Program shovívavosti v dohodách narušujících hospodářskou soutěž v Evropském soutěžním právu

The anti-competitive agreements are collusions concerning certain cooperation among undertakings. However, despite European Commission´s long-standing efforts, the prohibited ones are nowadays still present on markets in a large extent as well. This thesis characterizes both vertical and horizontal agreements, including their positive and negative effects. Since the negative impacts usually prevail in the horizontal (cartel) agreements, the related legislation under the terms of EU competition law is described including the conditions, under which these agreements can be approved (particularly the article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, block exemptions and de minimis notice). In order to get access to the otherwise unobtainable evidence about their existence, the leniency program exists since 1996. Its European adaptation is compared to the version adopted in the Czech Republic and in the USA. The legal and economic effectiveness of this tool is analysed. Settlement procedure and prioritization are characterized as well, since they allow both the undertakings and the competition authorities to reduce their costs connected with the proceeding.