Informační a komunikační technologie jako prostředek k posilování autoritářství

The aim of this dissertation is to provide an answer to the question what are the conditions, processes and strategies that enable the Chinese government to use information and communication technology (ICT) as a means of strengthening the political regime. Since theoretical explanations of the influence of ICT on the stability of authoritarian regimes are almost absent, the paper tries to update existing political science theories through an abductive method. Thus, a part of the dissertation research is a proposal of a theoretical conceptualization of the use of ICTs to enhance the stability of authoritarian regimes, which can potentially be used to analyse other cases. In doing so, the thesis depends primarily on two concepts – Gerschewski's (2013) three pillars of authoritarian stability and Maerz's (2016) hexagon of stabilization tools. The thesis proposes a reconstruction of these models so that they can be applied to the analysis of the Chinese case and possibly also other cases of modern authoritarianisms using ICT. Specifically, it proposes a new classification of stabilization tools, namely manipulation, policy adaptation, surveillance, violence, restriction and co-optation. It assigns these tools to the corresponding pillars of legitimation, repression and co-optation. The final section of the chapter two proposes a definition of digital authoritarianism, including a visual presentation, and provides arguments why this particular concept may be more appropriate than other similar terms. It also provides a proposal for operationalizing the concept. This consists first of identifying the preconditions of regime consolidation based on the three powers proposed by Göbel (2011), namely infrastructural, coercive and discursive powers. It then proposes a classification of methods of using ICT to control society, complemented also with e-government. The third chapter provides a detailed overview of the Chinese government's use of ICT to enhance regime stability. In terms of sources, it is primarily based on the analysis of opensource data from the Chinese internet, but also partly on observations conducted during field research in China in the autumn of 2018 and spring of 2019. In the course of the analysis of the Chinese case, it became clear that, compared to other Chinese regions, the Xinjiang region is specific in its extreme extent of the use of ICT to control society. Therefore, a separate fourth chapter is dedicated to the Xinjiang’s case. The fifth chapter applies the proposed theory from the second chapter to the Chinese case. It first explains why China can be considered a digital authoritarianism, identifies the three powers of consolidated authoritarianism with respect to ICTs, specifies the methods used by China with an indication of the extent of use, and then outlines the stabilizing tools they reinforce. This reinforcement is then illustrated graphically on the aforementioned pillars and hexagon. The final section then offers an explanation of the increasing political violence alongside the rise of ICT use, and in this context presents the possible threats to Chinese digital authoritarianism.