Physicalist theories of consciousness in the context of artificial intelligence

The thesis critically analyzes physicalist (materialist) theories of consciousness. Primary aim is to assess the plausibility of physicalism as a basis for a theory of consciousness. Initially, the concepts of consciousness and qualia are explained, a division between phenomenal and access consciousness is introduced, the easy and hard problems of consciousness are described together with intentionality. The problem of reduction (reductionism) is described in the context of physicalism and the ontological argument against reduction is presented. Then, after characterizing the causal argument in support of physicalism, three main arguments against physicalism are assessed – epistemological argument, modal argument, Hempel’s dilemma. Afterwards, individual physicalist theories of consciousness are analyzed. First, physicalism is divided into a priori and a posteriori physicalism, then functionalism, eliminative materialism, behaviorism, theory of identity and emergentism are described. Three varieties of functionalism are presented – computational, representational, homuncular – and two arguments against functionalism are characterized, the Chinese room argument and the Chinese brain argument. Within theory of identity, the metaphysical placement of theory of neural correlates of consciousness is discussed, together with its connection to homuncular functionalism. After a general introduction, artificial intelligence is divided into weak and strong AI. Then the possibility of artificial consciousness is discussed in the context of each individual physicalist theory of consciousness. In conclusion, an attempt at synthesis or transcendence of dialectical conflict between thesis (dualism) and antithesis (monism) is made with the use of the master-slave dialectic.