Právo EU jako nástroj redukce informačních selhání: Dopad CSRD a ESRS na adverzní selekci v nefinančním reportingu

This thesis examines whether and to what extent EU non-financial reporting legislation, specifically the CSRD and the ESRS, mitigates adverse selection in the disclosure of environmental information in the automotive industry. Drawing on Akerlof's theory of information asymmetry and adverse selection, the thesis links these concepts to the qualitative characteristics of information set out in ESRS 1 Appendix B. The empirical analysis follows three steps: mapping the information market through a screening of reporting approaches of ten European automakers, systematically linking causes of adverse selection to ESRS qualitative characteristics, and conducting a single case study of Škoda Auto focused on climate change disclosures (E1). The findings indicate that EU legislation does not eliminate adverse selection but rather transforms it. Fragmentation of legal bases, differences in the depth of audit assurance, and uneven transposition of the CSRD create conditions in which information asymmetry shifts into new forms rather than being eliminated. The thesis contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of regulatory instruments in sustainability reporting.