Srovnávací analýza hypotečních krizí ve Spojených státech amerických a Španělsku

This bachelor's thesis presents a comparative analysis of the mortgage crises in the United States and Spain, with the principal aim of identifying and comparing the economic, regulatory, and financial mechanisms that led to these crises and explaining how institutional and structural differences shaped their progression and economic consequences. The thesis employs a comparative case study approach combining qualitative and quantitative analysis. The theoretical chapter establishes the conceptual foundations in the areas of mortgage finance, credit expansion, financial innovation, and crisis transmission mechanisms. The empirical chapters analyze each crisis separately before conducting a comparative assessment of real-economy impacts, deleveraging dynamics, and policy responses. The findings demonstrate that the U.S. crisis was driven by the transformation of the mortgage market under the originate-to-distribute model, the expansion of securitization, and the growth of the shadow banking system, all of which dispersed risk broadly across financial markets. The Spanish crisis, by contrast, originated in a prolonged credit expansion concentrated in the real estate sector, with risk retained within the balance sheets of domestic banks. This structural distinction fundamentally shaped the deleveraging process and the duration of economic recovery. While the United States benefited from a comparatively faster stabilization of credit conditions through market-based mechanisms, Spain experienced a deeper and more persistent downturn, further compounded by the sovereign–bank feedback loop and delayed policy intervention. The thesis concludes that differences in financial system structure and credit allocation constituted a primary determinant of the divergence in economic impact and recovery trajectories between the two countries.