When do stable democracies emerge? Mending the view of economics and political science

This thesis deals with the economic theories of democracy and democratization and their synthesis with political science theories. First discussed is the 'static' model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), which focuses on economically motivated political conflict between elites and masses, and in which stable democracy emerges in countries with medium levels of economic inequality. The second discussed 'dynamic' approach comes from the North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), who postulate the existence of two social orders that inextricably combine economic and political elements . In the third chapter I argue that the economic models of democratization are not able to capture the dramatic spread of democracy around the world in the last three decades. For this purpose, they would have to include normative preference for dermokracy and political science concept of legitimacy. It is concluded that the synthesis of economic and political science models is essential for proper understanding of emergence of stable democracies.