Přístup USA, Ruska a Číny k jaderným zbraním a jejich odzbrojení

This thesis examines a comparison of the approaches of the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China to nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and disarmament during the period 2000–2026. Its objective is to identify the main similarities and differences in their conceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring the security of each superpower. The theoretical framework is based on a realist approach to international relations, the theory of nuclear deterrence, the concept of strategic stability, and arms control. The study is designed as a qualitative comparative case study based on an analysis of strategic documents, statements made at the United Nations and during review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and speeches by top political leaders. The comparison is conducted according to the doctrinal logic of deterrence, the structure and modernization of arsenals, attitudes toward arms control and disarmament, and the significance of extended deterrence and alliances. The results show that the U.S. employs a flexible, alliance-based deterrence strategy; Russia also uses nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional weaknesses and for strategic signaling; while China declares a policy of minimum deterrence and a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, yet is rapidly expanding its arsenal. Despite their differing doctrines, all three states are modernizing their nuclear forces and, in practice, are not moving toward disarmament, thereby contributing to the weakening of arms control and the growing instability of the emerging tripolar nuclear environment.