Abuse of Dominant Position in European Union Law

This thesis examines the abuse of a dominant position under European Union competition law, with a particular focus on exclusionary practices in the form of rebate schemes under Article 102 TFEU. The aim is to delineate the boundary between legitimate protection of a dominant undertaking’s commercial interests and abusive conduct, and to assess the impact of such practices on market structure and consumer welfare. The first chapter defines the key concepts (undertaking, relevant market, dominance and consumer welfare) and presents a typology of abusive conduct, including the notion of objective justification. The second chapter analyses the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Commission and the Czech Competition Authority on various categories of rebates (loyalty, target and retroactive rebates) and traces the shift from a largely formalistic approach towards a modernised, effects-based assessment (in particular Post Danmark II and the Intel case-law). The third chapter synthesises these findings and compares EU and Czech practice. The thesis concludes that the boundary between competitive and abusive conduct cannot be expressed as a single bright-line rule, but rather as a set of criteria that must be assessed in combination: the nature of the practice, its ability to exclude an equally efficient competitor, its impact on the structure of competition and on consumer welfare, and the existence of an objective justification. At the same time, it highlights the persistent tension between legal certainty and flexible effects-based analysis, especially in rapidly evolving digital markets.