Determinismus, path-dependence a nejistota pohledem postkeynesovské ekonomie

The thesis deals with analysis of conceptual-methodological issues examined in the framework of post-keynesian economics. The author´s goal is to supply a solution to the problem of a definition of determinism/non-determinism for both deterministic and stochastic systems and also to the problem of the prevailing confusion which surrounds the notion of reversibility/irreversibility in both path-dependent and traditional-equilibrist systems. The author regards the determinism/non-determinism problem as essentially linked to the problem of a definition of fundamental uncertainty. The key issues are being identified in the "problem of a generator of endogenous shocks" and the "selection - creation problem". Finding solutions to these enables us to take a stand on the validity/invalidity of the classical dichotomy, in the eyes of the author. Davidson´s interpretation of ergodicity and O´Donnell´s critique of this are being presented and, drawing on the latter, along with Álvarez-Ehnts´ critique, the author rejects a simplifying pattern of Davidson´s, according to which neoclassical economics is based on the ergodic axiom. The author suggests a solution to the "selection - creation problem" consisting in distinguishing epistemological determinism from ontological determinism on the one hand, and epistemological determinism from epistemological non-determinism on the other hand. While selection is a characteristic feature of epistemological determinism and, in effect, the realm of "fundamental certainty", creation is referred to by the author as a characteristic feature of epistemological non-determinism, i. e., in effect, the realm of fundamental uncertainty. The author regards the "problem of a generator of endogenous shocks" a self-contradictory notion, based on the principle of causality and the law of non-contradiction, and suggests a solution to the problem consisting in rejection of the concept of shock endogeneity. At the same time, the author rejects Davidson´s "fundamental neoclassical article of faith" rhetoric, based on the first cause argument implied by the principle of causality. In opposition to Davidson, the author regards fundamental uncertainty being of a basically epistemological nature, consisting in our ignorance of the "ultimate law of change", the "Devine formula". Unlike O´Donnell, however, who puts stress on the element of epistemological uncertainty in his epistemological approach to uncertainty, the author also puts stress on the element of ontological certainty, consisting in our knowledge of the existence of the "Devine formula", apart from our epistemological uncertainty.