Economic Analysis of Judicial Activity

The thesis deals with the problem of the monopoly structure of the modern justice system and the heavy regulation of most fields of dispute resolution. In this system, judges themselves comprise a self-interested group seeking relaxed regulation and increased rights from the government. The thesis describes inefficiencies and dangers stemming from the lack of market control of the modern justice system and suggests an alternative in the form of a private justice system. The purpose of this paper is to examine both the problem of successful implementation of competition into the current justice system, while describing various models as to how the private justice system could function without state control, with examples from history. This paper further examines the economic differences between private and public justice systems in terms of incentives, efficiency, the process of law creation, speed, and consumers' satisfaction, as well as the conditions under which different systems work best. The main conclusion of this paper is that society should allow all subjects desirous of opportunities to provide goods and services through new enterprises, even in areas currently the exclusive domain of the state, as doing so brings an increase in quality, speed of solution/service, and innovation.