352	0.99	0.348	-.0010622	.0027163
GINIindexWorldBankestimate	.9645629	1.67194	0.58	0.578	-2.817629	4.746754
Employmenttopopulationratio1	2.217343	1.164509	1.90	0.089	-.41696	4.851645
_cons	-183.4482	108.4226	-1.69	0.125	-428.7171	61.82076

sigma_u	18.601732	
sigma_e	10.285247	
rho	.76586146	(fraction of variance due to u_i)

After controlling for anti-discrimination, the impact of policy restrictiveness increases from 2.308 to 2.336 which means that the variable has a slightly higher and positive impact over the way policies impact the occurrence of attacks (more attacks). With regard to the coefficient for labour mobility, before controlling for any variables it is 0.102 and after controlling for anti-discrimination, it becomes -0.098 which means that the impact of the variable becomes inverse with relation to terror. Further, in terms of family reunion, it has an

initial coefficient of 0.280 which after controlling becomes -0.285 which is a decrease and implies less impact over terrorism. With regard to permanent residence, when not controlled for any variables, the coefficient is 0.682 decreases to 0.677 which means that the variable has a positive but less significant impact over the number of attacks. In terms of political participation, the prior coefficient was -0.369 and after controlling for anti-discrimination becomes -0.365 which is considered as an increase and due to the inverse relationship with terrorism, it is expected to increase. With regard to GDP per capita, the initial coefficient is 0.0008 and remains the same after controlling for anti-discrimination which means the variable has the same impact over terrorism. Further, the coefficient for GINI index was 0.963 prior to controlling for variables and becomes 0.964 which means that when controlling for anti-discrimination, inequality between individuals increases which increases the number of terror attacks. Lastly, in terms of employment, the initial value was 2.215 which further increased to 2.217, meaning that the higher the employment, the more terror is expected to occur.

7. Conclusion

The purpose of this research paper was to explore the relationship between immigration and terrorism by taking into account the restrictiveness of migration policies that immigrants face. For this purpose, literature that explores the topic of interest was collected in both directions of analysis – that immigration leads to more terrorism, that immigration leads to less terrorism and further emphasis on the mechanisms upon which there are different theoretical findings, presented as control variables. With regard to the impact of policy migration restrictiveness towards the immigrants the approach was identical.

This framework of research proposed two hypotheses – that more immigration leads to more terrorist attacks and that higher restrictiveness of policies reduces the number of terror within the European host countries to which immigrants from terror-prone state immigrate to.

With regard to finding further support in addition to the theoretical one, the current state of the topic was analysed through stylized facts, in a combination of a narrative and a graphical presentation of the relationships between the terms of concern.

Lastly, collection of quantitative data from GTD, DEMIG, MIPEX and WDI was combined, in order to select the relevant variables, as outlined by the secondary data findings as such, which were further analysed with the help of the statistical tool STATA through a fixed effect

regression model. The quantitative analysis was composed from two main parts – an initial interpretation of the sole impact of immigration and policy restrictiveness over terrorism, and a second stage through which the impact of the control variables labour mobility, family reunion, permanent residence, political participation, anti-discrimination, GDP per capita, GINI index and employment, were controlled for separately in subsequent regression models. As a result, both of the null hypotheses were confirmed.

The main conclusions from the quantitative analysis are that immigration is inversely and weakly related to the number of terrorist attacks, while the restrictiveness of policies is strongly and positively related to it.

With regard to the control variables, labour mobility and political participation had a permanent inverse relationship with terror, meaning the less immigrants are able to move within the host country for finding employment or for personal reasons and the less they are able to participate in the decision-making of the country, the more terror attacks are expected. Further, with regard to the opportunity that immigrants have to settle permanently within the destination country, how discriminated they feel, GDP per capita, GINI index and employment remained positively related to the number of attacks, meaning that the higher their value, the more terrorism is expected to occur.

In conclusion, it can be said that, due to the importance of the individual characteristics of immigrants such as education, gender, family background, goal and purpose for migrating to a new country which were not observed in the scope of this research, it can be said that even though in general immigration does not lead to higher levels of terrorism, there are circumstances in which it can. For this purpose, future research can focus on combining individual and country-level characteristics for the purpose of obtaining the individual mechanisms through which state level terrorism is impacted.

