Volební systém a výběr zaměstnanců jako prostředky kumulace moci v rámci Fotbalové asociace České republiky

The main focus of this thesis is the concentration of power within The Football Association of the Czech Republic (hereinafter FACR). The emphasis is put on the selection of employees and the electoral system, which are supposed to play an important role within the process of power concentration. The main method of this research is the semistructured in-depth interview with former FACR employees, officials, and experts on negative phenomena in the football industry such as corruption or clientelism. An additional method is the qualitative analysis of the documents such as statutes of FACR, which is used. The results suggest that within FACR the concentration of regulatory executive and dispute of regulations power, in case of the sport product (the match) as well as in case of the governance of the whole organization. For more results review several levels of democratic deficit in the electoral system that contribute to the power concentration. The concentration of power can be also supported by how employees are selected where a non-strategic reactive approach has been addressed as well as prioritizing of personal relationships over competencies of potential employees. Also, the self-interest of individuals has been prioritized over the interest of the organizations, which in some cases results in corruption or clientelism, that can help gain and maintain power within the organizational structure.