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Appendix

The graph below represents the terrorist levels between 2000 and 2017 for the 10 most terrorist-prone countries. Similarly to the overview done by IEP, the data, coincides with the identified four stages of terrorism and is identical in all of the countries. Between 2000 and 2007, the terrorist attacks for all countries varied between 500 or less, as the highest is in Iraq and the lowest for Nigeria. Despite the fact that this period is marked with the lowest levels of terrorism, the data shows that the trend for it to increase. Further, between 2007 and 2011, for countries such as Somalia, Nigeria, Egypt, Syria, Philippines and Yemen, even though the terrorism levels were slightly increasing, it was significantly less than the one in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Between the years 2011 and 2014, the terrorist levels peaked in all of the 10 countries, despite that there were significant differences between the individual states. The highest number of attacks remained in the three countries, reaching 4,000, 2,300 and 2, 000 for Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan respectively. The attacks in the rest of the 7 countries, despite peaking, remained around 1, 000 and commenced to decline until 2017.

Graph1, *Terrorist attacks in 10 most terrorist-prone states between 2000 and 2017*. Our world in data, 2018 [https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism][1]

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[1] Author's own calculations, based on https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism

As presented below in Graph 2, the immigration to Europe from the 10 outlined as most terrorist-prone states was relatively constant between the years 2000 and 2013. The number of immigrants from each country respectively was between 100 000 and 200 000 immigrants from Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and less than that for India, Nigeria, Philippines, Yemen and Syria. The peak for immigration to Europe for all of the countries is also between 2013 and 2014, despite the individual country differences. The biggest immigration occurred for Syrian migrants, followed by those from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia ranging from 900 000, 350 000 and 300 000 respectively. The rest of the immigrants from the 10 countries, accounted for around 100 000 on yearly basis for each country, as the lowest number was recorded from India, Yemen, Nigeria and Pakistan – less than 100 000 immigrants per year.

Graph2, *Immigration to Europe from 10 most terrorist-prone states*. The UN Refugee Agency, 2018. [http://popstats.unhcr.org][2]

[2] Author's own calculations, based on http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern

For the purpose of relating the terrorist attacks (launched and prevented) in Europe, an aggregation between the data for the attacks from the 10 countries is made. As it can be seen, the graph combines the number of successful/launched and foiled/prevented attacks, as the number of prevented has been always higher in comparison to the occurred attacks, except for the years 2016 and 2017. In addition to this, contrarily to the peak of domestic terrorism in 2014 as stated by IEP (2018), the number of launched attacks is less than the ones that occurred in the consequent years.

Graph 3, *Terrorist attacks in Europe incurred by 10 most terrorist-prone states between 2000 and 2018.* Politico, 2018 *[https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-hasnt-won-the-war-on-terror/*][3]

The graph below shows a combination of an aggregated data for the immigration to Europe from the 10 most terrorist-prone states with the occurred terrorist attacks therein. What can be understood is that there is an overlap between the immigration and terrorism levels. Despite this, in 2014 when the terrorism is supposed to peak, the immigration level is much higher than the launched terrorist attacks, as both increase significantly throughout the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 and further stagnate in 2018.

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[3] Author's own calculations, based on https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-hasnt-won-the-war-on-terror/ and Nesser, P., Stenersen, A. and Oftedal, E., 2016. Jihadi terrorism in Europe: The IS-effect. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *10*(6).

Graph 4, Immigration to Europe and terrorist attacks from 10 most terrorist-prone countries from 2000 to 2018. [http://popstats.unhcr.org][4]

Lastly, with regard to the level of terrorism and the respective restrictiveness that the immigrants have faced when arriving in Europe, the migration policies seem to differ from year to year. Explained by the lack of terrorism prior to 2000, the restrictiveness of the policies is very low, with a sudden increase in 2001 and decrease in 2002. Interestingly, the policies' restrictiveness seems to react and reflect the level of terrorism. Deriving this from the graph, the upward or downward fluctuation of migration policy restrictiveness and the level of terrorism seems to be significantly dependent on one another. There is however unavailability of data after the year 2015 with respect to the existent level of restrictiveness, despite the fact that the terrorist attacks are steadily increasing in 2016 and 2017.

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[4] Author's own calculations, based on [http://popstats.unhcr.org]

Graph 5, Migration policy restrictiveness and terrorism in Europe between 2000 and 2014. International migration institute, 2019. [https://www.migrationinstitute.org/data/demig-data/demig-policy-1][5]

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[5] Author's own calculations, based on https://www.migrationinstitute.org/data/demig-data/demig-policy-1